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 MACHIAVELLI AND THE POLITICS 
OF DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION 

 Introduction 
 This book has a double aim. On the one hand, it looks to contribute to 
the history of political thought by providing a new interpretation of the 
political theory of Niccolò Machiavelli, whose perpetually studied 
works have garnerned even more recent attention as a result of the 
quincentenary of the production of several of them. On the other hand, 
it seeks to develop a new theoretical model and ethical defence of dem-
ocratic practice, of radical democracy in particular. Specifically, the new 
method for thinking radical democracy will be mediated through a 
detailed consideration and reinterpretation of the texts of Machiavelli. 
The deployment of a five-hundred-year-old oeuvre for the sake of 
advancing a contemporary theoretical tradition that, even if it may 
trace its roots to ancient Athens has only emerged as a somewhat uni-
fied philosophical field recently, will no doubt strike some as a suspi-
cious intellectual endeavour. The fact that this oeuvre is the 
Machiavellian one may only add to the suspicion. After all, the subject 
of Machiavelli studies is a notoriously partisan one. Claude Lefort does 
not overstate the case when he writes that here “the variety of interpre-
tations and opinions, the depth of conflict, as well as the intensity of the 
critical passions, reach their highest degree.” 1 The Machiavellian text is 
not so much an object of disinterested scholarly interpretation as a field 
in which contending forms and traditions of political thought, with 
their own ontological and normative assumptions regarding the being 
of politics, deploy the Florentine secretary in an effort to advance their 
particular commitments. 
 1  Claude Lefort, “L’oeuvre de pensée et l’histoire,” in  Les formes de l’histoire: essais 
d’anthropologie politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 144. 
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 I make no claims to being able to symbolically rise above this realm 
of appearance, with its conflicting images and perspectives, in order to 
touch the truth of Machiavelli’s political thought. In this book I thus 
aim not at producing a systematic explication of the whole of Machia-
velli’s oeuvre, or an intellectual history schematically tracing the devel-
opment of his thought through time, or a contextual situation of his 
work within the overall environment of the  Cinquecento , and so on. On 
the contrary, I will adopt an interpretative methodology that I believe is 
much more consistent with Machiavelli’s own approach to the doing of 
political theory, an approach that I argue is the very source of the inten-
sity of the debates over Machiavellian meaning. Machiavelli’s norma-
tive political theory proceeds mainly through an analysis of various 
historical events and personages drawn from ancient and modern Ital-
ian history, but focusing particulary on the ancient Roman republic and 
recent Florentine experience. As is often pointed out, however, Machia-
velli’s historical method is highly atypical. Rather than seek to repre-
sent the trajectory of past events in a linear and straightforward mode, 
he selectively alters, elides, and invents lessons and events in order to 
invest them with a specific political meaning, a meaning that is then 
redeployed in his own context for the sake of achieving a contemporary 
political goal: the unification and liberation of the Italian peninsula. 
Machiavelli’s use of history is thus characterized by an imaginative and 
creative redistribution of historical meaning. This study asks what it 
means to read Machiavelli in the same way that Machiavelli read his 
historical sources, applying Machiavelli’s method for the interpretative 
analysis of history to the interpretative analysis of Machaivelli. Just as 
Machiavelli’s historical examples become, through their critical juxta-
position with one another, other than what they originally were, so too 
does Machiavelli become other than himself, depending on how we 
choose to read him in the moment. In this sense there are, potentially, 
innumerable Machiavellian moments. 2 
 My emphasis will be on what Machiavelli has to contribute to demo-
cratic theory, specifically, to a radical democratic theory grounded in an 
affirmation of the universal capacity for creative innovation. There is 
certainly nothing original about suggesting that Machiavelli is capable 
 2  On the existence of more than one (if not innumerable) Machiavellian moments see 
Marie Gaille,  Machiavel et la tradition philosophique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2007), 121–49. 
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of contributing important content to a theory of radical democracy. This 
has indeed been recognized for over forty years, such readings flourish-
ing in particular in France and Italy. 3 Despite important contributions 
by figures such as Miguel Vatter, Filippo Del Lucchese, and others, 
however, within the Anglo-American world the democratic Machia-
velli has come to be appreciated within mainstream political science 
only recently, in particular as a result of the many publications of John 
McCormick on the subject. 4 What I argue that existing democratic 
 readers – radical and otherwise – have failed to fully appreciate, how-
ever, is the extent to which Machiavelli’s normative commitment to a 
specific modality of political existence is ethically grounded in a par-
ticular understanding of the ontology of the human, and its relation to 
the form of existence of worldly being. In evaluating republican politi-
cal life within the context of the affirmation of a precise philosophical 
anthropology, Machiavelli generates an entirely unique defence of 
democratic rule. 
 Just as Machiavelli creatively appropriates elements of ancient and 
modern history in order to articulate a new national project, so will I 
attempt to creatively appropriate elements of Machiavelli’s thought in 
order to articulate a new model of democracy. Machiavelli is the ideal 
figure to work with in this respect because not only are there such ele-
ments in his work to be located, but also he is one of the few thinkers in 
the tradition of political thought to affirm the openness of political the-
ory to such a form of investigation. Although I will draw extensively 
from Machiavelli’s entire body of writing – including his major and 
minor political writings, historical studies, poetry, comedies, diplomatic 
 3  Perhaps the key point in this trajectory is the 1972 publication of Claude Lefort,  Le 
travail de l’oeuvre Machiavel (Paris: Gallimard, 1986). 
 4  Although McCormick aims to articulate the participatory democratic commitments 
of Machiavelli, he explicitly contrasts his reading with those in the radical democratic 
tradition, which tend to de-emphasize the role of the institution in mediating demo-
cratic self-expression, locating the latter precisely in the interruption of instituted 
political forms. See, for example, John P. McCormick, “Defending the People from the 
Professors,” ed. John Swadley,  The Art of Theory , 27 September 2010,  www.artoftheory
.com/mccormick-machiavellian-democracy . Although I agree with McCormick that 
most radical democrats obscure the institutional form of Machiavelli’s project, I will 
ultimately argue that it is possible to appreciate the radical content of his democratic 
theory by grasping the specifi c form of articulation of Machiavellian institutions, as 
institutions that are perpetually open to their own interrogation and interruption. 
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dispatches, personal correspondences, and more – at the heart of my 
analysis will be a reconsideration of the substance of and relationship 
between his two most well-known major political works,  The Prince 
and the  Discourses on Livy . 5 Without attempting to close off certain other 
readings, I will propose a new method for thinking the relationship 
between these two works, seeing each as one moment of a comprehen-
sive normative project affirming a specific ethics of political creation. 
Each of the two works is aimed primarily at articulating a figure of 
thought that contributes to the revelation of the human capacity for 
creativity or innovation. The first figure is to be found in  The Prince , 
Machiavelli here being concerned with presenting not only the mechan-
ics of a certain type of regime, but also those elements that structure a 
specific model of human subjectivity: Machiavelli is telling the reader 
what it means to be a creative subject. In the  Discourses , meanwhile, 
Machiavelli presents a second figure of thought, this one aimed at out-
lining a form of political regime that is capable of generalizing the 
model of human subjectivity detailed in  The Prince. The Machiavellian 
republic can be read in democratic terms as the form of regime in which 
all citizens are able to actualize their potential for political creation. The 
difference in the objects of the two works does not express a discontinu-
ity or non-correspondence, but rather is a manifestation of their very 
unity:  The Prince as a treatise on what it means for an individual to be a 
creative subject, and the  Discourses as a treatise on the possibility of 
conceptualizing a political regime in which this capacity for innovation 
is democratically institutionalized. Machiavelli’s theoretical project can 
thus roughly be divided into two parts. On the one hand he develops a 
philosophical anthropology. Machiavelli radically destabilizes all 
 5  Throughout the study I will cite Niccolò Machiavelli,  Tutte le opere , ed. Mario Martelli 
(Firenze: Sansoni Editore, 1971). I have also consulted the following English transla-
tions: Niccolò Machiavelli,  The Prince , trans. Harvey C. Mansfi eld (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1998); Niccolò Machiavelli,  Discourses on Livy , trans. Harvey C. 
Mansfi eld and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Niccolò 
Machiavelli,  Florentine Histories , trans. Harvey C. Mansfi eld and Laura F. Banfi eld 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Niccolò Machiavelli,  The Art of War , 
trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Niccolò 
Machiavelli,  The Chief Works and Others, volumes 1–3 , trans. Allan Gilbert (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1989); Niccolò Machiavelli,  Machiavelli and His Friends: Their 
Personal Correspondence , ed. and trans. James B. Atkinson and David Sices (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1996). 
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positive models of the human essence that attempt to outline a fixed 
structure of the human being, and instead interprets the essence of the 
latter negatively in terms of the ability to creatively shape the self and 
the world. Such a model of essence has been developed by a variety of 
the canonical thinkers in the history of political thought, but I will argue 
that Machiavelli is the first one who sees the actualization of this essence 
as being achieved primarily through political activity. Hence the sec-
ond part of Machiavelli’s project: the development of a political ontol-
ogy in which he tries to think about a form of political life that is capable 
of affirming this fundamental human creativity. Machiavelli’s ethical 
commitment to a form of democratic republic in which all citizens are 
capable of expressing their political will is a result of his perception of 
a universal human desire for creative self-expression. We are thus ulti-
mately presented with a new normative foundation for democratic life, 
one grounded not in any judgment regarding the competency of popu-
lar decision making, nor one regarding the fundamental natural rights 
of individuals, but rather the orientation of individual beings toward 
creativity and innovation. 6 
 As I have mentioned, the justification for such a reconstruction of the 
Machiavellian oeuvre is to be found in Machiavelli’s own practice of 
writing. I thus begin in  chapter 1 by providing a new analysis of what I 
take to be the unique character of Machiavelli’s methodology, specifi-
cally his political deployment of ancient historical examples, and how 
it will inform my own reading of Machiavelli’s texts. Although com-
mentators have often pointed out the extent to which Machiavelli’s 
affirmation of an active history oriented toward political creation is dis-
tinguished from a passive one in which historical events are treated 
merely as objects of contemplation, they have not gone far enough in 
describing how the precise form of Machiavelli’s historiography is a 
necessary element of his valorization of political creation. I attempt to 
demonstrate how this is the case by arguing that Machiavelli’s histori-
cal method can be thought of as an aesthetic practice of thinking in 
 6  Although he takes a different approach, Emmanuel Roux similarly interprets Machia-
velli as initiating a new genealogy of democracy (which includes Spinoza, Montes-
quieu, and Rousseau), a genealogy that “does not speak of the individual, of natural 
right, of the separation of powers.” Emmanuel Roux,  Machiavel, la vie libre (Paris: 
Raisons d’agir, 2013), 16. Democracy, instead, is thought of in terms of mutation and 
perpetual change. 
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constellations, such as was most famously articulated in the twentieth 
century by Walter Benjamin. Machiavelli critically and selectively jux-
taposes conceptual elements in order to generate figures of thought that 
reveal the potential to transcend the existing political organization of 
things. I argue that this method has important implications for how we 
think about both the means and ends of political theory, and my own 
approach to interpreting Machiavelli will take it as its model. 
 In part 2 I attempt to reconstruct from Machiavelli’s thought a consis-
tent philosophical anthropology.  Chapter 2 details Machiavelli’s rejec-
tion of positive models of human nature. This rejection is seen as a 
correlate of his theory of worldly being. Under the influence of the Epi-
curean philosophical tradition, Machiavelli provides a cosmological 
account of a world that is considered in terms of its fundamentally cha-
otic and indeterminate being, an account that rejects all transcendental 
attempts to absolutely ground the world and structure its being in a 
deterministic way, such as via theology, natural law, laws of history, 
and so on. This worldly indetermination also extends to the human 
being, and is represented in Machiavelli’s rejection of the attempt to 
thematize human nature in terms of a perpetually fixed set of proper-
ties whose form could be objectively grasped and schematized. Such a 
rejection is demonstrated in two primary ways: through an account of 
the radical diversity of human forms of doing and being, and through 
an explanation of the fundamental openness of human being to change 
and alteration through subjection to processes of socialization. In the 
final instance Machiavelli theorizes a radical indetermination of human 
being, this indetermination being expressed in the multiplicity and 
non-identity of human desire, a fact that closes off in advance the poten-
tial for a stable reconciliation or harmonization of human interest. 
Human difference, and subsequently conflict, thus remain an ineradi-
cable feature of social existence. 
 In  chapter 3 I provide, through a reinterpretation of the mode of 
being of Machiavelli’s ideal prince, an account of what I take to be 
Machiavelli’s negative model of the human essence. Such negative 
models reject attempts to theorize all elements of human being in terms 
of a system of positive determinations, seeing one of the fundamental 
components of essence instead in the specifically human ability to tran-
scend merely immediate and conventional forms of doing and being. A 
negative essence refers us, in other words, not to a specifically human 
content, but rather to a specifically human capacity, that is, the capacity 
for creativity, to generate new values and orders. The human being is 
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that which is capable of perpetually remaking itself and its social world 
through its life activity. This capacity is expressed in Machiavelli’s con-
cept of ambition, which is identified in terms of a fundamental human 
striving to transgress existing forms and construct new realities. I argue 
that princely creation is exalted by Machiavelli to the extent that it is 
seen as providing a model for a political form of creative self-activity, 
for the realization of the human desire for value formation. What 
Machiavelli’s idea of the new prince reveals, what the specific constel-
lation of thought articulated through the juxtaposition of conceptual 
elements drawn from a variety of historical experiences and actors dis-
closes, is the image of the prince as an ambitious creator: a model of the 
form of a fully realized human subjectivity. 
 According to my interpretation, Machiavelli’s  Prince may be read not 
only as a treatise on politics, but also as one on the nature of human 
subjectivity. In part three I turn to look more closely at the relation 
between this understanding of subjectivity and Machiavelli’s concep-
tion of the being of politics. In  chapter 4 I attempt to demonstrate that 
the psychic ambition which was seen in  chapter 3 to stimulate virtuous 
political creation is one that belongs not only to princes and other social 
elites, but to all citizens. It is common for readers of Machiavelli – 
whether Straussian, republican, or democratic – to bifurcate human 
desire into two opposed poles: whereas the great or noble are seen as 
possessing a fundamental desire to dominate others through the expul-
sion of their ambition, the people are seen as passively desiring not to 
be dominated. I will argue that this distinction Machiavelli makes, 
however, does not refer us to an essential or originary opposition, but 
rather to two different forms of appearance of the single desire for 
ambitious creation. I show that, according to Machiavelli, all human 
beings, not just the great, possess ambition, as can be seen through a 
variety of episodes Machiavelli details that reveal the popular desire 
for creative self-expression. Machiavelli in fact goes to great lengths, 
both in the  Discourses and in the  Florentine Histories and the “Discourse 
on Florentine Affairs,” to outline not only the popular desire to express 
ambition via participation in political modes and orders, but also a 
popular capacity to do so that is not differentiated in quality from that 
of any other groups in the city. There is not, in other words, a unique 
political skill, orientation, or knowledge that belongs to and can be 
exercised by only a minority of individuals. In recognizing both this 
political will and political capacity Machiavelli makes a simultaneous 
affirmation of a radical human freedom and equality, the latter residing 
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not in the establishment of a self-identical common interest, but rather 
in the equal capacity of always distinct individuals to express their par-
ticular political desire in speech. The fact that particular individuals 
always remain particular, that human multiplicity is incapable of being 
effaced, renders the political sphere one of inevitable difference and 
conflict. Machiavelli’s ultimate goal will be to think the means by which 
this difference and conflict may be agonistically expressed through 
democratic channels (as in the  Discourses ), as opposed to antagonisti-
cally and violently expressed (as in the  Florentine Histories ), or simply 
repressed (as in  The Prince ). 
 In  chapter 5 I demonstrate how the full manifestation of human 
equality in the political sphere necessitates the establishment of con-
crete economic equality in the social sphere. The establishment of such 
economic equality depends on, above all, the elimination of the  grandi 
as an organized social class embodying a particular shared humour, a 
unified desire directed toward command and oppression. If there is no 
essential distinction grounded in human nature between the people 
and the great, the contingency of the form of being of the  grandi allows 
for the latter’s elimination. Although Machiavelli only rarely acknowl-
edges this potential, he nevertheless provides us with significant clues 
suggesting it remains a very condition of possibility for the institution 
of democratic life. Positioning myself against those democratic readers 
who understand popular freedom as being only articulated against an 
already existent desire to oppress, I show how the seemingly originary 
division between the people and the great may be overcome through 
the establishment of a general economic equality. Although it is impos-
sible to structure a city such that insolent individuals never emerge, it 
is not impossible to structure a city in which these insolent individuals 
are incapable of consolidating themselves into a class that is able to 
leverage their disproportionate economic wealth for the sake of the 
advancement of their particular interests. For Machiavelli, humours – 
 umori – do not have a natural biological foundation, but rather are the 
contingent result of the constitution of particular social relationships. 
To this degree the particular being of any social  umore is not inexorable, 
even if the appearance of particular individual wills – be it a will to 
domination or otherwise – is. Theorizing the potential to terminate the 
conflict between the great and the people, furthermore, does not entail 
the termination of all conflict itself, for, as I show in  chapter 2 , human 
multiplicity is not exhausted by the division between the great and the 
people. Even if a social situation is instituted such as to militate against 
 Introduction 11
the emergence of those with a humour to oppress, such would not 
thereby instaurate a political site characterized by consensual relations, 
for human difference would continue to manifest itself inevitably in a 
variety of spheres and in a variety of modes. 
 Finally, in  chapter 6 I turn to the question of the form of political 
regime that is capable of generalizing this creative self-expression, thus 
providing spaces for all citizens to have the opportunity to act on their 
innate ambition. The defence of democratic institutionalization is 
rooted in the recognition that all individuals share a negative human 
essence, an orientation toward political creation that is realized in the 
controlled expulsion of ambitious energy. The democratic ethical 
imperative is grounded in both the perception of the universality of the 
human desire for self-creation, but also the recognition of the need for 
the productive rechannelling of this desire into socially useful ends via 
a project of autonomous institutionalization. If the latter is not achieved, 
if desire is not institutionally mediated, the society will regress into a 
form such as is detailed in Machiavelli’s  Florentine Histories , where indi-
viduals attempt to advance their own private interests at the expense of 
other citizens, who are not seen as possessing a right to political self-
expression. It is precisely because the human desire for creative expres-
sion is insatiable, however – that is, that the human is constantly 
redefining the nature of itself and its world through its self-activity – 
that the form of the political regime is never capable of becoming per-
manently fixed. Machiavelli’s republic is thus unique in that it is 
oriented toward its own perpetual interrogation and possible overcom-
ing. Machiavelli’s project is to think a system of institutions that is 
capable, through harnessing the creative energy of the people who con-
stitute the society, of continually calling itself into question, and through 
reinstituting itself provide a means for the actualization of that creative 
human desire that is detailed in  The Prince . It is in this sense that the 
republic is, as Machiavelli says, the regime in which all the people “can, 
by means of their virtue, become princes.” 7 
 7  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 2.2. 

 PART ONE 
 Methodology 

 It is common for readers of Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought to 
begin their inquiries by noting the diversity of interpretative conclu-
sions that have been drawn regarding his writings, as well as the mul-
titude of oftentimes mutually irreconcilable philosophical and political 
positions that he has been forced into. It seems that the Machiavellian 
oeuvre can be deployed in the service of any number of theoretical par-
adigms. 1 And yet few of these readers attempt to critically scrutinize 
the foundation of such interpretative operations, assuming on the con-
trary that their own specific methodological modes – from precise con-
textual analyses of the historical environment in which Machiavelli’s 
work was produced to deep textual readings emphasizing the esoteric 
or concealed content open to the eye of the sensitive interlocutor – are 
 Chapter One 
 Machiavelli and the Constellative 
Mode of Historical Appropriation 
 1  See, for example, Rafael Major, “A New Argument for Morality: Machiavelli and 
the Ancients,”  Political Research Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2007): 172; Raymond Aron, 
“Machiavelli and Marx,” in  Politics and History , ed. and trans. Miriam Bernheim 
(New York: Free Press, 1978), 87. For a summary of just some of the modes of reading 
and appropriating Machiavelli see Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli in Modern Historical 
Scholarship,”  Italian Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 9–26; Mary Walsh, “Historical Recep-
tion of Machiavelli,” in  Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli , 
ed. Patricia Vilches and Gerald Seaman (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 273–302; Victoria Kahn, 
“Machiavelli’s Afterlife and Reputation to the Eighteenth Century,” in  The Cambridge 
Companion to Machiavelli , ed. John M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 239–55; Jérémie Barthas, “Machiavelli in Political Thought from the Age 
of Revolutions to the Present,” in  The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli , ed. John M. 
Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 256–73; Giovanni Giorgini, 
“Five Hundred Years of Italian Scholarship on Machiavelli’s Prince,”  Review of Politics 
75, no. 4 (2013): 625–40. 
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capable of penetrating to the truth of Machiavelli. 2 It is curious that, as 
John Plamenatz observes, it seems as if “none of his interpreters writes 
about him as if he were seriously puzzled, or had come to his conclu-
sions with difficulty or held to them tentatively.” 3 It is thus, for exam-
ple, not a problem for such a close reader of Machiavelli as Harvey 
Mansfield to write, in reference to the interpretative work of Leo 
Strauss, that “as far as I know, among hundreds of statements in 
 Thoughts on Machiavelli susceptible of mistake, not one single mistake 
has yet been exposed.” 4 The possibility of an objectively correct reading 
of the intrinsic meaning of the Machiavellian texts is not only achiev-
able, but perhaps already achieved. 
 What I would like to suggest in this chapter, however, is that the very 
effort to read Machiavelli in terms of the schematic representation of a 
fixed meaning or intention itself constitutes a violation of the spirit of 
the Machiavellian project. Critical reflection on the nature of the Machi-
avellian methodology, specifically on Machiavelli’s unique deployment 
of those historical examples that form the background to his political 
thought, opens up to us a unique vantage point from which to evaluate 
the meaning of his theoretical project. This chapter will attempt to reas-
sess the well-known tension in Machiavelli’s thought between the 
claim to novelty and the appeal to the wisdom of the ancients. Rather 
than implore the contemporary actor to uncritically repeat established 
 2  Yves Winter and Filippo Del Lucchese are two of several recent exceptions to this 
tendency. Winter, for example, recognizes that “the question of Machiavelli’s ‘true 
intentions’ has no determinate answer, for the polysemy of his text makes securing 
a single meaning unfeasible.” Yves Winter, “Plebeian Politics: Machiavelli and the 
Ciompi Uprising,”  Political Theory 40, no. 6 (2012): 738. On the variety of secondary 
interpretations of Machiavelli, meanwhile, Del Lucchese writes that “the diversity of 
points of view and perspectives is not only the work of the centuries; it was implied 
since the beginning in Machiavelli’s methodology.” Filippo Del Lucchese,  The Political 
Philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 168. 
For a discussion of the multiple potentials contained within the Machiavellian oeuvre 
that are articulated within the context of the specifi cally Left appropriation of Machia-
velli (Althusser’s and Lefort’s in particular), see Warren Breckman, “The Power and 
the Void: Radical Democracy, Post-Marxism, and the Machiavellian Moment,” in 
 Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics , ed. Gregory Smulewicz-
Zucker and Michael J. Thompson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 237–54. 
 3  John Plamenatz,  Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau , ed. Mark Philp and Z.A. Pelczynski 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 18. 
 4  Harvey C. Mansfi eld, “Strauss’s Machiavelli,”  Political Theory 3, no. 4 (1975): 379. 
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modes of doing and being, Machiavelli encourages him or her to rede-
ploy the principle of creativity that lay at the source of those examples 
that are highlighted for the sake of the stimulation of political activity 
in the present. Aiming not at a literal representation of the sequence of 
historical events, Machiavelli selectively reappropriates ancient and 
modern examples and arranges them in specific organizations of 
thought in order to affirm the uniquely human capacity for political 
creation. This methodology, I suggest, is best thought of as a type of 
thinking in constellations, such as was most significantly articulated in 
the twentieth century by Walter Benjamin. This approach, whereby 
Machiavelli imaginatively constructs universals through the juxtaposi-
tion of conceptual particulars, is considered by Benjamin as the most 
effective strategy for countering the type of uncritical historicism that 
assumes a determinate trajectory of events foreclosing the possibility of 
meaningful human intervention in the world. Machiavelli’s appeal to 
the past is in the final instance made for the sake of a breaking free 
from the past, for the sake of the affirmation of the human potential to 
upset the order of things through the institution of the new. 
 Active vs Contemplative Historical Appropriation 
 It is by no means original to point out the apparent contradiction in 
Machiavelli’s use of history as a means to articulate a political ethos 
that emphasizes the virtues of novelty and innovation. In the words of 
Claude Lefort, “the thinker who was aware of innovating absolutely 
and whom posterity has indeed judged to have opened a new path to 
political thought, this man wished to erect Antiquity into a model.” 5 
Hence in the Preface to the  Discourses on Livy Machiavelli simultane-
ously proclaims his decision to “enter upon a road untrodden by any-
one,” and criticizes the inability of contemporary actors to properly 
imitate ancient examples. 6 The contradiction between novelty and imi-
tation in Machiavelli’s exhortation to return to the study of ancient 
 5  Claude Lefort, “Machiavelli and the  Verità Effetuale ,” in  Writing: The Political Test , ed. 
and trans. David Ames Curtis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 109. As Lefort 
writes elsewhere, “It is as though the discovery of the New and the Unknown coin-
cides with the rediscovery of the past.” Claude Lefort, “Machiavelli: History, Politics, 
Discourse,” in  The States of Theory: History, Art, and Critical Discourse (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 113. 
 6  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 1, preface. 
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examples, of course, is only an apparent one, his return to antiquity 
never taking the form of a simple repetition. It constitutes rather, in the 
case of the  Discourses , an imaginative reconstruction of the image of the 
Roman republic, made for the sake of the production of an alternative 
mental image of Rome that is capable of stimulating a practical impera-
tive that stretches into a future marked by the production of the new. 
 Machiavelli thus contrasts his own critical and reflective form of 
engaging with antiquity with those of modes of appropriating the past 
which dominate the present day, and at which he can only “marvel and 
grieve.” 7 Specifically, he will criticize those forms of historical appropria-
tion that reduce Rome to a merely aesthetic object meant to be passively 
contemplated by a disinterested observer. Hence a typical mode of a con-
temporary Florentine’s appreciation: “a fragment of an ancient statue has 
been bought at a high price for it to be near him, to honor his house and 
to be able to be imitated by those who delight in that art.” 8 The goal is the 
extraction of a private pleasure that is achieved through the contemplation 
of the static form of the object. Such a passive appropriation is nothing 
less than a rejection of human virtue, for the great actors of the past – 
“kings, captains, citizens, legislators” – are “so much shunned by 
everyone in every little thing that no sign of that ancient virtue has 
remained with us.” 9 The consequences of such a passive mode of histori-
cal appropriation can only be conformist. To the extent that it takes as its 
object a fixed image of the being of the city, an object that can be aestheti-
cally contemplated to the degree that it is seen as complete and perpet-
ual, it is fundamentally conservative, and hence an instrument for those 
who have an interest in the reproduction of the political status quo. The 
conservative reading of Rome that was dominant in the Florence of 
Machiavelli’s time was an ideological representation that was oriented 
toward the symbolic maintenance of the current structure of the city, cov-
ering up the contingent fact of patrician domination. 10 
  7  Ibid. 
  8  Ibid. 
  9  Ibid. 
 10  See, for example, Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli’s  Istorie Fiorentine : An Essay in Interpre-
tation,” in  Studies on Machiavelli , ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1972), 77; 
Martin Breaugh,  The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History of Political Freedom , trans. 
Lazer Lederhendler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 47; John M. Najemy, 
“Baron’s Machiavelli and Renaissance Republicanism,”  American Historical Review 101, 
no. 1 (1996): 127; Michelle T. Clarke, “Machiavelli and the Imagined Rome of Renais-
sance Humanism,”  History of Political Thought 36, no. 3 (2015): 452. 
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 Machiavelli’s rejection of the aesthetic mode of contemplation as the 
preferred form of historical engagement is thus a correlate of the rejec-
tion of the hypostatization of the existing organization of the city. The 
activation of the critical attitude and the critique of disinterested under-
standing functions to break up the unitary image of Rome as a perfectly 
unified and harmonious society that has achieved an ideal form of 
being, one that is reproduced in the present distribution of functions in 
the city. On the contrary, Machiavelli’s consideration of Rome is novel 
in the degree to which it may be pressed into the service of critical polit-
ical action, action that looks to the interruption of the existent and the 
reinstitutionalization of the social order. Machiavelli argues that those 
who treat the engagement with the classical histories in a disinterested 
and passive manner deny the specifically political potential that the for-
mer may open up for us, if we approach them with the proper spirit. 
The failure of historical imitation results “from not having a genuine 
understanding of histories, not drawing from reading them that sense 
nor savouring that flavour that they have in themselves.” 11 Machiavelli 
here seems clear: his preferred form of imitation, that which reflects a 
“genuine understanding of histories,” is not one that aims at the literal 
reproduction of the trajectory of historical events, but rather one that 
sensorially penetrates to the indeterminate soul of the work. 12 What 
this soul reveals to us is, as will be elaborated on in  chapter 3 of this 
study, the specifically human potential to create the new through the 
exercise of  virtù . What must be imitated is not a specific organization of 
events, but rather the critical spirit that animated the novel historical 
action. Machiavelli’s use of history is thus an active one: what deserves 
to be remembered is that which reveals to us the potential for non-
determined political creation. Passive reflection on the humanistic tra-
dition is subordinated to remembrance that looks to actualize political 
potential through the stimulation of practical activity in the world. 
 Commentators have usually interpreted this subordination in terms 
of Machiavelli’s call both for a reactivation of an ethically oriented 
mode of critical thinking or reflective judgment, and for the pressing of 
 11  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1, preface. 
 12  On the use that Machiavelli makes of bodily and sensory metaphors and the degree 
to which they can be seen as elements of a comprehensive political theory of sensa-
tion, see Davide Panagia,  The Political Life of Sensation (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 74–95. 
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this mode into the service of a concrete political project aiming at the 
creation of a new form of political organization on the Italian peninsula. 
Such was classically recognized by Hegel, for example, in his 1802 essay 
“On the German Constitution,” where he identifies Machiavelli’s pri-
mary political concern as the self-constitution of a popular and inde-
pendent Italian state. Hegel thus recognizes that Machiavelli, far from 
being an apologist for tyranny, is attempting to think the practical con-
ditions for the unification of a dispersed people into a political mass: 
“this is his demand and the principle which he opposes to the misery of 
his country.” 13 Machiavelli’s theoretical project, articulated primarily 
through his historical juxtapositions, is thus unintelligible without con-
sideration of what Louis Althusser will identify as his specific political 
conjuncture. The significance of Hegel’s reading for Althusser lay in his 
recognition of the historical project of Machiavelli, as well as Machia-
velli’s appreciation of the conjunctural conditions from which this proj-
ect must necessarily be launched: “A certain way of thinking about 
politics, not for its own sake, but in the shape of the formulation of a 
problem and the definition of a historical task – this is what surprises 
Hegel, and breaks open the empire of his own philosophical conscious-
ness.” 14 Machiavelli’s historical use of antiquity, the form of the rela-
tionship that he establishes between the past and the present case, can 
be evaluated only within the context of the conjuncture: “Just as Machi-
avelli does not apply a general theory of history to particular concrete 
cases, so he does not apply antiquity to the present. Just as the general 
theory of history intervenes solely on condition of being determined by 
a series of ‘negations’ that have meaning only as a function of the cen-
tral political problem, so too antiquity intervenes only under the deter-
mination of Rome, in order to illuminate the centre of everything – the 
political  vacuum of Italy – and the task of filling it.” 15 
 13  G.W.F. Hegel, “The German Constitution,” in  Political Writings , ed. Lawrence Dickey 
and H.B. Nisbet, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
81. For a short attempt to situate the last chapter of  The Prince within the context of 
the emergence of a unifi ed Italian national consciousness in the face of a renewed 
period of foreign invasion, see Felix Gilbert, “The Concept of Nationalism in 
Machiavelli’s Prince,”  Studies in the Renaissance 1 (1954): 38–48. 
 14  Louis Althusser,  Machiavelli and Us , ed. François Matheron, trans. Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 1999), 10. 
 15  Ibid., 46–7. Original emphasis. Althusser, however, is hardly the only commentator to 
note the practical commitments that motivate the Machiavellian theoretical project, 
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 We can begin to see here why Machiavelli, to the extent that he 
emphasizes the specificity of the individual case and the impossibility 
of conceptually subsuming this case in a standardized economy of 
thought through a process of derivation and identification, cannot be 
considered a scientific thinker in the traditional sense. His rejection of 
all systems of generalization includes the rejection of not only abstractly 
metaphysical utopian systems, but also those of the positive sciences. 
In Mikko Lahtinen’s words, “The individual case cannot and should 
not be  subsumed under any  general law or theory. From the point of view 
of the man of action, this means that it is not possible to predict or gov-
ern the course of the individual case by means of some general law, 
theory or socially static utopia.” 16 Machiavelli is far from being the 
founder of a modern political science, a system of causally connected 
rules and behaviours that can be generalized, and thus used as a uni-
versally valid explanatory instrument. 17 There is no system or science 
and in particular the extent to which Machiavelli’s use of history is critically deployed 
in order to advance this project. See, for just some examples, Martin Fleisher, “The 
Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Politics,”  History of Political Thought 16, no. 
3 (1995): 331; Victoria Kahn,  Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to 
Milton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 47; Bruce James Smith,  Politics 
and Remembrance: Republican Themes in Machiavelli, Burke and Tocqueville (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 38; Jack D’Amico, “Machiavelli and Memory,”  Mod-
ern Language Quarterly 50, no. 2 (1989): 106; Joseph Khoury, “Machiavelli Manufactur-
ing Memory: Terrorizing History, Historicizing Terror,” in  Ars Reminiscendi: Minds 
and Memory in Renaissance Culture , ed. Donald Beecher and Grant Williams (Toronto: 
Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2009), 253. 
 16  Mikko Lahtinen,  Niccolò Machiavelli and Louis Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism , trans. 
Gareth Griffi ths and Kristina Kolhi (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 140. Original emphasis. 
 17  Needless to say, there are plenty of commentators who insist on reading Machiavelli 
in this way, as a modern scientifi c or proto-scientifi c thinker of political technique. 
See, for example, Augustin Renaudet,  Machiavel: Étude d’histoire des doctrines poli-
tiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), 193; James Burnham,  The Machiavellians: The Defend-
ers of Freedom (New York: John Day, 1943), 40; Leonardo Olschki,  Machiavelli: The 
Scientist (Berkeley: Gillick Press, 1945), 25–6; Luigi Russo,  Machiavelli (Bari: Laterza, 
1949), 9; H. Butterfi eld,  The Statecraft of Machiavelli (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1960); 
Anthony Parel, “Machiavelli’s Method and His Interpreters,” in  The Political Calcu-
lus: Essays on Machiavelli’s Political Philosophy , ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1972), 3, 5. For a much more plausible account of Machiavelli’s “sci-
ence,” one that interprets the latter as a form of methodological anarchism such as 
was later articulated by Paul Feyerabend, see Megan K. Dyer and Cary J. Nederman, 
“Machiavelli against Method: Paul Feyerabend’s Anti-Rationalism and Machiavel-
lian Political ‘Science,’”  History of European Ideas 42, no. 3 (2016): 430–45. 
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of politics at play in his work. What motivates him is not the discovery 
of the form of the political most generally, but rather a specific political 
case, that of the crisis of Italian politics. There is no mode capable of 
uniting this case with all others in some sort of positive science, Machi-
avelli recognizing that the contingent dimension of human doing and 
being closes off any possibility of such universalization. 
 Although commentators have often stressed the degree to which 
Machiavelli’s image of an active or critical history, a history practically 
oriented toward the generation of social and political change, is con-
trasted with a conservative history, a history which takes the form of 
the passive contemplation of complete and self-identical aesthetic 
objects, they have not gone far enough in articulating the precise form 
of the Machiavellian historiographical method and its implications for 
how Machiavelli understands the practice of political theory. An initial 
entry into this question can be developed through a consideration of 
the specificity of Machiavelli’s use of Livy. It has been noted that there 
is nothing systematic in the method by which Machiavelli appeals to 
the authority of Livy. 18 Machiavelli is clearly not concerned with the 
simple reproduction of the Livian narrative, as evidenced by the per-
petual tendency he has to divert from Livy via processes of elision, 
exaggeration, and on occasion fabrication. Markus Fischer, for exam-
ple, provides two examples of Machiavelli’s deliberate misreading of 
Livy: 19 in  The History of Rome Livy reports that Romulus’s murder of 
Remus was simply the culmination of a fit of rage and jealousy, 20 
whereas Machiavelli roots it in Romulus’s perception of the necessities 
of foundation; 21 and although Livy tries to demonstrate the degree to 
which the Roman violation of a peace agreement with the Samnites had 
a just origin, 22 Machiavelli uses this episode to demonstrate that states 
 18  J.H. Whitfi eld, “Machiavelli’s Use of Livy,” in  Livy , ed. T.A. Dorey (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1971), 85. 
 19  Markus Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Rapacious Republicanism,” in  Machiavelli’s Liberal 
Republican Legacy , ed. Paul A. Rahe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
xxxvii. 
 20  Livy,  The Early History of Rome: Books I–V of The History of Rome from Its Foundations , 
trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (London: Penguin, 2002), bk. 1.7, 1.13–14. 
 21  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.9. 
 22  Livy,  Rome and Italy: Books VI–X of The History of Rome from Its Foundation , trans. Betty 
Radice (London: Penguin, 1982), bk. 9.4–15. 
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need not keep promises that were made under duress. 23 And even 
when Machiavelli is relatively faithful to the Livian account of events, 
the interpretation of the political significance of these events is often 
greatly different. It would thus be fair to say that Machiavelli only “pre-
tends to be a commentator,” 24 or even that “Machiavelli’s Livy is a char-
acter of Machiavelli.” 25 In the words of J.H. Whitfield, “the  Discorsi are 
not an archaeological inquiry, or even a critical discussion of Livy, seen 
in historical perspective.” 26 On the contrary, there is a “dual function of 
Livy and Machiavelli; the first constructs the past, makes it consist; the 
second seizes what is relevant, in the effort to construct the present, and 
to make the future consist.” 27 
 The consideration of Machiavelli’s use of historical sources, and in 
particular of his use of Livy, like that between the claim of novelty and 
the appeal to imitation, presents us with another characteristic Machi-
avellian contradiction: the authority of Livy is affirmed as that most 
adequate to the extraction of meaning from the examples of Rome, 
and yet this authority is perpetually undermined through a highly 
selective and altered presentation of these examples, through the 
active misapplication of the Livian lessons. The second contradiction 
is merely a manifestation of the first, and is resolved in the same man-
ner. Livy is of use in the contemporary political conjuncture to the 
extent that we are critically and reflectively able to represent elements 
of his histories which, through being combined in specific organiza-
tions of thought, reveal to us certain fundamental ethical and political 
imperatives relevant to the present. In this representation the Livian 
examples become other than what they originally were; they 
 23  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.42. 
 24  Smith,  Politics and Remembrance , 54. 
 25  Leo Strauss,  Thoughts on Machiavelli (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 
141. Strauss also maintains that, to the extent that Machiavelli was not strictly con-
cerned with the presentation of historical truth, he can be considered just as much an 
artist as an historian. Ibid., 45. 
 26  Whitfi eld, “Machiavelli’s Use of Livy,” 90. 
 27  Ibid., 84. It is certainly not diffi cult to locate additional inconsistencies in Machiavel-
li’s deployment both of Livy and of examples drawn from other historical sources. 
See, for example, Felix Gilbert,  Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in 
Sixteenth-Century Florence (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 167; Maurizio Viroli, 
 Redeeming The Prince: The Meaning of Machiavelli’s Masterpiece (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), 72; Michelle T. Clarke, “The Virtues of Republican Citizen-
ship in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy,”  Journal of Politics 75, no. 2 (2013): 322–3. 
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transcend their status as fixed statements regarding empirical pat-
terns of behaviour, calling into question the very practice of historical 
representation, representation that seeks to organize the past into a 
complete object fit for contemplation. Machiavelli’s selective approach 
to Livy is thus intended to overcome the conservatism of the Livian 
project. 
 Thinking in Constellations 
 Machiavelli’s active engagement with the past, mediated through the 
texts of Livy in the case of the  Discourses , is undertaken for the sake of 
the activation of Florentine political innovation in the present. 28 We 
thus see a triangulation of the terms of Rome, Florence, and Livy in 
“one unique time,” where “neither the history of Rome, nor that of Flor-
ence, nor the Livian text is significant in itself: they have to be deci-
phered, as it were, reconstituted, through one another.” 29 In  The Prince ’s 
dedicatory letter this dialectical relation between the past and the 
future, mediated through the deployed historical examples, is similarly 
affirmed as the ground from which emerges all practical political 
knowledge. Machiavelli proclaims that his specific historical under-
standing has been achieved relationally through his study of ancient 
things and his experience with modern ones. 30 If individuals and the 
world maintained an identical form across time, engagement in only 
one of the two modes would be necessary. But such is not the case; 
hence the necessity of Machiavelli’s method. Given the nature of this 
method, it would be a mistake to judge the efficacy of the Machiavel-
lian project on the basis of only one of its elements considered in its 
singularity. Most significantly, when evaluating Machiavelli’s use of 
historical examples as a mode of communicating political ideals we 
must above all resist the temptation to interpret the legitimacy of the 
presentation in terms of the establishment of a strict correspondence 
 28  Needless to say, however, this method characterizes not only the Machiavelli of the 
 Discourses . For an account of how Machiavelli reconfi gures and redeploys historical 
examples in the  Florentine Histories in order to stimulate a certain political sensibil-
ity, see Mauricio Suchowlansky, “Rhetoric and Violence in Machiavelli’s  Florentine 
Histories ,”  Shakespeare en devenir , no. 5 (2011). 
 29  Lefort, “Machiavelli: History, Politics, Discourse,” 114. 
 30  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. dedication. 
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between the Machiavellian discourse and the literal trajectory of 
events. 31 
 It is insufficient to simply suggest, as several readers do, that the exis-
tence of a discontinuity between the images that Machiavelli constructs 
and the established historical record can be taken as evidence that 
Machiavelli does not intend his examples to be taken at face value. 32 To 
interpret Machiavelli according to such criteria of correspondence is to 
fail to appreciate Machiavelli’s own historical methodology. 33 To bor-
row terms put forward by Edmund Jacobitti, we must be sensitive to 
the distinction between Machiavelli’s rhetorical history and scientific 
history. Whereas the latter attempts to systematically recollect events as 
they actually occurred and order them in a straightforward representa-
tive manner, the former looks to imaginatively construct “external 
poetic universals” through the heuristic appropriation of past symbols 
and values, universals that the present historical actor may seize upon 
and apply in her own context in the effort to stimulate political change: 
“The task of the historian was to take situations, events, or characters 
from the past and make them fit current needs. If the actual record did 
not do so, if it was incomplete or silent, it simply needed to be embel-
lished and recomposed in order to provide the examples.” 34 Such a 
 31  Alkis Kontos, “Success and Knowledge in Machiavelli,” in  The Political Calculus: 
Essays on Machiavelli’s Political Philosophy , ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972), 94; Marie Gaille-Nikodimov, “An Introduction to  The Prince ,” 
in  Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli , ed. Patricia Vilches 
and Gerald Seaman, trans. Gerald Seaman (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 25–6. 
 32  See, for example, Francesco Guicciardini, “Considerations on the  Discorsi of Nic-
colò Machiavelli,” in  The Sweetness of Power: Machiavelli’s Discorsi and Guicciardini’s 
Considerations , trans. James B. Atkinson and David Sices (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2002), 413; Catherine Zuckert, “The Life of Castruccio Castracani: 
Machiavelli as Literary Artist,”  History of Political Thought 31, no. 4 (2010): 577–603; 
John M. Najemy, “Machiavelli and Cesare Borgia: A Reconsideration of Chapter 7 
of  Il Principe ,”  Review of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 539–56; Ryan Balot and Stephen Tro-
chimchuk, “The Many and the Few: On Machiavelli’s ‘Democratic Moment,’”  Review 
of Politics 74, no. 4 (2012): 559–88. 
 33  Hence Michael McCanles: “I am not concerned with Machiavelli’s historical accu-
racy, with whether he rearranged historical events, or even if he made them up, 
because the text’s meaning is not validated by the accuracy of its empirical refer-
ence.” Michael McCanles,  The Discourse of Il Principe (Malibu: Undena, 1983), xv. 
 34  Edmund E. Jacobitti, “The Classical Heritage in Machiavelli’s Histories: Symbol and 
Poetry as Historic Literature,” in  The Comedy and Tragedy of Machiavelli: Essays on the 
Literary Works , ed. Vickie B. Sullivan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 180, 182. 
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method was, again, for the sake of the actualization of concrete political 
ends: “The actual events were secondary to the symbolic interpretation 
to which the events could be put. In short, the more Machiavelli infused 
mere empirical reality with poetic interpretation, that is, the farther he 
moved from chronological description of reality, the more instructive 
the writing became for use in reality.” 35 Preceding Jacobitti, Federico 
Chabod identifies Machiavelli’s mode of expression as being structured 
by an imaginative as opposed to a logical principle, and as being ori-
ented toward the invention of new political norms through the reinter-
pretation of prior realities: “Machiavelli’s imagination … accepts the 
legacy of the years, and converts it into a positive achievement – a new 
instrument, but still an imaginative one. On the other hand, it is nour-
ished and illumined by an intense love of political invention – an 
obscure mental process by which a given situation is endowed with 
unsuspected possibilities.” 36 This investment of the situation with new 
political potential is achieved through the critical redeployment of his-
torical facts into new arrangements of thought: “Here is the true Machi-
avelli, assembling all the scattered elements of his experience and 
adapting them to another and more spacious form of existence with 
which they, viewed in the light of their individual, limited significance, 
would not appear commensurate.” 37 The emergence of the new is the 
productive result of the creative and imaginative self-activity of the 
political theorist, a self-activity that takes the form of the reintegration 
of historical fragments, of past reflections and interpretations, into a 
new and “wholly unforeseen unity.” 38 The end of historical analysis is 
not the reproduction of a fixed narrative, but the expression and exten-
sion of a fundamental imaginative capacity: “The value of what he says 
does not lie in the exactness of the detail. It lies in his inexhaustible 
creativeness, which even overlooks known facts, because it strives 
above all after continual self-development and self-renewal through an 
ever-widening experience.” 39 
 The significance of these two readings lies in their explicit identifica-
tion of Machiavelli’s creative deployment of historical examples with 
 35  Ibid., 186. 
 36  Federico Chabod, “An Introduction to  The Prince ,” in  Machiavelli and the Renaissance , 
trans. David Moore (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1960), 2–3. 
 37  Ibid., 9. 
 38  Ibid., 19–20. 
 39  Ibid., 11. 
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his normative concern with the affirmation of the new: the selective 
representation and juxtaposition of examples is seen as being not just 
oriented toward the stimulation of practical action in the world, but 
also a manifestation of the very principle of human creativity that 
makes possible political change. Nevertheless, the full significance of 
this identification is not grasped to the extent that both Jacobitti and 
Chabod ultimately reduce the general principles that are produced via 
the juxtaposition of examples to universal rules of behaviour. That is to 
say, the arrangement of examples  x, y, and  z is said to articulate the 
general maxim or rule  a, a maxim or rule that is seen as being univer-
sally applicable across social contexts. Both readers succumb to the 
totalizing temptation to reduce the constructed figure of thought to a 
general unity that simply makes itself apparent in the concrete-specific 
case through the mode of comparison. Hence Chabod claims that 
Machiavelli “in any single event detects the ever-recurring workings of 
a universal process that is part and parcel of the human story.” 40 The 
general idea which is illumined by the critical reconstruction of the 
arrangement of particulars is seen as being eternally manifest in each of 
these particulars prior to their arrangement in thought. Here it seems as 
if the eternal simply resides in the being-itself of the particular, such 
that “Between  to-day , i.e. the passing moment with its particular prob-
lems, and  the eternal , i.e. the great and ever-valid laws of politics, there 
certainly remains a continuing connection, we might even say reciproc-
ity.” 41 This image of the relation between particular and universal, 
where the former simply bears the latter in various apparent ways, is 
not able to fully grasp the Machiavellian concept of novelty. Rather 
than interpret the particular as a derivation of the universal, I believe 
that we would do better to interpret the universal as the productive 
consequence of a specific organization of particulars, recognizing that 
the universal lacks an independent being prior to this organization. 
Machiavelli’s engagement with the particular example does not aim at 
the organization of such examples in a conceptual system structured by 
any sort of rational law. 42 I will argue that Machiavelli, to the extent that 
 40  Federico Chabod, “Machiavelli’s Method and Style,” in  Machiavelli and the Renais-
sance , trans. David Moore (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1960), 129. 
 41  Ibid., 136. 
 42  In François Regnault’s words, “Example is opposed to model.” François Regnault, 
“La pensée du prince,”  Cahiers pour l’analyse , no. 6 (1967): 36. On his reading, Machia-
velli’s materialism “[proves] by example that there are only examples.” Ibid., 41. 
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he establishes this relationship between universal and particular, antici-
pates a methodological mode which in the twentieth century would be 
most famously developed by Walter Benjamin, and which can be 
labelled thinking in constellations. 43 
 Constellative thinking is distinct from traditional forms of compara-
tive analysis that attempt to vertically relate concepts through the iden-
tification and isolation of the latter’s common derivation from a higher 
principle or term that remains static or fixed. Constellations challenge 
conceptual understandings that have ossified into second natures 
through the demonstration of the historical being of the phenomena 
under consideration. To place a concept in a constellation is to be able 
to take what was previously seen to be the content of the concept,  a , and 
 43  Reading Machiavelli in light of Benjamin, even if only methodologically, may ini-
tially seem strange. There is some precedent, though, for thinking certain common-
alities between Machiavelli and members or associates of the Frankfurt School. Most 
notably, Victoria Kahn argues that Machiavelli can be seen as a sort of kindred spirit 
to Adorno and Horkheimer, with the latter in fact being able to help us appreci-
ate the rhetorical dimensions of the former’s thought: “Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
exemplary resistance to the traditional distinction between literary and philosophi-
cal or political texts can help us not only to see how literary and political notions 
of representation and imitation are inextricable in Machiavelli’s work but also to 
recover the rhetoric in his political theory.” Victoria Kahn, “Reduction and the Praise 
of Disunion in Machiavelli’s Discourses,”  Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 
18, no. 1 (1988): 2. What Machiavelli resists, most notably expressed in the  Discourses ’ 
praise of disunion, is the “lure of harmony and totality.” Ibid. Despite his generally 
critical view of Machiavelli (see, for example, Martin Jay,  The Dialectical Imagination: 
A History of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, 1923–1950 [Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973], 257), this at least was recognized by Horkheimer, for whom 
Machiavelli was one of the “somber writers of the bourgeois dawn … who decried 
the egotism of the self, acknowledged in so doing that society was the destructive 
principle, and denounced harmony before it was elevated as the offi cial doctrine 
by the serene and classical authors. The latter boosted the totality of the bourgeois 
order as the misery that fi nally fused both general and particular, society and self, 
into one.” Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,  Dialectic of Enlightenment , trans. 
John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 2000), 90. In addition to Kahn’s article, also 
relevant in this respect is the following paper by Brian Harding, which suggests 
that “we can note the similarity between Machiavelli’s approach and that of criti-
cal theory: both look to history, rather than metaphysics, for an understanding of 
political possibilities.” Brian Harding, “Machiavelli’s Politics and Critical Theory of 
Technology,”  Argumentos de Razón Técnica , no. 12 (2009): 37–57. The specifi c possibil-
ity that critical theory is concerned with is the sublation of late capitalism, and that 
which Machiavelli is concerned with is the liberation of the Italian peninsula. 
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recognize that it is, dependent upon its critical juxtaposition with other 
concepts, also  b, c, d , and so on. The concept thus becomes both more 
and less than itself through the recognition of its internal difference and 
relation with other concepts. Although it is certainly the case that con-
cepts have a content, constellative thinking aims to demonstrate that 
this content does not exhaust the being of the object. Concepts can only 
ever represent fragmented parts of the empirical world. Those parts 
available to consciousness vary, depending on the precise form of sub-
jective mediation, on the specificity of the conceptual relation or the 
idea of which they are an element. By being rearranged through their 
constellative juxtaposition, concepts are capable of delivering to con-
sciousness hitherto unrecognized contents. 
 The theory of the constellation would be given its classic expression 
in Benjamin’s  The Origin of German Tragic Drama . Benjamin here distin-
guishes between knowledge and truth, between philosophical repre-
sentation and mathematical representation: “The more clearly 
mathematics demonstrate that the total elimination of the problem of 
representation – which is boasted by every didactic system – is the sign 
of genuine knowledge, the more conclusively does it reveal its renun-
ciation of that area of truth towards which language is directed.” 44 Phi-
losophy must be oriented toward the representation of truth, as opposed 
to the acquisition of knowledge, which is characterized always by pos-
session. Phenomena are capable of participating in truth only to the 
extent that they are able to elude assimilation into a system of acquired 
knowledge, only to the extent that their unity is broken up and their 
meaning multiplied. This multiplication is made possible through the 
empirical phenomenon’s representation in a concept placed in a spe-
cific historical constellation: “Through their mediating role concepts 
enable phenomena to participate in the existence of ideas. It is this same 
mediating role which fits them for the other equally basic task of phi-
losophy, the representation of ideas.” 45 
 As concepts are to knowledge, ideas are to truth. Truth, however, 
the representation of the idea, is not the representation of any deter-
minate content, but rather the arrangement of the system of concepts: 
“For ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and 
 44  Walter Benjamin,  The Origin of German Tragic Drama , trans. John Osborne (London: 
Verso, 1998), 27. 
 45  Ibid., 34. 
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exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as 
the configuration of those elements.” 46 Whereas concepts delineate 
the nature of the empirical, ideas relate concepts to one another, truth 
lying in this contingent interrelatedness of concepts. To the extent that 
the arrangement of concepts in the idea is the foundation of the repre-
sentative substance, neither concepts nor ideas present themselves as 
thematizable. The idea is simply the arrangement of such concepts, an 
arrangement that does not look toward the identification of static and 
singular contents: “When the idea absorbs a sequence of historical 
formulations, it does not do so in order to construct a unity out of 
them, let alone to abstract something common to them all.” 47 Con-
cepts are not extracted from ideas of which they participate a priori, 
but rather ideas are constructed historically through the critical 
arrangement of conceptual elements. Benjamin writes that “ideas are 
to objects as constellations are to stars.” 48 The meaning of its percep-
tion, the way in which a star is appropriated by a viewing subject, is 
dependent upon the vantage point from which the subject perceives, 
upon the constellation within which the star is seen to exist at the 
moment of perception. Similarly, the way in which the object is to be 
represented depends upon the critical arrangement of concepts in a 
particular constellation: “The history locked in the object can only be 
delivered by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of 
the object in its relation to other objects – by the actualization and 
concentration of something which is already known and is trans-
formed by that knowledge.” 49 The form of subjective cognition 
thereby structures the objectivity of that which the subject appropri-
ates, opening the seemingly closed world of the object to a multiplic-
ity of meanings or realities. 
 Subjective mediation thus has the potential to break up perceived 
truths that have hardened into dogmas, the concept being dereified 
through the affirmation of the historical specificity of knowledge. In 
constructing a constellation, then, one does not simply aim to con-
struct a new system, to supplant an old systematic doctrine with a 
 46  Ibid. 
 47  Ibid., 46. 
 48  Ibid., 34. 
 49  Theodor Adorno,  Negative Dialectics , trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 
163. 
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new one. Rather, one looks to reveal a previously hidden potentiality, 
bringing to light a new content without hypostatizing it, without 
invalidating the potential of the concept to enter into other relations. 
To put it more concretely, the image of Rome that results from Machia-
velli’s particular arrangement of conceptual elements drawn from 
Livy is one constellative possibility, just as is the conservative patri-
cian image. Similarly, in emphasizing and juxtaposing particular ele-
ments of Machiavelli’s political theory in deliberate ways, I produce a 
unique image of his thought. That production, however, is certainly 
not meant to instaurate an analytical closure that would bar the pos-
sibility of alternative readings via the construction of different con-
stellative arrangements, be they democratic, Cambridge School, 
Straussian, and so on. 
 Perspectival Analysis and Constellative Thinking 
 In light of the above discussion, it is of the utmost significance that in 
 The Prince Machiavelli begins his investigation into the nature of the 
virtuous political actor by affirming the necessity of recognizing the 
perspectival character of knowledge. In his dedicatory letter he will 
highlight the degree to which the acquisition of particular knowledges 
is structured by the observer’s objective position in a circumscribed 
field that delimits understanding: “because just as those who design 
landscapes place themselves low on the plain in order to consider the 
nature of mountains and high places, and to consider the low place 
themselves high on the mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of 
peoples one must be a prince, and to know well the nature of princes 
one must be of the people.” 50 Throughout Machiavelli’s political work 
we are continually confronted with this theme of perspectivism, the 
virtuous political actor being identified as one who is capable of repre-
senting to him or herself a multiplicity of different perspectives, recog-
nizing the extent to which the shift in perspective fundamentally alters 
the concept: one’s perception of the nature of the object that is being 
 50  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. dedication. Alejandro Bárcenas argues that Machia-
velli “took the artist, not the  condottiere as his model for the analysis of politics,” pre-
cisely because we live in a world of multiple perspectives, and the artist is the one 
most adept at viewing from a plurality of angles. Alejandro Bárcenas,  Machiavelli’s 
Art of Politics (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 43. 
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observed. 51 This is most notably expressed, for example, in Machiavel-
li’s exhortation to military leaders to privilege the study of the variance 
of sites and terrains, and how the occupation of different strategic loca-
tions strongly influences understanding. 52 Hence the subject matter of 
 Discourses 3:39, in which Machiavelli writes that “among the other 
things that are necessary to a captain of armies is understanding of sites 
and of countries, for without this general and particular understanding 
a captain cannot carry out anything properly. And because all knowl-
edges demand experience if one is to possess them well, this is one that 
requires very great experience.” 53 The key form of such experience – 
that aiming at the refinement of the capacity for critical perspectival 
analysis – is hunting: “One cannot acquire this understanding of coun-
tries in any other suitable way than via hunting, because hunting makes 
he who uses it particularly knowledgeable of that country where he 
trains. And once one is properly familiar with a region, he then compre-
hends with ease all new countries, because every country and every 
member of these have some conformity with one another, so that under-
standing of the one easily passes to understanding of the other.” 54 
 We must not be misled here by Machiavelli’s seeming suggestion 
that perspectival analysis generates in the prudent actor fixed stan-
dards of behaviour that are capable of being applied in necessarily 
identical contexts. Such forms of perspectival study are not valued to 
the degree that they result in the acquisition of a positive knowledge 
that can be referred to when one encounters equivalent situations. On 
the contrary, Machiavelli’s emphasis is not on a content, but a capacity, 
 51  For recognitions of this fact see Charles D. Tarlton, “ Fortuna and the Landscape of 
Action in Machiavelli’s  Prince ,”  New Literary History 30, no. 4 (1999): 737; Kenneth C. 
Blanchard Jr, “Being, Seeing, and Touching: Machiavelli’s Modifi cation of Platonic 
Epistemology,”  Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 3 (1996): 598; Sebastián Torres, “Tempo 
e politica: una lettura materialista di Machiavelli,” in  The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, 
Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Mor-
fi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 179. 
 52  E.g., Machiavelli, “Dell’Arte della guerra,” in  Tutte le opere , 334. 
 53  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.39. Such a process 
of generalization is noted by Laura Janara, who perceives that the prince’s success 
is grounded in his ability to imaginatively represent the diverse standpoints that 
exist in the political fi eld. Laura Janara, “Machiavelli, Elizabeth I and the Innovative 
Historical Self: A Politics of Action, Not Identity,”  History of Political Thought 27, no. 3 
(2006): 464. 
 54  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.39. 
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one being better equipped to critically confront the radically new situa-
tion when one is familiar with various forms of perspectival representa-
tion. This becomes clear in Machiavelli’s discussion of the topic in 
chapter 14 of  The Prince . Once again the significance of hunting is 
affirmed, it being maintained that the actor should “learn the nature of 
sites, learn about how mountains rise, how valleys descend, how plains 
lie, and understand the nature of rivers and marshes – and in this place 
the greatest care.” 55 Machiavelli will go on to suggest, however, that 
better learning the layout of your land is not for the sake of the con-
struction of a fixed schema that is universally applicable across multi-
ple times and spaces, but for the sake of the development of a critical 
skill or capacity that can be deployed in necessarily unique circum-
stances. Thus he writes, “understanding of and experience with those 
sites facilitates understanding of any other new site that it is necessary 
to examine.” 56 
 The potential to refine this skill or capacity, furthermore, is poten-
tially perpetual, as is revealed through the case of the Greek prince 
Philopoeman. Machiavelli will note that whenever Philopoeman was 
out with others he would always interrogate the landscape, asking, “If 
the enemy were up on that hill and we were here with our army, which 
of us would have the advantage? How could we advance, while main-
taining order, to meet them? If we wanted to withdraw, how ought we 
to? If they were withdrawing, how ought we pursue them?” 57 The prac-
tical questioning of Philopoeman illustrates to Machiavelli the non-
possibility of ever achieving a critical mastery that would terminate the 
need for perspectival study. But once again, the fact that it is not possi-
ble to abstract such practical activity from historical study is revealed in 
the manner in which Machiavelli concludes chapter 14, stressing again 
the dialectical relation between theory and practice, between the ancient 
and the present, through the reaffirmation of the actor’s need to supple-
ment the study of terrains with the exercise of the mind via the reading 
of histories and critical reflection on the deeds of past actors: “above all 
to do as some excellent man has done in the past, who has taken to 
imitate whosoever before him was praised and glorified, and who has 
always held these acts and deeds near himself, as it is said that 
 55  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 14. 
 56  Ibid. 
 57  Ibid. 
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Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, 
Cyrus.” 58 This common theme in Machiavelli, that great “men almost 
always walk on the paths beaten by others and proceed in their actions 
by imitation,” 59 that the prudent political actor will attempt to imitate 
the modes of clearly virtuous individuals in the past, refers us to a very 
precise form of imitation. It would be a mistake, for example, to think 
of imitation in terms of the static reproduction of prior particulars, such 
as is done by Francis Bacon, for whom “the form of writing which of all 
others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions 
is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, 
discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly 
and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars 
again.” 60 On the contrary, Machiavelli is advocating not the imitation of 
inert particulars whose beings are stable prior to their arrangement in 
thought – not fixed and immobile patterns of behaviour – but rather a 
creative and critical mode of being, a reflective orientation toward the 
world that allows one to respond to the emergence of contingency in 
always unique ways. If the actor learns from these modes a form of flex-
ibility and reflexivity, when fortune changes, he or she will be ready to 
resist. 61 
 Machiavelli writes that “one who considers present and ancient 
things easily knows how in all cities and in all peoples there are the 
same desires and the same humours, and how there always have 
been.” 62 It is this fact that allows prudent actors to anticipate the emer-
gence of future problems and initiate activity that looks to their resolu-
tion. Although such remedies may on occasion necessitate a 
reproduction of past modes, they may also be rooted in the innovative 
generation of entirely new modes. Thoughtful reflection on history 
may allow the actor facing new problems to apply “those remedies 
that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any that were used, to 
 imagine new ones , through the similarity of accidents.” 63 This notion of 
 58  Ibid. 
 59  Ibid., chap. 6. 
 60  Francis Bacon, “The Advancement of Learning,” in  Bacon’s Advancement of Learning 
and the New Atlantis (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2008), 196. 
 61  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 14. 
 62  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.39. 
 63  Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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imitation as innovation is particularly well articulated in  Discourses 
2:16, where Machiavelli recalls the first battle of the Latin War. The 
armies of the Romans and the Latins, Machiavelli tells us, were identi-
cal in all respects, possessing an equivalent skill, size, and obstinacy. 
This likeness was achieved as a consequence of the similar education 
of each: “having served a long time together in the military, they were 
alike in speech, order, and arms.” 64 The fundamental difference 
between the two armies, according to Livy, was the greater virtue 
among the Roman captains. And how did this virtue manifest itself? 
Crucially, for Machiavelli it was expressed through the Roman cap-
tains’ abilities to utilize a mode of creative imitation in order to respond 
to the emergence of unexpected contingencies. Specifically, “in the 
managing of this battle there emerged two accidents that had not 
arisen before and of which afterwards there have been few examples: 
of the two consuls, to keep the spirits of the soldiers firm, obedient to 
their commands, and determined to fight, one killed himself and the 
other his son.” 65 The actions of the Roman consuls Decius, who killed 
himself, and Torquatus, who killed his son, adequately hardened the 
spirits of the Romans, separating them from their enemies and provid-
ing them with the energy needed to prevail. In light of the objective 
identity of the opposing forces, the Romans could be elevated only 
through some extraordinary thing, but some thing which was abso-
lutely singular and without prior existence. Virtue was not located in 
the repetition of a past good and timeless example, but rather lay in a 
creative bringing forth of a completely new mode. Indeed, Machiavelli 
maintains that this openness to innovation is in fact the source of all 
Roman virtue: “Titus Livy shows, in showing this equality of forces, 
the whole order that the Romans maintained in armies and in fight-
ing.” 66 Virtue lay not in literal imitation, but in the imitation of a cre-
ative capacity that is deployed in always unique situations and which 
results in always unique modes. 
 This account, furthermore, appears immediately before Machiavelli 
seemingly advocates a more traditional form of imitation, appealing to 
modern leaders to repeat specific ancient orders and patterns, in this 
case through the arrangement of the  astati, principi, and  triari in battle. 
 64  Ibid., bk. 2.16. 
 65  Ibid. 
 66  Ibid. 
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There is no contradiction in the chapter, however, for once again what 
Machiavelli admires in this latter example is the arrangement’s open-
ness to change, the fact that this mode of fighting gives itself three 
opportunities before it is defeated. Modern armies are incapable of 
structuring themselves such that they are open to this multiplicity of 
chance, preferring instead to interpret their initial fate as the ultimate 
one, closing off any future possibility for a change of trajectory: “who-
ever cannot resist but on the first push, as all the Christian armies today, 
can easily lose, because any disorder, any middling virtue, can take vic-
tory away from them.” 67 To the extent that they eschew a willingness to 
organize themselves so as to allow for creative adaptation in response 
to changing fortune, the Christian armies affirm a one-sided and literal 
imitation of things, as opposed to a critical and reflective imitation of 
capacities. What is to be affirmed, in other words, is a critical orienta-
tion that is able to prudently recognize the need for behavioural adap-
tation should innovative activity be perpetuated and new realities 
generated. 68 
 What Machiavelli hopes to reveal to his reader through these exam-
ples is the possibility for unprecedented human action. He wishes to 
preserve the memory of those events that break the seemingly 
 67  Ibid. On the fact that Machiavelli prioritizes the managing of accidents in battle 
see John P. McCormick, “Pocock, Machiavelli and Political Contingency in Foreign 
Affairs: Republican Existentialism Outside (and Within) the City,”  History of Euro-
pean Ideas 43, no. 2 (2017): 180. Compare my reading here to that of Felix Gilbert, who 
understands Machiavelli’s call for a reappropriation of ancient lessons of warfare in 
terms of literal imitation. Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the  Art of 
War ,” in  Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age , ed. Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 22. 
 68  Eugene Garver, arguing that Machiavelli never advocated slavish imitation of past 
modes, notes that “ The Prince is fi lled with examples of princes going wrong by 
imitating examples; these must alert the prince to the paradoxical task of learning, 
through imitation, to become an innovator.” Eugene Garver, “Machiavelli’s  The 
Prince : A Neglected Rhetorical Classic,”  Philosophy and Rhetoric 13, no. 2 (1980): 101. 
The examples Machiavelli provides are not meant to be strictly imitated, but on the 
contrary to stimulate prudent refl ection; “examples do not function as instances of 
truths already ascertained.” Ibid., 104. Elsewhere Garver will distinguish between 
the stylistic imitation of the hereditary prince and the rhetorical invention of the new 
prince, the straightforward or literal imitation of the latter being identifi ed as neces-
sarily antithetical to political creation. Eugene Garver, “Machiavelli and the Politics 
of Rhetorical Invention,”  CLIO 14, no. 2 (1985): 158. 
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determinate flow of history, thus revealing the fact that time is not 
sequential, but rather open to the radical emergence of the new. 69 It is 
within the context of Machiavelli’s theorization of the event, of the 
human potential for historical creation, that we must understand the 
well-known concept of the  verità effettuale della cosa . Distinguishing 
between his own historical approach, which takes off from the political 
potential germinating within the concrete here and now, and those 
abstractly utopian political projects ungrounded in consideration of the 
constraints of life in an empirical world, Machiavelli writes: “since my 
intention is to write something useful to one who understands it, it 
seemed the most suitable to go after the effectual truth of the thing 
rather than the fantasy of it. And many have fantasized about republics 
and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in real-
ity; for there is so much distance between how one lives and how one 
should live that he who gives up what is done for what should be done 
learns his ruin rather than his preservation.” 70 The  verità effettuale does 
not refer us to any sort of absolute truth or reality that would pre-structure 
the direction of our action, but rather to the truth of the possibility 
for the virtuous actor to generate new political realities – events – 
through the critical analysis of worldly potential. In the words of Bar-
bara Godorecci, the  verità effettuale expresses a “conception of truth 
whose identity is tied to the event (‘lo evento della cosa’), to the process 
of living that is a constant becoming. In practical terms, Machiavellian 
 verità effettuale rejects programming, if by ‘program’ one intends a pre-
established goal to be achieved by pre-established methods (a rejection, 
therefore, of any specific form of methodology).” 71 
 As I will argue in  chapter 3 in my discussion of the relationship 
between  virtù and  fortuna , to recognize the  verità effettuale is to recognize 
the contextual situation of your action within a non-teleological histori-
cal stream which you act into and which acts upon you, such interaction 
producing a multiplicity of unforeseeable and undetermined events. In 
 69  There is once more a strong parallel between Machiavelli and Benjamin here, given 
the latter’s critique of historicism. See especially Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” in  Illuminations: Essays and Refl ections , ed. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 253–64. 
 70  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 15. 
 71  Barbara J. Godorecci,  After Machiavelli: “Re-Writing” and the “Hermeneutic Attitude” 
(West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 134. 
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order to articulate such singularities, to further highlight the political 
significance of major historical events, Machiavelli theoretically pushes 
them to their most extreme points. For Benjamin “Ideas are timeless con-
stellations, and by virtue of the elements’ being seen as points in such 
constellations, phenomena are subdivided and at the same time 
redeemed; so that those elements which it is the function of the concept 
to elicit from phenomena are most clearly evident at the extremes.” 72 It 
is thus that “the concept has its roots in the extreme.” 73 Machiavelli’s 
much-noted method of exaggeration can here be thought in terms of a 
form of thinking at the extreme, used in order to affirm the capacity to 
initiate the new. 74 
 • 
 Just as Machiavelli pushes to the extreme his ancient sources in order 
to affi rm the innovative capacity, in what remains of this work I will 
attempt to extract and push to the extreme those conceptual elements in 
Machiavelli that speak to the potential for radically democratic politi-
cal creation. I have argued in this chapter that not only, as is commonly 
pointed out, does Machiavelli’s appeal to the wisdom of the ancients 
not contradict his claim regarding his theoretical novelty, but also that 
this appeal is a deliberate methodological strategy that upholds a broad 
affi rmation of novelty most generally. The lessons Machiavelli would 
 72  Benjamin,  The Origin of German Tragic Drama , 34–5. 
 73  Ibid., 35. 
 74  It is especially notable that a recently inaugurated book series on the thought of 
Machiavelli takes as its title “Thinking in Extremes.” For its fi rst contribution see 
Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no, eds,  The Radical Machia-
velli: Politics, Philosophy and Language (Leiden: Brill, 2015). For different inter-
pretations of the function of Machiavelli’s exaggeration see Strauss,  Thoughts on 
Machiavelli , 82; Gilbert,  Machiavelli and Guicciardini , 166; Victoria Kahn, “ Virtù and 
the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli’s  Prince ,” in  Machiavelli and the Discourse 
of Literature , ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 200; Pierre Manent,  An Intellectual History of Liberalism , trans. Rebecca 
Balinski (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13. On the relationship 
between thinking at the extreme and political creation see Emmanuel Terray, “An 
Encounter: Althusser and Machiavelli,” in  Postmodern Materialism and the Future of 
Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition , ed. and trans. Antonio Callari and 
David F. Ruccio (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 258; Louis Althusser, 
“Is It Simple to Be a Marxist in Philosophy?,” in  Essays in Self-Criticism , trans. Gra-
hame Lock (London: New Left Books, 1976), 170. 
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have us draw from the past are not to be found in our one-sided imita-
tion of prior modes of doing and being, but rather in our critical rec-
ognition of the singularity of these past events, events that reveal to us 
the specifi cally human capacity for political innovation. Machiavelli’s 
mode of historical appropriation aims at, through the creative reinvest-
ment of the meaning of events through their selective juxtaposition 
in specifi c fi gures or constellations of thought, the articulation of this 
innovative potential. The recognition of this potential is then seen to 
provide a ground from which the interested political actor is able to 
launch a historical endeavour aimed at the transformation of the world. 
For Machiavelli such is the only legitimate mode of historical practice. 
 I would suggest that the implications of Machiavelli’s project for 
political theory, and in particular the history of political thought, are 
potentially far-reaching. What would it mean to read Machiavelli, for 
example, in the same way that Machiavelli reads Livy? To begin to 
answer this question would be to begin to explain the staggering diver-
sity of interpretations that characterize the field of Machiavelli studies, 
which might be initially divided into two broad categories. As is noted, 
for example, by Eric Weil and Miguel Abensour, we may distinguish 
between an academic Machiavelli who exists only as an object of schol-
arship, and a political Machiavelli who emerges in the present histori-
cal context in order to assist us in articulating the being of the 
contemporary political conjuncture. In Abensour’s words, “The ques-
tion is no longer to address the topic called Machiavelli, but to think 
Machiavelli through, or better to think  with Machiavelli the political 
issues of the present.” 75 This distinction between a scholarly and a 
political Machiavelli can be mapped onto Machiavelli’s distinction 
between a contemplative and an active history. Just as Machiavelli’s 
historical examples become, through their critical juxtaposition with 
one another, other than what they originally were, so might Machia-
velli become other than himself depending upon how we choose to 
read him in the moment. Once we begin to read Machiavelli in our 
time, in our own here and now, we find that, in the words of Weil, 
“other moments emerge and give a new life to he who, until then, was 
 75  Miguel Abensour,  Democracy against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment , 
trans. Max Blechman and Martin Breaugh (London: Polity Press, 2011), 4. Original 
emphasis. 
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but one author among others.” 76 The fact that Machiavelli was respond-
ing to his specific historical-political situation in no way delimits his 
potential to intervene in our own. 77 In opposition to the wide variety of 
contextualist and esoteric readings of Machiavelli, I would suggest that 
our goal should be not exclusively examining what it is that Machia-
velli thought and why, but in addition, considering what it is that 
Machiavelli can do for us today, if we adopt the same approach to read-
ing him as he did to his ancient sources. 
 76  Eric Weil, “Machiavel aujourd’hui,” in  Essais et conférences , vol. 2:  Politique (Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1991), 190. 
 77  On this point see, for example, Carlos Frade, “An Altogether New Prince Five Cen-
turies On: Bringing Machiavelli to Bear on Our Present,”  Situations 5, no. 1 (2013): 60; 
Gopal Balakrishnan, “Future Unknown: Machiavelli for the Twenty-First Century,” 
 New Left Review 32 (April 2005): 20. 
 PART TWO 
 Philosophical Anthropology 

 In this chapter I will attempt to extract from Machiavelli’s writings a 
general philosophy of being that is composed of two related elements: 
a theory of worldly being and a theory of human being. Machiavelli 
will theorize both external and internal nature in terms of a radical 
indetermination unhinged from any absolute structural foundations 
that would transcendentally ground them, as well as any determinable 
logics of development that would orient their movement in a rational 
or causal manner. Machiavelli’s rejection of totalizing forms of philo-
sophical investigation is well-known. Nevertheless, the lack of any 
trace of systematization is certainly no justification for suggesting that 
Machiavelli rejects all forms of philosophical investigation. 1 Machia-
velli’s rejection of static structures of Being, whether grounded in an 
affirmation of a positive natural law, cosmology, or theology, must not 
lead us to conclude that he rejects all ontological effort as such. On the 
contrary, he most notably gives us a very precise ontology of the human 
being, specifically one grounded in a consideration of its creative politi-
cal power. 2 Machiavelli’s philosophy does contain a specific ontology, a 
specific theory of human being in the world. It is just that for Machia-
velli this question of being does not refer us to any positive metaphysic, 
 Chapter Two 
 The Contingency of Being: On Worldly 
and Human Indetermination 
 1  See, for example, Dante Germino, “Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss’s Machiavelli,” 
 Journal of Politics 28, no. 4 (1966): 815. For a study of Machiavelli’s relation to the 
philosophical tradition and the degree to which he can be situated in it see Gaille, 
 Machiavel et la tradition philosophique . 
 2  As Agnès Cugno notes, “The thought of Machiavelli takes the human as its theme, but 
in the very specifi c mode of  homo politicus .” Agnès Cugno, “Machiavel et le problème de 
l’être en politique,”  Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ ê tranger 189, no. 1 (1999): 19. 
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to any surplus reality beyond that which we are capable of experienc-
ing as sensuous beings. In particular, Machiavelli is interested in the 
question of the form of political action as a modality of human 
creation. 
 I argue in this chapter and the following one that Machiavelli pro-
vides us with a very precise model of the human essence. His concept 
of human essence, however, is a negative as opposed to a positive one. 
A positive essence would refer us to a perpetually fixed set of natural 
human properties whose objective contours could be determined and 
mapped in systematic fashion, thus producing an architectonic model 
of humanity. A negative essence, on the contrary, rejects attempts to 
theorize all elements of human being in terms of such positive determi-
nations, seeing one of the fundamental components of essence instead 
in the specifically human ability to transcend many merely immediate 
and conventional forms of doing and being. A negative essence refers 
us, in other words, not to a specifically human content, but rather a 
specifically human capacity, that is, the capacity for creativity. The 
human being is that which is capable of, through its life activity, per-
petually remaking itself and its social world, although in a form that is 
obviously delimited by certain biological and historical constraints. 
Negative models of essence that emphasize the creative potential of 
human beings to shape their own nature have been developed in differ-
ent ways by a variety of the canonical thinkers of the tradition of mod-
ern political thought. The significance of Machiavelli, however, lies in 
the fact that he was the first to interpret such creation as manifesting 
itself in the specifically political field, providing a model of an explicitly 
political form of the realization of the negative human essence. In  chap-
ter 3 I will examine in more detail this political form of realization 
through a study of the ethics of creation as articulated in  The Prince . In 
this chapter, however, I will first provide an overview of those philo-
sophical assumptions that for Machiavelli provided the conceptual 
background for the theorization of the human being in terms of a fun-
damental creativity. In the first part of the chapter I will detail Machia-
velli’s thoughts on the contingent and chaotic structure of the world. 
This structure of the world, lacking any positive organizing form, is 
mirrored in the indetermination of the individual human being. In the 
second part of the chapter I will thus begin to provide an initial account 
of this indetermination, specifically as it is represented for Machiavelli 
in both the diversity of modes of human doing and being, and the 
openness of human being to change and alteration. 
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 Worldly Indetermination and the Rejection of Metaphysics 
 It has become increasingly common for readers of Machiavelli to stress 
the extent to which he not only engaged with but was significantly 
influenced by the Epicurean philosophical tradition, whose rediscov-
ery in the Florentine context took on an especially acute form. 3 Machia-
velli was very familiar with the Epicurean tradition, having transcribed 
Lucretius’s  De rerum natura and having known Diogenes Laertius’s 
 Lives of Eminent Philosophers , as revealed for example in his redeploy-
ment of various of the statements found in this text in “The Life of Cas-
truccio Castracani.” 4 Paul Rahe notes that “by 1517 or so, if not well 
before, Machiavelli had made Lucretius’ repudiation of religion and his 
rejection of natural teleology his own.” 5 In this section I will be con-
cerned with outlining the main contours of this rejection of natural tele-
ology, demonstrating how Machiavelli theorizes the fundamentally 
inconstant, irregular, and chaotic form of being of the world. This out-
line will certainly not be sufficient to construct a comprehensive phi-
losophy of world in Machiavelli, a philosophy that he clearly never 
attempted to analytically define, but will hopefully suffice to demon-
strate the extent to which Machiavelli understands temporal being in 
 3  See, for example, Alison Brown,  The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ada Palmer,  Reading Lucretius in the 
Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
 4  Machiavelli, “La vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca,” in  Tutte le opere , 613–28. 
On Machiavelli’s annotations of  De rerum natura see Palmer,  Reading Lucretius in the 
Renaissance , 81–8. 
 5  Paul A. Rahe, “In the Shadow of Lucretius: The Epicurean Foundations of Machia-
velli’s Political Thought,”  History of Political Thought 28, no. 1 (2007): 44. For further 
studies of the infl uence of Lucretius on Machiavelli see Louis Althusser, “The Under-
ground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” in  Philosophy of the Encounter: 
Later Writings, 1978–87 , ed. François Matheron and Oliver Corpet, trans. G.M. Gos-
hgarian (London: Verso, 2006), 163–207; Vittorio Morfi no, “Tra Lucrezio e Spinoza: 
la ‘fi losofi a’ di Machiavelli,” in  Machiavelli: immaginazione e contingenza , ed. Filippo 
Del Lucchese, Luca Sartorello, and Stefano Visentin (Pisa: Edizioni Ets, 2006), 67–110; 
Rahe, “In the Shadow of Lucretius”; Robert J. Roecklein,  Machiavelli and Epicureanism: 
An Investigation into the Origins of Early Modern Political Thought (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2012); Alison Brown, “Lucretian Naturalism and the Evolution of Machia-
velli’s Ethics,” in  The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo 
Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 105–27; Del 
Lucchese,  The Political Philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli , 32–6. 
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terms of non-determination, such non-determination being ultimately 
the very condition of possibility of human freedom. 6 
 I am thus attempting to provide an alternative to those readings of 
Machiavelli that locate in his thought an affirmation of a natural or 
ontological stability that gives a consistency and uniformity to tempo-
ral being. 7 It is certainly true that there seem to be some passages in the 
Machiavellian texts that suggest the belief in the type of patterned order 
that certain commentators perceive. One chapter commonly cited, for 
example, is  Discourses 3:43, where Machiavelli writes that “anyone who 
wants to see what has to be considers what has been; for all the things 
of the world, in every time, have their counterpart in ancient times.” 8 
Nevertheless, Machiavelli’s seeming affirmation of the constancy of the 
world through time is immediately problematized, as he goes on to 
make clear that such constancy is by no means the product of natural 
movement, but rather is socially constituted and highly contextual. 
Speaking of the identity of past worldly being and present worldly 
being, he continues: “This arises because, being caused by men, who 
have and always have had the same passions, they of necessity result in 
the same effect. It is true that their works are now in this province more 
virtuous than in that, and in that more than in this, according to the 
 6  This relationship between worldly contingency and free human action that this 
contingency has opened has, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty has noted, puzzled many 
of Machiavelli’s readers. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “A Note on Machiavelli,” in  Signs , 
trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 218. 
The extent to which the latter leans upon the former, however, has certainly been 
noticed by some commentators. See, for example, Miguel Vatter,  Between Form and 
Event: Machiavelli’s Theory of Political Freedom (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 2000), 133. Antonio Negri,  Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State , 
trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 38. Dick 
Howard,  The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought from the Greeks to the 
French and American Revolutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 199. 
 7  Anthony J. Parel,  The Machiavellian Cosmos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992); Sammy Basu, “In a Crazy Time the Crazy Come Out Well: Machiavelli and the 
Cosmology of His Day,”  History of Political Thought 2, no. 2 (1990): 213–39; John H. 
Geerken, “Elements of Natural Law Theory in Machiavelli,” in  The Medieval Tradition 
of Natural Law , ed. Harold J. Johnson (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 
1987), 37–65; Graham Maddox, “The Secular Reformation and the Infl uence of Machi-
avelli,”  Journal of Religion 82, no. 4 (2002): 539–62; Mark Hulliung,  Citizen Machiavelli 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 154. 
 8  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 3.43. 
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form of education in which those people have taken their mode of liv-
ing.” 9 The affirmation of stability of worldly being, however, is not here 
simply displaced onto another register, the fixity of the world being a 
consequence of the fixity of the universal nature of the species, as rep-
resented in the claim regarding the identity of the passions. On the con-
trary, Machiavelli makes clear that in this discussion he is presuming a 
continuity in the precise forms of education and socialization that a 
community utilizes through time: “It is easy to know the things to come 
from the past, if a nation for a long time keeps the same customs, being 
continually avaricious or continually fraudulent, or having some other 
similar vice or virtue.” 10 As I will argue in  chapter 6 , the republic is that 
form of regime that is capable of breaking out of this continuity and 
institutionalizing innovation, thus making it possible to reflectively 
and self-consciously remake the world. The identity and constancy of 
worldly things as presented in 3:43 is historically contingent, an artifi-
cial result of a precise form of social organization, one which in the final 
instance Machiavelli will reject on normative grounds. Indeed, in this 
chapter Machiavelli will proceed to associate the impoverishment of 
the contemporary Florentine political situation with that type of uncrit-
ical approach to history that generates the very sense of temporal uni-
formity. Machiavelli says that in their dealings with external nations 
the Florentines, criticized for being avaricious and lacking in faith, 
failed to learn from past lessons, failed to recognize the modes which 
these nations have historically acted in. He writes, “if Florence had not 
been compelled by necessity or overcome by passion, and had read and 
understood the ancient customs of the barbarians, it would have been 
deceived by them neither this nor many other times, since they have 
always been in one mode and have always used with everyone the very 
same terms.” 11 Florentine virtue would here lie precisely in the aboli-
tion of the presumption of historical constancy, perpetually affirmed by 
its enemies. The Florentines’ own corruption would be overcome 
through the transcendence of the belief in the continuity of time. Their 
recognition of the universality of the modes of others is the means by 
which the Florentines might overcome their own current, although by 
no means natural or inevitable, nature. 
  9  Ibid. 
 10  Ibid. 
 11  Ibid. 
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 Although initially it might suggest a belief in the stable being of the 
form of the world, 3:43 in the end actually affirms the opposite. There 
are many other passages in the  Discourses that lend further evidence to 
the argument that Machiavelli thinks of the being of the world in terms 
of contingent movement and flux. Here I will highlight just some of 
these passages, although in a necessarily, given Machiavelli’s own form 
of presentation, non-systematic way. 12 The most notable such passage is 
2:5, where, according to Antonio Negri, Machiavelli “tries to define the 
Heraclitean flux of becoming as an experience of freedom.” 13 The title 
of 2:5 is “That the variation of sects and languages, together with the 
accident of floods or plague, extinguishes the memories of things.” This 
title points us toward a dual concern with both conventional human 
variation and physical worldly variation via accidental natural events, 
and hence a simultaneous affirmation of natural and social flux. Indeed, 
Machiavelli begins the chapter by stating: “To those philosophers who 
determined that the world was eternal, I believe that one could reply 
that if such antiquity were true it would be reasonable that there should 
be memory of more than five thousand years, except it is seen how the 
memories of times is extinguished by diverse causes, of which part 
come from men, part from heaven.” 14 First, the diversity of human 
beings is located in “the variations of sects and of languages.” 15 Sectar-
ian division here refers us to variation in religion, religion having been 
earlier identified as the primary mode of human socialization, the 
diversity of sects thus referring us to a larger diversity of culture. 16 If 
 12  Indeed, the apparently non-systematic structure of Machiavelli’s work can be seen as 
representative of the non-systematic structure of reality. See, for example, Gennaro 
Sasso,  Niccolò Machiavelli: storia del suo pensiero politico (Bologna: Società editrice il 
Mulino, 1980), 520; Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, “The Poetry of Power: Machiavelli’s 
Literary Vision,”  Review of National Literatures 1, no. 1 (1970): 48; Filippo Del Luc-
chese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza (London: Continuum, 
2009), 47. 
 13  Negri,  Insurgencies , 70. On the Heraclitean dimension of Machiavelli’s thought see 
also Neal Wood, “Some Common Aspects of the Thought of Seneca and Machia-
velli,”  Renaissance Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1968): 19. 
 14  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.5. 
 15  Ibid. 
 16  On the signifi cance of religion as a comprehensive mode of socialization for 
Machiavelli, as opposed to a one-sided and instrumental compulsion to obey the 
law, see, for example, John M. Najemy, “Papirus and the Chickens, or Machiavelli on 
the Necessity of Intepreting Religion,”  Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 
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knowledge of past cultures is inadequate – that is, if individuals do not 
adequately recognize the fact of social difference across time and space – 
it is because succeeding cultures undertake active war on them in the 
attempt to eliminate all memory of different modes of doing and being. 
Thus, for example, Christianity’s war against the Gentiles: “It erased all 
its orders, all its ceremonies, and extinguished every memory of that 
ancient theology.” 17 Machiavelli, however, goes on to note that it is not 
possible to completely eliminate remembrance of such prior modes, 
and hence the perpetuation through time of various cultural remnants, 
preserved, for example, through the continued use of Latin, and so on. 
Significantly, after detailing the contingency of human custom, Machia-
velli proceeds to detail a seemingly analogous contingency of physical 
nature, suggesting the former is merely one element of a much more 
comprehensive philosophy of natural history. He writes that “as for the 
causes that come from heaven, they are those that extinguish the human 
race, and reduce to a few the inhabitants of part of the world, this com-
ing through plague or through famine or through an inundation of 
water.” 18 Machiavelli thus explicitly rejects belief in a regular and pre-
dictable movement of natural history, going so far as to partially locate 
cultural variation in the displacements that result from contingent 
natural events that interrupt the apparently static and regular being of 
the world. 
 Machiavelli can be seen to locate the chaotic structure of reality in a 
quasi-dialectical understanding of the objects of the world. This is cer-
tainly not a positive dialectical understanding that, in teleological fash-
ion, assimilates historical events into a logical or causal time continuum 
culminating in the actualization of a synthetic end, but rather a negative 
dialectical understanding that emphasizes the internal non-identity of 
objects. Objects are subject to a play of different forces whose interaction 
and interpenetration generate a multitude of unique potentialities. 
Hence Machiavelli’s characterization of the process of unpredictable 
objective movement in  Discourses 3:37: “near the good there is always 
some evil, which arises so easily with that good that it seems impossible 
to be able to miss the one while wanting the other. And this is seen in all 
659–81; Benedetto Fontana, “Love of Country and Love of God: The Political Uses of 
Religion in Machiavelli,”  Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 639–58. 
 17  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.5. 
 18  Ibid. 
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the things that men work on. Therefore one acquires the good with dif-
ficulty, unless fortune aids you in such a way that it and its force defeat 
this ordinary and natural inconvenience.” 19 One must know not to put 
all of one’s force behind one mode, thus exposing oneself to ruin should 
the form of the arrangement of those internal tendencies structuring the 
being of the object shift. Even if we presume that the form of the object 
will remain relatively stable over a period of time, the elements consti-
tuting it are so closely intertwined that human investigation will never 
be sufficient to conceptually parse them one from the other, for things 
“have bad so near to the good, and so much are they joined together, 
that it is an easy thing to take the one, believing one has seized the 
other.” 20 And what is more, any human intervention will necessarily 
upset the composition of elements, thus contributing to the emergence 
of unforeseen and necessarily unconsidered permutations. Hence in 1:6 
Machiavelli states that “in all human things he who will examine them 
well sees this: that you can never remove one inconvenience without 
another one emerging.” 21 The world provides no opportunity for indi-
viduals to initiate modes which will produce assured ends: what is 
“entirely clear, entirely without uncertainty, is never found.” 22 
 As will be elaborated on later, in the final instance it is the fact of 
worldly contingency that makes impossible the thought of a political 
project that looks to the instrumental mastery of human reality. No 
virtue is compelling enough to provide a stable direction to the non-
determined movement of objects through the flux of time. Such is made 
explicit in  Discourses 2:29, where Machiavelli notes that this project of 
mastery was impossible even for his largely fictional and idealized 
Romans: “If you consider well how human affairs proceed, you will see 
that many times things emerge and accidents take place that the heav-
ens did not want to provide for at all. And if that which I say occurred 
in Rome, where there was so much virtue, so much religion, and so 
much order, it is not surprising that it occurs far more often in a city or 
in a province that lacks the things said above.” 23 Even the most virtuous 
 19  Ibid., bk. 3.37. 
 20  Ibid. 
 21  Ibid., bk. 1.6. 
 22  Ibid. See also Machiavelli, “L’Asino,” in  Tutte le opere , 967; “Istorie fi orentine,” in 
 Tutte le opere , bk. 5.1. 
 23  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.29. 
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of cities is thus incapable of definitively stabilizing the unstable and 
unpredictable temporality of the world. Obviously this is not to sug-
gest, however, that human endeavour is wasted in the effort to negoti-
ate the non-determinate, even if the latter cannot be shaped into the 
determinate. The possibility of such negotiation is revealed, for exam-
ple, in  Discourses 3:14, where the contingencies that perpetually arise in 
battles are presented as an element of the contingency of the world. 
Machiavelli writes: “Of how many times in conflicts and in battles a 
new accident arises because of a thing neither seen nor heard before is 
demonstrated in many places.” 24 
 As I showed in the previous chapter, given that the emergence of 
such accidents produces always new and unprecedented situations, the 
repetitions that prudent actors undertake in responding to them must 
refer not to actual patterns of behaviour, but to the imitation of a type of 
critical spirit or orientation that allows one to reflectively respond to 
contingency, and in some way neutralize the effects of necessity. Such a 
spirit, though, certainly does not look to overcome necessity, but actu-
ally depends upon a recognition and acceptance of its inevitability. 
Machiavelli states that “not so much are the orders of an army neces-
sary to be able to fight in an orderly way, but so that every least accident 
not disorder you. For no other reason are multitudes of people not use-
ful for war than that every noise, every voice, every uproar, alters them 
and makes them flee.” 25 People must be socialized such that they are 
able to recognize the fact of unpredictability and act prudently in the 
face of it. They must, in other words, overcome the desire to stabilize 
and permanently fix the order of reality. In order to accustom his troops 
to the fact of contingency the prudent captain will thus deliberately 
introduce accidents to ill-prepared armies as a mode of disruption. 26 
These new innovations have a double function, being used both to dis-
rupt your opponents, but also to prepare your own soldiers to respond 
to the inevitable accidents that will arise and confront them. As Machia-
velli says, “And so a good captain ought to do two things: one, to see, 
through some of these new inventions, to frightening the enemy; the 
other, to be prepared, so that if the enemy tries this against him, he can 
 24  Ibid., bk. 3.14. 
 25  Ibid. 
 26  Ibid. 
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uncover them and make them turn out in vain.” 27 The recognition of 
the inevitability of unpredictability provides a condition for neutraliz-
ing the effects of unpredictability upon you. 28 
 Although it is in the  Discourses that Machiavelli most comprehen-
sively articulates his understanding of the indetermination of worldly 
being, we can also point to several other passages throughout his work 
that seem to confirm the metaphysical instability reading. In  The Prince 
3, speaking of the Romans and the impossibility of deferring the 
moment of political decision in the hope that time will rectify one’s 
problems, Machiavelli writes: “Nor did it ever please them, that which 
is in the mouth of all the wise of our day, to enjoy the benefit of time, but 
the good of their virtue and prudence;  for time drives all things forward , 
and can lead him to good as well as bad, and bad as well as good.” 29 In 
chapter 7 this process whereby time drives forward or alters the organi-
zation of the things of the world is once again referenced. Here Machia-
velli argues that one who becomes a prince primarily through fortune 
acquires with ease but will maintain authority with great difficulty. 
This is due precisely to the inconstancy of the world, to the fact that the 
emergence of new objects and new relations perpetually upsets the 
stable order of things, the non-virtuous prince being ill-equipped to 
negotiate such fluctuations. The things of the world are constantly in 
motion, and the only means to keep what fortune has provided you is 
to act virtuously, to be able to recognize the opportunities presented in 
the displacements caused by the movement of time. 30 And just as in 
 27  Ibid. 
 28  Ibid. 
 29  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. 3. Emphasis added. On this subject 
Robert Orr argues that “Man, as Machiavelli sees him in society, inhabits a world 
ruled neither by fortune, nor by himself, but by time.” Robert Orr, “The Time Motif 
in Machiavelli,” in  Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought , ed. Martin Fleisher 
(New York: Atheneum, 1972), 188. Michael McCanles, furthermore, writes that for 
Machiavelli “to conform oneself to the times really means to conform oneself to time 
itself.” McCanles,  The Discourse of Il Principe , 116. On the competing conceptions of 
time in Machiavelli’s work see Antoine Chollet,  Les temps de la démocratie (Paris: Dal-
loz, 2011), 87–135. 
 30  For an early recognition that Machiavellian thought grasps the political realm as 
being fundamentally one of movement, as opposed to one of static objects, see J. 
Condé, “La sagesse Machiavelique: politique et rhétorique,” in  Umanesimo e scienza 
politica , ed. E. Castelli (Milan: Marzorati, 1951), 84. 
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 Discourses 2:5, here the instability of the political field simply reflects 
the instability of the natural one, Machiavelli again articulating a coex-
tensive philosophy of natural history: “the states that come into being 
immediately,  like all the other things in nature that are born and grow 
quickly, cannot have roots and corresponding elements, so that the first 
challenging time extinguishes them.” 31 In chapter 10, speaking of the 
impossibility of attacking a prince who is not hated by his people with-
out suffering embarrassing defeat, Machiavelli writes: “A prince, there-
fore, who has a strong city and does not make himself hated, cannot be 
attacked; and even if there is someone who would attack him, he would 
withdraw in disgrace, because  the things of the world are so variable that it 
is almost impossible that one could stand with his armies idle for a year 
in a siege.” 32 And in the penultimate chapter of the text this variability 
is considered in terms of the conceptual impossibility of generating a 
metaphysical schema capable of regulating and investing with a singu-
lar meaning the chaos of life, Machiavelli writing of “the great variabil-
ity of things that have been seen and are seen now each day, beyond all 
human conjecture.” 33 
 Machiavelli and the Appearance of Human Wickedness 
 Despite some prominent exceptions, it is notable just how many com-
mentators, despite their attempts to assimilate Machiavelli into highly 
distinct political positions – not just radical democratic ones, but proto-
liberal, 34 civic humanist, 35 realist, 36 and even fascist 37 ones – agree on the 
question of his affirmation of the fact of worldly contingency. 38 Most of 
 31  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. Emphasis added. 
 32  Ibid., chap. 10. Emphasis added. 
 33  Ibid., chap. 25. 
 34  Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli,” in  Against the Current: Essays in the 
History of Ideas (New York: Viking Press, 1980), 37. 
 35  Hanan Yoran, “Machiavelli’s Critique of Humanism and the Ambivalences of 
Modernity,”  History of Political Thought 31, no. 2 (2010): 251. 
 36  Friedrich Meinecke,  Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État and Its Place in Modern 
History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 31. 
 37  Joseph Femia, “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism,”  History of Political Thought 25, no. 1 
(2004): 5. 
 38  Besides the commentators already mentioned, see also, for example, Carl Roebuck, 
“A Search for Political Stability,”  Phoenix 6, no. 2 (1952): 55; Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, 
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these readers, however, despite recognizing that Machiavelli rejects all 
positive metaphysical frameworks that conceive being in terms of sta-
bility and rationally guided movement, abstract the human from the 
world, asserting a fixed Machiavellian human nature. 39 In general 
human essence is interpreted in terms of an acquisitive and invidious 
egoism that insatiably strives after possessions and honours, and which 
is moralized through the label of wickedness. 40 Quentin Skinner, for 
“The Poetry of Power: Machiavelli’s Literary Vision,”  Review of National Literatures 
1, no. 1 (1970): 42; Gilbert,  Machiavelli and Guicciardini , 198; Felix Gilbert, “The 
Humanist Concept of the Prince and  The Prince of Machiavelli,” in  History: Choice 
and Committment (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 
92; Klaus Held, “Civic Prudence in Machiavelli: Toward the Paradigm Transforma-
tion in Philosophy in the Transition to Modernity,” in  The Ancients and the Moderns , 
ed. Reginald Lilly, trans. Anthony Steinbeck (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), 119; Diego A. von Vacano,  The Art of Power: Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and 
the Making of Aesthetic Political Theory (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 78; Brook 
Montgomery Blair, “Post-Metaphysical and Radical Humanist Thought,”  History of 
European Ideas 27, no. 3 (2001): 200; Michael Dillon, “Lethal Freedom: Divine Violence 
and the Machiavellian Moment,”  Theory and Event 11, no. 2 (2008). 
 39  For explicit manifestations of this ambivalence with respect to the question of 
worldly vs. human nature see Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli,” 172; Robert 
Kocis,  Machiavelli Redeemed: Retrieving His Humanist Perspectives on Equality, Power, 
and Glory (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1998), 37, 60; Paul A. Rahe, “Situating 
Machiavelli,” in  Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Refl ections , ed. James 
Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 270–308; Joseph V. Femia, 
 Machiavelli Revisited (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2004), 13, 64. One of the few 
commentators to note the continuity between these two dimensions of Machiavelli’s 
thought is Diego von Vacano. Von Vacano divides Machiavelli’s metaphysics into 
two spheres: a cosmology that provides a model of the world and a philosophical 
anthropology that provides a model of the human being, both of which are subject to 
contingent dynamics to a degree that closes off the potential for systematic analysis. 
Von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 78–9. 
 40  See, for example, Strauss,  Thoughts on Machiavelli , 279; Olschki,  Machiavelli: The 
Scientist , 18; Raymond Aron,  Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes , ed. Rémy Freymond 
(Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1993), 68; Mark Jurdjevic, “Machiavelli’s Hybrid Repub-
licanism,”  English Historical Review 122, no. 499 (2007): 1238; Hillay Zmora, “Love of 
Country and Love of Party: Patriotism and Human Nature in Machiavelli,”  History 
of Political Thought 25, no. 3 (2004): 425; Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Rapacious Repub-
licanism,” xxxv; Gérald Sfez, “Deciding on Evil,” in  Radical Evil , ed. Joan Copjec, 
trans. James Swenson (London: Verso, 1996), 127–8. Oftentimes this anthropological 
assumption of human evil, furthermore, is seen to be a residual trace of the preva-
lence of Augustinian theology in Machiavelli’s historical context. See, for example, 
Bjørn Qviller, “The Machiavellian Cosmos,”  History of Political Thought 27, no. 3 
(1996): 328; Joseph Anthony Mazzeo,  Renaissance and Revolution: The Remaking of 
 The Contingency of Being 55
example, writes that Machiavelli has a “deeply pessimistic view of 
human nature,” one that is reducible to the best-known characteriza-
tions of the people that we find in  The Prince . 41 Machiavelli writes that 
“of men one can say this generally: that they are ungrateful, fickle, 
deceivers and dissimulators, avoiders of danger, covetous of profit.” 42 
Later in the same chapter, while discussing the prince’s need to be feared 
in such a way that he is not hated, Machiavelli details the primary mode 
by which the possessive and acquisitive being of individuals is asserted. 
He maintains that the prince should above all else assure that he respects 
the property of his subjects, for individuals are so self-regarding as to 
privilege the security of their private possessions over the actual physi-
cal lives of, not only others, but close relations. He writes that the prince 
will succeed at his goal if he “refrains from the property of his citizens 
and his subjects, and from their women. And even if it is necessary to 
proceed against anyone’s life, do it when there is reasonable justification 
and manifest cause; but, above all, refrain from the property of others, 
because men sooner forget the death of a father than the loss of a father’s 
estate.” 43 It thus seems difficult to imagine, given this apparently acquis-
itive and egoistic being, how a common political order grounded in 
mutual respect for the interests and needs of other citizens could be 
established. Indeed, Skinner will ultimately go so far as to claim that 
Machiavelli “is a consistent, an almost Hobbesian skeptic about the pos-
sibility of inducing men to behave well except by cajolery or force.” 44 
Hence even in the  Discourses must the founder of the commonwealth 
presume that all men are wicked and that envy is a fundamental ele-
ment of human nature. Neither education, inspiring leadership, nor reli-
gion are capable of transforming human nature to shape people such 
that they are able to privilege civic virtue over their private desire. 45 
European Thought (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), 85; Giuseppe Prezzolini, “The 
Christian Roots of Machiavelli’s Moral Pessimism,”  Review of National Literatures 1, 
no. 1 (1970): 33–7; Max Horkheimer, “Egoism and the Freedom Movement: On the 
Anthropology of the Bourgeois Era,” trans. David Parent,  Telos , no. 54 (1982): 13. 
 41  Quentin Skinner,  The Foundations of Modern Political Thought , vol. 1:  The Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 137. 
 42  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 17. 
 43  Ibid. 
 44  Skinner,  The Foundations of Modern Political Thought , vol. 1:  The Renaissance , 185. 
 45  Quentin Skinner, “Machiavelli on  Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty,” in  Visions of 
Politics , vol. 2:  Renaissance Visions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 169–73. 
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 The passage that Skinner is here referring to is the following, from 
 Discourses 1:3: “it is necessary to one who provides a republic, and 
orders laws in it, to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they must 
always use the malignity of their spirit anytime they have a free occa-
sion to.” 46 There are, however, two issues that would seem to problema-
tize the utilization of this statement as evidence for Machiavelli’s belief 
in the universality of a human nature considered in terms of an orienta-
tion toward the invidious maximization of private good. The first, of 
course, is that Machiavelli does not state that all individuals  are by their 
nature bad, but simply that the prudent orderer of the political regime 
must  presuppose that they are so. The second issue, which provides us 
with an explanation as to why one seeking to order a republican way of 
life must presume this, is given an initial expression in this chapter, 
through one of Machiavelli’s many accounts of the socializing power of 
custom and law. After the expulsion of the Tarquins the nobles of Rome 
were initially able to conceal their malevolence through feigning a pop-
ular spirit and a love for the plebs. Once the nobles perceived them-
selves as secure in their social position, however, their actual hatred of 
the plebs was allowed to externally manifest itself, there having not 
been established after the expulsion of the Tarquins a new political 
order that would have been able to successfully institutionalize the 
prior condition, that is, noble fear. Lacking a customary foundation for 
the preservation of the desired condition, law assumes responsibility 
for moral training: “it is said that hunger and poverty make men indus-
trious, and the laws make them good. And where a thing works well 
itself without law, law is not necessary; but when that good custom is 
lacking, the law is immediately necessary.” 47 
 Although Machiavelli here uses the language of individuals being 
made good, one may nevertheless resist reading this lesson in terms of 
the potential to transform an apparent human nature, instead taking 
from it Machiavelli’s understanding of the fundamental power of the 
law to compel good behaviour in spite of a perpetual human malevo-
lence that always desires an external expression, regardless of whether 
or not a social space is available that would allow for such expression 
without fear. Such an interpretation, however, seems to be blocked by 
chapter 1:18. Here Machiavelli is speaking of a city that has been 
 46  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.3. 
 47  Ibid. 
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overcome by “universal corruption.” 48 Under such conditions corrup-
tion is incapable of being overcome through legal means alone, but 
rather through a form of customary socialization that aims at a funda-
mental transformation of a deep substratum of human being. Machia-
velli writes that “because, just as good customs need laws in order to be 
maintained, such laws need good customs in order to be observed.” 49 
Ultimately there is a co-determination between law and custom at play, 
good laws being respected where custom has moulded good people 
who voluntarily recognize the legitimacy of the legal order, and good 
custom being habitually preserved through the legal order that affirms 
the social values inculcated in individuals. And should a reader be 
unconvinced that Machiavelli is in this discussion not referring to an 
actual transformation of individual nature, he will go on to clearly dif-
ferentiate between forms of society on the basis of a distinction between 
a generalized goodness and a generalized wickedness, through the 
account of the need to vary laws and orders through time in order to 
stay in accord with historical movement, writing that “the orders and 
the laws made in a republic at its birth, when men were good, are no 
longer appropriate later, when they have become bad.” 50 
 At this point we can return to Machiavelli’s original formulation 
regarding the necessity of the republican founder to assume the wick-
edness of individuals, and how it can be read as simultaneously consis-
tent with both Machiavelli’s pessimistic characterization of individuals 
in  The Prince , and his optimistic characterization of individuals later in 
Book One of the  Discourses , which I will examine in more detail in the 
following section. Regarding the latter characterization let us consider, 
as just one example,  Discourses 1:55, which is particularly notable given 
that Machiavelli here presents us with an example of a community of 
individuals who explicitly reject a mode of behaviour that is in  The 
Prince taken to be the fundamental marker of invidious egoism. In 1:55 
Machiavelli affirms that the establishment and preservation of a well-
ordered republic depend upon a people in possession of what he calls 
goodness: “And truly, where there is not this goodness, one can expect 
nothing good, as nothing good can be hoped for in the provinces that in 
 48  Ibid., bk. 1.18. 
 49  Ibid. 
 50  Ibid. 
58 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
these times are seen as corrupt, as in Italy above all others.” 51 Crucially, 
the primary expression of this goodness is precisely the opposite of 
what had been taken to be the primary expression of human wicked-
ness: against the egoistic drive to accumulate and secure private goods, 
we see instead individuals who, as a consequence of their positive inte-
gration into the life of the city, do not hesitate in contributing to it 
through the forfeit of their own property. This, for example, was seen in 
the Senate’s trust that the plebs would fulfil Camillus’s vow to contrib-
ute one-tenth of the booty of the Veientes to satisfy Apollo. Although 
this debt was ultimately not called in, “nevertheless one sees by this 
decision how much the Senate trusted in the goodness of [the plebs], 
and how they judged that nobody would not present precisely all that 
the edict had ordered. On the other hand, one sees how the plebs did 
not think of defrauding any part of the edict through giving less than 
they had to.” 52 
 Indeed, on Machiavelli’s account we see many examples of the will-
ingness of the people of Rome, as well as those of contemporary Ger-
many, to financially contribute to the city, without being compelled and 
without the expectation of the benefits of recognition: “Those [German] 
republics, when they need to spend some quantity of money for the 
public account, have those magistrates or councils that have authority 
assess all the inhabitants of the city one percent, or two, of what each 
has of value. And after such decision, according to the order of the land, 
each presents himself before the collectors of the tax, and first having 
taken an oath to pay the proper sum, throws into a designated chest 
that which according to his conscience it appears he has to pay: of this 
payment there is no witness but the one paying. Hence one can conjec-
ture how much goodness and how much religion is still in these men.” 53 
 51  Ibid., bk. 1.55. 
 52  Ibid. 
 53  Ibid. It is also worth bearing in mind at this point that even in  The Prince Machiavelli 
suggests that individuals ultimately care about more than just the preservation of 
their own property, noting how the people may support the prince even if their 
goods are destroyed in the process of siege. Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 10. See 
also the case of Spurius Cassius in  Discourses 3:8 and the speech of a member of the 
Signori in the  Florentine Histories , who, resisting the princely ambitions of Walter, 
duke of Athens, maintains that there is no amount of external goods suffi cient to 
counter the desire for freedom. Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito 
Livio,” bk. 3.8; Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 2.34. 
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There are two determining reasons for the appearance of such a will-
ingness for civic financial contribution. The first is the external lack of 
invidious comparison and the resentful desire that it gives rise to. This 
lack is largely a consequence of the non-encounter with foreign goods, 
individuals “not having had major interactions with their neighbours; 
for the latter have not come to their home, nor have they to the home of 
others, because they have been content with those goods, to live from 
those foods, to dress with that wool, which their country provides.” 54 
The second, which I will examine in more detail later, is the internal 
lack of invidious comparison, a result of the establishment of a certain 
type of social equality, represented in the lack of an idle class of expro-
priating gentlemen: “those republics where a political and uncorrupt 
life is maintained do not allow that any of their citizens be or live in the 
way of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among themselves a level 
equality, and to those lords and gentlemen in that province they are 
extremely hostile.” 55 In the final instance what we see is that the estab-
lishment of certain social modes of existence provides the concrete con-
ditions for overcoming that form of disposition that so many of 
Machiavelli’s commentators take to be an ineradicable dimension of 
the human essence. 
 Almost all readers recognize the extent to which Machiavelli affirms 
the socializing power of law and custom. Such socialization, however, 
is generally interpreted in terms of a productive regulation or modera-
tion of a basic set of essential human drives. 56 What the above example 
seems to demonstrate, however, is that there is nothing primary about 
appetitive acquisitiveness, which does not emerge in this situation as a 
consequence of the lack of those social conditions that stimulate its 
conventional development. What must be stressed is that for Machia-
velli neither goodness nor badness in the sense of the properties or 
 54  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.56. 
 55  Ibid., bk. 1.55. 
 56  Such a reading most notably characterizes the neo-Roman interpretation of Machia-
velli. For example, after identifying what he takes to be the vices “deeply rooted in 
human nature,” Quentin Skinner goes on to note that Machiavelli believes “that the 
law can act to liberate us from our natural but self-destructive interests.” Skinner, 
“Machiavelli on Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty,” 168, 177. Maurizio Viroli, 
meanwhile, interprets the law in terms of a necessary restriction of fundamental 
human appetites. Maurizio Viroli,  Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 128. 
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dispositions described here can be reduced to constituent elements of 
human nature, but in both cases are contingent results of concrete 
social-historical conditions of life. This is why Machiavelli can simul-
taneously speak of human wickedness where individuals are social-
ized in an institutional context that does not value or stimulate 
communal sensibilities, and human goodness in an institutional con-
text that does. As Claude Lefort writes, “The conduct of men is deter-
mined at once according to objective possibilities configured by 
circumstances, and rules or obligations imposed on them by institu-
tions, and the latter are elaborated and modified according to the rela-
tions developed by the actors, engaged as they are in factual conduct.” 57 
What Lefort correctly perceives here is that Machiavelli’s various and 
oftentimes seemingly contradictory declarations regarding the nature 
of individuals are analysable only within the context of the specific 
form of the political community under discussion at the moment of 
evaluation. Machiavelli assumes neither a natural human goodness 
nor a natural human badness, Lefort going so far as to claim that such 
questions are to Machiavelli ultimately irrelevant: “Are all men wicked 
or are they not? Is human nature in itself bad? Such questions hardly 
matter to Machiavelli. And if one insists on posing them, one will run 
up against contradictory statements that in fact acquire their meaning 
only once they are put back into context.” 58 
 If the majority of that human content that we take to be positive 
nature is just second nature, then in fact the defining human charac-
teristic would be nothing other than the openness of nature to altera-
tion and change. And if the primary factor stimulating alteration in 
nature is the form of social and political organization, then individu-
als themselves, to the extent that they are able to initiate common 
political projects and reflectively organize their lives according to cer-
tain principles of being, can themselves be seen as both the subjects 
and objects of such alteration. Human beings would thus be those 
who assume responsibility for creating their own nature; human 
essence would be negative as opposed to positive. In part three I will 
examine the mechanics by which individuals collectively perform 
such political operations through a study of the radically democratic 
 57  Claude Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , trans. Michael B. Smith (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 2012), 262. 
 58  Lefort, “Machiavelli and the  Verità Effetuale ,” 129. 
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form of Machiavelli’s republic. In the remainder of this chapter, 
though, I will highlight other key passages from Machiavelli’s writ-
ings that suggest this open and negative understanding of the human 
essence. 
 Socialization and the Production of Human Nature 
 Machiavelli’s critique of static and positive models of the human 
essence is revealed in two fundamentally related ways. The first has 
already been suggested: it is through Machiavelli’s multiple assertions 
regarding the openness of human being to alteration via socialization. 
The second is revealed through Machiavelli’s emphasis on the strong 
multiplicity that can be observed between different groups and indi-
viduals, a precise consequence of the potential for individual being to 
be developed in unique and myriad ways as a result of its openness to 
change. The potential for human being to change its form through 
exposure to unique socializing forces, often framed by commentators in 
terms of a distinction between first and second nature, is most clearly 
expressed in the  Discourses . 
 One of Machiavelli’s arguments that we see repeated over and over 
in the  Discourses is that the institution of a republican form of life 
depends first of all on the creation of a collectivity whose individual 
members have been educated toward a particular type of civility. This 
civility is considered not simply in terms of a repression of an always-
ineradicable wickedness, but rather in terms of an overcoming and abo-
lition of it, possible to the extent that the latter is always contingent and 
socially grounded. As noted, individuals are by their nature neither 
good nor bad, which is not to say that they are incapable of being either 
good or bad. Indeed, a civil way of life depends upon a social mutuality 
that is grounded in a certain human goodness, that is to say, a human 
form of being that eschews as primary the instrumental and egoistic 
pursuit of private goods. Hence Machiavelli’s distinction between 
shackled and unshackled populations, and how the people’s relation to 
the law fundamentally informs its “nature.” 59 The key chapter here is 
1:58, which will be analysed in more detail below in part three. The les-
son, though, is repeated in various places. It appears, for example, in 
1:11, during a discussion of Roman religion and the extent to which it 
 59  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.58. 
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was necessary for Numa to institute religious rites in order for him to 
engage with a “ferocious people” in need of pacification. 60 
 This discussion of the necessity of religion to political foundation 
takes place in the context of Machiavelli’s recognition of the present 
corruption of Italy, suggesting that the utilization of religious tech-
niques is not universally necessary for foundation, but rather only in 
certain social-historical situations, including Machiavelli’s and 
Numa’s, situations in which individuals are defined in terms of par-
ticular asocial yet transcendable forms of being. Hence Machiavelli 
writes that “without doubt, those who would wish to found a repub-
lic in the present time would find it easier among mountain men, 
where there is no civilization, than among those who are used to liv-
ing in cities, where civilization is corrupt: and a sculptor will get 
more easily a beautiful statue from rough marble than from one 
poorly shaped by others.” 61 That the utilization of religion as a politi-
cal technique is only required as a mode of socialization where indi-
vidual nature is deficient from the standpoint of republican life is 
confirmed in 1:13. Here Machiavelli shows how the use of religion is 
oriented toward the establishment of an internal social homogeneity 
that minimizes the potential for social conflict. What is crucial to rec-
ognize, and what again refers us to the always present need for con-
textual sensitivity to social-historical facts of existence when 
interpreting Machiavelli, is that he is thus not yet discussing his nor-
mative ideal – a well-ordered political regime in which disunion is 
productive – but rather a corrupt state where all forms of heterogene-
ity have the potential to immediately dissolve into sectarianism. The 
chapter speaks of the various noble uses of religion that were 
designed to break the instituted power of the plebs. Since we know, 
however, that Machiavelli does not ultimately think the plebs should 
be subordinated to the will of the nobles, it follows to assume that 
Machiavelli only thinks the utilization of religion as a mode of paci-
fication is justified when the popular matter is ferocious and corrupt, 
that is, wicked. 
 60  Ibid., bk. 1.11. 
 61  Ibid. Daniel Waley takes this observation to be one element of what he calls Machia-
velli’s primitivism, people who are rough and coarse being seen as more mal-
leable and open to change. Daniel Waley, “The Primitivist Element in Machiavelli’s 
Thought,”  Journal of the History of Ideas 31, no. 1 (1970): 92. 
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 This theme is returned to in a new context three chapters later in 1:16, 
where Machiavelli maintains that it is extremely difficult for people liv-
ing under a prince to maintain their freedom after being liberated, for 
they have not been educated to that civic mode of life necessary for the 
perpetual reproduction of free political self-activity. Machiavelli notes 
that “such difficulty is reasonable, because that people is not otherwise 
than a brute animal, which, although of a fierce and savage nature, has 
always been nourished in prison and in servitude. Afterwards, left free 
to its fate in the countryside, not being used to feeding itself nor know-
ing the places where it must take refuge, it becomes the prey of the first 
who seeks to rechain it.” 62 Needless to say, though, human beings are 
not mere beasts, even if they might appear so under such conditions. 
Indeed, what precisely differentiates the human being from other ani-
mal beings, what marks its specificity, is the openness of its nature to 
change through the confrontation with educating modes and orders. 
Machiavelli’s most detailed differentiation of human from animal 
nature occurs in  The Ass , specifically as it is articulated in the speech of 
the boar. In particular, the boar revels in the regular and constant nature 
of its life, a life unsubjected to the desires and ambitions of humans: 
“Our species does not care for other food than the product of heaven 
without art, and you want that which nature cannot bring. / You are 
not content with a single food, like us, but, to satisfy better your greedy 
desires, journey for these unto the kingdoms of the East. / It is not 
enough that which you collect on earth, so you enter the Ocean’s breast 
to satiate yourself with its spoils.” 63 The boar will go on to locate the 
insatiability of desire in the human capacity to produce and speak, and 
through the exercise of these capacities cancel out the immediacy of 
nature, simultaneously transforming the structure of the world and 
also the structure of the self. Unlike the animal, the human being can 
through its life activity transcend its nature. 64 The question at this point 
 62  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.16. 
 63  Machiavelli, “L’Asino,” 975. 
 64  Here there would seem to be a parallel between Machiavelli and Marx, a fact 
recognized by various Marxian inspired readers of Machiavelli. See, for example, 
Benedetto Fontana,  Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machia-
velli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 127; Antonio Gramsci, “The 
Modern Prince,” in  Selections from the Prison Notebooks , ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 133. 
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is not whether Machiavelli thinks it is a more genuine or truer happi-
ness to be self-identical and constant like the sated pig. 65 It is essential 
to note simply that the specificity of human nature is articulated in 
terms of the human ability to subvert its immediate forms. 
 If human beings are habituated to living like animals, then it makes 
little sense to expect them to immediately possess the ability to enjoy a 
free way of life, to the extent that freedom is largely thought in terms of 
a certain reflective self-questioning. A liberated people lacking such a 
nature, since it is “used to living under the governments of others, not 
knowing how to reason about any public offence or defence, not know-
ing of princes nor being known by them, soon returns under a yoke that 
most of the time is more severe than the one that, a little earlier, it had 
threw off its neck; and it finds itself in these difficulties although its 
matter is not corrupt. Because a people where everything has entered 
into corruption cannot live free.” 66 Whenever referring to human capac-
ity then, often framed in terms of the form of appearance of human 
nature, we must begin our analysis with a consideration of the distinc-
tion between forms of social being, between a people socialized to con-
cern for civic life in common and a people socialized to concern for 
merely private advantage. Such contextual need is suggested by Machi-
avelli’s specification in 1:16 that “our reasonings are of those peoples 
where corruption is not very extended, and where there is more of the 
good than of the spoiled.” 67 Once again, though, despite Machiavelli’s 
utilization of the language of corruption, it is not a matter of isolating 
either a primary goodness or a primary badness, locating apparent 
badness in the mere corruption of fundamental goodness, or apparent 
goodness in the repression of fundamental badness. The existence of an 
essentially bad substratum is explicitly rejected in 3:29, where Machia-
velli writes that “princes should not complain of any sin committed by 
the people they rule, because these sins necessarily arise either from his 
negligence, or from him being guilty of similar errors. And whoever 
discourses on the people who in our times have been held full of 
 65  In  The Ass this ability for self-transcendence is identifi ed as the source of human 
misery, as seen for example in the violent attempts of individuals to realize their 
private ambition. As I will argue later, though, the actualization of ambition need 
not proceed in these terms, that is violently, privately, and against others, but can be 
realized through a form of non-antagonistic democratic practice. 
 66  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.16. 
 67  Ibid. 
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robberies and similar sins, will see that it is  entirely created by those who 
ruled, who were of a similar nature.” 68 Once again, the nature of indi-
viduals is a productive result of processes of political socialization. 
 Just as it would be a mistake to read Machiavelli’s account of social-
ization as mere mediation of an essential human disposition toward a 
positive mode of doing or being, so too it would be a mistake to inter-
pret it as mere habituation that produces a second nature that is as static 
as our “first” nature. 69 Against such readings that emphasize the rigid 
form of habitual character, I would argue that Machiavelli provides us 
with many examples of cases in which second nature reveals its per-
petually open character through non-protracted socialization. Such 
seems to be clearly disclosed in  Discourses 1:42, significantly entitled 
“How easily men can be corrupted.” This ease is a consequence pre-
cisely of the instability of human nature, revealed here through the 
example of life under the Decemvirate. Machiavelli writes: “We note 
also, in this Decemvirate matter, how easily men are corrupted, and 
made to assume a contrary nature, despite how good and well-
trained.” 70 It took very little indeed for the youth attracted by Appius to 
abandon or lose their prior disposition and throw their support behind 
the Ten, for instance. The most specific examples Machiavelli provides 
of short-term alteration in preformed nature occur in the military con-
text; hence the chapter immediately following 1:42, again on the 
destructive influence of the Decemvirate, in the context of a discussion 
of the uselessness of mercenaries and their orientation toward the 
 68  Ibid., bk. 3.29. Emphasis added. Mark Jurdjevic reminds us that Machiavelli never 
shied away from placing all of the blame for Italy’s woes on rulers. Mark Jurdjevic, 
“Virtue, Fortune, and Blame in Machiavelli’s Life and  The Prince ,”  Social Research 81, 
no. 1 (2014): 40. 
 69  See, for example, Janet Coleman,  A History of Political Thought: From the Middle 
Ages to the Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 255; Cary J. Nederman, “Rhetoric, 
Reason, and Republic: Republicanisms – Ancient, Medieval, and Modern,” in  Renais-
sance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Refl ections , ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 363. Compare such readings with that of some-
one like Pierre Manent. For Manent what defi nes the new prince is the ability to live 
without a habitus, this being just one manifestation of Machiavelli’s affi rmation of 
the capacity for self-variability that is at the heart of his anthropology: “If Machia-
velli asks the Prince of enough freedom of mind to exit the path of the good, it is as 
test and guarantee of the indefi nite plasticity of his soul.” Pierre Manent,  Naissances 
de la politique moderne (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 22. 
 70  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.42. 
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achievement of their own glory. Machiavelli notes that Roman soldiers 
were in possession of exactly the same set of technical skills in the 
interim as before and after the rule of the Ten yet nevertheless lacked 
the spiritual disposition to function as good soldiers, and this precisely 
because they lacked an orientation toward a free way of life. Neverthe-
less, a change in the customary mode was sufficient to reinstall this 
orientation and correct the lack that the Decemvirate arbitrarily pro-
duced: “But as soon as the magistracy of the Ten was eliminated, and 
they began a free military life, the same spirit returned to them; and in 
consequence their enterprises had the same happy end as before, in 
accordance with their old custom.” 71 The new situation produced not 
only a new character, but a new character defined in terms of a capacity 
for free action. Overall, it seems as if Machiavelli believes that once an 
individual’s character or nature becomes generated there nevertheless 
always remains the potential for further alteration through exposure to 
new forces. Individuals and armies can transform from bad to good 
and back again as a result of subjection to new customs, orders, and 
institutions. As Machiavelli puts it in the “Discourse on Florentine 
Affairs,” “men mutate easily and turn from good to miserable.” 72 
 The Multiplicity of Human Being 
 The non-determination of human nature for Machiavelli is second 
revealed through the strong multiplicity of forms of human doing 
and being that we can observe in the world. This multiplicity is the 
social consequence of the openness of internal nature to alteration via 
engagement with specific processes of socio-cultural and political 
socialization. Readers of Machiavelli most often interpret the latter’s 
understanding of social difference as exhausted by the seemingly 
primary differentiation of humours that Machiavelli associates with 
the plebs and the grandees respectively. Whereas the latter are 
defined in terms of their desire to oppress and dominate, the former 
are defined in terms of their desire to not be oppressed or dominated. 
In  chapter 4 I will argue that this distinction of humours is not only 
not originary, but simply the form of appearance of a fundamental 
 71  Ibid., bk. 1.43. 
 72  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” in  Tutte Ie opere , 24. 
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human desire for self-creation. In this section, though, I will point to 
several passages in Machiavelli’s work that reveal the fact that social 
difference is actually much more complex and variegated than nor-
mally thought, and ultimately irreducible to the binary division of 
noble and plebeian humours. 
 The link between the two manifestations of the contingency of human 
nature is established by Machiavelli in  Discourses 3:22, in the discussion 
of the differing modes of Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus. As 
in the case of Quintius and Appius Claudius presented three chapters 
earlier, the modes of Manlius and Valerius are seen as providing us 
with contrasting examples of potential means of command: “Manlius, 
with every severity, without intervening in his soldiers’ fatigue or pain, 
commanded them; Valerius, on the other hand, with every human 
mode and way, and full of familiar attachment, delighted them.” 73 
Despite the opposite modes, however, both actors achieved the same 
success. This raises several questions, the most significant for our pur-
poses being, how could two individuals raised in the same place pro-
ceed so differently? The answer to this question lay in the internally 
differentiated modes of education that mark all cities, and republican 
ones in particular. The specificity of Manlius’s upbringing produced a 
strong nature that inclined him to extraordinary command. One not 
socialized in this way, and hence not in possession of this nature, would 
not be able to act by such extraordinary modes. As Machiavelli says, 
“whoever is not of this strength of spirit ought to guard himself from 
extraordinary controls, and in the ordinary ones use his humanity; for 
ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince, but to the laws 
and to those orders.” 74 There is thus a co-determination between the 
multiplicity of being and the openness of being to change, the form of 
internal nature and the modes of action that this nature allows for being 
delimited by embeddedness in a part of this multiplicity. Ultimately the 
question of education and upbringing speaks to the social difference of 
the polity, to the fact that there will never exist in the city a form of 
homogeneous socialization that is capable of levelling human being, 
producing an exact identity among citizens. 
 I have suggested in this chapter that Machiavelli’s theorization of the 
variability of internal nature is a constituent element of his recognition 
 73  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.22. 
 74  Ibid. 
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of the variability of external nature, as represented in his account of the 
world as chaotic and subject to historical flux. This relationship is 
nowhere articulated with more precision than in certain of Machiavel-
li’s private letters. In the  Ghiribizzi , for example, Machiavelli writes to 
Giovan Battista Soderini that “my luck has exhibited to me so many 
things, and so varied, that I am rarely compelled to be surprised or 
confess that I have not savoured, either through reading or through 
practice, the actions of men and their modes of proceeding.” 75 Such a 
diversity of individuals and modes is for Machiavelli taken to be sim-
ply a reflection of the natural diversity that he sees all around him in the 
temporal world, nature having bestowed on individuals, even prior to 
their socialization, unique forms and tendencies: “I believe that, as 
Nature has created men with different faces, so it has created them with 
different temperaments and imaginations. From this emerges that each 
one governs himself according to his own temperament and imagina-
tion.” 76 It is precisely because the world is in a perpetual state of move-
ment that the modes of one individual may at one point in time lead to 
success while at another lead to ruin. 
 Machiavelli’s apparent belief in the stability of individual beings, 
themselves fixed manifestations of the diversity of human being, might 
seem to suggest that individuals are thus at the mercy of time. Indeed, 
he goes on to write that “because times and things in general and in 
particular mutate frequently, and men change neither their imagina-
tions nor their modes of proceeding, it results that one has good fortune 
at one time and miserable at another.” 77 Yet of course we know given 
the discussion above this cannot be the case. As will be argued in the 
following chapter, Machiavelli is here referring only to the impossibil-
ity of individuals completely mastering reality, simultaneously achiev-
ing complete rational dominance over their psyches and their world. 
Hence when the theme of the relationship between one’s temperament 
 75  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 116, Niccolò Machiavelli a Giovan Battista Soderini,” in  Tutte 
le opere , 1082. For an account of Machiavelli’s theory of imagination such as it is 
elaborated in this letter, see K.R. Minogue, “Theatricality and Politics: Machiavelli’s 
Concept of Fantasia,” in  The Morality of Politics , ed. Bhikhu Parekh and R.N. Berki 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), 148–62. 
 76  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 116, Niccolò Machiavelli a Giovan Battista Soderini,” in  Tutte le 
opere , 1083. 
 77  Ibid. 
 The Contingency of Being 69
and the times is returned to in  Discourses 3:9, Machiavelli highlights the 
actor’s ability to autonomously match his or her mode with the worldly 
reality. 78 Indeed, here it is precisely the diversity of republics that is 
identified as that which allows them to vary with the times more ade-
quately than republics, the people being, if slower as a consequence of 
their number, equally able to reorient their mode of being in light of 
their perception of the shifting nature of the historical conjuncture. 79 
 It is not true that the unique internal nature bestowed on the indi-
vidual by external nature is incapable of being altered. On the contrary, 
Machiavelli theorizes virtuous action precisely in terms of such reflec-
tive alteration, the successful political actor being he or she who is most 
able to imitate the diversity of the world through the adoption of a 
diversity of natures or personas. For Machiavelli the multiplicity of 
human life is a moment or element of the multiplicity of nature, one 
which individuals must seek to imitate for the sake of environmental 
orientation. 80 This multiplicity of internal and external nature is explic-
itly affirmed by Machiavelli in a letter to Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli 
using the experiences of himself and his friend as examples of the 
dynamics here at play: “Whoever would see our letters, honourable 
comrade, would see the diversity of them, and would greatly marvel, 
because it would immediately seem that we were serious men, entirely 
directed toward great things, and that no thought could pass through 
our heads that did not have integrity and grandeur. But afterwards, 
turning the page, it would seem to them that we ourselves be frivolous, 
inconstant, lascivious, and directed toward useless things. This mode 
of proceeding, if for someone it appears to be shameful, to me it appears 
laudable, because we are imitating nature, which is changeable; and 
whoever imitates that cannot be reprimanded.” 81 
 Overall, Machiavelli’s letters reveal his belief that to imitate nature is 
to be receptive to adaptation, to the need to shift one’s mode of doing 
and being in order to actualize the human potential to create one’s 
nature. In Arlene Saxonhouse’s words, “Unlike the Nature of the 
 78  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.9. 
 79  Ibid. 
 80  On this point see Del Lucchese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spi-
noza , 145. 
 81  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 239, Niccolò Machiavelli a Francesco Vettori,” in  Tutte le opere , 
1191. 
70 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
ancients and medieval philosophers, Machiavelli’s Nature demands 
that we not affirm a fixed form to ourselves lest we be broken by the 
rigidity of our characters, that we not mire ourselves in the moralistic 
pieties of those who lose in the comic stories of Italian literature.” 82 
Indeed, Saxonhouse argues that tracing the comedic elements in Machi-
avelli’s letters allows us to reconstruct his strong emphasis on the 
human potential to create, refound, and redefine being. Machiavelli’s 
letters “become an explicit arena for the exercise of his imagination, for 
the creation of stories and drama – for the leap from what is to what 
might be, from what we observe to what we suspect based on observa-
tion.” 83 The emphasis is on the ability of the actor to become other than 
what he or she is prior to imaginative creation. Hence in the most 
famous letter to Vettori, Machiavelli’s personal adaptability, his every-
day imitation of the diversity of nature, is expressed through his con-
stant oscillation between various social roles, such as a writer on 
principalities, a student of the ancients, a hunter, a gamesman, and so 
on. 84 This diversity of being was stimulated by Machiavelli’s engage-
ments with the locals, who compelled him to an even greater degree to 
recognize and appreciate the diversity of humankind: “moving then up 
the road toward the inn, I talk to those who pass by, I ask news of their 
countries, I come to understand various things, and I note the manifold 
tastes and different patterns of men.” 85 
 Machiavelli’s letters thus reveal that human multiplicity has a double 
form: individuals are non-identical both with respect to others, and 
 82  Arlene W. Saxonhouse, “Comedy, Machiavelli’s Letters, and His Imaginary Repub-
lics,” in  The Comedy and Tragedy of Machiavelli: Essays on the Literary Works , ed. Vickie 
B. Sullivan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 61. See also Arlene W. Saxon-
house, “Machiavelli’s Women,” in  Machiavelli’s Legacy: The Prince after Five Hundred 
Years , ed. Timothy Fuller (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 
70–86. 
 83  Saxonhouse, “Comedy, Machiavelli’s Letters, and His Imaginary Republics,” 63. 
Maurizio Viroli also observes that in his letters Machiavelli “asserted as clearly as 
possible that the right way of living and thinking is to intelligently accommodate 
different and even contradictory aspects of human life, like passions and reason, 
gravity and lightness, civic integrity and playful transgression.” Viroli,  Redeeming 
The Prince , 67. 
 84  Saxonhouse, “Comedy, Machiavelli’s Letters, and His Imaginary Republics,” 75. 
 85  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 216, Niccolò Machiavelli a Francesco Vettori,” in  Tutte le opere , 
1159. 
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with respect to themselves. This double form is further revealed in the 
 Discourses , where it will ultimately influence Machiavelli’s theorization 
of the ideal form of his republican regime, a regime that is able to har-
ness this double difference for the sake of political generation. Both the 
external and internal non-identity of individuals are clearly and simul-
taneously articulated in the preface to Book Two during one of Machia-
velli’s discussions of the misappropriation of past historical objects. 
Machiavelli here asks the following question: if individuals misjudge 
ancient things because of a lack of direct experience with them, should 
they then not be able to properly judge those events that they have 
lived through themselves and that they have experienced directly? 
Machiavelli determines that it is ultimately impossible to establish a 
universality of perception grounded in an equivalent experience of all 
subjects. This is because individuals are different from one another, 
appropriating and judging the world in unique ways, and also because 
individual forms of being themselves change over time, such that 
objects are experienced and perceived in different ways at different 
points in the subject’s life. On the one hand we see a general “variation 
of customs.” 86 On the other hand, even if this were not the case, there 
would still not be a ground for assuming consistent judgment: “This 
thing would be true if men through all the times of their lives were of 
the same opinion, and had the same appetites; but since these vary 
even if the times do not vary, they cannot appear the same to men who 
have other appetites, other delights, other considerations in old age 
than in youth.” 87 In short, people are capable of occupying a variety of 
seemingly incompatible subject positions. As will be detailed in the fol-
lowing chapter, Machiavelli associates the ability of individuals to shift 
such positions with virtuous political action, as revealed for example 
through the figure of the centaur Chiron in  The Prince , who is able to 
exploit the diverse modes of both beast and human. 
 In other places throughout the  Discourses the general fact of human 
difference is expressed in various contexts and in various ways. For 
example: in 1:9, during a discussion of the many versus the one with 
respect to the efficiency of foundation and preservation, Machiavelli 
speaks of the “diverse opinions” naturally held by people; 88 in 3:6, 
 86  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2, preface. 
 87  Ibid. 
 88  Ibid., bk. 1.9. 
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during his discussion of the causes of the failures of conspiracies, and 
in particular of the inability to control or map the motivations of others, 
Machiavelli again affirms the fact of differential rationality, writing that 
“two cannot be agreed together in all of their reasonings”; 89 and in 3:9, 
the intensification of difference in republican contexts is pointed out, an 
essential feature of republics being the existence of “diverse citizens 
and diverse humours.” 90 Machiavelli’s affirmation of social difference, 
however, at least inasmuch as it is articulated within his major political 
writings, is most clearly revealed in 3:46. Here Machiavelli makes clear 
that human division manifests itself not only between unique political 
communities, between cities that are considered internally homoge-
neous though distinguished from one another via cultural or social-
political variation. There is also a division internal to cities, and not just 
republican ones: “It appears that not only one city has certain modes 
and institutions different from another, and produces men more hard 
or more effeminate, but in the same city one sees such difference exis-
tent in families, one from the other. This is found to be true in every 
city.” 91 Machiavelli gives as evidence for this claim certain distinguish-
able tendencies found within Rome, such as the particular toughness of 
the Manlii, the kindness of the Publicoli, the ambition of the Appii, and 
so on, for “many other families had each of its qualities distinct from 
the others.” 92 
 Machiavelli’s framing of difference in terms of familial singularity 
might mislead us into reading division in simply genetic terms, as a 
manifestation of an intrinsic and ineradicable biological logic that oper-
ates independently of human intervention. Machiavelli, though, will 
immediately go on to close off such potential readings, locating differ-
ence in a variety of contingent social relations and determinations. 
Machiavelli thus explicitly posits here, again, a co-relationality between 
the two markers of the contingency of human nature that I have 
 89  Ibid., bk. 3.6. 
 90  Ibid., bk. 3.9. As Pocock notes, and as will be investigated later, one of the key 
reasons the republic is a more adaptable regime than the principality is because it 
has “a diversity of personality types at its disposal.” J.G.A. Pocock, “Machiavelli and 
Rome: The Republic as Ideal and as History,” in  Machiavelli and Republicanism , ed. 
John M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 153. 
 91  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.46. 
 92  Ibid. 
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identified, the openness to alteration and the fact of difference. He 
writes: “These things cannot arise only from the blood, because that 
should vary by means of the diversity of marriages, but must necessar-
ily come from the diverse education of one family from another. So it is 
very important that a youth of tender years begin to hear good or bad 
said of a thing, because it should make an impression, and from then on 
regulate the mode of proceeding in all the times of his life.” 93 The latter 
contention, furthermore, that socialization produces an impression that 
the subject will bear with him or herself throughout his or her life, 
should not be interpreted as Machiavelli’s concession that once one’s 
character becomes fixed it assumes an essential form that closes the 
potential for future alteration. On the contrary, it is simply Machiavel-
li’s recognition that individuals are always historical beings, beings 
from some time and some place, with a particular past, and whose exis-
tence always leans upon and is delimited by their social location and 
experience. As noted by many commentators, it is precisely such social 
difference that any political project must seek to negotiate, each of 
Machiavelli’s major political works being largely oriented toward a 
consideration of the potential nature of such negotiations. 94 Part three 
of this study will be concerned with articulating how difference is 
negotiated in Machiavelli’s republican writings, as I will argue that 
Machiavelli’s defence of the republic is grounded in an ethical impera-
tive to affirm human difference through a form of agonistic democratic 
institutionalization. 
 • 
 Once again, it must be stressed that Machiavelli’s theorization of the 
indetermination of human being is a correlate of his theorization of the 
indetermination of the world. Readers of Machiavelli are generally far 
too quick to attribute to him belief in a positive human nature, that is, 
 93  Ibid. 
 94  See, for example, Jane S. Jacquette, “Rethinking Machiavelli: Feminism and Citizen-
ship,” in  Feminist Interpretations of Machiavelli , ed. Maria J. Falco (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 339–40; Maurizio Viroli,  From Politics to 
Reasons of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–
1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 173; S.M. Shumer, “Machia-
velli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption,”  Political Theory 7, no. 1 (1979): 15; 
Terray, “An Encounter: Althusser and Machiavelli,” 273. 
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a determinate human orientation toward certain universal modes of 
doing and being, closing off or denying the potential for the human 
being to create its own nature, thus transcending human nature’s im-
mediate form of appearance. Recognition of the co-implication of 
worldly and human being has important consequences for how we in-
terpret Machiavelli’s political theory. Machiavelli’s rejection of natural 
teleology certainly does not necessitate an equivalent rejection of all 
normative political ethics. 95 On the contrary, the former fundamentally 
structures the latter. For Machiavelli the lack of a human telos is not 
coextensive with the lack of political essence because essence is nega-
tive, speaking only to the human potential for creative self-alteration. 
Machiavelli will thus think the being of the political in precisely such 
creative terms: politics is not oriented, for example, toward delibera-
tion aimed at the mutual recognition of common human goods, but 
toward agonistic debate over the always highly contentious direction 
of the form of the political community, which is never capable of being 
fixed due to the fact of human multiplicity and the capacity for self-
alteration. For Machiavelli the human being is indeed a political animal, 
just not an Aristotelian political animal. Specifically, the human being 
is a political animal to the extent that politics is considered by Machia-
velli as the mode by which individuals are capable of expressing their 
fundamental capacity for creative self-overcoming. Before examining 
the outlines of such a mode of politics, however, we must first inves-
tigate in more detail Machiavelli’s theorization of this creativity that is 
suggested by the account of the indetermination of human being. In 
this chapter I have detailed the extent to which Machiavelli rejects all 
positive philosophical anthropologies. In the next chapter I will go on 
to attempt, primarily through a study of the form of subjectivity that 
Machiavelli presents us with in  The Prince , to reconstruct an alternative 
philosophical anthropology that more comprehensively highlights the 
ethos of creativity that I have been referring to throughout this study. 
 95  For manifestations of this position see Paul A. Rahe,  Against Throne and Altar: 
Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 55; Rahe, “Situating Machiavelli,” 305; Leo Strauss, “Machia-
velli and Classical Literature,”  Review of National Literatures 1, no. 1 (1970): 10. 
 Chapter Three 
 Politics and the Human Essence:  
The Prince as a Model of Human 
Subjectivity 
 In this chapter I provide a first element of my proposal for a new mode 
of reading Machiavelli’s  Prince in relation to the  Discourses on Livy . I 
argue that in  The Prince Machiavelli is assembling a theoretical constel-
lation aimed at the articulation of the ideal mode of political subjectiv-
ity, the form of being of the virtuous political actor. In the  Discourses , 
meanwhile, Machiavelli develops a different constellation of thought, 
this one looking toward the figure of a political regime that is capable 
of generalizing this form of subjectivity, and providing the institutional 
conditions for a popular actualization of political virtue. In this chapter 
I will concentrate on the first of these two constellations. I will argue 
that through extracting and juxtaposing certain conceptual elements 
from the text, and through presenting them in light of Machiavelli’s 
critique of positive models of essence as detailed in the last chapter, we 
can reread  The Prince as a treatise on the nature of the human capacity 
for creative self-expression. 
 The form of subjectivity that Machiavelli develops in  The Prince is the 
foundation of his reorientation of human ethics, a reorientation that is 
only fully articulated in the normative defence of democratic republican 
life in the  Discourses on Livy . With respect to  The Prince , although com-
mentators are correct to point out the extent to which Machiavelli here 
rejects all totalizing moralities that delimit in advance the legitimate 
scope of political behaviour, often they are far too quick to interpret such 
a rejection in terms of a refusal of any ethical principle as such. 1 
 1  See, for example, Yoran, “Machiavelli’s Critique of Humanism,” 256; Plamenatz,  Machia-
velli, Hobbes, and Rousseau , 20. 
76 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
Contrary to such interpretations, in this chapter I argue that Machiavel-
li’s text articulates a new ethical paradigm grounded in a consideration 
of the fundamental creative power of the individual. The Machiavellian 
concept of  virtù will ultimately refer us to a particular form of reflective 
judgment that looks toward – through the critical interrogation of the 
being of the world and the opportunities for action this being opens up 
to the actor – the energetic expulsion of a fundamental human ambition, 
an expulsion that actualizes itself in the generation of new political 
modes and orders. 2 Machiavelli’s ethics is thus one of self-creation. He 
attempts to think the conditions for the realization of a particular type of 
negative human essence considered in terms of the transgressive ability 
to perpetually overcome existent forms through the institution of new 
political realities. 
 The Affirmation of Creativity and 
the Constellative Form of  The Prince 
 What immediately strikes one as consistent across the wide range 
of Machiavelli’s writings is the strong emphasis placed on the value of 
novelty or innovation. Machiavelli’s valorization of the new and of 
beginnings is well known. The principle of creativity affirmed by 
Machiavelli can be seen as operative in a diversity of human fields, 
Machiavelli constructing a hierarchy of foundation that moves from 
founders of religions, to founders of states, to expanders of states, to 
literary creators. 3 In this construction Machiavelli establishes a strong 
link between political creation, artistic creation, and productive cre-
ation, seeing each as moments of a larger general orientation toward 
innovative institution. The potential range of such institution, further-
more, extends outwards indefinitely: “To any other man, the number of 
 2  Inversely, in the  Mandragola Machiavelli explicitly associates stupidity with the inca-
pacity to interrogate the legitimacy of existing realities. Machiavelli, “Mandragola,” in 
 Tutte le opere , 877. This incapacity defi nes the being of Messer Nicia, whose uncritical 
nature is revealed through his subservience to established authority, most notably 
in his naive belief in kings’ and nobles’ manipulation of the sexual power of the 
mandrake. For example, after being told of the practice of consuming the mandrake 
for pregnancy, and having another sleep with the woman in question fi rst in order 
to draw out the poison, Nicia states: “I am content, because you say that kings and 
princes and lords have held to this mode.” Ibid., 876. 
 3  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 1.10. 
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which is infinite, is credited with some part of the praise that his art or 
practice brings him.” 4 Those actors deserving of praise, in whatever 
sphere they operate in, are creators. Hence in  The Art of War , for exam-
ple, Machiavelli is explicit that one cannot determine in advance a set of 
qualities that mark one as a good commander, for such is revealed only 
in concrete creative practice, which is largely identified with the ability 
to reflectively self-generate modes of action. Fabrizio states that “I 
would not know how to choose any other man than he who knew how 
to do all those things that we have reasoned about today; yet these 
would not be enough, if he did not know how to find them himself. 
Because no one without invention was ever a great man in his art; and 
if invention brings honour in other things, in this above all it honours 
you. And one sees every invention, however slight, is celebrated by the 
writers.” 5 All human beings, regardless of the mode of activity that they 
are engaged in, deserve praise to the extent that they move to actualize 
this potential for creative invention. Needless to say, however, what 
most interests Machiavelli is the specifically political form of this actu-
alization. Hence in  The Prince the founding of new political orders, the 
creative reinstitutionalization of the social field, is considered as the 
greatest of acts: “nothing does so much honour to a newly emerging 
man as do the new laws and new orders he founds. These things, when 
they are well founded and have greatness in them, make him revered 
and admirable.” 6 As I will attempt to show, Machiavelli’s entire theo-
retical project can be considered in terms of his fundamental affirma-
tion of the human capacity for creation. 
 Machiavelli to this degree can be seen as participating in a more gen-
eral philosophical trajectory of which he is an exceptional contributor. 
Indeed, Skinner notes that the “emphasis on man’s creative powers 
came to be one of the most influential as well as characteristic doctrines 
of Renaissance humanism.” 7 The early Renaissance civic humanist 
claim that individuals were capable of achieving excellence required a 
certain model of human creation: “To assert that men are capable of 
reaching the highest excellence is to imply that they must be capable of 
 4  Ibid. 
 5  Machiavelli, “Dell’Arte della guerra,” in  Tutte le opere , 386. 
 6  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. 26. 
 7  Skinner,  The Foundations of Modern Political Thought , vol. 1:  The Renaissance , 98. 
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overcoming any obstacles to the attainment of this goal. The humanists 
willingly recognize that their view of human nature commits them to 
just such an optimistic analysis of man’s freedoms and powers, and in 
consequence go on to offer an exhilarating account of the  vir virtutis as 
a creative social force, able to shape his own destiny and remake his 
social world to fit his own desires.” 8 Roberto Esposito, meanwhile, 
highlights how the Italian humanist emphasis on creation was often 
explicitly anti-essentialist in orientation, this anti-essentialism being 
characterized in particular by a substitution of becoming for being, in a 
recognition of the specifically innovative capacities of the human being, 
and the openness of this being to change and self-alteration. This orien-
tation is given a characteristic expression, for example, in the work of 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who represents “the breaking of the 
classical scheme in favor of a new dynamic that has at its center the 
transition from being to becoming: human beings are nothing other 
than what they become, or better, what they intend to ‘make’ of 
themselves.” 9 
 On those few occasions when Machiavelli speaks of the fixity of 
human nature, the most we can attribute to this statement given his 
account of the indeterminacy of the human being such as was detailed 
in the previous chapter, is the universal orientation toward creativity, 
an expression of the perpetual human ability to constantly overcome 
the form of its existence and reshape its being. 10 My suggestion is that 
it is possible to read  The Prince not only as a text detailing the mechan-
ics of a certain type of political regime, the new principality, but also as 
one detailing Machiavelli’s understanding of the form of being of this 
creative human practice.  The Prince is a text that operates on multiple 
registers. Just as it is possible to interpret it as a political treatise articu-
lating the mode of functioning of a civil principality, or as an initial 
  8  Ibid., 94. 
  9  Roberto Esposito,  Living Thought: The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 41 See also Michelle Zerba, “The Frauds of Human-
ism: Cicero, Machiavelli, and the Rhetoric of Imposture,”  R h etorica: A Journal of the 
History of Rhetoric 22, no. 3 (2004): 222. On the human being’s capacity to voluntarily 
create its own nature and perpetually reinvent itself see especially Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola,  On the Dignity of Man , trans. Glenn Wallis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1965), 4–5. 
 10  Such is recognized, for example, by Diego von Vacano, who understands Machia-
velli as interpreting the individual in terms of an innate tendency for creative self-
actualization. Von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 16. 
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programmatic statement regarding the process of republican institu-
tionalization, it is also possible to read it as an account of the nature of 
the human actor considered as a virtuous subject. The foregrounding 
of any particular interpretative reading – that is, the generation of any 
particular textual constellation – depends upon the precise set of ele-
ments that are highlighted, and the nature of their arrangement or 
juxtaposition. 
 On my reading  The Prince ’s surplus, which is not to say non-political 
nature, lay in its articulation of the general characteristics of human sub-
jectivity. 11 It is significant that these characteristics are not drawn from 
any one historical source. We must remember our discussion from  chap-
ter 1 on the significance of Machiavelli’s perspectivism, on the necessity 
of the virtuous subject’s capacity for perspectival representation. What 
the new prince understands above all is that his understanding is struc-
tured by his particular location in a shifting historical field, each loca-
tional movement affecting the form and object of his perception. Even if 
we believe it is justified to ascribe to the object a stable and determinate 
being – and we know from  chapter 2 that such a belief is highly prob-
lematic given Machiavelli’s theorization of the world in terms of per-
petual movement and flux – human beings are not epistemologically 
capable of singularly subsuming this being under the sign of the con-
cept. There is no Archimedean point that would allow for a complete 
schematization of the contours of objective being, hence Machiavelli’s 
occupation with the necessity of engaging with, not the essence of 
things, but the appearance of things: “And men universally judge more 
with their eyes than with their hands, because seeing moves everyone, 
feeling a few. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few perceive what 
you really are.” 12 One can read Machiavelli here as positing an inequal-
ity of intelligences whereby a certain minority of individuals is endowed 
with the capacity to grasp genuine being. As is suggested, though, by 
his claim that it is a universal feature of humans that they are incapable 
 11  Giulio Ferroni is one of the rare readers who perceives that in  The Prince Machiavelli 
is developing a specifi c anthropology, it being “not only a political treatise but also 
the construction of a model of human behavior.” Giulio Ferroni, “‘Transformation’ 
and ‘Adaptation’ in Machiavelli’s Mandragola,” in  Machiavelli and the Discourse of 
Literature , ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn, trans. Ronald L. Martinez 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 84. 
 12  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 18. 
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of touching the essence of being, we could also read Machiavelli as 
maintaining that there exists no privileged spectator who escapes the 
field of appearance, or at least no spectator whose privilege allows him 
or her such an escape. There are no exalted viewers, only vulgar ones: 
“for the vulgar are always taken in by what appears, and with the out-
come of the thing, and in the world there are none but the vulgar; and 
the few have no place there when the many have somewhere to lean 
on.” 13 What in any case seems clear is that in a world in which at least 
the vast majority of people are incapable of comprehending the essence 
of things, a political project grounded in the consideration of this essence, 
as opposed to the manipulation of appearances, is impossible. Even if 
there are those few who can touch the essence of the object (and in  chap-
ter 4 I will argue that there are not), the transmission of such perception 
cannot be the basis for political determination in a world dominated by 
those who can only see. Hence in the final instance there is no possibility 
for the transcendence of the stratified field of appearance, either through 
the subjective possession of unique properties or capacities, or through 
the occupation of a certain objective social position. 
 Given the impossibility of a political actor acquiring a complete 
knowledge of the essence of things, of mastering political reality, it 
should not surprise us that Machiavelli is unwilling to give the reader 
an archetypal model of the new prince who completely actualizes his 
political ethic. 14 Peter Breiner notes the significance of the fact that 
Machiavelli does not provide his reader with any single example of a 
particular historical prince who embodies the ethic of virtue that the 
text is intended to reveal. On the contrary, Machiavelli selectively 
extracts traits and qualities from a multiplicity of sources, constructing 
a mental image of the new prince through the arrangement of these ele-
ments in a specific figure of thought: “To be sure, Machiavelli presents 
 13  Ibid. That the political world is constituted only by the vulgar is noted in Smith, 
 Politics and Remembrance , 94; Erica Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 62. 
 14  Indeed, there is very little reason to believe Machiavelli thought that such a prince 
ever existed. It would thus be a mistake to read the text as a form of historical inves-
tigation meant to identify virtuous precedents. See, for example, Federico Chabod, 
“ The Prince : Myth and Reality,” in  Machiavelli and the Renaissance , trans. David Moore 
(London: Bowes and Bowes, 1960), 61; Charles D. Tarlton, “Machiavelli’s Burden: 
 The Prince as Literary Text,” in  Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on 
Machiavelli , ed. Patricia Vilches and Gerald Seaman (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 66. 
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numerous candidates for such a role: Louis XII of France, Cesare Bor-
gia, Francesco Sforza, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Pope Julius II, but 
none of these figures represent ‘the new prince’ as such but only frag-
ments of what a new prince might do or have to do.” 15 Breiner will go 
so far as to recognize that this constellative form of arrangement has a 
major significance for the reader of the political text, who is encouraged 
to selectively appropriate Machiavelli’s conceptual content in light of 
his or her own concrete historical situation, for “who that reader is spe-
cifically depends on the way s/he cobbles together that political advice 
and examples for his/her own constellation of governments, territory, 
and conflicting groups. In short, Machiavelli leaves open who that 
reader might be and where s/he is located in the matrix of political 
forces.” 16 The act of interpreting Machiavelli’s constellation is thus seen 
as a constellative act in itself. In the final instance, “it is, thus, the reader 
as potential political actor who must put the text together relative to 
his/her (political) situation which fortune always serves up in unpre-
dictable and unique ways.” 17 The political significance of such constel-
lative reading is highlighted in the concluding chapter of the text, 
where Machiavelli maintains that it is possible for a contemporary actor 
to seize the historical moment and work toward the political task at 
hand, the unification and liberation of the peninsula, provided he or 
she is able to properly synthesize the relevant concepts that are articu-
lated through the juxtaposition of examples provided. In Machiavelli’s 
words, to learn the lessons of the text “is not very difficult if you take 
before you the actions and lives of those named above.” 18 
 Machiavelli himself notes that the prudent actor’s political success is 
largely grounded in his or her ability to selectively appropriate princely 
 15  Peter Breiner, “Machiavelli’s ‘New Prince’ and the Primordial Moment of Acquisi-
tion,”  Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 66–7. Agnès Cugno also recognizes the non-
empirical being of the new prince, writing that “the Machiavellian prince has no 
reality, neither empirical nor logical. It is a pure idea.” Agnès Cugno, “Machiavel et 
le problème de l’être en politique,”  Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 189, 
no. 1 (1999): 23. And Diego von Vacano writes that “ The Prince , ostensibly written 
about principalities, is also a  representation of the ethic of the great man in terms of 
the human condition … It is the  imaginary portrayal of the quintessentially political 
man.” Von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 44. 
 16  Breiner, “Machiavelli’s ‘New Prince,’” 84. 
 17  Ibid., 86. 
 18  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 26. 
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traits in response to the necessity of the situation. This, for example, is 
the lesson of the presentation of the examples of Marcus Aurelius and 
Severus in chapter 19. It is within the context of a discussion of whether 
a prince should privilege the satisfaction of the people or the satisfac-
tion of the soldiers that Machiavelli introduces these contrasting exam-
ples. From whom should the contemporary actor take his or her lead? 
Should he or she aim to replicate the brutality and ferocity of Severus 
or the humaneness and constancy of Marcus? For Machiavelli the 
opposition is a false one, for imitation is not a matter of deliberating 
and choosing between antithetical and self-contained positions that 
are seen to exhaust all possible options. It is not at all a matter of choos-
ing between pre-existing forms of proceeding: “a new prince in a new 
principality cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor yet is it neces-
sary to follow those of Severus; but he ought to take from Severus 
those parts that are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus 
those that are appropriate and glorious to conserve a state that is 
already established and firm.” 19 It is not sufficient for the actor to sim-
ply aim to replicate in an immediate way past patterns, and in fact 
such non-reflective and one-sided imitation is identified as being that 
fundamental error that caused the downfall of Pertinax and Alexan-
der, as well as Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus. Whereas the for-
mer group attempted to imitate the modesty of Marcus without 
possessing a hereditary right to their state, and hence with a need to 
satisfy the soldiers and the people, the latter attempted to imitate the 
cruelty of Severus without possessing the virtue that allowed him to 
appear “so admirable in the sight of the soldiers and the people that 
the latter remained in a certain way astonished and stupefied, and the 
former reverent and satisfied.” 20 It is by no means insignificant, fur-
thermore, that in the  Discourses Machiavelli identifies the same Severus 
as a criminal, from which there seems not to be any precise lessons to 
be drawn. 21 This results exactly from the fact that in the  Discourses we 
are dealing with a fundamentally different constellation of thought, 
the unique organization of concepts generating unique figures of 
meaning and hence unique imperatives. 
 19  Ibid., chap. 19. 
 20  Ibid. 
 21  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.10. 
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 Ambition and the Function of the New Prince 
 What the constellative presentation of examples is meant to reveal is the 
creative human faculty, the ability of the human actor to institute the new 
through exercising the capacity for innovation. This concern with the 
new is first of all revealed in the very specificity of the topic discussed, 
that is, in Machiavelli’s clear differentiation of the new principality from 
the hereditary and the ecclesiastical principalities. 22 Machiavelli’s refusal 
to discuss these latter two forms in any detail is grounded in his percep-
tion of their ahistorical existence, in his recognition that each is governed 
by a logic of development that closes off the potential for human inter-
vention and fixes the trajectory of each. The new principality’s situation 
in a historical continuum that structures activity but does not determine 
it is represented in his characterization of the instability that always 
haunts the new principality, in  chapter 3 represented by the non-security 
of political leaders and the fickleness of political subjects. 23 The new 
prince will ultimately be seen as one who can insert himself into time in 
order to create new modes and orders, thus altering the constitution of 
the historically variable and unstable political world. 
 Although it is not unusual for readers of Machiavelli to note his valo-
rization of an ethic of  virtù that is identified with novelty and political 
innovation, it is rare for commentators to attempt to ground this valori-
zation in what I take to be Machiavelli’s negative philosophical anthro-
pology. 24 The central element of this anthropology is a dynamic human 
desire emanating from the psychic flux of the mind. Martin Fleisher 
notes that for Machiavelli, as is often pointed out, “politics is the very 
life of the soul.” 25 Very few readers, however, have attempted to reflect 
 22  On the signifi cance of this differentiation see, for example, Sheldon Wolin,  Politics and 
Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 180; J.G.A. Pocock,  The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought 
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 158; 
Gaille-Nikodimov, “An Introduction to  The Prince ,” 34; Negri,  Insurgencies , 50. 
 23  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 3. 
 24  Although not clarifying its content in detail, Filippo Del Lucchese does specify that 
Machiavelli’s anthropology is a specifi cally negative one. Filippo Del Lucchese, “On 
the Emptiness of an Encounter: Althusser’s Reading of Machiavelli,” trans. Warren 
Montag,  Décalages 1, no. 1 (2010): 2. 
 25  Martin Fleisher, “A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli,” 
in  Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought , ed. Martin Fleisher (New York: Ath-
eneum, 1972), 119. 
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more literally on this image. Doing so leads us to recognize that Machi-
avelli’s concept of  animo refers us very specifically to politics as an 
essential mode of human being. Machiavelli’s concept of the soul is not 
static; it does not refer us to a set of fixed parts that may be arranged 
into a harmonious whole or architechtonic psychological system. On 
the contrary, the soul “is, rather, in continual motion.” 26 This motion, 
furthermore, is not uniform or subject to a transcendentally or ratio-
nally guided movement, but is irregular and stratified, the soul being a 
vital force of expression whose trajectory is continually being redi-
rected. In Dante Germino’s words, “the psyche is a field of perpetually 
shifting and contending passions, one or more of which may temporar-
ily gain control, only later to be replaced by a contradictory passion or 
set of passions.” 27 As constant motion and variation, the soul is a field 
for the “agonistic” play of passion. 28 All that we can say is that the soul 
is perpetually oriented toward creation: “The  animo continually and 
changeably desires or values things. It is truly vital – the genuine source 
of human values. And what it desires or values most is the ability to 
command any desire or bestow any value it wishes.” 29 Hence the 
“supreme value” is “ the power to designate and appropriate values .” 30 
 The vitality of the psyche, the perpetual desire of the  animo , is most 
significantly expressed through the concept of ambition. As Yves Win-
ter writes, “if  ambizione is what distinguishes the human among other 
animals, then the definitional attribute of being human is the capacity 
to be or become unnatural,” the human thus being “that animal whose 
nature is to undo nature.” 31 The key text detailing Machiavelli’s 
 26  Ibid. 
 27  Dante Germino, “Machiavelli’s Political Anthropology,” in  Theorie und Politik: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburstag für Carl Joachim Friedrich , ed. Klaus von Beyme (Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 39. 
 28  Ibid. On the dynamism of desire and its implications for political theory see also 
Nicole Hochner, “Machiavelli: Love and the Economy of the Emotions,”  Italian 
Culture 32, no. 2 (2014): 85–97; Bonnie Honig,  Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 70. 
 29  Fleisher, “A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli,” 124. 
 30  Ibid. Original emphasis. 
 31  Yves Winter, “Necessity and Fortune: Machiavelli’s Politics of Nature,” in  Second 
Nature: Rethinking the Natural through Politics , ed. Crina Archer, Laura Ephraim, and 
Lida Maxwell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 27. On the specifi cally 
human nature of ambition see also Wendy Brown,  Manhood and Politics: A Feminist 
Reading of Political Theory (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1988), 77; Haig Patapan, 
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thinking on the nature of human ambition is his poem “Of Ambition.” 
The significance of the poem lies in Machiavelli’s explicit identification 
of ambition, which throughout  The Prince and the  Discourses is concep-
tually deployed in order to articulate the direction and insatiability of 
human desire, with objective alteration. Here Machiavelli presents 
most concisely the fundamental psychic element that structures his 
philosophical anthropology, reading the essence of the human being 
(and crucially, there is here no bifurcation of desire into popular and 
noble humours, the significance of which will be elaborated on in  chap-
ter 4 ) in terms of a vital creative energy that is fundamentally transgres-
sive, looking to perpetually interrogate and potentially overcome 
existing forms: “meditate a little better on human desire. / For from the 
sun of Scythia to that of Egypt, from England to the opposite shore, one 
sees the germination of this offence. / What country or what city is 
devoid of it? What village, what hovel? In all places Ambition and Ava-
rice reach.” 32 Machiavelli in “Of Ambition” is explicit: wherever you 
find human beings you find this transgressive and limitless energy 
looking to overcome the being of the merely existent, the birth of it nec-
essarily accompanying the birth of humanity. 33 
 In “Of Ambition,” however, the linking of ambition and avarice 
reveals the degree to which the expression of value creation takes place 
through violence, through the external deployment of psychic energy 
against others: “Oh human mind insatiable, proud, sly, and changeable, 
and above everything malignant, iniquitous, impetuous, and wild, / 
for through your ambitious desire was seen the first violent death in the 
world, and the first bloody grass!” 34 The externalization of ambitious 
energy thus has a double consequence: the satisfaction of the desire of 
the one is paid for with the denial of the other (“you will see from 
Ambition one or the other art: as the one robs the other weeps for its 
tattered and scattered fortune”). 35 Machiavelli’s sympathy for those 
 Machiavelli in Love: The Modern Politics of Love and Fear (Lanham: Rowman and Little-
fi eld, 2006), 52. 
 32  Machiavelli, “Dell’Ambizione,” in  Tutte le opere , 983. 
 33  Ibid., 984. 
 34  Ibid. On what Machiavelli takes to be the inhumanity of violence in itself (as 
opposed to the utilization of violence as a performative modality of human virtue) 
see Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.26. 
 35  Machiavelli, “Dell’Ambizione,” 986. 
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who are the victims of ambition, along with his recognition that ambi-
tion cannot simply be willed away, since “man by himself cannot expel 
it,” 36 leads him to attempt to find a solution to the problem of energetic 
discharge, which if ignored will bring a city to ruin. 37 Here that solution 
is identified with the outward projection of passion against external cit-
ies through war making. The violence that accompanies transgressive 
creation is simply displaced onto other peoples and cities, the non-
possibility of an internal expression being suggested by the purely nega-
tive characterization of the function of law in terms of restraint, in terms 
of the repression of human desire: “To this our natural instinct leads us 
by our own motion and our own passion, if law or greater force do not 
restrain us.” 38 The internal expression of desire would result in the ruin 
of the city, hence the need for law to place limits on such expression, 
while at the same time providing a field for outward projection: “When 
a country lives unbridled by its nature, and then, by accident, is estab-
lished and ordered by good laws, / Ambition uses against foreign peo-
ple the furore that neither the law nor the king grants it to use at 
home.” 39 Clearly the simple displacement of violence onto another reg-
ister, from the citizens of one city to the citizens of another city, is from 
an ethical standpoint no meaningful solution to what Machiavelli iden-
tifies as the problem of ambitious expression. In  The Prince , however, 
although Machiavelli will continue to think about the essentiality of 
ambition to human being – viewing it as the source of the innovation of 
the virtuous actor – he will fundamentally reconceptualize its mode of 
expression, specifically through a rearticulation of the relationship 
between desire and law. 
 In  The Prince law is not considered as the means for the one-sided 
repression of ambitious desire, but rather as a medium that is able to 
productively channel this desire in socially beneficial ways. Although 
in the  Discourses on Livy Machiavelli will attempt to think the institu-
tional conditions for a universal expulsion of desire mediated by law, a 
situation in which all citizens are able to legally vent their ambitious 
energy, in  The Prince it is the new prince alone who is able to actualize 
ambition. This results from the specific social situation that Machiavelli 
 36  Ibid. 
 37  Ibid., 985. On the mechanics of this ruin see also Machiavelli, “L’Asino,” 966. 
 38  Machiavelli, “Dell’Ambizione,” 985. 
 39  Ibid. 
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is detailing. We must recall the double variability of people: not only 
are individuals distinct from each other, but they are also distinct from 
themselves, their desires and wants changing form over time as a con-
sequence of their experiences in a historically fluctuating world. This 
double variability is summed up in  The Prince when Machiavelli writes 
that “the nature of peoples is variable, and it is easy to persuade them 
of a thing, but difficult to hold them in that persuasion.” 40 The function 
of the prince is comprehensible only in the context of the recognition of 
this primary fact of human difference. In the previous chapter I made 
an initial bifurcation between two social contexts, one that produced 
human badness – that is, an orientation in individuals toward the ego-
istic self-maximization of private good – and one that produced human 
goodness, considered in terms of the renunciation of such an orienta-
tion and a willingness to affirm civic mutuality. I also suggested that 
 The Prince corresponds to the former situation. The political imperative 
in  The Prince is thus structured by the objective reality of this form of 
social existence. We can consider the totality of Machiavelli’s political 
project as responding to the question of the problem of social differ-
ence.  The Prince and the  Discourses give two fundamentally different 
answers to this question, to the extent that they speak to two funda-
mentally different social realities. As I will detail later, in the  Discourses 
Machiavelli demonstrates how difference can be given a positive insti-
tutional expression in a political context in which all citizens recognize 
the claim of other citizens to expel their ambition in order to satisfy 
their desire for value formation. In  The Prince, however, individuals are 
not capable of making such a recognition to the extent that they are 
invidiously motivated, seeking to actualize their own desire at the 
expense of the actualization of others. In such a context the universal 
expulsion of difference must result only in violence and destruction, 
such as the kind detailed in the  Florentine Histories . 
 Hence the function of the new prince is not to provide the institu-
tional conditions for the affirmation of social difference, but rather to 
cover up this difference through a project of social unification. Machia-
velli would make this explicit in a letter to Francesco Vettori, where he 
maintains that a new prince of a corrupt city must look to homogenize 
the social field through imposing unity on the diverse elements that 
 40  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 6. 
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compose it: “One who becomes a prince ought, therefore, think of mak-
ing it a unified body, and accustom [the diverse members] to recognize 
it as one as soon as possible. This can be done in two modes: either by 
staying there in person, or by appointing one of his lieutenants to com-
mand everyone, so that those subjects, even if from diverse towns and 
moved by different opinions, begin to observe one alone, and know 
him as prince.” 41 To the extent that individuals are multiple, it is unre-
alistic to expect to be able to achieve universal agreement on the legiti-
macy of the form of princely constitution independent of the potential 
to deploy force as a means of coercion. It is for this reason that unarmed 
prophets invariably come to ruin: “Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romu-
lus would not have been able to ensure respect for their constitutions 
for long if they had been unarmed, such as happened in our time with 
Brother Girolamo Savonarola, who was destroyed in his new orders as 
the multitude began to not believe in them; and he had no way to keep 
firm those who believed, nor to make believe the unbelieving.” 42 The 
prudent political orderer is thus identified as one who not only recog-
nizes social variability and its potentially destructive consequences, but 
also is willing and able to deploy force in order to bring that variability 
under control, uniting the diverse elements that constitute the social 
body under the image of the prince. The prince is thus an external 
mediator who imposes an artificial unity on the fragmented social field. 
 This movement, which does constitute one dimension of the text, is 
captured by what might be called the transitional reading of the rela-
tionship between  The Prince and the  Discourses . According to this 
now-standard interpretation, the political function of the prince is 
the production, within the context of a general corruption of the body 
politic, of the institutional conditions for the re-education of a group 
of citizens fit for republican life. 43 If the social field upon which the 
 41  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 239, Niccolò Machiavelli a Francesco Vettori,” in  Tutte le opere , 
1191. 
 42  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 6. 
 43  In the words of Maurizio Viroli in his recent reading of the prince as redeemer, 
this political founder is specifi cally “one who acts as a monarch but then opens 
the path for a republic.” Viroli,  Redeeming The Prince , 18. See also G.H.R. Parkin-
son, “Ethics and Politics in Machiavelli,”  Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 18 (1955): 
41; Norman Jacobson,  Pride and Solace: The Functions and Limits of Political Theory 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 44; Sebastian de Grazia,  Machiavelli 
in Hell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 236; Robert Kocis,  Machiavelli 
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new principality is instituted is considered largely in terms of the 
chaotic distribution of matter lacking a form that integrates diverse 
and self-referring elements, the new prince is that actor who intro-
duces those modes and orders that look toward a positive socializa-
tion capable of generating civic-minded citizens, citizens able to 
orient themselves away from a quest for the realization of their pri-
vate interest and toward a quest for the realization of a common 
interest of which their private interest is a non-abstractable part. 44 
This suggests that the goal of the prince is not the simple and imme-
diate unification of the social, but the institution of a precise form of 
social unity, one that integrates the singular elements in a specific 
pattern. This pattern is revealed through Machiavelli’s consideration 
of whether the prince should rely on the people or the great in his 
effort at stabilization. In chapter 9 Machiavelli is clear that the civil 
principality requires a form of social approval in order to be estab-
lished. It is instituted “when a private citizen, not through wicked-
ness or other intolerable violence but through the support of his 
fellow citizens, becomes prince of his country.” 45 This support will 
take one of two forms, being grounded in the backing of one of the 
two poles constituting society’s fundamental social division, that 
between the people and the great. This division is relationally defined 
Redeemed: Retrieving His Humanist Perspectives on Equality, Power, and Glory (Beth-
lehem: Lehigh University Press, 1998), 149; Alissa M. Ardito,  Machiavelli and the 
Modern State: The Prince, the Discourses on Livy, and the Extended Territorial Republic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13. For examples of scepticism that 
Machiavelli could have intended single-person foundation to be a plausible solution 
to the problem of political rejuvenation see, for example, Mary G. Dietz, “Trapping 
the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception,”  American Political Science 
Review 80, no. 3 (1986): 780; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,  Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and 
Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 295; John M. Najemy, “Society, Class, and State in Machiavelli’s Discourses on 
Livy,” in  The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli , ed. John M. Najemy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 101–2; John M. Najemy, “The 2013 Josephine 
Waters Bennett Lecture: Machiavelli and History,”  Renaissance Quarterly 67, no. 4 
(2014): 1147. 
 44  Needless to say, such an integration is achieved at the level of appearance alone, it 
not being possible to objectively unify the disparate constituents of the social fi eld. 
See, for example, Farhang Erfani, “Fixing Marx with Machiavelli: Claude Lefort’s 
Democratic Turn,”  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39, no. 2 (2008): 204. 
 45  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 9. 
90 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
according to the form of appearance of human desire. As will be elab-
orated on later, whereas the great seek to satisfy their ambition 
through the desire to oppress and dominate other citizens, the people 
seek to simply not be oppressed and dominated. 46 The prince must 
thus decide which of these two social groups he will rely on in order 
to institute the civil principality. 
 A principality is supported by the great when it is instituted so as to 
overcome the noble fear of being overwhelmed by the people, provid-
ing a space for the satisfaction of the noble desire for oppression. The 
great agree to invest all legitimate civil authority in a single figure, “so 
that they can, under his shadow, vent their appetite.” 47 Ultimately, 
however, Machiavelli advises the prince against attempting to stabilize 
his authority through the construction of a space upon which the  grandi 
are able to express their desire to dominate. On the one hand, such an 
organization is a threat to the stable being of the prince, who is able to 
secure himself with more ease when aligned against few as opposed to 
many. 48 What is more, this few that constitutes the  grandi is differenti-
ated from the people precisely in its desire to command, and thus con-
stitutes a continual threat to the authority of the prince, whom they 
might seek to overwhelm or resist at any point through the redirection 
of their hostility. Machiavelli thus writes that “he who comes to the 
principality with the aid of the great maintains himself with more dif-
ficulty than he who does so with the aid of the people, because he finds 
himself with many around him who think themselves equal to him, 
and because of this he cannot command them nor manage them in his 
own way.” 49 It thus seems that it is the potential confrontation with the 
power of the  grandi that motivates the prince to recruit the people. 50 
Crucially, however, beyond these two apparently instrumental consid-
erations we also see in this chapter the introduction of the germ of an 
ethical imperative to limit human suffering, Machiavelli noting that 
 46  It is important to note, however, that the people’s desire not to be oppressed does 
not preclude on their part a desire for ambitious expression, as I will demonstrate in 
 chapter 4 . 
 47  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 9. 
 48  Ibid. 
 49  Ibid. 
 50  Alfredo Bonadeo, “The Role of the ‘Grandi’ in the Political World of Machiavelli,” 
 Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969): 17. 
 Politics and the Human Essence 91
“no one can with decency satisfy the great without injury to others, but 
one can the people, because the end of the people is more upright than 
that of the great.” 51 
 A principality supported by the people is created when the latter 
grant authority to an individual who it is hoped will defend them from 
the insolence and oppression of the great. The people in this institution 
are no mere passive components, but an active force that consciously 
assents to the establishment of the regime. And unlike the great, the 
problem of popular assent cannot simply be evaded through the elimi-
nation of the discontented party, for unlike members of the  grandi the 
people cannot be purged from the city: “It is necessary still that the 
prince live always with the same people, but he can do well without the 
same nobles, being able to make and unmake them every day, and take 
away and give them their reputation as he pleases.” 52 Even under a 
non-ideal condition where authority is established through the support 
of the great, the new prince should immediately move to ally himself 
with the people at the first opportunity: “one who, against the people, 
becomes prince through the support of the great must above all seek to 
win the people, which is easy to do if he takes them under his protec-
tion.” 53 In the final instance Machiavelli will reject the maxim that the 
ruler who founds on the people does so on shaky ground, arguing on 
the contrary that such a foundation is in fact the necessary condition for 
the establishment of a relatively stable civil principality. The ultimate 
lesson of chapter 9 is that the historical function of the new prince, the 
neutralization of human difference so as to homogenize the social field 
 51  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 9. See also Erica Benner, “The Necessity to Be 
Not-Good: Machiavelli’s Two Realisms,” in  Machiavelli on Liberty and Confl ict , 
ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila Vergara (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2017), 167. For an account of what is to be taken to be Machiavelli’s 
self-declared philanthropy see Patrick Coby, “Machiavelli’s Philanthropy,”  History 
of Political Thought 20, no. 4 (1999): 604–26. Fredi Chiappelli also emphasizes what 
he takes to be Machiavelli’s empathy, which he sees as expressed not only in the 
theoretical writings, but the diplomatic ones as well. Fredi Chiappelli, “Machiavelli 
as Secretary,”  Italian Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 27–44. 
 52  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” 9. Erica Benner, for example, calls attention to the fact 
that Machiavelli always advises those in power to establish authority via consent, 
respecting the potential capacity for the self-legislation of the people. Benner, 
 Machiavelli’s Ethics , 259. 
 53  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 9. 
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and mitigate the expression of civic violence, is not an immediate one, 
but rather one that must proceed according to a specific logic, that is, a 
popular logic looking toward the good of the people. 
 Although the above discussion reveals the extent to which  The Prince 
can be seen to be governed by a popular logic, it can nevertheless not be 
interpreted as a specifically democratic text. 54 In  The Prince it is the new 
prince alone who is able to realize his creative desire for value forma-
tion, such a realization being achieved through the denial of a similar 
realization to all other citizens. The fact of princely desire, though, that 
the prince himself is in possession of ambitious energy seeking exter-
nalization, must not be forgotten. The prince’s desire for rule is achieved 
through his support for the people, through his placing definite limits 
on the ability of other nobles to pursue their desire to dominate via the 
subjection of the people. It is precisely in this limitation, though, that 
we can begin to see the reconfiguration of the means by which desire is 
realized. The prince, if he is to separate himself from the nobles, must 
do so via the support of the people, which is achieved through the insti-
tution of laws that limit the ability of some to dominate many. It is in 
this initial movement that we begin to see come into focus the function 
of the law in the mediation of the discharge of desire. The prince, of 
course, to the extent that he projects an image of himself that exists 
above society, is not subject to the limitations of the law in the same 
manner that his subjects are. Nevertheless, already in  The Prince Machi-
avelli is beginning to anticipate that relation between desire and law 
that will be fully articulated in the contrast between the modes of ener-
getic expulsion that we see contrasted in the  Discourses and the  Floren-
tine Histories . Consider again a passage I have already cited, his advice 
to the prince, in the context of the recognition of the impossibility of 
being simultaneously loved and feared, on how to avoid being feared 
in such a way so as not to be hated: “this he will always do if he refrains 
from the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women. 
And even if it is necessary to proceed against anyone’s life, do it when 
there is reasonable justification and manifest cause.” 55 In short, Machia-
velli is conceding that the self-affirmation of the prince cannot be 
 54  In this sense I disagree with the conclusion drawn by Vatter, for whom “ The Prince 
is the fi rst philosophical grounding of a democratic project of modernity.” Miguel 
Vatter,  Machiavelli’s The Prince (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 29. 
 55  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 17. 
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achieved through an arbitrary exercise of will. After all, one of the fun-
damental foundations of all states is “good laws,” 56 and princes “begin 
to lose their state at the hour they begin to break the laws.” 57 As will be 
elaborated on in more detail in part three, in Machiavelli’s political 
writings the relationship between law and desire is articulated in a fun-
damentally different way than in “Of Ambition,” law existing not in 
order to one-sidedly repress desire, but rather as a means for the pro-
ductive channelling or sublimation of it. 58 
 The Dialectic of  Virtù and  Fortuna 
 In detailing the activity of the virtuous prince Machiavelli articulates a 
form of energetic expulsion that looks toward the productive creation 
of new political objects. It is of the utmost significance that the possibil-
ity of such controlled or mediated creation is seen as dependent on the 
openness or contingency of the being of the world, such as was detailed 
in the previous chapter. What is essential to recognize is the extent to 
which early in  The Prince Machiavelli establishes a conjunction between 
the actor’s ability to create the new and the instability of existent forms. 
It is the latter, a consequence of the indetermination and inconstancy of 
life in a historical world, which makes possible the former. To the extent 
that the temporal world is thought of in terms of a radical indetermina-
tion in which human objects are perpetually unstable and subject to 
unpredictable movement, the Machiavellian concept of creation that is 
given an initial expression in the generative activity of the prince must 
not be reduced to a production of the new that might result from the 
simple recombination or reorganization of already existing elements. 59 
 56  Ibid., chap. 12. 
 57  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.5. 
 58  On the linking of institutionalization with sublimation in Machiavelli see Christo-
pher Holman, “Machiavelli and the Concept of Political Sublimation,”  Italian Culture 
35, no. 1 (2017): 1–20; Pitkin,  Fortune Is a Woman , 316–20; Dante Germino,  Machiavelli 
to Marx: Modern Western Political Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), 53. For an example of a reader who claims that Machiavelli ultimately does 
not believe it possible to channel “superlative ambition” toward socially benefi cial 
ends see Alexander F. Duff, “Republicanism and the Problem of Ambition: The Cri-
tique of Cicero in Machiavelli’s  Discourses ,”  Journal of Politics 73, no. 4 (2011): 980–92. 
 59  This, for example, characterizes certain Marxist or Gramscian readings that, 
although identifying a principle of creation in Machiavelli’s thought, reduce it to 
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As Althusser notes, Machiavellian creation is creation  ex nihilo , as it 
does “ not rely on anything , neither on an existing State nor on an existing 
Prince, but on the non-existent impossibility: a new Prince in a new 
Principality.” 60 As pointed out by Cornelius Castoriadis, however, it is 
clear that to posit the possibility of creation from nothing is not to posit 
creation as in nothing ( in nihilo ) or as with nothing ( cum nihilo ). 61 As I 
have suggested above, the prince as a historical construction always 
emerges at some time and in some place, his actions leaning on already 
instituted forms and determinations. It is simply that the political 
orders that he institutes cannot be reduced to these prior forms and 
determinations, as if the latter were merely sequential moments in a 
causal sequence culminating in the positive creations of the prince. 62 
the productive consequence of a necessary or deterministic logic. See, for example, 
Gramsci, “The Modern Prince,” 130; Fontana,  Hegemony and Power , 6. For a contrary 
interpretation arguing that Gramsci, along with Althusser, is using Machiavelli in 
order to aid in “the development of a non-determinate Marxism,” see Ross Speer, 
“The Machiavellian Marxism of Althusser and Gramsci,”  Décalages 2, no. 1 (2016): 1. 
 60  Althusser, “Is It Simple to Be a Marxist in Philosophy?,” 171. Original emphasis. 
For elaboration on the signifi cance of the ideas of beginning and creativity in 
Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli see Mohamed Moulfi , “Lectures machiavéliennes 
d’Althusser,” in  The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo 
Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 406–19. On 
Machiavelli and creation  ex nihilo see also Negri,  Insurgencies , 52; Terrence Ball, “The 
Picaresque Prince: Refl ections on Machiavelli and Moral Change,”  Political Theory 12, 
no. 4 (1984): 531; Terray, “An Encounter: Althusser and Machiavelli,” 264–5. 
 61  See, for example, Cornelius Castoriadis, “Time and Creation,” in  World in Fragments , 
ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 392. 
 62  It is the non-recognition of the historical being of creation  ex nihilo which I think has 
led certain commentators to reject the idea of creation as being a normative ideal in 
Machiavelli’s thinking. Erica Benner sees the reading that associates  virtù with the 
capacity for self-creation as “grounded in an unrealistic view of human capabili-
ties. It refl ects a longing for total control of circumstances that cannot be completely 
controlled – though they can be ‘managed’ or ‘governed’ by self-ordering  virtù .” 
Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 68. As I will argue below, however, to affi rm the human 
capacity for self-creation is certainly not to affi rm the human capacity for rational 
mastery, the creative potential indeed always being limited by the constraints of 
life in a historical world. For Dante Germino, as well, Machiavelli’s recognition that 
individuals are incapable of completely mastering fortune is a concession regarding 
the incapacity for human self-creation. Machiavelli’s alleged realism – that is, his 
non-belief that individuals are capable of creating the conditions of their own exis-
tence – is counterposed to what Germino labels the “fantasies of Marx.” Germino, 
“Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss’s Machiavelli,” 814. In fact, however, Machiavelli 
 Politics and the Human Essence 95
This relationship between the already instituted and the process of cre-
ative institution is articulated in Machiavelli’s establishment of a rela-
tional proximity between the concepts of  virtù and  fortuna , a proximity 
that closes off the possibility of an independent evaluation of either 
category. 
 In  The Prince the relation between the form-giving activity of the 
political actor and the field of action which conditions and facilitates 
creation is expressed through Machiavelli’s positing of a dialectical 
relationship between the concepts  virtù and  fortuna . 63 To understand 
the meaning of these categories we must first resist the urge to reduce 
or subsume them to concepts already established in the tradition of 
and Marx appear to be quite close in this respect, Machiavelli’s dialectic of creation 
as revealed in the interpenetration of virtue and fortune anticipating Marx’s conten-
tion that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum-
stances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.” Karl Marx, 
 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1934), 10. 
For an alternative interpretation of Machiavelli’s realism, one that emphasizes the 
imaginative powers of human actors, see Maurizio Viroli, “Machiavelli’s Realism,” 
 Constellations 14, no. 4 (2007): 466–82. For a study of the relationship between Marx 
and Machiavelli with respect to the idea of the real see Claude Lefort, “Réfl exions 
sociologiques sur Machiavel et Marx: la politique et le réel,” in  Les formes de l’histoire: 
essais d’anthropologie politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 169–94. 
 63  The specifi cally dialectical form of this relationship has been pointed out by several 
readers. See, for example, Leonardo Olschki,  Machiavelli: The Scientist (Berkeley: 
Gillick Press, 1945), 40; André Rélang, “La dialectique de la fortune et de la virtù 
chez Machiavel,”  Archives de philosophie 66, no. 4 (2003): 649–62; Angus Fletcher, 
“The Comic Ethos of Il Principe,”  Comparative Drama 43, no. 3 (2009): 293–315; Dick 
Howard,  The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought from the Greeks to 
the French and American Revolutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 
195; Virginia Cox, “Rhetoric and Ethics in Machiavelli,” in  The Cambridge Companion 
to Machiavelli , ed. John M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
182; Filippo Del Lucchese,  The Political Philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 36–42. For an account of the degree to which 
Machiavelli’s work more generally is structured by dialectical principles see McCan-
les,  The Discourse of Il Principe ; Banu Bargu, “Machiavelli after Althusser,” in  The 
Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio 
Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 420–39; Catherine H. Zuckert, 
 Machiavelli’s Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 23. Also espe-
cially relevant in this respect is the work of Victoria Kahn. See, for example, Kahn, 
“Reduction and the Praise of Disunion in Machiavelli’s Discourses”; Victoria Kahn, 
“Habermas, Machiavelli, and the Humanist Critique of Ideology,”  PMLA 105, no. 3 
(1990): 464–76; Kahn,  Machiavellian Rhetoric , 19. 
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political thinking. Machiavelli’s conception of  fortuna , to begin with, 
must be differentiated from the most well-known understandings of 
the meaning of fortune circulating during his time. 64 Machiavellian  for-
tuna , considered in its necessary relation with that of  virtù , refers us to 
the specifically human capacity to critically intervene in the world, 
altering its form of being through human action aiming at the introduc-
tion of completely new historical trajectories. 65 If we were to try to ini-
tially consider the concept of  fortuna independently, we might 
characterize it as Machiavelli’s representation of the being of the tem-
poral world as flux. The degree to which  fortuna speaks to worldly 
indetermination is clearly revealed, for example, in the poem “Of For-
tune.” Here Machiavelli writes: “Not a thing in the world is eternal; 
Fortune wants it so, and beautifies herself by it, so that her power be 
more discerned.” 66 Fortune is Machiavelli’s representation of the con-
tingent and chaotic structure of the being of the world, the metaphysi-
cal representation of all that is beyond rational human control. 67 Fortune 
is thus neither a person, nor an object, nor a system, but an aesthetic 
representation of the indetermination of being. 68 And the objective 
manifestation of this contingency, of course, is itself always changing 
with the times, never taking on a determinate form, but throwing up 
 64  Especially relevant here are the formulations of Boethius and Dante. Although both 
theorize Fortune in terms of historical mutability, such mutability is immanent to 
Fortune itself, which is impervious to human intervention. See especially Boethius, 
 The Consolation of Philosophy , trans. V.E. Watts (London: Folio Society, 1998), bk. 1.1, 
1.3. Dante Alighieri,  Inferno , ed. Giuseppe Mazzotta, trans. Michael Palma (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2008), canto VII. 80–90. 
 65  Machiavelli’s innovative articulation of the concept of fortune can lead to confusion 
when not recognized. Anthony Parel, for example, interprets Machiavellian  fortuna 
in terms of Ptolemaic cosmology, reading it as identical with the heavens, and 
hence unsusceptible to any form of human intervention, and thus without political 
relevance. Anthony Parel, “Farewell to Fortune,”  Review of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 
587–604. 
 66  Machiavelli, “Di Fortuna,” in  Tutte le opere , 978. 
 67  See, for example, von Vacano,  The Art of Power: Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and the Making 
of Aesthetic Political Theory , 26. 
 68  Such has been pointed out by several readers. See, for example, Robert M. Adams, 
“Machiavelli Now and Here: An Essay for the First World,”  American Scholar 44, no. 
3 (1975): 380. Mazzeo, “The Poetry of Power: Machiavelli’s Literary Vision,” 45–6; 
J.G.A. Pocock, “Machiavelli in the Liberal Cosmos,”  Political Theory 13, no. 4 (1985): 
562; Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , 195; von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 26; Dillon, 
“Lethal Freedom.” 
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new circumstances that confront the actor in perpetually new ways. 
Hence we also find in “Of Fortune” Machiavelli’s emphasis on the ulti-
mately unpredictable nature of worldly transformation: “She often 
keeps the good under her foot, the dishonest she raises up; and if she 
ever promises you anything, she never keeps it. / And she puts king-
doms and states upside down, according to how she feels, and deprives 
the just of the good that she offers the unjust freely. / This inconstant 
goddess and unstable deity often places the unworthy on a seat which 
to the worthy never comes.” 69 There is thus no ultimate ground or foun-
dation that would be capable of, if properly reflected upon and grasped 
in its complexity, allowing us to rationalize worldly movement. 
 Despite positing the indetermination of the world in such terms, 
Machiavelli will in the poem immediately go on to affirm, through a 
repetition of the famous river metaphor in  The Prince , the ability of cer-
tain actors to jostle and push fortune. Through their resistance to its 
constraints they may succeed in impressing their will upon the world, 
a possibility precisely to the degree that this world lacks a stable form. 70 
Contrary to those writers who interpret fortune as an omnipotent force, 
Machiavelli explicitly suggests that the perception of omnipotence is 
merely a reflection of the incapacity of certain individuals to assert 
themselves in such a way as to effect this worldly change. It is simply a 
manifestation of those who experience a disjunction between their 
modes and the times, and who in the face of this disjunction are inca-
pable of adjusting through innovation. Hence Machiavelli writes: “This 
by many is called omnipotent, because whoever comes into this life, 
either late or early, feels her power.” 71 One’s arrival is capable of being 
transcended as an absolutely limiting boundary to the extent that indi-
viduals are endowed by their nature with the capacity for self-alteration. 
You as an actor will only be abandoned by fortune if you “cannot 
change your persona, nor leave behind the order that heaven endows 
you with.” 72 The significance of this creative capacity to respond to the 
fluctuations of fortune through self-innovation, an innovation which is 
so strong that Machiavelli characterizes it in terms of an alteration of a 
God-given nature, will be returned to and explored in much greater 
 69  Machiavelli, “Di Fortuna,” 976. 
 70  Ibid., 979. 
 71  Ibid., 976. 
 72  Ibid., 978. 
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detail in  The Prince , where Machiavelli explicitly affirms the intertwine-
ment of worldly contingency and creative action through these two cat-
egories of  fortuna and  virtù. 
 The most systematic articulation of this intertwinement appears in 
chapter 25, entitled “How much fortune can be found in human affairs, 
and in what mode it can be opposed.” Machiavelli begins the chapter 
by asserting that he is well aware of the various metaphysical doctrines 
that interpret physical reality as a determined product of God or for-
tune, a product impervious to all human effort or mediation. If such 
were indeed the case, Machiavelli concludes, human beings need not 
expend too much energy worrying about human affairs and politics, 
for they would be impermeable to merely mortal intervention. The 
extent to which Machiavelli’s concept of fortune is irreducible to such 
formulations is immediately revealed, however, as he goes on to reject 
all principles of structural determination by affirming the simultaneous 
existence of fortune and human freedom. He writes, “so that our free 
will is not eliminated, I judge it to be true that fortune is the arbiter of 
half of our actions, but that she still leaves for us to govern the other 
half, or near it.” 73 Once again, fortune is theorized as a river, producing 
shifts and displacements in the structure of the world, and once more it 
is just this movement that generates spaces allowing for human inter-
vention, here represented through the process of damming and diking: 
“And I liken [fortune] to one of these ruinous rivers, which, when 
angered, floods the plains, ruins the trees and the buildings, raises earth 
from this part, puts it in the other; everyone flees before them, each 
yields to their impetus without being able to oppose any part. And 
although they are like this, it does not remain a fact that men, when 
times are quiet, cannot provide precautions through dikes and embank-
ments, so that when they rise later, either they go to a canal or their 
impetus is neither so wanton nor so injurious.” 74 And indeed, if Italy 
finds itself in such a wretched contemporary situation, seemingly over-
whelmed at every instance by the worldly forces that it confronts, it is 
because of a failure in this respect, for “if it had been diked by an appro-
priate virtue, like Germany, Spain and France, either this flood would 
not have made the great variations that it has, or it would not have 
 73  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 25. 
 74  Ibid. 
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come to us.” 75 In the river metaphor the seemingly either/or dichotomy 
of virtue-fortune is overcome, Machiavelli calling attention to the inter-
mingling of the concepts through his appreciation of the ability to alter 
fortune through the exercise of virtue. 
 In theorizing a world open to human intervention so as to allow for 
the directed, if not determining, alteration of being, Machiavelli avoids 
two extremes that characterize much thinking on the nature of human 
freedom. The actor is not an autonomous subject whose relation to that 
exterior to him or herself takes the form of necessarily passive percep-
tion of a world impervious to human effort, but nor are the objects the 
actor confronts and works in and from the mere stuff of the actor’s proj-
ect, mere matter upon which a form can be unproblematically imposed. 
The capacity for action is constrained not by the limits of human imagi-
nation, but by those boundaries that characterize life in a historical 
world. Indeed, in the  Discourses Machiavelli suggests that intellectual 
and material production is always conditioned by the form of its 
embeddedness, by its encounter with objective externalities: “as some 
more philosophers have written, the hands and tongues of men, the 
two noblest instruments for ennobling him, would not have worked 
perfectly nor directed human works to the height they have been 
directed to had they not been pushed by necessity.” 76 Political creation, 
in particular, does not take place in a historical vacuum, but must work 
from and with existing matter. This is articulated in  Discourses 1:25. 
Here Machiavelli concedes that if one wants to create a tyranny then 
one should endeavour to eliminate all vestiges of the prior way of life 
and “renew everything.” 77 If one desires the establishment of “a politi-
cal way of life,” however, it is necessary to recognize the positive func-
tion of preserving existing orders for the sake of maintaining a minimal 
continuity of time. 78 The failure to ensure such preservation is the basis 
of Machiavelli’s critique of Italian life prior to the rule of Theodoric, 
where “not only did the government and the prince vary, but the laws, 
the customs, the mode of living, the religion, the language, the dress, 
the names.” 79 Machiavelli’s critique of such arbitrary and destabilizing 
 75  Ibid. 
 76  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.12. 
 77  Ibid., bk. 1.25. 
 78  Ibid. 
 79  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 1.5. 
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social movement reveals that innovation is irreducible to any model of 
political creation that affirms change merely for the sake of change, or 
better, that does not differentiate between modes of change, between 
change that is sensitive to social-historical context and change that is 
not. 
 One cannot build a free city on nothing, for people always have past 
experiences and modalities that form an essential part of their self-
identity, the affirmation of which is a necessary condition of freedom. 
The new and free way of life is thus always historically situated and 
bound by the past in some way. The non-determining character of 
human embeddedness, as manifested in the dialectic of  fortuna and 
 virtù , is revealed in Machiavelli’s concept of  occasione . 80 If  fortuna refers 
to the unstable and perpetually moving structure of the world,  occasione 
refers to the spaces of action that such movement opens up, these spaces 
providing a ground from which the actor may launch a creative politi-
cal project, provided he or she possesses the appropriate virtue to do so. 
What  occasione speaks to is the fact that the political actor’s creation 
always leans on external considerations, on an objectivity that eludes 
the subjectivity of the actor. This objective structuring is manifest even 
in those instances when Machiavelli recalls the political creation of the 
great and mythic legislator-founders. Moses, for example, could only 
have acted as he did if he had found the Hebrews enslaved in Egypt, 
while Cyrus needed to encounter a Median people beaten down and 
disenchanted by their rulers, and Theseus required a dispersed Athe-
nian population for his creation. 81 
 For Machiavelli the virtuous actor is he or she who is able to, through 
the deployment of a critical and reflective judgment, recognize these 
spaces of action that are opened up in the world, insert him or herself 
into them, and from them launch activity. The prince acts out of the 
opportunity that  fortuna opens; hence the characterization of  occasione 
as an encounter between a subjectivity and an objectivity that can never 
 80  In inserting the concept of  occasione into the  virtù-fortuna relation, we must again 
recall the co-determining form of the categories. As Thomas Berns notes,  virtù, 
fortuna , and  occasione “draw their respective meanings exclusively by relating to each 
other, thereby implying that none of them can have substantial value without the 
other two.” Thomas Berns, “Prophetic Effi cacy: The Relationship between Force and 
Belief,” in  The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del 
Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 207–8. 
 81  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 6. 
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be disentangled. 82 Neither is the prince capable of dominating fortune, 
nor is fortune capable of dominating the prince. The prince is not one 
who unitarily imposes his own will on an object and manipulates it to 
fit his design, but one who must reflectively alter his action in light of 
objectivity in order to seize the opportunity presented to him. 83 In the 
concluding chapter of  The Prince Machiavelli maintains the state of con-
temporary Italy provides such a space, such an occasion, one from 
which a national project of unification and liberation can be initiated. 
The ruin of Italy has provided a ground for virtuous refoundation. 
Returning to the earlier discussion in  chapter 6 , Machiavelli reaffirms 
the delimitation of action by external conditions: “And if, as I said, it 
was necessary if wanting to see the virtue of Moses that the people of 
Israel be enslaved in Egypt, and to experience the greatness of spirit of 
Cyrus that the Persians be oppressed by the Medes, and to recognize 
the excellence of Theseus that the Athenians be dispersed, so at present, 
to want to realize the virtue of an Italian spirit it was necessary that 
Italy be reduced to the state she is in at present, that more enslaved than 
the Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the 
Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, 
overrun, and having suffered every sort of ruin.” 84 Italy is thus just 
waiting for an actor to seize the historical moment, the opening or  occa-
sione that  fortuna has provided: it is “ready and willing to follow a flag, 
provided that there is someone to raise it.” 85 
 82  The commingling of subjectivity and objectivity in the  virtù-fortuna relationship is 
recognized by Agnès Cugno in Agnès Cugno,  Apprendre à philosopher avec Machiavel 
(Paris: Ellipses, 2009), 51. 
 83  Hence Jérémie Duhamel writes that “ virtù designates less the superior capacity of the 
act by which it would be able to dominate fortune, than the value of individual and/
or collective effort that seeks to optimize the limited fl exibility assigned to human-
kind.” Jérémie Duhamel, “Machiavel et la vertu intellectuelle de prudence: étude du 
chapitre XXV du  Prince ,”  Canadian Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2013): 835. 
 84  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 26. 
 85  Ibid. On  fortuna providing the  occasione for the actualization of freedom through 
the exercise of will see also Machiavelli’s “Words to be Spoken on the Provision 
of Money”: “Fortune does not change purpose where order is not changed, and 
the heavens do not want or are not able to support a thing that wants to collapse 
in any case. This I cannot believe in, seeing that you are free Florentines, and that 
your freedom is in your hands. For this I think you will have as much concern as 
those always have had who are born free and desire to live free.” Niccolò Machia-
velli, “Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio, facto un poco di proemio et di 
scusa,” in  Tutte le opere , 13. 
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 Freedom, then, does not lie in the unbounded capacity to master the 
world, in the ability to overcome being’s contingent temporality 
through dictating form, but rather in the ability to spontaneously gen-
erate new realities out of the objective opportunities that the subject 
encounters. The world is not a formless mass that the virtuous actor is 
able to impose his or her will upon without resistance, but rather an 
irregular field of tensions and pressures that limits and circumscribes 
the possibilities for action. 86 In this sense Machiavelli’s philosophical 
anthropology, as noted by Diego von Vacano, is tragic, “for it shows 
man’s lot to be of necessity bounded by nature.” 87 The being of the 
encounter between subject and object is perhaps expressed most clearly 
by Machiavelli when he writes: “here one may see extraordinary things 
without example, brought about by God: the sea has opened; the cloud 
has shown you the path; the stone has shed water; here has rained 
manna; everything has gathered for your greatness. The remainder you 
have to do yourself. God does not want to do everything, so as to not 
take from us free will and that part of glory that moves us.” 88 The free-
dom of the historical actor is thus only actualized in the material 
encounter with a lived reality. 89 Free will is not reducible to the tran-
scendental mastery of the inner life or soul, but is rather revealed in the 
human effort to partially impress one’s will on social-historical being 
through the material specificity of the encounter. 90 
 86  Needless to say, this resistant fi eld is largely composed of the virtue of other actors. 
On fortune as the intersection of a multiplicity of human wills see Francesco Ercole, 
 La politica di Machiavelli (Roma: Anonima Romana Editoriale, 1926), 17; McCanles, 
 The Discourse of Il Principe , 113. 
 87  Von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 25. Such a conclusion is also drawn in Mark Wen-
man,  Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power in the Era of Globalisation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 38. And Machiavelli famously characterizes 
himself at one point as a tragedian. Machiavelli, “Lettere, 291, Niccolò Machiavelli a 
Francesco Guicciardini,” in  Tutte le opere , 1224. 
 88  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 26. See also Machiavelli, “L’Asino,” 967. 
 89  As noted by Marcia Colish, Machiavelli certainly does not think that freedom is 
realized in the spontaneous activity of the mind, but rather in concrete material 
practice. Marcia L. Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,”  Journal of the History 
of Ideas 32, no. 3 (1971): 327. On the various materialities that may potentially affect 
the encounter see Vittorio Morfi no,  Il tempo e l’occasione: L’incontro Spinoza Machiavelli 
(Milano: LED, 2002), 219. 
 90  That said, Machiavelli’s emphasis on the human potential for creative self-activity 
may very well also have infl uenced certain representatives of the tradition of 
German idealism who posit the self’s capacity for the spontaneous generation of 
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 The content of the category of  virtù will be explicated more in the fol-
lowing section, although we can already begin to see its specific mean-
ing come into focus.  Virtù speaks to the actor’s ability to actively project 
his or her will externally, to the exteriorization of an originary psychic 
force. Recall that ambition is conceptualized by Machiavelli as a desire 
for transgressive value formation and is grounded in the instability and 
flux of the human psyche, as represented in the concept of  animo .  Virtù 
would here be the means by which this creative desire is actualized in 
the political sphere: the virtuous actor is he or she who is able to pru-
dently recognize the  occasioni opened by  fortuna , and externalize his or 
her will through the active creation of new political realities. By tracing 
the expression of v irtù to the activity of the psyche we are able to under-
stand it as an element of Machiavelli’s negative model of the human 
essence. 91 In a crucial passage in chapter 6 of  The Prince , Machiavelli 
links together  fortuna, occasione, virtù, and  animo in a manner that will 
allow us to gather together and synthesize in a summary manner the 
various conceptual elements I have been calling attention to. Speaking 
of virtuous founders he writes: “examining their actions and lives, one 
does not see that they owed anything to fortune but the occasion, which 
gave them the matter to introduce the form they wanted; and without 
that occasion their virtue of spirit would have been eliminated, and 
without that virtue the occasion would have been in vain.” 92 The new 
prince creates from the opportunity that is presented to him by fortune 
new political objects, these objects being the specific productive results 
of a process of value generation that is rooted in the desire of the spirit. 
thought. Douglas Moggach, for example, claims that “Fichte fi nds in Machiavelli, 
in tension with the more authoritarian elements, a notion of free activity and self-
transformation which accords with his own early philosophical principles.” Douglas 
Moggach, “Fichte’s Engagement with Machiavelli,”  History of Political Thought 14, 
no. 4 (1993): 577. In the words of Carl Schmitt, the recuperation of Machiavelli by 
fi gures such as Hegel and Fichte “belongs to the great work of historical justice and 
objectivity.” Carl Schmitt,  The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning 
and Failure of a Political Symbol , trans. George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 85. 
 91  Rarely is  virtù seen as a manifestation of the human essence, but there are some 
readers who make this identifi cation. John Bernard, for example, writes that “virtue 
is a fundamental component of human nature” that is manifest in “all social activi-
ties” that individuals undertake. John Bernard,  Why Machiavelli Matters: A Guide to 
Citizenship in a Democracy (Westport: Praeger, 2009), 65. 
 92  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 6. 
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The concept of spirit ( animo ) refers us back to the originary structure of 
the psyche, its invariable and multiple organization seeking external-
ization via the energetic and ambitious expulsion of energy. The insa-
tiability of desire is not frustrated after the initial generation of political 
order, however, for the instability of the world, represented in the con-
cept of  fortuna , necessitates that if the principality is to be preserved the 
prince must be perpetually active. The changing nature of the times 
requires the prince’s dynamic and creative intervention, most com-
monly realized in the alteration in the image or form of appearance that 
the prince has constructed for himself. 
 Virtù and Performative Political Ethics 
 In the final instance historical creation, the  ex nihilo production of new 
political forms, depends not entirely on virtue or entirely on fortune, 
but on what Machiavelli calls, in perhaps his most clear formulation 
regarding the dialectical codetermination of the two categories, “fortu-
nate astuteness.” 93 It is the centrality of the idea of political creation, 
and of that which is necessary to bring the new into existence, that has 
produced what is often taken to be the idiosyncratic nature of Machia-
velli’s ethics. The recognition of the double-indetermination of nature, 
of the openness of worldly and human being, serves as the foundation 
for the Machiavellian reorientation of ethics, for the displacement of 
traditional moralities structured around simple binaries of right and 
wrong. Such binaries must be overcome to the extent that they neces-
sarily neutralize the potential for creative action, the construction of a 
fixed or universal system of morality schematizing – independently of 
any consideration of the historical demands of the empirical – the scope 
of human behaviour, thus erasing in advance the actor’s capacity to 
critically respond to the opportunities generated by the shifting of  for-
tuna . To possess  virtù is not only to be able to recognize those spaces of 
action that open up in the world, but also to be able to judge what spe-
cific ethical qualities’ adoption will permit one to from those spaces 
launch productive action that generates new realities. In short, the vir-
tuous actor is the one who knows how to create, and who knows that in 
order to create one must be to some extent free from rigid moralities 
 93  Ibid., chap. 9. 
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that would restrict the scope of action. If  virtù is considered in terms of 
its dialectical relationship with  fortuna – its implication in a pre-existing 
world – then it must refer us to the power to critically adapt or be stra-
tegically fluid in the face of this concrete embededness. 
 Machiavelli’s refusal to provide universal rules of behaviour is a 
manifestation of the need for methodological flexibility in the face of 
worldly contingency. It is in chapter 15 of  The Prince that Machiavelli 
most explicitly rejects universalist moralizing that is grounded in the 
binary distribution of qualities along a predetermined axis. Machiavelli 
identifies what he takes as some of the traditional moral qualities and 
their corresponding vices: liberality and meanness; beneficence and 
rapacity; cruelty and mercy; faithfulness and treachery; cowardice and 
spiritedness; humaneness and arrogance; chastity and lasciviousness; 
straightforwardness and craftiness; agreeableness and hardness; levity 
and gravity; and religiosity and incredulousness. 94 According to Machi-
avelli if one wishes to succeed politically, that is, succeed in the effort to 
reinstitutionalize the social sphere through the creation of new political 
modes and orders, then one cannot possess all of the virtues exclu-
sively: “And I know that everyone will confess that it would be a most 
praiseworthy thing in a prince to be all of the above qualities that are 
held to be good. But because he cannot have them, nor fully observe 
them, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary to be so 
prudent as to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices that will 
take away his state from him.” 95 The prince who loses his state is the 
prince who ceases to be an actor, who no longer is effective in creating 
those new political realities that ensure the perpetuation of the regime. 
To possess  virtù is to have the willingness and ability to alter one’s 
mode of proceeding, an alteration that as we will see is characterized in 
terms of an alteration of nature, so as to be able to multiply activity. To 
be unvirtuous, on the contrary, is to adopt the position of the moralist. 
It is to be unwilling or unable to waver from an absolute set of universal 
standards of behaviour that close off the potential for activity through 
rendering the actor incapable of productively responding to the imper-
manency and flux of the temporal world, or what Machiavelli here calls 
“human conditions.” 96 To be unvirtuous, in other words, is simply to be 
 94  Ibid., chap. 15. 
 95  Ibid. 
 96  Ibid. 
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unable to initiate activity, to be weak and passive, or to lack the ability 
to express the power of the will. 97 
 A case study in the principle of virtuous adaptation, and of the dan-
ger of uncritically adhering to traditional moral categories regardless of 
circumstance or context, is undertaken by Machiavelli in chapter 16, 
through his interrogation of the qualities of liberality and meanness. 
Liberality is specifically identified as harmful to the actor when that 
actor becomes identified with it exclusively: “because if it is used righ-
teously and as it ought to be used, it will not be recognized, and you 
will not avoid the infamy of its opposite.” 98 If one is labelled liberal, and 
wants to maintain this identification, then one must be constantly 
exceeding one’s prior liberality, necessitating an increasing expenditure 
of resources on lavish events and spectacles in the effort to confirm 
one’s reputation. In order to do this, however, the prince requires funds, 
which must necessarily be extracted from his citizens: “It will be neces-
sary in the end, if he wants to maintain a name for liberality, to burden 
and tax the people extraordinarily, and to do all those things that he can 
do to get money.” 99 Excessive taxation of the people, though, will gen-
erate among them hatred of the prince. And should the prince attempt 
to reverse this hatred through eliminating public expenditures, he will 
immediately come to be identified as mean. In the process initiated by 
the desire to realize the value of liberality, then, this liberality consumes 
itself and turns into its opposite. The one-sided affirmation of the value 
is incapable of achieving the desired end. The prince should thus not 
concern himself with initially acquiring a reputation for meanness. 
Indeed, over time this identification, if the prince is able to prudently 
negotiate it, will also turn into its opposite as time moves forward: 
“Because over time he will be taken to be more and more liberal, it seen 
that with his parsimony his income is sufficient, he can defend himself 
from those who make war on him and he can undertake endeavours 
without burdening the people, so that he comes to use liberality with all 
those that he does not take from, who are countless, and meanness with 
all those to whom he does not give, who are few.” 100 Meanness is thus 
  97  On virtue as a type of will to power see Negri,  Insurgencies , 41; Honig,  Political 
Theory and the Displacement of Politics , 67–75; Held, “Civic Prudence in Machiavelli,” 
121; Brown,  Manhood and Politics , 82. 
  98  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 16. 
  99  Ibid. 
 100  Ibid. 
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the condition for providing a secure state for the citizens of the regime 
without having to exploit them. In Machiavelli’s words, “a prince ought 
to care little of incurring a name for meanness, so as to not have to rob 
his subjects, to be able to defend himself, to not become poor and con-
temptible, to not be forced to become rapacious, because this is one of 
those vices that allows him to rule.” 101 And significantly, through 
emphasizing the utilization of meanness as the condition for the per-
petuation of an active rule, Machiavelli clarifies that what the prince is 
reproducing in this movement is not a static condition or organization 
of things, but rather the very capacity to act. 
 Although Machiavelli recognizes the necessity of the actor to be open 
to a diversity of strategic modes should political creation be successful, 
it is no doubt true that active as opposed to passive modes have a privi-
leged position. 102 In  The Prince this general ordering of types of modes 
is most clearly laid out in chapter 25. Again it is affirmed that the prince 
who has his security ruined is the one who is incapable of innovating 
his action so as to counter the shifting of fortune. Such innovation is 
realized in an interrogative process in which the actor may very well 
 101  Ibid. 
 102  The critique of absolute moral universalism and its generation of passivity is 
notably embodied in Machiavelli’s well-known appraisal of Christianity. Whereas 
the ancient religions were fundamentally dynamic and active, the ferocity of the 
religious rites reproducing itself in the nature of people who were through their 
exposure to religion socialized to action, the Christian religion glorifi es passivity, 
providing through such a glorifi cation no space for the achievement of worldly 
virtue. Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.2. Hence 
Nicole Hochner argues that Machiavelli’s recuperation of the political potential of 
civil religion is to be found in the production of “new rites, new ceremonies and 
new symbolic gestures that can trigger a new civic virtuosity.” Nicole Hochner, 
“A Ritualist Approach to Machiavelli,”  History of Political Thought 30, no. 4 (2009): 
588. Even when commentators do try and make the case that Machiavelli’s thought 
is strongly infl uenced by Christianity, this is an active Christianity that promotes 
the expression of vigour and vitality. On this point see, for example, de Grazia, 
 Machiavelli in Hell ; Ronald Beiner, “Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil 
Religion,”  Review of Politics 55, no. 4 (1993): 617–38; John H. Geerken, “Machiavelli’s 
Moses and Renaissance Politics,”  Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 4 (1999): 579–
95; Maurizio Viroli,  Machiavelli’s God , trans. Anthony Shugaar (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). Indeed, even in his ostensibly Christian exhortation to 
charity Machiavelli praises the virtue of the active life, as opposed to the traditional 
emphasis on meekness and passivity. Machiavelli, “Exortatione alla penitenza,” in 
 Tutte le opere , 932–4. 
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need to “change his nature”: “that prince who leans entirely on fortune 
is ruined as it varies. I believe, furthermore, that he is happy who adapts 
his mode of proceeding to the quality of the times, and similarly he is 
unhappy whose procedure is in discord with the times.” 103 Two actors 
who proceed in the same mode may in fact achieve the same end, while 
two who proceed in identical modes might achieve opposite ends, and 
“this stems from nothing other than the quality of the times, which they 
conform to or not in their procedure.” 104 As will be elaborated on 
shortly, there are thus no universal modes guaranteeing the actualiza-
tion of specific results: “If one governs himself with caution and 
patience, and the times and things change in a way that his government 
is good, he is happy; but, if the times and things change, he is ruined, 
because he does not change his mode of proceeding.” 105 It is therefore 
the case that in some instances the prudent actor might perceive the 
necessity of caution or patience, while in others he or she will foresee 
the need for boldness and impetuosity. The virtuous actor, because his 
or her character is not rigidly fixed, is capable of altering his or her 
nature in accord with the perpetually shifting realities of time, thus 
countering fortune’s potentially adverse effects. Nevertheless, as 
summed up in the famous concluding lines of this chapter, precisely 
because of the active orientation of impetuosity, the latter is more 
friendly to subjective invention than caution, which when deployed 
must always be for the sake of innovation as opposed to mere passive 
preservation. 106 
 The virtuous prince’s self-affirmation is realized through the willing-
ness to act, the will to make a decision. 107 In chapter 21 this will to action 
 103  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 25. Hence Skinner points out that in the fi nal 
instance the ultimate failure of Maximilian, Cesare Borgia, and Julius II can be 
traced to the same error, this failure to accommodate personality to the times. 
Quentin Skinner,  Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 17. 
 104  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 25. 
 105  Ibid. 
 106  Ibid. 
 107  Such a principle Machiavelli attempted to live according to himself. Hence writing 
to Francesco Guicciardini regarding the prospect of war in Italy and the potential 
forms of the relationship between Florence and France, he writes: “I declare a thing 
that will appear to you reckless or ridiculous; nevertheless, these times require 
bold, unusual, and strange decisions.” Niccolò Machiavelli, “Lettere, 296, Niccolò 
Machiavelli a Francesco Guicciardini,” in  Tutte le opere , 1229. 
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or doing is juxtaposed with Machiavelli’s critique of princely neutrality. 
Machiavelli writes that “a prince is further esteemed when he is a true 
friend and a true enemy; that is, when without any hesitation he 
declares himself in favour of one against another. This resolution will 
always be more useful than staying neutral.” 108 For example, should 
the prince declare support for the winning party in a conflict, that party 
will have an obligation to him, and yet if he declares support for the 
losing party, the latter might nevertheless give him refuge. The danger 
lies in indecisive neutrality, in the passive mode. If the prince fails to 
make a decision the winner will become immediately suspicious of 
him, and should this party move against him the loser will not provide 
sanctuary as a result of his failure to provide aid. Indeed, the useless-
ness of neutrality is what the Romans attempted to convince the Achae-
ans of in their conflict with the Aetolians. Antiochus, allied with the 
Aetolians, urged them to remain neutral, while the Roman legate noted 
the truth of the matter. In the words of Livy, quoted by Machiavelli: “As 
to what they say, moreover, that you not intervene in the war, nothing 
is more alien to your interests; without thanks, without dignity you will 
be the prize of the victor.” 109 In the final instance Machiavelli concludes 
that “irresolute princes, to escape present dangers, most times follow 
the neutral path, and most times are ruined.” 110 
 The prince’s non-action as a general strategic mode, as represented in 
the utilization of a principle of neutrality, is one element of what Machi-
avelli takes to be a larger error: believing in the possibility of occupying 
a static place of safety secure from the vicissitudes of historical life. 111 
Machiavelli writes: “Nor should any state ever believe that it can 
always make safe resolutions; rather, it should think that they all have 
to be doubted, because it is found in the order of things that one never 
tries to avoid one inconvenience without running into another one; but 
prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the qualities of incon-
veniences and in taking up the less bad as good.” 112 We have already 
 108  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 21. 
 109  Quoted in Machiavelli,  The Prince , chap. 21. 
 110  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 21. 
 111  On Machiavelli’s recognition of the impossibility of mastering reality, and how 
this sets him apart from modern governmental reason, see Robyn Marasco, 
“Machiavelli Contra Governmentality,”  Contemporary Political Theory 11, no. 4 
(2012): 339–61. 
 112  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 21. 
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encountered in the previous chapter this language of inconvenience, 
and the extent to which it is one manifestation of Machiavelli’s recogni-
tion of the contingency or instability of the being of worldly objects. It 
is this contingency or instability that princes who have lost their states 
have failed to grasp, they assuming on the contrary that the world is 
static, that the order of reality will not change, and hence that their pas-
sive orientation to the existent might be perpetually reproduced. And 
when they realize that this is in fact not the case, furthermore, they 
again, being incapable of action themselves, simply displace responsi-
bility for reacting onto others: “having never thought that quiet times 
can change (which is a common defect in men, not to account, during 
the calm, for the storm), when then adverse times come they thought of 
fleeing and not of defending themselves.” 113 What they fail to do, in 
other words, is affirm themselves and their will through the active 
making of a decision. Hence Machiavelli’s final advice, that “one should 
never want to fall, believing that you can find someone to pick you up; 
because whether this happens or does not happen, it is not for you 
secure, for this defence is cowardly and does not depend on yourself. 
And only those defences are good, are safe, and are durable, that 
depend on yourself and on your virtue.” 114 
 As classically noted by Hannah Arendt, when Machiavelli says that a 
prince needs to learn how to not be good, this does not mean that he 
needs to learn how to be evil, but rather, that he needs to learn how to 
avoid all fixed or universal schemas of behaviour, or in other words, 
that he needs to learn how to decide. 115 Ethics is no longer identified 
with consistent adherence to rigid standards of conduct determined in 
advance of reflection on the concrete demands of the political situation, 
but with the active oscillation between multiple modes of doing, 
grounded in prudent consideration of the unstable structure of the 
world, and for the sake of the generation of new political modes and 
orders. This emphasis on multiplicity is here key, referring us once 
again to the ontological plurality that Machiavelli sees as characterizing 
the being of internal and external nature. As will be examined further 
 113  Ibid., chap. 24. 
 114  Ibid., chap. 25. 
 115  Hannah Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” in  Responsibility and 
Judgment , ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 80; Hannah Arendt, 
 The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 77. 
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in the final chapter, the fact that the being of the people is multiple and 
hence unstable makes it the actor most suitable for engaging with or 
productively responding to the flux of history. Indeed, as pointed out 
by Filippo Del Lucchese, the prince is successful precisely to the degree 
that he is able to be like the people, that is, to the extent that he is capa-
ble of living as multiple and adaptable: “Only by continually adapting 
to changes is he able to achieve the kinds of results that the multitude, 
thanks to its multiple constitution, is naturally capable of accomplish-
ing. The qualities that a single individual needs are various and even 
opposing.” 116 It is in the context of this fact of multiplicity – which 
again, is a repetition of the multiplicity of nature – that we need to eval-
uate the image of Chiron the centaur that Machiavelli takes as a model 
of the teacher of the political actor. The centaur represents the necessity 
to affirm a principle of adaptation in the face of natural contingency 
through the capacity to become multiple or many. 117 
 Chapter 18 of  The Prince is extremely important from the standpoint 
of the Machiavellian account of subjectivity as active adaptation in the 
face of worldly contingency. Machiavelli begins by noting that there are 
two general forms of combat, the one that utilizes law and the one that 
utilizes force. Whereas combat through law is the mode proper to the 
human and combat through force is the mode proper to beasts, Machia-
velli ultimately concludes that the first alone is insufficient to generate 
success, and hence “to a prince it is necessary to know well how to use 
the beast and the man.” 118 Thus the good of Achilles and those other 
ancient princes who were raised by Chiron, the latter teaching the for-
mer how to oscillate between the sets of modes corresponding to each 
nature: “This does not mean anything other than, to have for a teacher 
a half-beast and half-man, that it is necessary for a prince to know how 
to use the one or the other nature; and the one without the other is not 
durable.” 119 With respect to beastliness the actor must know how to be 
specifically both fox and lion, and when it is appropriate to imitate each 
one’s nature. Specifically, both the fox and the lion overcome the defi-
ciencies of the other, the fox being able to avoid snares through the rec-
ognition of the prudent necessity of not always keeping faith, and the 
 116  Del Lucchese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza , 144. 
 117  Ibid., 142. 
 118  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 18. 
 119  Ibid. 
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lion being able to deter wolves through the external projection of 
princely power. 120 Although the modes of the fox and lion are initially 
framed in terms of a departure from humanity, what Machiavelli’s sub-
sequent discussion reveals is that human nature is actually located not 
in the one-sided affirmation of perpetual strategies, but rather in the 
ability to oscillate between different strategies. The original distinction 
between human and animal is thereby displaced, the former being 
redefined in terms of the capacity for virtuous adaptation. 121 This inno-
vation can be especially well gleaned through contrasting Machiavelli’s 
images of the fox and the lion with those of Cicero, whom he is ostensi-
bly building from. 122 
 Cicero will affirm a weak human difference in body and spirit 
through his account of the human being’s capacity for playing roles, for 
adopting personas as on the stage. Regardless of individual personas 
 120  Ibid. 
 121  Emmanuel Roux notes that this is thus one element of Machiavelli’s dialectical 
orientation: “This thinking is dialectical because it rejects  the conceptual separations 
that lead to alternatives whose terms are mutually exclusive . Machiavelli thus refuses 
that it would be a contradiction for a prince to be both ‘man’ and ‘animal.’ The 
passage from man to the brutality of the lion and the simulation of the fox signifi es 
that there is no political identity without dialectics.” Emmanuel Roux,  Machiavel, la 
vie libre (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 2013), 34. Original emphasis. 
 122  For a comparative analysis of use of the images of the fox and lion in Machiavelli 
and Cicero, specifi cally with respect to the question of the affi rmation of the  vita 
activa and its relation to classical philosophy, see J.J. Barlow, “The Fox and the Lion: 
Machiavelli Replies to Cicero,”  History of Political Thought 20, no. 4 (1999): 627–45. 
For an account of the way in which Machiavelli in  The Prince, although seemingly 
imitating  On the Ideal Orator , subverts Cicero, see Daniel J. Kapust, “Acting the 
Princely Style: Ethos and Pathos in Cicero’s On the Ideal Orator and Machiavelli’s 
Prince,”  Political Studies 58, no. 3 (2010): 590–608. Christina Christoforatau also 
calls attention to the ways in which Machiavelli subverts the traditional image of 
Chiron, and the latter’s political signifi cance. Christina Christoforatou, “Ontologies 
of Power in the Sovereign Politics of Pindar and Machiavelli,”  Italian Culture 
33, no. 2 (2015): 97. For a reading that attempts to demonstrate how the lion–fox 
metaphor can be seen as situated within a specifi cally Lucretian as opposed 
to Ciceronian paradigm, see Tania Rispoli, “Imitation and Animality: On the 
Relationship between Nature and History in Chapter XVIII of The Prince,” in  The 
Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio 
Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 190–203. On the appropriateness 
of speaking of Machiavelli’s political profi les in terms of personas see Michelle 
Zerba,  Doubt and Skepticism in Antiquity and the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 184. 
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and the fact of this difference, however, there remains a fundamental 
substratum of universal nature. Our universal persona “is common, 
arising from the fact that we all have a share in reason and in the supe-
riority by which we surpass brute creatures.” 123 The legitimate scope of 
individual behaviour – the degree to which we can manifest our perso-
nas specific to us as individuals – is bounded by universal nature: “Each 
person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is 
peculiar to him, so that the seemliness that we are seeking might more 
easily be maintained. For we must act in such a way that we attempt 
nothing contrary to universal nature; but while conserving that, let us 
follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits may be weightier 
and better, we should measure our own by the rule of our own 
nature.” 124 For Cicero the modes of the lion and the fox, of force and 
deceit, are precisely those types of action that violate our fundamental 
nature, those which “seem most alien to a human being.” 125 For Machi-
avelli, on the other hand, the form of activity characterized by the 
images of the fox and the lion does not represent a violation of human 
nature; rather, the very alternation between the two modes, undertaken 
as a result of critical reflection on the nature of political necessity, repre-
sents the highest form of human nature. 126 The shifting of appearances, 
possible to the extent that individuals possess a capacity for self-display 
and representation, is that which is necessary if one is to actualize the 
potential for action and assert one’s status as a virtuous actor. 127 
 123  Cicero,  On Duties , ed. M.T. Griffi n and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1991), bk. 1.107. 
 124  Ibid., bk. 1.110. 
 125  Ibid., bk. 1.41. 
 126  For different perspectives on the specifi cally human features of these beastly 
fi gures see James A. Arieti, “The Machiavellian Chiron: Appearance and Reality in 
The Prince,”  CLIO 24, no. 4 (1995): 387; Eugene Garver,  Machiavelli and the History 
of Prudence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 88; Bernard Flynn, 
 The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2005), 24; Timothy J. Lukes, “Lionizing Machiavelli,”  American 
Political Science Review 95, no. 3 (2001): 561–75. 
 127  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 18. Hence Agnès Cugno writes: “The variability of the 
virtuous prince … is his only permanent virtue.” Agnès Cugno,  Machiavel – Le Prince 
(Paris: Ellipses, 2012), 58. On the extent to which Machiavelli himself performatively 
presents and negotiates his identity, and how such performance constitutes a 
theatrical act, see Guido Ruggiero,  Machiavelli in Love: Sex, Self, and Society in the Italian 
Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 108–62. 
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 The virtuous prince must know how “to be a great simulator and 
dissimulator.” 128 This prince is conceptualized by Machiavelli as an 
actor in the aesthetic sense, as a performer upon the stage, playing 
many roles and wearing many masks. 129 The fact that Machiavelli con-
structs an aesthetics of politics, or thinks about politics in largely aes-
thetic categories, has often been pointed out by commentators. 130 What 
is of the utmost significance to recognize, however, is how this image 
of the prince as performing artist is specified through Machiavelli’s 
reconceptualization of the political relation between means and ends. 
Such a reconceptualization has profound implications for Machiavel-
li’s concept of action. Neal Wood could stand in for the large number 
of readers who correctly identify Machiavelli as a theorist of action: 
“Action in his sense suggests self-conscious and purposeful motion, 
self-directed doing for the accomplishment of the goals upon which 
the actor has deliberated.” 131 In almost all instances, however, even 
when readers such as this recognize Machiavelli as a theorist of cre-
ative activity, they do not recognize this action for what I take it to be, 
a type of good-in-itself, instead subordinating it to the external goals 
that are pursued. 132 
 128  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 18. 
 129  On the theatrical dimensions of Machiavelli’s political thought see Jacobson,  Pride 
and Solace , 27–8; Bernard,  Why Machiavelli Matters , 41; Minogue, “Theatricality 
and Politics,” 156; Zerba,  Doubt and Skepticism in Antiquity and the Renaissance , 
184; David Owen, “Machiavelli’s Il Principe and the Politics of Glory,”  European 
Journal of Political Theory 16, no. 1 (2017): 49–50; Kahn, “Machiavelli’s Afterlife and 
Reputation to the Eighteenth Century,” 246; Charles D. Tarlton, “‘Azioni in modo 
l’una dall’altra: Action for Action’s Sake in Machiavelli’s  The Prince ,”  History of 
European Ideas 29, no. 2 (2003): 139; Wayne A. Rebhorn,  Foxes and Lions: Machiavelli’s 
Confi dence Men (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 25. 
 130  In addition to the above, see also Edgar Quinet,  Les révolutions d’Italie, tome second 
(Paris: Germer-Baillière, 1874), 37; Charles S. Singleton, “The Perspective of Art,” 
 Kenyon Review 15, no. 2 (1953): 169–89; Gérald Sfez,  Machiavel, Le Prince sans qualités 
(Paris: Editions Kimé, 1998), 30; Smith,  Politics and Remembrance , 69. 
 131  Neal Wood, “Machiavelli’s Humanism of Action,” in  The Political Calculus: Essays on 
Machiavelli’s Political Philosophy , ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972), 34. 
 132  Although emphasizing the extent to which Machiavelli is concerned with the 
success of action, John Tinkler notes that nevertheless “Machiavelli is concerned 
with  virtù for its own sake.” John F. Tinkler, “Praise and Advice: Rhetorical 
Approaches in More’s  Utopia and Machiavelli’s  The Prince ,”  Sixteenth Century 
Journal 19, no. 2 (1988): 197. 
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 The prince is not an artist whose self-activity is considered in terms 
of the instrumental fabrication of an exterior aesthetic object, but rather 
in terms of a theatrical performance whose actualization is entirely 
internal to itself. It is Hannah Arendt who has clarified this most inci-
sively. In her essay “What Is Authority?” Arendt interprets Machiavelli 
in the conventional manner, as a theorist of politics who emphasizes the 
instrumentality of foundation in such a way as to retroactively justify 
recourse to violence, should this violence as means successfully gener-
ate the end desired. According to this view of politics as making, “You 
cannot make a table without killing trees, you cannot make an omelet 
without breaking eggs, you cannot make a republic without killing 
people.” 133 In “What Is Freedom?,” however, Arendt gives a far more 
nuanced reading of Machiavelli’s politics, interpreting them rather as a 
precursor of her own, a politics emphasizing not instrumental fabrica-
tion, but action as virtuous performance. 134 Here the aesthetic political 
content is not located in the art of production, but the art of performing, 
and hence contains its own end within itself.  Virtù refers us to “an 
excellence we attribute to the performing arts (as distinguished from 
the creative arts of making), where the accomplishment lies in the per-
formance itself and not in an end product which outlasts the activity 
that brought it into existence and becomes independent of it.” 135 Poli-
tics cannot be seen as a plastic art, for as I will elaborate on in chapter 6, 
institutions are never complete, but are rather in need of constant 
 133  Hannah Arendt, “What Is Authority?,” in  Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises 
in Political Thought (New York: Penguin, 1993), 139. For a critical discussion of such 
an account of political constitution as an act of fabrication with respect to Machia-
velli, see Thomas Berns, “Le retour à l’origine de l’état,”  Archives de philosophie , no. 
59 (1996): 244–8. For a critique of Arendt’s instrumental reading of Machiavellian 
political creation see Victoria Kahn,  The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early 
Modern Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 91. 
 134  For an account of the performative dimension of Arendt’s politics see Christopher 
Holman,  Politics as Radical Creation: Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt on Political 
Performativity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
 135  Hannah Arendt, “What Is Freedom?,” in  Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises 
in Political Thought (New York: Penguin, 2006), 153. Contrary to Arendt, Wayne 
Rebhorn identifi es the prince as practising the art of making, Machiavelli having a 
“vision of the Prince as an architect and mason.” Wayne A. Rebhorn, “Machiavelli’s 
 Prince in the Epic Tradition,” in  The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli , ed. John 
M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81. See also Joseph D. 
Falvo, “Nature and Art in Machiavelli’s  Prince ,”  Italica 66, no. 3 (1989): 323–32. 
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refinement in the face of the unstable temporality of the world. As 
opposed to the plastic arts, “the performing arts … have indeed a strong 
affinity with politics. Performing artists – dancers, play-actors, musi-
cians, and the like – need an audience to show their virtuosity, just as 
acting men need the presence of others before whom they can appear; 
both need a publicly organized space for their ‘work,’ and both depend 
upon others for the performance itself.” 136 
 As noted by a minority of commentators, Machiavelli’s political 
thought actually constitutes a radical rejection of the logic of means and 
ends. 137 On the one hand, Machiavelli emphasizes the extent to which 
instrumental political logic is easily abstracted from any ethical content 
that could regulate the end for the sake of which it is deployed. In  Dis-
courses 1:34, in one manifestation of his critique of extraordinary modes, 
he thus writes: “for if one makes a habit of breaking orders for the sake 
of the good, then later, under that example, they are broken for the 
evil.” 138 On the other hand, Machiavelli explicitly dissociates  virtù from 
the successful actualization of the desired goal, locating glory not in the 
achievement of a result, but in the virtuous exercise of a capacity. 139 
Machiavelli’s most explicit rejection of instrumental political logic, 
however, takes place through the perpetually reoccurring critique of 
the hubristic attempt to discover means that would ensure or guarantee 
the actualization of specific ends. 140 Such a discovery is an impossibility 
 136  Arendt, “What Is Freedom?,” 154. On the infl uence of Machiavelli on Arendt’s idea 
of political performativity see Lawrence Hamilton, “Real Modern Freedom,”  Theo-
ria 60, no. 4 (2013): 8–9; Faisal Baluch, “Arendt’s Machiavellian Moment,”  European 
Journal of Political Theory 13, no. 2 (2014): 154–77. On the issue of Machiavelli’s per-
formativity, Yves Winter has gone so far as to interpret Machiavelli’s theorization of 
war in terms of performance: “The battlefi eld resembles a stage on which a precise 
choreography must be enacted. War is a performance, or perhaps a dance.” Yves 
Winter, “The Prince and His Art of War: Machiavelli’s Military Populism,”  Social 
Research 81, no. 1 (2014): 183. 
 137  See, for example, Tarlton, “Azioni in modo l’una dall’altra: Action for Action’s 
Sake in Machiavelli’s  The Prince ,” 139; Garver,  Machiavelli and the History of 
Prudence , 84; Germino, “Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss’s Machiavelli,” 
805; Shumer, “Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption,” 11; Kahn, 
 Machiavellian Rhetoric , 38. 
 138  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.34. 
 139  See, for example, ibid., bk. 3.10; ibid., bk. 3.42. 
 140  This, notably, is the foundation of Machiavelli’s critique of conspiracy as a form of 
political action. Conspiratorial activity is inadequate as a political mode to the extent 
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given both the unpredictability of worldly movement, and the incapac-
ity of any human subject to escape that field of appearance which 
delimits their capacity to acquire knowledge of the object of investiga-
tion. I have already cited several passages that call attention to this 
impossibility, but it is perhaps summed up most concisely in the  Ghiri-
bizzi . Here Machiavelli writes that although the virtuous actor is one 
who is open to self-interrogation and changing one’s modes in light of 
necessity, nevertheless there is no actor capable of perfectly mastering 
reality, even if we consider this reality to be objectively schematizable: 
“And truly, whoever were so wise as to understand the times and the 
order of things, and to accommodate himself to them, would always 
have good fortune, or he would avoid the bad, and it would come to be 
true that the wise could command the stars and the fates. But, because 
one does not find these wise, men being firstly short-sighted and then 
not able to command their nature, it follows that Fortune varies and 
commands men, keeping them under her yoke.” 141 Machiavelli most 
certainly encourages the actor to act, to make a decision in light of pru-
dent consideration of the opportunity presented; however there is no 
ultimate guarantee that such action will generate the desired result. 
This constitutes, as noted above, the tragic dimension of political action. 
To the extent that it is concretely grounded in the contingent materiality 
of existence, such action is always subject to chance and risk. What is 
essential to note is that in his various discussions of  virtù Machiavelli 
highlights not necessarily the actor’s terminal achievement of a con-
crete end, but rather the actor’s ability to perpetually reproduce his or 
her capacity to act, to continually strive after political creation. Creative 
intervention in the world is potentially perpetual precisely because of 
the fact of political unpredictability. The prince’s manipulation of 
appearance and his strategic adoption of multiple personas is ulti-
mately for the sake of the continuation of action, for the sake of the 
maintenance of the prince’s status as an actor. 
that it necessarily presumes the human potential to master all elements of reality and 
marshal them toward the desired end. Such mastery, though, given the chaotic and 
variable form of being of the world, is clearly impossible. In the case of conspiracies 
an infi nite number of contingencies can emerge, thus thwarting the design of the 
activity. Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.6. 
 141  Machiavelli, “Lettere, 116, Niccolò Machiavelli a Giovan Battista Soderini,” in  Tutte 
le opere , 1083. 
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 The Example of Cesare Borgia 
 It is in light of the above considerations that we might now attempt to 
make sense of what many commentators take to be the vexing problem 
of the contrast between two of Machiavelli’s most notable examples in 
 The Prince , those of Cesare Borgia and Agathocles the Sicilian. Is Cesare 
really the virtuous actor that Machiavelli seems to make him out to be, 
and what differentiates the quality of Cesare’s virtue from that of 
Agathocles, who Machiavelli says at various times both does and does 
not possess  virtù ? I would like to briefly consider such questions 
through the recent contributions made by John McCormick on the sub-
ject. McCormick reads Machiavelli as the first significant theorist in the 
history of political thought to wholly support the interests of the people 
over those of the nobility, a support that is partially reflected in his cel-
ebration of Borgia: “Machiavelli suggests that Cesare, through his own 
accomplishments, earns the title ‘duke’ in the eyes of the people and, 
apparently, in the eyes of Machiavelli, as well. The people’s judgment, 
 not that of popes and kings, is what matters ultimately.” 142 McCormick 
will go on to suggest that Machiavelli’s use of the Borgia case study also 
provides an example of the extent to which the deployment of cruelty 
is subject to an essential limit. Specifically, the execution of henchman 
Remirro de Orco is taken as a concrete sign to the people that Cesare 
recognizes that extra-legal terror is incompatible with good govern-
ment. The violence Cesare utilizes against Remirro and the nobility is 
thus codeterminate with a populist mode of political institutionaliza-
tion: “Duke Valentino beat down the nobility who misruled the people 
for so long; he ended the arbitrary violence that continually plagued 
them; and he established judicial and representative institutions for 
them.” 143 
 142  John P. McCormick, “Prophetic Statebuilding,”  Representations 115, no. 1 (2011): 2. 
Compare McCormick here to a reader like Leo Paul S. de Alvarez, who agrees that 
Cesare is of the people, but argues that this being of the people is not accompanied 
by an adequate knowledge of the great. Leo Paul S. de Alvarez,  The Machiavel-
lian Enterprise: A Commentary on The Prince (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1999), 33. According to de Alvarez it is this which ultimately causes Borgia’s 
downfall, and which suggests the impossibility of his being a positive exemplar of 
a virtuous prince. Below I will attempt to show how this standard of success is no 
criterion for such an evaluation. 
 143  McCormick, “Prophetic Statebuilding,” 9. 
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 Such a reading seems indeed to be supported by the text. Borgia is 
initially presented as an example of one who acquires and loses power 
through fortune, yet one who nevertheless possesses the ability to 
secure oneself through virtue: he “acquired the state through the for-
tune of his father, and through that lost it, notwithstanding that he 
made use of every means and did all those things that a prudent and 
virtuous man must do to put roots in those states that the arms and 
fortune of others had granted him.” 144 Crucially, however, Cesare’s suc-
cess is not identified by Machiavelli only with his ability to secure 
princely authority for himself, but with, as suggested by McCormick, 
providing a foundation of good government grounded in popular sup-
port, actualized first through the production of an internal social unity: 
“After having taken Romagna the duke found it had been commanded 
by powerless lords, who had sooner plundered their subjects than cor-
rected them, and given them matter for disunion, not for union, so that 
the country was entirely full of thefts, intrigues, and every other form 
of insolence; he judged it was necessary, if he wanted to reduce it to 
peace and obedience to the regal arm, to give it good government.” 145 
This project of popular institutionalization is what is especially “wor-
thy of notice and of being imitated by others.” 146 Indeed, in his “Lega-
tions” Machiavelli recalls Borgia’s declaration of his concern for the 
 144  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. Although here Machiavelli blames the fall of 
Cesare on the fortune of his father, he will later concede that Cesare did in fact err 
in allowing the creation of Pope Julius II. He forgot that “one who believes that new 
benefi ts to great personages will make them forget old injuries deceives himself. 
Therefore, the duke erred in this choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.” 
Ibid. Although some readers of Machiavelli will take this as the latter’s ultimate 
concession that Cesare cannot be seen as a virtuous actor, I prefer to read it in terms 
of Machiavelli’s recognition that no political actor is capable of possessing an abso-
lute knowledge that would perfectly guide their action with a precise certainty. As 
pointed out many times in this study, virtuous action is never enough to overcome 
or master the historical world within which the actor is embedded, a fact that is 
not revealed with any more clarity than in the example of Borgia. In an article, 
for example, emphasizing aging and death as particular limits on the capacity for 
adaptation, Timothy Lukes notes that even though Cesare possessed the seemingly 
requisite skills to succeed, he nevertheless was incapable of overcoming his own 
fi nitude. Timothy J. Lukes, “Fortune Comes of Age,”  Sixteenth Century Journal 11, 
no. 4 (1980): 45. 
 145  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. 
 146  Ibid. 
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popular interest: “he told me many things, which reduced to one, 
shows that he wants to make his stake here, and that he will not think 
about the past, but only about the common good.” 147 Such is reasserted 
in the  Discourses on Livy , where Borgia is brought up in the context of 
Machiavelli’s discussion of how the seemingly sinful nature of peoples 
is rooted in the misrule of princes. The Romagna prior to the displace-
ment of the local princes by Cesare “was an example of every most 
wicked life, because there one could see great slaughters and robberies 
following every slight cause. This was born from the wickedness of 
those princes, not from the wickedness of men, as [these princes] 
said.” 148 Specifically, the laws in the Romagna were neither observed by 
princes nor applied and executed uniformly, while punishments were 
only inflicted in those instances in which princes thought there was a 
financial benefit to be extracted. From this situation “arose many incon-
veniences, and above all this, that the people were impoverished and 
not corrected; and those who were impoverished strove to prevail 
against those less powerful than themselves.” 149 
 Borgia’s project, and the extent to which Machiavelli sees it as deserv-
ing of praise, must be partially understood in light of the recognition of 
both this particular social-historical context, and Cesare’s desire to 
overcome it through the popular reinstitutionalization of the social 
order. Whereas initially the establishment of a non-arbitrary and legiti-
mate order necessitated the utilization of force and violence, as mani-
fested, for example, in the cruel means of Remirro de Orco, at a certain 
point Borgia realized that this “excessive authority” was no longer 
needed, and began to institute quasi-democratic civic reforms, such as 
the creation of a provincial court in which each town had a representa-
tive. 150 Cesare also recognized, however, that the institution of such a 
populist project needed to be accompanied by an explicit political dis-
tancing from earlier modes, in order to “purge the spirits of those peo-
ple.” 151 Such was achieved through the execution of Remirro, the 
physical representative of these prior modes. The execution of Remirro 
will be a symbolic representation to the people of Cesare’s recognition 
 147  Machiavelli, “Prima legazione alla corte di Roma,” in  Tutte le opere , sec. 30. 
 148  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.29. 
 149  Ibid. 
 150  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. 
 151  Ibid. 
 Politics and the Human Essence 121
of the incompatibility of arbitrarily used extra-legal violence and civic 
life, and a declaration of his ultimate commitment to a political ethic of 
popular legitimacy. 152 Machiavelli famously writes of Cesare that after 
having “seized upon the occasion, in Cesena one morning he had him 
put in two pieces in the piazza, with a chunk of wood and a bloody 
knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle rendered those people at 
the same time satisfied and stupefied.” 153 The execution of Remirro is 
from Machiavelli’s perspective a performative political act meant to 
communicate to the people of the Romagna Cesare’s commitment to 
them and to civil life in common. 154 
 The example of Cesare in chapter 7 is immediately followed by that 
of Agathocles in chapter 8, where acquiring a principality through 
crime is identified as a mode distinct from acquiring it through fortune 
and virtue. And yet Machiavelli goes on to attribute the rise of Agatho-
cles, achieved through clearly criminal acts, largely to his “virtue of 
spirit and of body.” 155 After having distinguished himself in his military 
career to an extent that allowed him to rise to the position of praetor, he 
“decided to become a prince,” a position that he was able to achieve 
after having ambushed the senators of the city and other social and 
economic elites, and killing them all at an assembly he had convened 
for the citizens of Syracuse. 156 After his appropriation of power 
 152  There is thus not necessarily a contradiction here between the utilization of brutal 
means and the affi rmation of the common good. Hence Gennaro Sasso writes, “If 
then one looks more fully into the movement of  The Prince , one sees that in the 
merciless and barbaric action of Cesare Borgia shines, in spite of everything, that 
awareness of the popular good that is the fi rst element on the basis of which it 
is possible to distinguish the ‘civil principality’ from the ‘absolute principality.’” 
Gennaro Sasso,  Machiavelli e Cesare Borgia: storia di un guidizio (Rome: Edizioni 
dell’Ateneo, 1966), 82. 
 153  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. In the words of McCormick, in such a way 
Borgia “dismembers himself from the very body that signifi es excessively cruel 
violence. He dramatically cuts himself off from the very em-bodiment of arbitrary 
violence.” McCormick, “Prophetic Statebuilding,” 8. 
 154  Diego von Vacano also calls attention to the fact that the killing of Remirro is an 
illustration of the performative nature of political action. Von Vacano,  The Art 
of Power , 43. Michael McCanles, furthermore, reads Cesare’s presentation of the 
murder of Remirro as a communicative act, as a discursive message transmitted 
to the people indicating, for example, his willingness to consider and respond to 
popular will. McCanles,  The Discourse of Il Principe , 78. 
 155  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 8. 
 156  Ibid. 
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Agathocles reproduced his authority not through obligation, but the 
threat and application of non-consensual force. Through his criminality 
he was able to successfully consolidate his rule while defending his city 
from external Carthaginian encroachments, Agathocles surviving 
through his deployment of well- (as opposed to badly) used cruelties: 
“Well-used one can call (if of evil it is licit to speak well) those made in 
one stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not sus-
tained but converted into the most benefit for the subjects as possible. 
Badly used are those which, although few in the beginning, grow more 
with time rather than be eliminated.” 157 The seeming ambiguity in 
Machiavelli’s treatment of Agathocles is that at the same time that he 
refers to the “well-used” cruelty and “virtue of spirit and of body,” he 
also writes that “one cannot yet call it virtue to kill one’s citizens, betray 
friends, be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes 
enable one to acquire rule, but not glory.” 158 It seems as though in the 
final instance Agathocles’s “brutal cruelty and inhumanity, with his 
infinite wickedness, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most 
excellent men. One cannot, therefore, attribute to fortune or to virtue 
that which he achieved without the one or the other.” 159 
 Readers of Machiavelli have attempted to explain this ambivalence 
in the deployment of the notion of  virtù in chapter 8, and its relation to 
the articulation of the concept in the context of the example of Cesare 
Borgia in chapter 7, in a variety of ways. 160 As mentioned above, 
 157  Ibid. 
 158  Ibid. 
 159  Ibid. 
 160  Here we can list just a few notable examples. A typical interpretive strategy for 
reconciling the seeming Agathocles problem is to differentiate between two 
different forms of  virtù operative in the chapter. Thus Michael McCanles, for 
example, argues that although it is true that Agathocles lacks Christian virtue, the 
evidence suggests that he possesses political virtue. McCanles,  The Discourse of Il 
Principe , 62. Indeed, for McCanles this conceptual deployment is just one example 
of Machiavelli’s discursive strategy, the meaning of the discourse being reversed 
through the shifting of textuality. Thus, “Agathocles’ cruelty (and by the end of  Il 
Principe any action) has no meaning at all, neither good nor evil, nor is it indeed 
‘ crudeltà ’ until men textualize the action and by the names they give the action 
set up semantic-logical entailments regarding the kind of discourse that can by 
thought, spoken, and written about.” Ibid., 64. Contrasting the rhetorical strategy 
of Machiavelli with that of Cicero, Gary Remer claims that Machiavelli ultimately 
fails to uphold the division between the virtue of Borgia and the non-virtue of 
Agathocles, or even the differing types of virtue possessed by each, emptying the 
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however, here I would like to focus only on the democratic reading of 
John McCormick. In one of the most significant attempts to recuperate 
the legacy of Agathocles, McCormick argues that not only is the former 
considered virtuous by Machiavelli, but in fact Machiavelli sees his vir-
tue as potentially exceeding even Cesare Borgia’s. 161 Interrogating the 
facts of Agathocles’s rise to power and rule is seen to reveal this worth. 
In short, Agathocles is interpreted as a revolutionary populist who suc-
ceeds in breaking the power of an oligarchic class that had earlier ended 
democratic rule, in the process never harming the people nor losing 
their support. Indeed, Agathocles’s establishment of his principality is 
achieved through the wholesale elimination of Syracuse’s  grandi, who 
are killed “in full sight of the  popolo .” 162 It is this foundation of his rule 
in the people that allowed Agathocles to maintain his authority for so 
long, his citizens not having any inclination to conspire against him as 
a result of his defence of them. For McCormick Agathocles thus achieves 
his ultimately democratic end: he “initiates and guides the transforma-
tion of an oligarchic republic into a more democratic one.” 163 
 Although McCormick provides a compelling argument regarding 
the status of Agathocles in Machiavelli’s text, particularly for those 
inclined to read Machiavelli through a democratic prism, I believe that 
it ultimately suffers to the extent that it reduces Machiavelli’s politics to 
concept of all substantive ethical content and losing any sense of the  honestum . Gary 
Remer, “Rhetoric as a Balancing of Ends,”  Philosophy and Rhetoric 42, no. 1 (2009): 
5–6. For Victoria Kahn, Agathocles’s crimes cannot be called virtuous precisely to 
the extent that no one thing can be called  virtù , there being no positive content that 
substantively fi xes its meaning: “virtù is not a general rule of behavior that can be 
applied to a specifi c situation, but is rather, like prudence, a faculty of deliberation 
about particulars.” Kahn, “ Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli’s 
 Prince ,” 206. Kahn will later alter her interpretation of Agathocles, maintaining 
– contrary to my reading – that “Agathocles himself changed in response to the 
dictates of his reign,”  virtù being associated with the willingness to alter ones 
modes in light of changing circumstances. Victoria Kahn, “Revisiting Agathocles,” 
 Review of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 561. Nevertheless, Kahn now ultimately accepts 
Machiavelli’s claim that Agathocles cannot be said to have achieved glory, as he 
failed to rise “to a Roman standard of greatness.” Ibid., 569. 
 161  John P. McCormick, “The Enduring Ambiguity of Machiavellian Virtue: Cruelty, 
Crime, and Christianity in  The Prince ,”  Social Research 81, no. 1 (2014): 136. 
 162  John P. McCormick, “Machiavelli’s Inglorious Tyrants: On Agathocles, Scipio and 
Unmerited Glory,”  History of Political Thought 36, no. 1 (2015): 32. 
 163  McCormick, “The Enduring Ambiguity of Machiavellian Virtue,” 147. 
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the instrumental language of means and ends, evaluating the legacy of 
Agathocles solely in terms of his contribution to the establishment of an 
external state of being. As McCormick writes, “Agathocles initiates and 
guides the transformation of an oligarchic republic into a more demo-
cratic one. Both [Agathocles and Nabis] left their republics, by certain 
standards, in better civic and military condition than when they first 
usurped them.” 164 Such a reading is perfectly adequate when consid-
ered from the standpoint of what I earlier identified as the transitional 
reading of the function of the new prince in relation to Machiavelli’s 
normative defence of republican life. As I have suggested, however,  The 
Prince operates on more than one register: the civil principality can be 
read as not only the prerequisite for the establishment of those social 
conditions necessary for the institution of the republic, but also as a 
model of human subjectivity. It is this double form that can be seen to 
account for the ambivalence in Machiavelli’s treatment of Agathocles. 
Agathocles may very well be seen as a model prince to the extent that 
he purged his city of the nobles and grounded his authority in the peo-
ple. He is not a model, however, for Machiavelli’s ethics of self-activity 
as revealed in the articulation of the nature of performative  virtù . 
McCormick writes: “There is virtually no difference between the crimes 
of Borgia and those of Agathocles.” 165 This may very well be substan-
tively true, however Machiavelli’s condemnation of Agathocles is not 
grounded in the latter’s willingness to utilize techniques of violence in 
order to secure political ends, but rather in his deployment of violence 
as a matter of principle, as a universally applicable political strategy. 
Agathocles errs in the same way as do the political moralists who 
demand that actors adhere to conventional ethical standards in every 
circumstance, although in an inverted way. What characterizes both is 
an inability to alter their mode of proceeding in order to respond to the 
shifting demands and necessities of fortune. Agathocles may have used 
cruelty well, but this good use is only a constituent element of a more 
fundamental ethic of virtue when reflectively combined with the pru-
dent deployment of other political modes. Such a stratagem begins to 
 164  McCormick, “Machiavelli’s Inglorious Tyrants,” 40. 
 165  John P. McCormick, “Machiavelli’s Agathocles: From Criminal Example to 
Princely Exemplum,” in  Exemplarity and Singularity: Thinking through Particulars 
in Philosophy, Literature, and Law , ed. Michèle Lowrie and Susanne Lüdemann 
(London: Routledge, 2015), 127. 
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be realized in the chapter’s final paragraph, where Machiavelli dis-
cusses the necessity of doing injuries all at once so as to offend less, and 
of doing benefits little by little over time so as to be appreciated more 
consistently. 166 Already in this very crude account of the mixing of 
political modes do we find a radical departure from the singularity of 
Agathocles’s technique. 
 Agathocles may very well have succeeded where Borgia failed, to the 
extent that he maintained his state. Virtue, however, is not defined 
exclusively in terms of such instrumental considerations. Cesare distin-
guishes himself from Agathocles through an openness to political flex-
ibility grounded in prudent reflection on the always contingent nature 
of the field in which the prince acts. 167 Borgia is a pre-eminent example 
of an actor capable of comprehending the requirements of action, not 
relying on previously fixed schemas that structure behaviour in 
advance, but reflectively interpreting the historical situation and his 
place in it, and formulating a critical plan of action in light of this inter-
rogation. And crucially, what this action aims at is not simply the repro-
duction of a state of being, in for example the perpetuation of one’s 
rule, but the  ex nihilo creation of new political realities. 168 Cesare Borgia 
is above all an innovator, a creator of new political forms. His political 
creation, though, was again possible only to the extent that he pos-
sessed a capacity for critical innovation with respect to political tech-
nique, neither refusing violence as a matter of principle nor affirming it 
as a singular mode. Violence, rather, was critically deployed in a cre-
ative project ultimately looking to benefit his citizens. The difference 
 166  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 8. 
 167  Indeed, that action must be grounded in such prudent refl ection, and not merely 
the will to make a decision irrespective of rational consideration of historical 
possibility, must not be forgotten. Hence Machiavelli will locate the greatness of 
the Pope and the Duke in their interrogation of  occasioni and their orientation of 
their action in light of it: “they are experts of the occasion and know how to use it 
very well; this opinion is confi rmed by experience of the things carried out by them 
with the opportunity.” Machiavelli, “Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana 
ribellati,” in  Tutte le opere , 15. 
 168  Indeed, for Althusser the fi gure of Borgia speaks to the emphasis on the  ex nihilo 
form of creation in Machiavelli. Specifi cally, Borgia proves that a new prince can 
seemingly emerge from nothing, and hence that the radically new principality “is 
materially  possible , and hence that it is not a dream or utopia.” Althusser,  Machiavelli 
and Us , 79. 
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between this project and that of Agathocles could not be more 
striking. 169 
 • 
 In this chapter I have argued that through his emphasis on the per-
formativity of political action, as represented in the characterization 
of the prince as an actor upon a stage theatrically embodying a mul-
tiplicity of diverse roles, Machiavelli reorients political activity as a 
good-in-itself. 170 The diversity of political actors and goals that Ma-
chiavelli chooses to highlight in  The Prince is a manifestation of the 
central concern with the articulation of the form of political subjectiv-
ity, as opposed to that form of regime that is capable of generalizing 
this political subjectivity. In  The Prince the process of creation itself is 
generally of far more significance than the precise object of creation. 
The prince deserving of praise is he who is able to, through the cre-
ative exercise of  virtù , bring something new into the world, altering 
the structure of the world in some productive way. The actualization 
of human creativity is a normative good to be affirmed to the extent 
that it is grounded in a fundamental psychic orientation toward trans-
gressive self-expression via the externalization of ambitious energy. 
 Virtù is the human capacity that allows the actor to seize upon the 
 occasioni presented by  fortuna in order to generate new human reali-
ties. Political creation is a mode for the actualization of the negative 
human essence considered in terms of internal and external overcom-
ing. This notion of  virtù as performative self-expression allows us to 
more adequately contextualize Machiavelli’s frequent deployment of 
the language of happiness in relation to the political self-activity of 
the prince. In chapter 6, for example, we first see the use of the term  fe-
lice, the appearance of a concept of a specifically political happiness, a 
gratification realized in political creation: “These occasions, therefore, 
made these men happy, and their excellent virtue rendered the occa-
sions known; hence their countries were ennobled and became very 
 169  In Lefort’s words, “One unfolds entirely beneath the sign of violence; the other 
proves capable of being modifi ed according to the imperatives created by the coex-
istence of the prince with his subjects.” Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , 135. 
 170  For a relatively early identifi cation of the goodness that Machiavelli sees as internal 
to the creation of  ordini see J.H. Whitfi eld, “On Machiavelli’s Use of  Ordini ,”  Italian 
Studies , no. 10 (1955): 24. 
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happy.” 171 Machiavelli’s explicit identification of creative action and 
happiness, the latter term or a variation of it being most prominently 
displayed in chapter 25, where the Machiavellian theory of freedom 
is most clearly articulated in that text, is often obscured by his read-
ers, who again tend to instrumentally focus on the prince’s effort to 
actualize extrinsic conditions of being. A few commentators, however, 
have noted it, such as Wayne Reborn: “happiness essentially defines 
what he feels. For if princes do what they are supposed to do, if that is, 
they succeed – then they will be not only ‘powerful, secure, honored,’ 
but also, as Machiavelli adds, ‘happy [ felici ].’” 172 Indeed, the penulti-
mate chapter of  The Prince abounds with terms such as  felice and  felici-
tare . Rebhorn argues that although often translated into the language 
of success and prosperity, such vocabulary would be more accurately 
rendered in terms of happiness, one of the overall lessons of  The Prince 
being that their exists joy in action. 173 In the final instance, political 
creation, institutional expression as a mode for the externalization of 
human ambition, is thus seen to generate a type of gratification, and 
to this degree can be interpreted in performative terms as a sort of 
good-in-itself.  
 171  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 6. 
 172  Rebhorn, “Machiavelli’s  Prince in the Epic Tradition,” 93. 
 173  Ibid. Such is recognized by a few other interpreters. Looking specifi cally at the 
 Art of War , Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings note that virtuous action is 
“focused on glory and joy.” Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, “Virtuous 
Violence and the Politics of Statecraft in Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber,” 
 Political Studies 59, no. 1 (2011): 63. More generally, Roger Masters notes that a key 
element informing Machiavelli’s normative thought is the affi rmation of a principle 
of enjoyment. Roger D. Masters,  Fortune Is a River: Leonardo Da Vinci and Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s Magnifi cent Dream to Change the Course of Florentine History (New York: 
Free Press, 1998), 199. Crucially, furthermore, this joy in action is irreducible to a 
happiness acquired through command, an identifi cation Machiavell never makes. 
Gennaro Sasso, “Problemi di critica machiavelliana,” in  Studi su Machiavelli (Napoli: 
Morano, 1967), 66. 

 PART THREE 
 Political Ontology 

 Chapter Four 
 Ambition and the People: The Popular 
Form of the Desire for Creation 
 In the previous chapter I argued that it is possible to read  The Prince not 
only as a treatise on the being of a particular form of regime – the civil 
principality instituted by a new prince – but also as a treatise on the 
being of human subjectivity. In  The Prince Machiavelli details what it 
would mean for the negative human desire for value formation – 
expressed through the concept of ambition – to be realized via the cre-
ative institution of new political modes and orders. According to my 
argument, reading the text in this way allows us to rearticulate the rela-
tionship between it and the  Discourses on Livy . Specifically, in the  Dis-
courses Machiavelli attempts to theorize a form of regime that is 
democratic to the extent that all individuals, not merely princes, are 
capable of actualizing their potential for political creation. If  virtù is the 
name given to the human capacity for such actualization, the  Discourses 
provides an image of a political form of society in which all citizens are 
virtuous, a political form of society in which  virtù is generalized. The 
suggestion that the popular virtue that Machiavelli defines in the  Dis-
courses is of the same quality as the princely virtue detailed in  The Prince 
is one that would be rejected by most readers of Machiavelli, who pre-
fer instead to qualitatively differentiate between the two expressions of 
 virtù . A wide variety of scholars follow Friedrich Meinecke, who 
famously distinguished between heroic  virtù and civic  virtù – the latter, 
manifested in a concern for the common, being only a secondary deri-
vation of the former, manifested in the creative form-giving activity of 
political elites. Ultimately civic  virtù depends upon heroic  virtù to the 
extent that only the truly great founder is capable of creating the condi-
tions for the generation of republican life. In Meinecke’s view, Machia-
velli’s privileging of heroic  virtù “shows that he was a long way from 
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believing uncritically in the natural and imperishable virtue of a repub-
lican citizen, and that he viewed even the republic more from above, 
from the standpoint of the rulers, than from underneath, from the 
standpoint of broad-based democracy.” 1 What all such differentiations 
between types of virtue implicitly or explicitly affirm is a natural human 
inequality, and in particular an inequality grounded in what is seen to 
be a popular deficiency. Generally speaking, such deficiency is theo-
rized in either one of two ways, although they are frequently combined 
with each other. First, the people are often identified by readers of 
Machiavelli as lacking the creative and ambitious desire to express 
themselves in the world. Such a lack is the ground upon which the peo-
ple are then justly excluded from certain political offices or roles, for 
they do not possess any positive civic desire for political participation. 
Political participation, in other words, is not a mode of activity the peo-
ple crave to the extent that they lack an impulse to creative self-expression, 
seeking as they do merely their own private security and well-being. 
Second, even if and when the mass of citizens constituting the people is 
seen to be in possession of an ambitious desire to participate in the 
affairs of state, many commentators interpret Machiavelli as advocat-
ing withholding such participation on the grounds that they lack the 
requisite intellectual or cognitive skills needed for prudent political 
deliberation. 
 Contrary to such interpretations grounded in a perception of human 
inequality, in this chapter I will attempt to locate in Machiavelli’s 
thought a double affirmation. On the one hand, Machiavelli provides 
an affirmation of a radical human freedom, all individuals being seen 
 1  Meinecke,  Machiavellism , 32. For further assumptions of a bifurcation of types of  virtù 
see, for example, Hulliung,  Citizen Machiavelli , 43; Skinner,  The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought , vol. 1:  The Renaissance , 125; Michael Walzer,  The Revolution of the 
Saints (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 9; John Plamenatz, “In Search of 
Machiavellian  Virtù ,” in  The Political Calculus: Essays on Machiavelli’s Political Phi-
losophy , ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 159; Markus 
Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Political Psychology,”  Review of Politics 59, no. 4 (1997): 807, 
821; John H. Geerken, “Homer’s Image of the Hero in Machiavelli,”  Italian Quarterly 
14, no. 3 (1970): 45; Ball, “The Picaresque Prince,” 529; Neal Wood, “Some Refl ections 
on Sorel and Machiavelli,”  Political Science Quarterly 83, no. 1 (1968): 81; R. Claire Sny-
der, “Machiavelli and the Citizenship of Civic Practices,” in  Feminist Interpretations of 
Niccolò Machiavelli , ed. Maria J. Falco (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2004), 217. 
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as inclined toward expressing a will to positively participate in public 
affairs, and this to the extent that they all desire an outlet for the expres-
sion of their essential ambition. And on the other hand, Machiavelli 
provides an affirmation of a radical human equality, all individuals 
being seen as potentially capable of possessing the intellectual capaci-
ties and skills required to make informed political decisions via the 
articulation of their desire in speech. After demonstrating in this chap-
ter the extent to which Machiavelli theorizes the ambitious form of the 
popular desire for freedom and the equal capacity for popular political 
judgment, in  chapter 5 I will demonstrate the extent to which the actu-
alization of such freedom and equality has as its precondition the elimi-
nation of pronounced socio-economic stratification. Finally, in  chapter 
6 I will turn to look at the specific institutional form of Machiavelli’s 
ideal republic, demonstrating how it is structured so as to give a posi-
tive expression to these two interrelated values of freedom and 
equality. 
 Social Difference and the Essentiality of Conflict 
 Machiavelli specifies the nature of the division between the humours of 
the great and the people in each of his three major political works. In 
 The Prince he writes that “in every city is found these two diverse 
humours, and it stems from the fact that the people desire not to be 
commanded or oppressed by the great, and the great desire to com-
mand and oppress the people.” 2 In the  Discourses he grounds his early 
discussion of the productivity of social conflict in a recognition that 
there “are in every republic two diverse humours, that of the people, 
and that of the great,” 3 going on to specify the content of this bifurca-
tion one chapter later, writing that “without doubt, if one considers the 
end of the nobles and of the ignobles, one will see in the former great 
desire to dominate, and in the latter only desire not to be dominated.” 4 
And in the  Florentine Histories the division is articulated not in terms of 
a specification of its potential contribution to the establishment of free-
dom, but rather in terms of it as a source of corrupting factional conflict: 
“The grave and natural enmities between the people and the nobles, 
 2  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. 9. 
 3  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 1.4. 
 4  Ibid., bk. 1.5. 
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caused by the wish of the latter to command and the former not to obey, 
are the cause of all the evils that emerge in cities; for from this diversity 
of humours all the other things that disturb cities take their nourish-
ment.” 5 This division, furthermore, is apparently considered to be 
grounded in a certain natural principle. Such is suggested by the seem-
ingly inevitable emergence of conflict between the people and the 
 grandi after the suppression of the factional conflict between the Guelfs 
and Ghibellines, Machiavelli writing that “there remained ignited only 
those humours that are naturally wont to exist in all cities between the 
powerful and the people; because, since the people want to live accord-
ing to the laws, and the powerful to command them, it is not possible 
that they understand together.” 6 
 Machiavelli’s emphasis on the division between these two humours, 
particularly the extent to which their interaction is implicated in the 
emergence of either productive or destructive social conflict, has been 
rightly taken to be a central issue by the majority of his readers. My 
contention, however, is that such readers err when they interpret this 
division in ontological terms, as speaking to a fundamental bifurcation 
of human nature or psychology, a bifurcation that closes off or limits the 
potential for democratic institutionalization through reading the being 
of the people in terms of an essential lack or incapacity. Typical in this 
respect is Anthony Parel, who writes that in the work of Machiavelli 
“political humors refer to desires and appetites natural to a social 
group.” 7 Political potential, the possible range of institutionalization 
within the social body, is thus delimited by the biological realities of the 
primary humours, the body politic being thus reduced to a de facto 
organic entity: Machiavelli “makes a universal statement regarding the 
structure of political regimes, irrespective of whether they are princi-
palities, republics, or oligarchies: in every city there are two opposed 
humors. The unity of a political regime, according to this statement, is 
organic.” 8 The opposition between the humours cannot be overcome, 
for “these dispositions are natural, permanent, and necessary.” 9 This 
 5  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 3.1. 
 6  Ibid., bk. 2.12. 
 7  Parel,  The Machiavellian Cosmos , 105. 
 8  Anthony Parel, “Machiavelli’s Use of  Umori in  The Prince ,”  Quaderni d’Italianistica 11, 
no. 1 (1990): 92. 
 9  Ibid., 93. 
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opposition, though, is mutually conditioning, the perception of this 
conditioning being rooted in the ancient medical science that under-
stands the health of the organism in terms of the balanced opposition 
of the humoral elements. 10 The health of the body politic depends upon 
the mutual satisfaction of each humour in a relation of co-determination 
that is framed in terms of a law of organic necessity, such that we must 
conclude that “the real ends of politics are basically pre-moral and 
pre-rational.” 11 
 According to such a conception, the political task becomes one of 
balancing the parts of the city, identifying the political offices and roles 
that correspond to the biologically determined humours associated 
with each such part, and arranging them relative to one another so as to 
establish an internally proportionate unity that ensures to the greatest 
possible degree the stability of the body politic. Such a vision of the end 
of the state as being oriented toward the establishment of a peaceful 
internal coherence would be a common feature of civic humanist politi-
cal thinking grounded in reflection on classical republicanism. Indeed, 
it was given perhaps an archetypal expression in Cicero’s  De re publica , 
which is worth quoting at length. Cicero writes: “In playing the lyre or 
the flute, and of course in choral singing, a degree of harmony must be 
maintained among the different sounds, and if it is altered or discor-
dant a trained ear cannot endure it; and this harmony, through the reg-
ulation of very different voices, is made pleasing and concordant. So 
too the state, through the reasoned balance of the highest and the low-
est and the intervening orders, is harmonious in the concord of very 
different people. What musicians call harmony with regard to song is 
concord in the state, the tightest and the best bond of safety in every 
republic; and that concord, can never exist without justice.” 12 It is this 
tradition of theorizing republican life in terms of such a coordination of 
elements that many readers of Machiavelli take the latter to be partici-
pating in. According to such a model of republican life, the harmony of 
 10  Ibid. For a very different account of the extent to which Machiavelli was infl uenced 
by the medical science of his time, and in particular humoral theory, stressing the 
signifi cance of social confl ict as opposed to social harmony, see Marie Gaille-Nikodi-
mov,  Confl it civil et liberté: la politique machiavélienne entre histoire et médecine (Paris: 
Honoré Champion, 2004). See also Patapan,  Machiavelli in Love , 112. 
 11  Parel, “Machiavelli’s Use of  Umori in  The Prince ,” 99. 
 12  Cicero, “On the Commonwealth,” in  On the Commonwealth and On the Laws , ed. 
James E.G. Zetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 56–7. 
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the political community is achieved to the extent that the direction of 
the humours within it are capable of being comprehensively mapped 
and channelled into modes that mutually satisfy them, in a relation of 
equivalent fulfilment. The determinate form of being of human appe-
tite is thus the condition for the determinate form of being of the inter-
nally stable and harmonious republic. 
 There is very strong reason to doubt, however, that Machiavelli 
theorized either of these possibilities. 13 In  chapter 2 , for example, I 
attempted to show the extent to which human difference greatly 
exceeds the apparently natural division between the humours of the 
great and the people. In  chapter 3 I attempted to show that Machia-
velli theorizes human psychology in terms of an irregular and non-
thematizable ambition that perpetually seeks an external expression 
through the transgression of existing realities. Indeed, it is the latter 
fact of inexhaustible human ambition that generates the former fact 
of inexhaustible human conflict. As was suggested in my presenta-
tion of Machiavelli’s critique of contemplative historical understand-
ing in  chapter 1 , the reduction of the image of the healthy city to one 
whose being is considered in terms of stability and self-identity was 
an ideological manoeuvre designed to cover up the fact of patrician 
domination. The humanist praise of civic harmony and unity func-
tioned to mask a status quo where a minority derived political and 
economic privilege from the established set of social relations. 
Although the common good was praised, this good was interpreted 
as being realizable only through the benevolent application of wise 
policy by elites. The rejection of the potentially productive conse-
quences of disunion was an ideological strategy for preserving patri-
cian rule. 
 Machiavelli’s affirmation of the productivity of conflict must not be 
read in terms of that conflict’s potential resolution via the establishment 
 13  As is often the case, this fact was recognized with more clarity by certain of Machia-
velli’s contemporaries than by later readers, as suggested by Guicciardini’s critique 
of Machiavelli, the former stating with reference to the latter that “praising discord 
is like praising a sick man’s illness, because the remedy that has been used on him is 
the right one.” Guicciardini, “Considerations on the Discourses of Niccolò Machia-
velli,” 393. For an additional example of Guicciardini’s praise of internal social unity 
and his critique of discord and division see Francesco Guicciardini,  Dialogue on the 
Government of Florence , ed. and trans. Alison Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 81. 
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of an ordered relation of balance between the diverse elements seen to 
constitute the social field, but rather in terms of the irreducibility of 
conflict to a binary relation that is reconcilable in a static order of 
things. 14 Conflict in Machiavelli is a necessary condition of life given 
the multiplicity of forms of human being and doing. Filippo Del Luc-
chese is the contemporary reader who has done most to emphasize 
the significance of social conflict to Machiavelli’s thought, and Machi-
avelli’s rejection of universal models of the common human good. He 
notes, for example, that Machiavelli never speaks of the actualization 
of the common good as ensuring the realization of the good of every 
particular individual within the society. 15 The common good is thus 
not equivalent to the good of all, especially in social contexts marked 
by a division between the  grandi and the people: “If what we mean by 
‘common good’ means the good of all social groups, necessarily in 
conflict in the city (in Rome and in Florence), this good simply does 
not exist in the radically realistic thought of Machiavelli. If it is com-
mon, we might say, then it is not a true good.” 16 Indeed, in  Discourses 
2:2 it is claimed that the common good can be realized where the few 
suffer, this few here being the grandees. The common good, in short, 
is irreducible to an organic conception of unity in which each part 
fulfils itself in its positive contribution to the well-being of the society. 
For Del Lucchese the impossibility of such a form of social closure is 
especially well revealed in the structure of the  Florentine Histories , 
where the presentation of competing views on virtually all issues 
demonstrates both the conflictual nature of politics, and also the 
impossibility of reconciling competing visions in the realization of a 
good that is literally common to all. 17 Indeed, the very idea of justice 
is articulated through the conflict of interests that expresses the inter-
nal differentiation of society. Justice is not theorized in terms of the 
 14  This is sometimes recognized. See, for example, Wolin,  Politics and Vision , 208; Mark 
Jurdjevic,  A Great and Wretched City: Promise and Failure in Machiavelli’s Florentine 
Political Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 103. 
 15  Del Lucchese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza , 29. 
 16  Filippo Del Lucchese, “Machiavellian Democracy,”  Historical Materialism 20, no. 
1 (2012): 242. On Catherine Zuckert’s reading, when Machiavelli uses the phrase 
“common good” he means only “the good of the vast majority of the people who 
want the security government by law can provide without oppression. It does not 
include the good desired by the ‘great.’” Zuckert,  Machiavelli’s Politics , 467. 
 17  Del Lucchese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza , 32. 
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derivation of a specific order of things from a transcendent source, but 
is rather a conflictual claim articulated in a concrete historical 
context. 
 My argument is that multiplicity is itself the result of a basic fact of 
human existence: the negative human desire for creative self-expression. 
It is not that different groups of individuals have specifically fixed 
ends or purposes. On the contrary, all individuals are oriented toward 
the externalization of the same insatiable ambition. It is precisely 
because of the fact, though, that such ambition has no positive content 
that individuals attempt to realize it in such a diversity of conflicting 
modes, pursuing and valuing different objects. 18 The political ques-
tion for Machiavelli then becomes: how can such necessarily con-
flictual diversity be given a social expression in a non-antagonistic 
way? In  chapter 6 I will attempt to show how Machiavelli answers 
this question. First, however, it must be demonstrated that Machia-
velli does in fact think the universality of the negative human desire 
for self-expression, that even the people, as opposed to simply the 
 grandi , possess an active ambition that perpetually seeks exterioriza-
tion. My argument is that the distinction between the desire to oppress 
and the desire not to be oppressed is not grounded in a biological 
differentiation between differing human natures, but is simply a dif-
ference in the form of appearance of desire, a difference grounded in 
a divergence in the means by which individuals attempt to realize a 
universal negative human essence. Specifically, the great attempt to 
satisfy their ambition through the domination of others – that is to say, 
through denying others their capacity for ambitious expression. The 
people, on the other hand, do not participate in such a limitation, 
being content instead with a form of democratic institutionalization 
in which all citizens are able to express their creative desire. Whereas 
the people are satisfied to vent their desire through proper institu-
tional outlets, the great attempt to vent their desire privately, and 
attempt to restrict such self-expression to themselves alone. The dif-
ference is thus not in the nature of desire, but rather in the mode of 
expression of desire. 
 18  On the necessary mutual intelligibility such a situation produces see Minogue, “The-
atricality and Politics,” 153; von Vacano,  The Art of Power , 61–2. 
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 The Ground of Freedom: The Active Form of Popular Desire 
 As suggested above, Machiavelli’s identification of two humours 
always present in a city, one that seeks to oppress and one that seeks not 
to be oppressed, has often been interpreted by readers in terms of a 
fundamental bifurcation of human nature: whereas the great possess an 
active and spirited impulse to impress their will upon the world, the 
people are considered primarily as passive and static, seeking only the 
assurance of their own private security. Such a reading is common to a 
variety of intellectual traditions within Machiavelli studies, including 
neo-republican, 19 Straussian, 20 and even democratic. 21 In my view, 
however, such a polarization of desire (at least in the Straussian and the 
neo-republican cases, if not that of democratic readers) rests upon a 
conflation of the notions of domination and authority, as if the people’s 
 19  Especially notable here is Skinner’s stress on republican governments as those that 
provide the conditions for the realization of a negative liberty to undertake private 
pursuits, as “To be free, in short, is simpy to be unconstrained from pursuing what-
ever goals we may happen to set for ourselves.” Quentin Skinner, “The Republican 
Ideal of Political Liberty,” in  Machiavelli and Republicanism , ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin 
Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 302. 
See also Skinner,  The Foundations of Modern Political Thought , vol. 1:  The Renaissance , 
125; Skinner, “Machiavelli on Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty”; Philip Pettit, 
 Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 28. For brief overviews of Skinner’s attempt to reground republican liberty 
in negative freedom see Carl K.Y. Shaw, “Quentin Skinner on the Proper Meaning 
of Republican Liberty,”  Politics 23, no. 1 (2003): 46–56; Marco Geuna, “Skinner, Pre-
Humanist Rhetorical Culture and Machiavelli,” in  Rethinking the Foundations of Mod-
ern Political Thought , ed. Annabel Brett, James Tully, and Holly Hamilton-Bleakley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 50–72. 
 20  See, for example, Vickie B. Sullivan,  Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of Liberal 
Republicanism in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33; Vickie 
B. Sullivan, “Machiavelli’s Momentary ‘Machiavellian Moment’: A Reconsideration 
of Pocock’s Treatment of the Discourses,”  Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992): 312. 
 21  Although stressing the active participation of the people in the republican regime, 
McCormick ultimately suggests that this participation is not driven by a desire for 
plebeian self-expression, but is rather a strategic response to the noble desire for 
domination: “The people and their plebeian magistrates must act in a more than a 
merely passive and reactive manner  if they are to contain and control wily and well-
resources social actors identifi ed fi rst and foremost by an insolent humor to oppress 
others.” John P. McCormick,  Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 94. Emphasis added. 
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apparent desire not to be dominated logically excludes the people’s 
immanent desire to have a share in government. Such a position is a 
manifestation of an anti-democratic impulse that necessarily reads gov-
ernance in terms of command or oppression. For Machiavelli, though, 
this identification is illegitimate. There is a popular desire to actively 
participate in legislative activities, and this desire is grounded in the 
universal vitality of the human psyche. The two primary humours are 
simply two different forms of appearance of the single desire for cre-
ative self-expression, two different modes for the realization of ambi-
tion. I will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which the people can be 
seen to possess such a desire through constellating several key episodes 
drawn from Machiavelli’s writings. 
 There is certainly some precedent for thinking the presence of such a 
natural desire for participatory freedom in the people. 22 Most notable is 
a recent contribution by Mark Jurdjevic on Machiavelli’s Florentine 
writings, specifically the  Florentine Histories and the “Discourse on Flo-
rentine Affairs.” According to Jurdjevic, we see in these writings a shift 
away from Machiavelli’s earlier emphasis on the transformative power 
of single actors, toward an emphasis on the stimulating powers of col-
lective action and mutual consent. In Jurdjevic’s words, “we see a broad 
transformation in his way of thinking about power from an early focus 
on individuals to a later sociological analysis of power rooted in frank 
skepticism about the limit and utility of individual action.” 23 Jurdjevic 
asks, for example, why in the Florentine writings there is not a single 
reference to the positive example of Rome, if not because Machiavelli 
abandoned the Roman model as a normative goal: “By 1520 Machia-
velli has no intention of attempting or ever desiring to imitate the 
Roman model.” 24 Significantly, this transition is thought in terms of a 
fundamental reconceptualization of the people and its desire. It is 
 22  Ugo Dotti, for example, links Machiavelli’s affi rmation of freedom to a specifi c form 
of naturalism, seeing freedom as grounded in the recognition of the specifi city of 
human instinct. Ugo Dotti,  Niccolò Machiavelli: la fenomenologia del potere (Milano: 
Feltrinelli Editore, 1979), 122–3. More recently, Erica Benner has identifi ed the desire 
for freedom as a universal modality grounded in the natural human capacity for 
self-legislation, this universality explaining why certain peoples strive for freedom 
even without having any direct prior experience of it. Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 
230. 
 23  Jurdjevic,  A Great and Wretched City , 54. 
 24  Ibid., 73. 
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suggested that by this time Machiavelli no longer considers the people 
as capable of achieving satisfaction only through the guarantee of a 
secure space of negative liberty, but also as needing the attainment of 
an active participatory role in society. Hence “he repeatedly and explic-
itly warned that the people can only be satisfied by giving them an 
outlet in the government for the expression of their political ambitions 
and identity.” 25 Popular desire is here oriented toward “action and par-
ticipation for its own sake.” 26 As a consequence of this identification of 
the nature of popular desire, Machiavelli is compelled to abandon his 
earlier differentiation of plebeian and noble humours, now reading 
both in terms of the same positive desire for political self-expression: 
“their desires are equally political, the problems they pose are identical, 
and the solutions are identical – realizing a form of government that 
gives both of them their voice and roles in the common enterprise of 
governing.” 27 Hence, “In his later republicanism, the people have 
become irreducibly political.” 28 
 Although I think that Jurdjevic is absolutely correct that we can iden-
tify in Machiavelli’s Florentine writings a popular political being con-
sidered in terms of a desire for self-legislation, I disagree with him that 
this being only emerges in these later works. I argue, instead, that there 
are several passages in the  Discourses that suggest Machiavelli always 
identified plebeian desire with the will to participatory self-expression. 
The initial suggestion of the people’s possession of an active ambition 
seeking exterior projection occurs early in the  Discourses , in the defence 
of the socially productive consequences of Roman tumults in 1:4. After 
specifying the orientation of the two primary humours constituting the 
civic population, Machiavelli goes on to locate the institution of laws in 
favour of freedom in the conflictual confrontation of these humours, 
writing that “those who condemn the tumults between the nobles and 
the plebs seem to me to blame those things that were the first cause of 
keeping Rome free, and consider more the noises and the cries that 
these tumults created than the good effects that they brought.” 29 What 
is immediately worthy of recognition is that Machiavelli does not claim 
 25  Ibid., 75. 
 26  Ibid., 76. 
 27  Ibid., 78. 
 28  Jurdjevic, “Machiavelli’s Hybrid Republicanism,” 1254. 
 29  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.4. 
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that these tumults constitute a good in themselves, but rather a good to 
the extent that they are articulated in a specific form, one that channels 
the humoral passions into modes that are not antagonistically violent, 
and for the sake of a specifically productive institutional creation. 
Regarding the former, on the non-violent character of the tumults, he 
writes: “from the Tarquins to the Gracchi, which was more than three 
hundred years, the Roman tumults rarely brought exile and very rarely 
blood. Therefore, these tumults can be neither judged harmful, nor a 
republic divided, which in such a long time sent into exile no more than 
eight or ten citizens due to its differences, and killed very few, and con-
demned not many more in fines.” 30 If Machiavelli in defending the 
tumults was concerned exclusively with demonstrating that their con-
tinued existence did not preclude the establishment of a social field in 
which individuals could live without fear of interference, his narration 
might have ended here. He goes on, however, to note that the tumults 
generated in Rome a productive benefit associated with not only the 
creation of a negative security, but also the creation of positive institu-
tional spaces allowing for the expression of a popular will to action. 31 
 It is precisely the existence of popular ambition and the necessity of 
modes and orders capable of channelling this ambition that those who 
criticize the conflict of humours fail to recognize: “If anyone should say 
the modes were extraordinary, and almost savage, to see the people 
 30  Ibid. 
 31  Marco Geuna notes that the plebeian tumults that Machiavelli calls attention to were 
socially productive not only to the extent that they led to the generation of popular 
institutions in the fi rst instance, but also all throughout the period that Rome lived 
in freedom. Marco Geuna, “Machiavelli ed il ruolo dei confl itti nella vita politica,” in 
 Confl itti , ed. Alessandro Arienzo and Dario Caruso (Napoli: Libreria Dante & Des-
cartes, 2005), para. 1.2. Machiavelli says that Rome remained free from the expulsion 
of the Tarquins to the murder of Gaius Gracchus, a period of around 400 years, from 
510 to 121  BCE . The tribunes were instituted fi rst in 494 and then in 449, Machiavelli 
maintaining however that the tumults were the origins of laws in favour of freedom 
for long after this. What this suggests is that there is thus a permanent place for such 
activity in a democratic polity which is already directed toward plebeian good, to 
the extent that there is no constitutional form able to permanently reconcile social 
division, the latter being constitutive of the social order: “Looking at the thesis in 
this light shows that Machiavelli suggests indirectly that the tumults cannot be 
resolved once and for all, not even through the pure form of the mixed constitution. 
The tumults reemerging again and again and again must be managed by those who 
actively work in the politics of the republic. Even the perfect constitutional form can-
not put them to an end.” Ibid. 
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together shouting against the Senate, the Senate against the people, 
running tumultuously through the streets, the shops closed, all of the 
plebs leaving Rome, all things which frighten those who only read of 
them, I say that every city ought to have its modes with which  the people 
can vent its ambition , and especially those cities that want to affirm the 
people in important things.” 32 The people here are not merely reacting 
against the insolence of others who would seek to dominate them, but 
are actively looking to vent their own desire. Hence the tumults deserve 
to be commended to the extent that they were the stimulus to the cre-
ation of an institution that was capable of functioning as a stable 
medium for this active expression. The conflict between the great and 
the people is not praised in itself, but to the degree that it resulted in the 
creation of the tribunes as an order for the expulsion of plebeian ambi-
tion: “And if the tumults were the cause of the creation of the tribunes, 
they merit the highest praise; because, in addition to giving popular 
government its part, they were constituted as the guard of Roman 
freedom.” 33 
 The necessity of a specifically institutional form for the venting of 
ambition is articulated through Machiavelli’s juxtaposition of the 
modes of “running tumultuously through the streets” and “leaving 
Rome,” with participation in “important things.” That which might 
constitute such participation in important things is suggested by the 
initial reference to the activity of the tribunes, but is immediately clari-
fied in the following chapter, in relation to the newly introduced theme 
of the guard of freedom. The political question interrogated in 1:5 is 
perhaps the most significant in Machiavelli’s thought. It is: what social 
institution of desire should be affirmed in the city? How should the 
political modes and orders be arranged so as to facilitate the expression 
of ambitious energy? Machiavelli approaches the question through his 
observation that any well-ordered republic requires a “guard of free-
dom.” 34 The ostensible subject of the chapter is the question of who this 
guard should be placed in the hands of, the great or the many, the 
nobles or the people. The issue is initially approached through contrast-
ing Lacedomonian and Venetian modes of institutionalization with the 
Roman one, the former two examples functioning as case studies in 
 32  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.4. Emphasis added. 
 33  Ibid. 
 34  Ibid., bk. 1.5. 
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constructing an aristocratic social economy of desire, the latter as a case 
study in constructing a democratic one. Machiavelli maintains that if 
one examines the matter from the standpoint of ends, then one should 
take the aristocratic position, for Sparta and Venice lasted longer than 
Rome. We know, however, that Machiavelli’s criterion of political judg-
ment is irreducible to merely instrumental considerations, such as the 
secure and stable reproduction of the political community in its self-
identity, and hence the need for a more rigorous interrogation. 
 The aristocratic argument associated with the Spartan and Venetian 
models has two elements. The claim is that by giving the guard of free-
dom to the great you, first, allow them an outlet through which they are 
able to satisfy their ambition, and second, keep authority out of the 
restless and unstable hands of the plebs. The special significance of the 
latter claim has not been fully appreciated. What is recognized here by 
defenders of aristocratic order is that which most contemporary advo-
cates of aristocratic rule (or more specifically, readers who reject the 
notion that Machiavelli was a democratic thinker affirming a popular 
will to political participation) deny: that popular desire is identical to 
noble desire, that is, that it is just as insatiable and perpetually directed 
toward additional acquisition. 35 Thus in Rome, where although “the 
tribunes of the plebs had this authority in their hands, it was  not enough 
for them to have one plebeian consul, but they wanted to have both. 
From this they wanted the censorship, the praetor, and all the other 
offices of rule in the city;  nor was this enough for them , for, carried away 
by the same  passion , they with time began to adore those men who they 
saw as able to beat down the nobility.” 36 In short, it is precisely the elite 
recognition of the plebs’ possession of the same desire to acquire that 
they have which produces their belief in the necessity of closing off the 
former’s access to major offices. The difference in desire lay not in the 
possession or non-possession of an ambitious appetite, but in the mode 
 35  On the identity of plebeian and noble nature see, for example, Alfredo Bonadeo, 
 Corruption, Confl ict, and Power in the Works and Times of Niccolò Machiavelli (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), 46; Giorgio Cadoni,  Crisi della mediazione politica 
e confl itti sociali: Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini e Donato Giannotti di fronte 
al tramonto della Fiorentina libertas (Roma: Jouvence, 1994), 37; Catherine Zuckert, 
“Machiavelli and the End of Nobility in Politics,”  Social Research 81, no. 1 (2014): 90; 
Coby, “Machiavelli’s Philanthropy,” 608–9; Del Lucchese, “Machiavellian Democ-
racy,” 239. 
 36  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.5. Emphases added. 
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by which this appetite is realized, as is made evident by the examina-
tion of the democratic argument. Defenders of the Roman model, 
including Machiavelli, thus maintain that the guard should be placed 
in the hands of those who are less likely to appropriate power for them-
selves alone: “And without doubt, if one considers the end of the nobles 
and of the commoners, one will see in the former great desire to domi-
nate, and in the latter only desire not to be dominated; and, conse-
quently, a greater will to live free.” 37 It is not the case that the people 
have less of a desire to exercise political power, but rather that they 
have less of a desire to exercise it  exclusively , appropriating authority 
for themselves alone and denying their fellow citizens the opportunity 
for political self-expression. 
 As I suggested in chapter 2 and as I will mention again in the follow-
ing section in my discussion of popular political judgment, it is no 
doubt true that the popular desire for self-activity is one that can be 
largely repressed, and hence Machiavelli’s identification of the corrupt 
multitude, the unshackled people who have not been self-educated to 
freedom, the people who lack forms of socialization that look toward 
the refinement of their critical-rational capacities. 38 Such a people were 
those that Machiavelli seemed to be primarily speaking of, for example, 
in  The Prince . 39 Nevertheless, even under such conditions, even when 
the social economy of desire is organized in such a way that the major-
ity of citizens appear to rest content with the existing order, and where 
only a few are capable of acting on the thirst for acquisition, the univer-
sal ambition which Machiavelli associates with value formation contin-
ues to exist as a subterranean current. That is, even in those instances 
where the people  seem to be passive, conservative, interested only in the 
preservation of that which they already control, ambition is still pres-
ent. Hence in 1:5, in the context of his articulation of the active form of 
being of plebeian desire, Machiavelli writes: “much disputed is which 
is the more ambitious, one who wants to maintain or one who wants to 
acquire; because easily one or the other appetite can be the cause of 
 37  Ibid. 
 38  Marie Gaille-Nikodimov argues that the particular form of expression of popu-
lar desire changes depending upon the context. Unlike in  The Prince, where it is 
primarily a desire to be protected from the great, in the  Discourses it takes the form 
of a desire for active participation in affairs of the city via self-government. Gaille-
Nikodimov,  Confl it civil et liberté , 44. 
 39  For an argument to this effect see Chabod, “ The Prince : Myth and Reality,” 63–5. 
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very great tumults. Yet nevertheless, more often than not they are 
caused by those who possess, because the fear of losing generates in 
them  the same desires that are in those who desire to acquire; for it does 
not appear to men that they securely possess what they have, if they do 
not acquire something else new.” 40 As Machiavelli puts it in  The Prince , 
“It is truly a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire.” 41 
 Machiavelli’s belief in the universality of that human ambition which 
he attributes to the people in 1:5 is confirmed in various places through-
out the  Discourses . In 1:7, during his discussion of the function of accu-
sation as a necessary mode to guard freedom, one of the two benefits 
associated with accusing is its creation of a field that allows for the 
expulsion of the always surplus energy of the people. 42 Such an expul-
sion, furthermore, is not identified as merely a reactive response to elite 
encroachments on the freedom of the republic. Indeed, in 1:50 Machia-
velli maintains that the tribunate is a useful institution not only to the 
extent that it is able to guard against the ambition of the great being 
deployed against the plebs, but also to the extent that it is able to guard 
against the ambition of the people being deployed against itself: “Here 
one has to note, first, the utility of the tribunate, which was not only 
useful to moderate the ambition that the powerful used to control the 
plebs, but also that which they used among themselves.” 43 In other 
words, Machiavelli is here positing the existence of a universal ambi-
tion that can be potentially directed toward others in an agonistic way, 
and which need not be associated exclusively with the  grandi , who 
ostensibly alone possess the desire to oppress. 
 The orientation of desire toward the perpetual overcoming of the 
existent – that is, the insatiability of a general human ambition – is 
meanwhile affirmed in 1:29. Here Machiavelli, speaking of the univer-
sality of citizens, writes that “the nature of men is ambitious and suspi-
cious, and does not know how to place a limit on its fortune.” 44 This fact 
about human nature is what accounts for why a prince often feels the 
need to secure himself ungratefully against those subordinates who 
have distinguished themselves. Because of the ambitious nature of 
 40  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.5. Emphasis added. 
 41  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 3. 
 42  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.7. 
 43  Ibid., bk. 1.50. 
 44  Ibid., bk. 1.29. 
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individuals there is no ultimate achievement of a status, position, or 
state of being that would be capable of permanently satisfying their 
desire, thus terminating the quest for additional acquisition. Neverthe-
less, a republic, unlike a principality, may be structured so as to harness 
this vitality and deploy it toward ends beneficial to the city. One of the 
ends of a free city is the reproduction of the conditions of its freedom, a 
freedom which, as will be elaborated on in  chapter 6 , is considered in 
terms of this productive sublimation of ambition. One of the most com-
mon errors that republics make in the effort to maintain their freedom 
is offending those citizens that it ought to reward, and to suspect those 
that it ought to have confidence in. 45 Several chapters earlier Machia-
velli identifies the necessity of rewarding those citizens who through 
the strength of their spirit are able to generate good works that benefit 
the city. Indeed, “although a republic be poor, and can give little, it 
ought not to abstain from that little; for always will every small gift, 
given to anyone in recompense for a good however great, be esteemed 
by whoever receives it as honorable and very great.” 46 In sum, the 
republic errs when it treats these citizens as the prince does, for unlike 
the principality the healthy republic must provide opportunities for 
citizens to vent their desire without punishment, so long as this venting 
is generalized and directed toward socially productive objects. In this 
chapter, then, Machiavelli both identifies the universality of human 
ambition, and grounds the reproduction of freedom in the public recog-
nition of those who have exercised such ambition for the sake of civic 
good, as opposed to private benefit. In the final instance, “although 
these modes in a republic that has come to corruption are the cause of 
great evils, and many times bring it more quickly to tyranny … never-
theless in a not corrupt republic they are the cause of great goods, and 
permit it to live free.” 47 
 The general insatiability of human desire is affirmed in three more 
significant places in the  Discourses . In the Preface to Book Two it is iden-
tified again as the source of human dissatisfaction with the existent, a 
dissatisfaction that stimulates a perpetual drive toward innovation. 
Desire is here theorized as a surplus always in excess of the human 
capacity to acquire the objects of its cravings, largely as a consequence 
 45  Ibid. 
 46  Ibid., bk. 1.24. 
 47  Ibid., bk. 1.29. 
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of the contingent being of a world that does not present itself as open to 
human mastery: “besides this, human appetites are insatiable, for hav-
ing, by nature, the power and the will to desire everything, and, by 
fortune, the power to attain little, the result is a continuous discontent 
in human minds, and a boredom with the things that they possess: this 
makes them condemn the present times, praise the past, and desire the 
future, even doing this if they are not motivated by any reasonable 
cause.” 48 The foundation of what Machiavelli takes to be the human 
orientation toward innovation and creativity in this insatiability, fur-
thermore, is confirmed in 3:21. The topic of the psychic fixation with the 
new is brought up in the context of a discussion of how it is possible 
that Hannibal could have acquired the reputation that he did in spite of 
the fact that, contrary to a figure such as Scipio, he deployed cruel and 
violent methods with regularity. Machiavelli writes that “thinking from 
whence this thing could emerge, there is seen several reasons for it. 
The first is that  men are desirous of new things , so much so that most of 
the time those who are well off desire novelty as much as those who 
are poorly off; for, as was said another time, and it is true, men become 
bored in the good and grieve in the bad. Therefore, this desire opens the 
door to everyone who in a province makes themselves head of an 
innovation.” 49 
 The self-reference that Machiavelli makes above, in which he earlier 
speaks of the proclivity of individuals toward the new and their desire 
for innovation, is to be found in chapter 1:37, during the discussion of 
the conflict over the Agrarian law. And indeed, there is no passage 
within the  Discourses on Livy that so clearly articulates the insatiable 
form of the plebeian desire for creative self-expression. 50 We begin 
again by noting both the natural orientation of human desire toward 
 48  Ibid., bk. 2, preface. 
 49  Ibid., bk. 3.21. Emphasis added. 
 50  Indeed, Luca Sartorello writes that in 1:37 “Machiavelli presents in a few passages of 
rare effi ciency his theory of desire.” Luca Sartorello, “L’urna sanza fondo machia-
velliana e l’origine’ della politica,” in  Machiavelli: immaginazione e contingenza , ed. 
Filippo Del Lucchese, Luca Sartorello, and Stefano Visentin (Pisa: Edizioni Ets, 2006), 
208. Here we see the reappearance of the concept of ambition in a specifi cally popu-
lar form, and characterized by an infi nite movement that perpetually exceeds the 
desired object. See also Giorgio Cadoni,  Crisi della mediazione politica e confl itti sociali: 
Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini e Donato Giannotti di fronte al tramonto della 
Fiorentina libertas (Roma: Jouvence, 1994), 35. 
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acquisition, and the incapacity of this desire coming to rest through 
being satisfied in objective possession: “nature has created men in a 
way that they can desire everything, and cannot attain everything; 
thus, since the desire is always greater than the power of acquisition, 
the result is discontent with that which they possess, and a lack of sat-
isfaction with it. From this emerges the variability of their fortune; 
because some men desire to have more, and some fear to lose what has 
been acquired, they come to hostilities and war, from which arises the 
ruin of one province and the exaltation of the other.” 51 What is essential 
to note, however, is that here Machiavelli will go on to explicitly iden-
tify this ambitious desire with the insatiable plebeian demand for 
opportunities for a specifically political self-expression relative to the 
 grandi . Desire is not, as might be suggested by the above quotation, 
oriented only toward the acquisition of objects, but rather toward the 
actualization of a modality of political being. Machiavelli thus writes 
that “to the Roman plebs it was  not enough to secure themselves against 
the nobles through the creation of the tribunes, to which  desire compelled 
it by necessity ; for having obtained that, it  immediately began to struggle 
through ambition, and to wish to divide with the nobility honours and 
possessions, as the thing most esteemed by men.” 52 It is within the con-
text of this struggle over the social institution of desire, of the plebs’ 
ambition to perpetually institute spaces allowing for creative legisla-
tion against the  grandi ’s ambition to limit the scope of freedom through 
restricting participation to it alone, that the Agrarian conflict must be 
understood. 
 The law ostensibly had two mechanisms oriented toward the main-
tenance of social equality, an equality that was considered essential 
as a ground for generalizing participation. The first was that no citi-
zen could possess more than two  jugera of land; the second was that 
the land appropriated from state enemies would be divided among 
the Roman people. The nobles were of course offended by both of 
these, “because those who possessed more assets than the law per-
mitted (which was the greater part of the nobles), had to be deprived 
of them, and dividing among the plebs the assets of enemies removed 
from them the way to be enriched.” 53 Over time the nobles 
 51  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,”  bk. 1.37. 
 52  Ibid. Emphases added. 
 53  Ibid. 
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temporized what they saw as offences through various means, with 
the original disputes ultimately subsiding as Roman territory 
expanded into isolated regions whose geographic location prevented 
plebeian intervention, the plebs being less desirous of distant and 
difficult-to-cultivate lands. As the debate over the law quieted down, 
the latter began to be no longer uniformly enforced, and it is here, not 
in popular insolence as defenders of aristocracy would suggest, that 
we can locate the root cause of the Agrarian scandal. Due to a general 
lack of enforcement over time, the sudden re-establishment of the 
law by the Gracchi had explosive consequences, and “ruined entirely 
Roman freedom.” 54 Indeed, “it ignited so much hatred between the 
plebs and the Senate that they came to arms and blood, outside of 
every civil mode and custom.” 55 The normal, legal, and regular 
enforcement of the law, by diverting passion through a publicly rec-
ognized legal order, would have minimized if not closed off the 
potential for extra-legal expulsion via the utilization of private modes 
of remedy. What the Agrarian episode ultimately demonstrates is not 
only that plebeian desire is insatiably oriented toward self-expression, 
but also that this ambitious self-expression, if it is not to be destructively 
released through antagonistic and private modes, must be produc-
tively channelled through the law. Law, in other words, does not exist 
in order to restrict or constrain desire, as was Machiavelli’s position in 
“Of Ambition,” but rather to provide a medium for the release of an 
always excess of desire, specifically the desire for freedom. This is a 
desire not just for any particular object, but for a mode of creative 
self-activity, and in this sense it is, to paraphrase Lefort, a desire not 
to have but rather to be. 56 
 Such a desire is articulated particularly well in the  Florentine His-
tories by a member of the Signori after Walter, Duke of Athens, had 
managed to install himself as de facto prince in Florence. After warn-
ing the duke of the dangers his extraordinary command would entail 
 54  Ibid. 
 55  Ibid. 
 56  Lefort, “Machiavelli and the  Verità Effetuale ,” 112. Notably, however, whereas the 
desire “to be” is associated with the people and corresponds to the desire not to 
oppressed, the  grandi possess instead a desire “to have” corresponding to their 
desire to oppress. See, for example, Claude Lefort, “Machiavel: la dimension 
économique du politique,” in  Les formes de l’histoire: essais d’anthropologie politique 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 131. 
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to himself as a consequence of the hatred engendered by his private 
appropriation of power, the speaker goes on to posit the existence of 
that desire for freedom which, once again, is seen as manifest even 
in social contexts in which populations have no direct experience of 
free life itself: “That the time to consume the desires for freedom is 
not enough is most certain: for [freedom] is often taken up in a city 
by those who have never tasted it, but loved it only through the 
memory that their fathers had left them; and therefore, when recov-
ered, they preserve it with every obstinacy and danger. And if ever 
their fathers had not remembered it, the public palaces, the places of 
the magistrates, the insignia of the free orders recall it: these things 
must be recognized with the utmost desire by the citizens.” 57 And 
what is more, the positive form to this desire, the fact that it cannot 
be reduced merely to a negative desire to live secure in one’s posses-
sions, is suggested by the speaker’s following claim that no amount 
of external goods, nor humane treatment or non-interference, is suf-
ficient to counter it: “Which works of yours do you want to be a 
counterbalance to the sweetness of living freely, or to make men lose 
the desire for these conditions? Not if you were to add all of Tuscany 
to this dominion, and if every day you were to come back into this 
city triumphant over our enemies: for all of the glory would not be 
its, but yours, and the citizens would not acquire subjects, but fellow 
slaves, in which they would see their servitude reaggravated. And 
while your customs would be saintly, your modes benign, your 
judgments upright, they would not be enough to make you loved; 
and if you believe that they would be enough, you would deceive 
yourself, because to one accustomed to living untied, every chain 
weighs and every bond constrains him.” 58 Popular desire thus 
exceeds the production of a space of negative liberty, this being here 
represented in the speaker’s claim that bringing instrumental bene-
fit to the city through benign modes and upright judgment, at least 
inasmuch as these are uninitiated by citizens or by those publicly 
authorized by citizens, is no substitute for self-determination. What 
the people desire is to be free, and this condition of being free can 
only be actualized in participatory political activity. 
 57  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 2.34. 
 58  Ibid. 
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 The “Discourse on Florentine Affairs” 
and the Democratic Imperative 
 Machiavelli’s most concise articulation of this movement, from the rec-
ognition of the being of popular ambition to the demand for this ambi-
tion’s actualization in concrete political participation, occurs in the 
“Discourse on Florentine Affairs.” This text was written for Pope Leo 
X and is often dismissed as a compromised document from which no 
democratic lessons can be learned as a consequence of the multiple 
instances of overt Medici flattery, and the seeming guarantee of the 
perpetuation of a princely space within the proposed republican con-
stitution. The “Discourse” can nevertheless be read, once these criti-
cisms are properly situated within the social-historical context leaning 
upon Machiavelli, as an essential moment contributing important nor-
mative content to the Machiavellian theory of radical democracy. Such 
content, furthermore, to the extent that it articulates the form of rela-
tion between popular desire and popular rule, exceeds the common 
reading of the text as a representation of a potential transitional move-
ment from the principality to the republic. 59 In the “Discourse” we can 
isolate two related democratic moments: the first in Machiavelli’s rec-
ognition of the need for a popular institutional space for the venting of 
citizen desire, and the second in the call for a gradual deepening of this 
space through the enlargement of the sphere of popular participation 
over time. 
 Machiavelli begins by writing, “The reason why Florence has always 
varied frequently in its government, has been because it has been nei-
ther a republic nor a principality that has had its necessary quality; for 
one cannot call that principality stable where things are done according 
to the will of one, and decided with the consent of many; nor can one 
believe that republic to be enduring where those humours that need to 
be satisfied for the republic not to be ruined are not satisfied.” 60 
 59  See, for example, Gatti,  Ideas of Liberty in Early Modern Europe , 28; Joseph Francese, 
“La meritocrazia di Machiavelli. Dagli scritti politici alla  Mandragola ,”  Italica 71, no. 
2 (1994): 153–75; Luca Baccelli, “Political Imagination, Confl ict, and Democracy,” in 
 Machiavelli on Liberty and Confl ict , ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila 
Vergara (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 359. 
 60  Niccolò Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii 
Medices,” in  Tutte le opere , 24. 
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Florence’s oscillation between these two forms of regime as a conse-
quence of each one’s internal structural contradictions point to a funda-
mental polarity of government. Indeed, in the “Discourse” Machiavelli 
maintains that when it comes to forms of state there are in fact only two 
options, the principality or the republic: “no state can be ordered that is 
stable if it is not either a true principality or a true republic, because all 
of the governments between these two are defective.” 61 This polarity, 
however, is not an absolute one, there being a sort of dialectic between 
the principality and the republic, the dissolution of each being achieved 
through the tendency toward the other: “the principality has only one 
way toward its dissolution, which is to descend to the republic; and so 
the republic has only one way to being dissolved, which is to ascend up 
to the principality.” 62 The fact, however, that there is no principle or law 
of motion that would direct the movement from one to the other dem-
onstrates both Machiavelli’s rejection of any type of cycle of govern-
ment, as well as any form of government that could successfully 
mediate between the two forms, such as in the classical image of the 
mixed regime. Indeed, “All the other ones are useless and of very short 
life.” 63 According to this typology, then, there is simply popular gov-
ernment in which the people have an active role in rule, and all other 
governments in which they do not, the vast plurality of non-democratic 
regimes being collapsed into one category defined negatively in terms 
of their shared lack. The republican criterion is here not simply found 
in the existence of government oriented toward the institution of poli-
cies benefiting the common good, but toward concrete popular partici-
pation. This is why, for example, the government of Maso degli Albizzi 
was bound to fail, for he attempted to order a “republic governed by 
aristocrats,” a fundamental contradiction in terms. 64 It would then be 
correlatively the case that it is impossible to ground a long-lasting prin-
cipality in the patronage of the people. As Giorgio Cadoni notes, “One 
of the theses of the ‘Discourse on Florentine Affairs’ is that the only 
possible principality is that which is founded on the support of the 
 grandi , and on the oppression of the masses.” 65 If such is the case, then 
 61  Ibid., 26. 
 62  Ibid. 
 63  Ibid. 
 64  Ibid., 24. 
 65  Giorgio Cadoni, “Machiavelli teorico dei confl itti sociali,” in  Machiavelli attuale / 
Machiavel actuel , ed. Georges Barthouil (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1982), 21. 
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Machiavelli’s programmatic advice in  The Prince regarding the need for 
a popular ground for foundation and preservation can only suggest the 
necessarily temporary form of the new principality. 
 Although Machiavelli initially claims that there is a foundation upon 
which one can judge the form of government that is most appropriate 
given existing social conditions, specifically the presence or non-presence 
of equality, there is a suggestion that there is a more primary ethical 
ground for his preference. The content of this ground is anticipated by 
Machiavelli’s once more calling attention to the natural predilection 
that individuals have toward experiencing and enjoying the new: “Nor 
should one believe it to be true that men easily return to the old and 
customary mode of living, because this occurs when the old life is more 
pleasing than the new; but when it pleases less, they will not return if 
not forced, and then live for only as long as that force endures.” 66 Peo-
ple are thus not only shackled to the past, to their already existent 
modes of doing and being, but are in fact open to and desirous of the 
new. This desire is given an outlet in the construction of a space within 
the proposed body politic for popular political creation. Although 
attempting to convince the Medici that establishing a principality in a 
city such as Florence would be not only difficult, but “inhuman and 
unworthy of anyone who desires to be held merciful and good,” he 
nevertheless attempts to temper his proposal in their eyes, both through 
the suggestion that the movement toward republicanism would further 
esteem them, and through preserving a form of political inequality by 
ensuring that the highest offices would be occupied by elites. 67 We 
should not be misled, though, by the fact that Machiavelli’s proposal 
grants the highest authority within the city to such seeming eminents – 
at least insomuch as the city contains citizens who “are arrogant and 
believe that they deserve to come before the others; to satisfy them is 
necessary in ordering a republic.” 68 The historical reality of the contem-
porary Florentine situation thus structures the political possibility 
 66  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” 26. 
 67  Ibid., 27. 
 68  Ibid. And although Machiavelli suggests that the three classes identifi ed in Florence 
exist in all cities, earlier he concedes that it is possible to imagine a situation in which 
“all the nobility would have to be eliminated, and reduced to an equality with the 
others.” Ibid. The potential for such an elimination will be further explored in the 
next chapter. 
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germinating within the city. For the grandees Machiavelli thus pro-
poses a new Signoria composed of “sixty-five citizens of at least forty-
five years, fifty-three for the major [guilds] and twelve for the minor; 
and they should remain in the government for life.” 69 One member 
drawn from the Signoria should furthermore serve as Gonfalonier of 
justice for a fixed term of two or three years. This body minus the Gon-
falonier would be divided into two groups of thirty-two, which would 
alternate governing on a yearly basis, and which would be further sub-
divided into groups of eight, rotating into and out of authority every 
three months. The second class of middling citizens, furthermore, 
would be satisfied through the institution of a permanently held Coun-
cil of two hundred made up of individuals of at least forty years of age, 
one-hundred and sixty of whom would be selected from the major 
guilds and forty of whom would be selected from the minor guilds. 70 
 After outlining the institutions meant to satisfy these elites and the 
middle group of citizens, Machiavelli turns to the largest group within 
the city, the people. Once again he emphasizes the insatiability of the 
desire of the people, and explicitly identifies its satisfaction with the 
establishment of a participatory space guaranteeing a popular role in 
government, a space furthermore that allows for the continual expres-
sion of ambition: “It now remains to satisfy the third and final class of 
men, which is the whole of the citizens: these are never satisfied (and 
whoever believes otherwise is not wise) if their authority is not restored 
or promised to be restored.” 71 Each social class is seen as requiring its 
own institutional outlet to the extent that each possesses the same 
ambitious spirit seeking externalization. The people, contrary to vari-
ous conservative or anti-democratic readings, is not an inert mass that 
is capable of being pacified through the guaranteed establishment of a 
private security, but rather an active force that seeks a concrete place in 
government in order to vent its ambition. Their participation would be 
achieved through the re-establishment of “the hall of the Council of 
one-thousand, or at least six-hundred citizens, who would distribute, 
in the same way that they had already distributed, all the offices and 
magistracies, except for the aforementioned Sixty-five, Two-hundred, 
 69  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” 27. 
 70  Ibid., 28. 
 71  Ibid. 
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and Eight of the  balía .” 72 Because the people possess the same participa-
tory desire for self-expression as do the other groups of citizens, they 
will never be contented through the preservation of their security alone, 
but rather require an active place in government. Hence, “Without sat-
isfying the whole of the people, it is not possible to render a stable 
republic. The whole of the Florentine citizens will never be satisfied 
unless the hall is reopened.” 73 
 In addition, Machiavelli also calls – “in order that the whole of the 
people … is satisfied” – for the establishment of sixteen citizen pro-
vosts, four of which would be chosen by lot to hold office for one month 
at a time. 74 The provosts would scrutinize the elite institutions in order 
to ensure no decision contrary to the common good would be enacted, 
Machiavelli writing that “the thirty-two would not be able to decide 
anything without the presence of said provosts,” and that “nor could 
the Council of two-hundred do anything, if there were not at least six of 
the sixteen provosts.” 75 Through such institutions common citizens 
have the ability to not only accuse others who might transgress civil life 
in common, but also are given an additional field for the expulsion of 
their creative energy. Machiavelli thus writes: “It is also not good that 
citizens who have a hand in the state should not have someone who 
observes them, and makes them refrain from activities that are not 
good, removing from them that authority that they use badly. The other 
reason is that, through removing from the universality of the citizens, 
by raising up the Signoria as you do today, the power of being Signori, 
it is necessary to restore to them an office that resembles that which is 
taken away: and this [new office] is greater, more useful to the republic, 
and more honourable than that [old office].” 76 
 After articulating the need for a popular venting of desire, in the final 
pages of the “Discourse” Machiavelli suggests a will to intensify his 
seemingly modest democratic reforms after the death of Giovanni de’ 
Medici. He speaks, for example, of the existing proposals as meant to be 
instituted within “the life of Your Holiness,” even writing that as “Your 
Holiness and the most reverend monsignor are living, [the state] is a 
 72  Ibid., 28–9. 
 73  Ibid., 29. 
 74  Ibid. 
 75  Ibid. 
 76  Ibid., 29–30. 
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monarchy, because you command all the arms, you command the crimi-
nal judges, you have the laws in your breast.” 77 Machiavelli is both flat-
tering the Medici in the hopes that they will overlook the fully democratic 
potential germinating in the reforms, while at the same time expressing 
a wish for the further entrenchment of democracy, which would receive 
a popular demand after the death of Giovanni. Machiavelli thus writes: 
“We do not yet see how the universality of the citizens cannot be satis-
fied, seeing restored that part of the distributions, and seeing the others 
 little by little fall into their hands .” 78 Such would ultimately be of the high-
est benefit to the city, and generate additional reputation for the reform-
ers, and this because “I believe that the greatest honour that men can 
have is that voluntarily given them by their homeland: I believe that the 
greatest good that one does, and the most pleasing to God, is that which 
one does to one’s homeland. Besides this, there is no man so exalted in 
any of his actions, as are those who with laws and institutions reform 
republics and kingdoms: these are, after those who have been Gods, the 
first praised.” 79 If Giovanni does not seek after his glory through the 
initial movement toward genuine republican life, the city will never be 
free of threats and ills. Machiavelli, though, is aware that it is not possi-
ble to order a perpetual republic, to construct a system of orders that is 
capable of fixing the being of the polity and eliminating all accidents 
and dangers. That said, the form of regime most able to successfully 
ward off such dangers is one structured according to a principle of self-
government, that is, one ordered “in a way that it administers itself.” 80 
In such a state “it is enough that Your Holiness keeps half an eye facing 
it.” 81 In the final instance the healthiest city is one that has orders and 
institutions structured such that “each person will have a hand in 
them,” 82 that is to say, such that each person will have an opportunity to 
actively participate in political life, thereby achieving satisfaction 
through the expulsion of creative energy. 
 77  Ibid., 30. 
 78  Ibid. Emphasis added. In framing his proposal in this way, Machiavelli, always 
aware of the historical conditions that structure potentiality, thus “adjusts to the real-
ity of the present.” Cadoni,  Crisi della mediazione politica e confl itti sociali , 161. 
 79  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” 30. 
 80  Ibid., 31. 
 81  Ibid. 
 82  Ibid., bk. 31. 
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 The Ground of Equality: 
The Competency of Popular Judgment 
 In the previous two sections I attempted to demonstrate that Machia-
velli locates in popular desire an ambitious impulse to self-expression. 
Democratic participation can thus not be rejected as a Machiavellian 
ideal as a consequence of the people’s lack of such an impulse. There is, 
however, another ground upon which readers attempt to deny Machia-
velli’s democratic ethics. This denial is based on the assumption that 
the people, regardless of whether or not they possess an ambitious 
desire that looks to realize itself through political participation, lack the 
requiste cognitive ability, either as individuals or as a collectivity, to 
initiate informed and reasoned policy decisions. 83 The fact that mem-
bers of the people lack certain critical-rational faculties necessitates that 
they should be entrusted only with that minimal amount of authority 
that they are capable of exercising competently, matters of legislation, 
for example, being left to political elites. 
 Hence, for example, the influential reading of Strauss, who argues 
that to the extent that the people are moved by mere appearances they 
are incapable of penetrating to the truth of objects in themselves, and 
thus must be guided to act by wise and prudential leaders: “The true 
issue becomes visible once one reflects on the fact that the multitude or 
the plebs needs guidance. This guidance is supplied ordinarily by laws 
and orders which, if they are to be of any value, necessarily originate in 
superior minds, in the minds of founders or of princes.” 84 Whereas 
princes are superior in creating new laws and orders, the people are 
superior only in maintaining them, and this because whereas princes 
are rational and innovative, the people are conservative and traditional: 
“The people is the repository of the established, of the old modes and 
orders, of authority.” 85 Even if the republic is oriented toward the actu-
alization of the common good or the good of a majority, the people 
should not have access to legitimate institutions of rule: “The majority 
 83  For examples of readers who affi rm popular ambitious desire yet see essential dif-
ferences in individuals’ capacities for the realization of this desire, see Gilbert,  Machi-
avelli and Guicciardini , 187; Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Political Psychology,” 790; Fischer, 
“Machiavelli’s Rapacious Republicanism,” xlviii. 
 84  Strauss,  Thoughts on Machiavelli , 129–30. 
 85  Ibid., 130. 
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cannot rule. In all republics, however well ordered, only a tiny minority 
ever arrives at exercising functions of ruling. For the multitude is igno-
rant, lacks judgment, and is easily deceived; it is helpless without lead-
ers who persuade or force it to act prudently.” 86 
 It is not simply readings influenced by Strauss, however, that reject 
popular political competency. Even those readers of Machiavelli who 
emphasize his normative concern with the good of the people and the 
desire for popular civic participation still tend to minimize the poten-
tial for concrete rule on the part of common citizens. Hence, for exam-
ple, Alfredo Bonadeo writes that Machiavelli “was aware of the 
limitations inherent to the actual and potential political power and 
value of the people,” the most notable such limitations being the peo-
ple’s lack of leadership and practical knowledge. 87 Similarly, and 
despite the fact that she stresses a universal human desire for self-
legislation, Erica Benner nevertheless still locates in Machiavelli’s work 
a recognition of the need for a differentiation of political tasks grounded 
in a disparity of political capacity: “In all his main works Machiavelli 
stresses the need for a clear division of political labor between the few 
who exercise authority and the many who obey.” 88 
 The passage most often pointed to as problematizing this affirmation 
of a strict inequality of intelligences in Machiavelli’s thought is  Dis-
courses 1:58, entitled “The multitude is more wise and more constant 
than a prince.” Machiavelli frames the chapter as a critique of Livy’s 
assertion regarding the inconstancy and vanity of the multitude. In this 
 86  Ibid., 260. Following Strauss, Vickie Sullivan argues that even in those instances in 
which Machiavelli seems to be democratically oriented, such is a merely instrumen-
tal dissimulation meant to pacify the common citizens who are always a majority 
within the city. Sullivan,  Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of Liberal Republicanism 
in England , 40. 
 87  Alfredo Bonadeo, “The Role of the People in the Works and Times of Machiavelli,” 
 Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 32, no. 2 (1970): 375. 
 88  Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 270. Many further manifestations of such a position 
could be presented. See, for example, Burnham,  The Machiavellians , 51; Germino, 
“Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss’s Machiavelli,” 810; Orr, “The Time Motif in 
Machiavelli,” 208; Eugene Garver, “After  Virtù : Rhetoric, Prudence, and Moral 
Pluralism in Machiavelli,”  History of Political Thought 27, no. 2 (1996): 212; Janara, 
“Machiavelli, Elizabeth I and the Innovative Historical Self,” 484; Nomi Claire Lazar, 
“Must Exceptionalism Prove the Rule? An Angle on Emergency Government in 
the History of Political Thought,”  Politics and Society 34, no. 2 (2006): 256; Balot and 
Trochimchuk, “The Many and the Few.” 
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judgment, Machiavelli maintains, Livy is entirely within the main-
stream of the Western tradition of thought, whose representatives have 
almost always posited a stark distinction between the intellectual 
capacities of the few and the many. In attempting to refute the legiti-
macy of this distinction Machiavelli knows that he is staking out a scan-
dalous position, writing that “I want to defend a thing that, as I said, 
has been accused by all the writers.” 89 Such accusations are from his 
perspective ungrounded, though, to the extent that they are ahistorical, 
the writers not situating their analyses of popular capacity in reflection 
on the concrete social-historical conditions within which subjectivity is 
developed. Specifically, when comparing the qualities of peoples to 
those of princes, we must begin by attempting to equalize the condi-
tions of evaluation to as great a degree as possible. If such an equaliza-
tion is achieved, we can only conclude that there exists a general 
equality between peoples and princes, the critics of popular judgment 
simply arbitrarily selecting the objects of analysis without any consid-
eration of the contingent background conditions that structure an 
always negative human nature. Such an abstraction is for Machiavelli 
theoretically illegitimate. He hence claims that “as to that defect of 
which the writers accuse the multitude, they can accuse all men par-
ticularly, and above all princes; for everyone who is not regulated by 
the laws would make those same errors as the unshackled multitude.” 90 
Indeed, one could easily proceed in the investigation from an opposite 
route, selectively examining the being of princes who act contrary to 
apparent reason, Machiavelli noting that “there are and there have been 
many princes, and the good and wise ones have been few.” 91 
 89  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.58. 
 90  Ibid. 
 91  Ibid. Just as he will challenge Livy’s assessment of the deliberative capacities of the 
people most generally, so too will Machiavelli challenge Livy’s assessment of the 
deliberative capacities of the common soldier more particularly, maintaining that 
Livy is mistaken in thinking that Roman growth owed more to the virtue of the 
city’s captains than its soldiers. Indeed, in many of Livy’s own accounts are we able 
to fi nd evidence of the spontaneous ability of the soldiers to self-generate modes and 
orders independent of elite guidance. Ibid., bk. 3.13. Hence, for example, the Roman 
army’s recovery and self-organization in Spain after the death of its two leaders 
and subsequent securing of Roman rule. Indeed, when Machiavelli two chapters 
later maintains that when it comes to matters of war it is useless to divide com-
mand among many, this imperative is not grounded in any observation regarding an 
inequality of capacity. The need to identify a source of fi nal authority is grounded in 
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 Already in  chapter 2 I identified the error of those readers of Machia-
velli who attempt to abstract the particular manifestation of human 
being from the historical context within which it is articulated, positing 
a mere appearance as a transcendental universal applicable in all times 
and places. Against such totalizing theoretical tendencies Machiavelli 
rejects the vision of both fundamental human goodness and fundamen-
tal human badness, locating the appearance of both in concrete social 
facts of existence, in whether or not individuals have been institution-
ally socialized to civility. The demand for the same contextualization of 
evaluation is made during Machiavelli’s discussion of popular judg-
ment in 1:58. One cannot compare, as Livy and the other classical 
authors do, a prince of a well-ordered city with an unshackled multi-
tude lacking regulation: “for the comparison ought to be posed with a 
multitude regulated by the laws such as [those princes] are; and there 
will be found in it the same goodness that we see to be in them, and it 
will be seen to neither dominate arrogantly nor meekly serve: as was 
the Roman people, who, while the Republic was uncorrupted,  never 
served meekly nor dominated arrogantly ; indeed, with its orders and mag-
istrates it held its position honourably.” 92 The italicized portion of the 
above quotation is especially significant, for it simultaneously reveals 
that the people are neither naturally passive, nor is their energy when 
mediated through certain institutional channels naturally oriented 
toward the actualization of self-interest. On the contrary, the form of 
popular participatory action is structured by its institutional back-
ground conditions, a good organization of civic life being one that is 
able to productively direct ambition, a direction that depends in the 
first instance on the fundamental human capacity for reflective 
self-activity. 
 The potential range of forms of this self-activity is wide in scope, 
Machiavelli mentioning in this chapter a few of the political tasks that 
the people are potentially capable of excelling at. They can, for exam-
ple, demonstrate a legislative ability surpassing that of princes, being 
able to critically reflect on the demands of the situation and formulate 
prudent policy in light of their consideration and comprehension of the 
the specifi city of military technique alone, for although many individuals might be 
capable of performing the task competently, the number occupying the position at 
any one time must be limited for practical reasons. Ibid., bk. 3.15. 
 92  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.58. 
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conditions within which they act. When the situation demands creative 
intervention they initiate new modes, while respecting the legislative 
authority of others when appropriate. Hence “when it was necessary to 
move against a powerful person, it did so, as is seen in Manlius, in the 
Ten, and in others who sought to oppress it,” and yet “when it was 
necessary to obey the dictators and the consuls for the public safety, it 
did so.” 93 The popular capacity for critical interrogation also manifests 
itself in the people’s superior ability to judge between competing 
claims: “As to judging things, one sees very rarely – when [the people] 
hears two speakers taking different sides, and when they are of equal 
virtue – that [the people] not take up the better opinion, and not under-
stand the truth that it hears.” 94 It is this ability to make prudent judg-
ment after representing and mediating between conflicting positions 
that makes the people also better suited to choosing magistrates than 
the prince, the latter having a tendency to be persuaded by powerful 
and corrupt individuals. Machiavelli thus notes that “in so many hun-
dreds of years, in so many elections of consuls and tribunes, it did not 
make four elections of which it had to repent.” 95 
 Machiavelli provides a more detailed account of this phenomenon in 
 Discourses 3:34, where he poses the question as to how individuals go 
about judging potential magistrates, stating initially that “the people in 
its distributing goes according to what is said of one through public 
voice and fame – when his works are not otherwise known to it – or 
through the presumption or opinion that it has of him.” 96 These opin-
ions “are caused either by the fathers of these, for being great and val-
iant men in the city it is believed that their sons ought to be like them, 
until such time as through their works [the people] perceive the oppo-
site; or it is caused by the modes taken by he of whom we are speaking 
of. The best modes that can be taken are: to keep company with serious 
men, of good customs, and reputed wise by everyone.” 97 Although per-
haps initially suggesting an aristocratic affirmation of a principle of 
heredity, Machiavelli here is actually implicitly recognizing the power 
of positive socialization, noting that if one keeps good company one 
 93  Ibid. 
 94  Ibid. 
 95  Ibid. 
 96  Ibid., bk. 3.34. 
 97  Ibid. 
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has the strong potential to be educated to that company’s good modes. 
More notably, however, Machiavelli identifies as the greatest source of 
public recognition the explicit doing of virtuous works. The people are 
seen as capable of prudently judging the virtue of others according to 
all three of these above-mentioned modes (through consideration of the 
actor’s legacy, the actor’s current company, and the actor’s good works): 
“the people, when it begins to give a position to one of its citizens, by 
relying on those three reasons written above, does not found itself 
badly.” 98 And later, when virtue is further generalized through increased 
democratic institutionalization, the people “can almost never be 
deceived.” 99 
 For Machiavelli the key criterion for competent human judgment is 
not the possession of any intrinsic skill or capacity, but rather access to 
those facts of existence that constitute the historical present. If people 
have access to such facts they will generate decisions of equal or supe-
rior worth than princes. Machiavelli is thus concerned with thinking 
about the construction of institutional orders that allow the people to 
acquire the knowledge of the world needed to make informed judg-
ments. 100 And indeed, once these orders are in place they will err less 
than princes, to the extent that the latter’s counsellors, lacking the peo-
ple’s diversity of perspective, are inferior to popular orders and delib-
erative spaces as modes of knowledge acquisition. Machiavelli thus 
writes: “And because it can be that peoples might be deceived about 
the fame, the opinion, and the works of a man, esteeming them greater 
than they are in truth – which would not happen to a prince, because he 
would be told and he would be warned by those who council him – so 
that peoples also do not lack these councils, good orderers of republics 
  98  Ibid. 
  99  Ibid. 
 100  Cary Nederman contrasts this discursive republicanism with that of James 
Harrington, for whom “public decision-making must be conducted in accordance 
with a strict principle of right reason, accessible only to a wise few, who therefore 
take it upon themselves to serve as guardian of the people for the sake of common 
benefi t.” Nederman, “Rhetoric, Reason, and Republic,” 266. Indeed, Harrington 
himself in  The Commonwealth of Oceana perceives Machiavelli’s hostility to the idea of 
a privileged noble class, going on to defend the central place that the nobility should 
have in popular government as a corrective to Machiavelli’s view. James Harrington, 
“The Commonwealth of Oceana,” in  The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of 
Politics , ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15. 
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have ordered that when they have to create the supreme offices of the 
city, where it would be dangerous to put inadequate men, and seeing 
the popular will directed at creating something that would be inade-
quate, it is lawful to every citizen, and is attributed to his glory, to pub-
licize in speech the defect of that one, so that the people, not lacking 
knowledge of him, can judge better.” 101 Machiavelli in this passage is 
certainly not denying that democratic life does not necessitate a divi-
sion of political tasks, that there are not certain political roles that 
require a particular skill that not all possess as a consequence of diver-
gent educations and upbringings. However, in these cases the people 
are seen as having ultimate responsibility for choosing who fills these 
offices, the form of this choosing extending well beyond the aristocratic 
mode of election to include more comprehensive interrogation and 
scrutiny. Such interrogation depends upon the people possessing a crit-
ical rationality that allows them to fully represent to themselves the 
spectrum of opportunity and comprehend the demands of the political 
situation. 
 The quality of the people’s selection, the fact that it is grounded in a 
highly reflective scrutiny of the necessity of the objective circumstances, 
is revealed in the fact that they do not uncritically or reactively elevate 
members of their own class to positions simply as a result of their social 
affiliation. Hence in  Discourses 1:47 Machiavelli notes a key event in the 
plebeian confrontation with the noble appetite, here expressed through 
the exercise of consular authority. The Roman people, reflecting on their 
role in the city, determined that they deserved consular representation, 
and in response the nobility agreed to create a limited number of tri-
bunes with consular power, tribunes that would be open to both nobles 
and plebs. Revealingly, however, despite the fact that the plebs had 
potential access to this office, the Roman people elected all nobles: “It 
appeared generally to the Roman plebs that it deserved the consulate, 
because it had more part in the city, because it carried more danger in 
wars, because it was that which with its limbs kept Rome free, and 
made it powerful. As it appeared to it, as was said, this desire was rea-
sonable, it turned to obtaining this authority in any mode. But as it had 
to make judgment on its men particularly, it recognized the weakness 
of them, and judged that none of them deserved that which all of them 
 101  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.34. 
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together appeared to merit.” 102 Although here plebeian desire for politi-
cal self-expression is clearly evident, the people demonstrate a willing-
ness for self-limitation in light of their consideration of the specificities 
of the political occasion. 
 What all of these examples of the competency of popular political 
judgment reveal to Machiavelli are not any natural facts about the 
unique being of the people, but rather the general fact of human equal-
ity. The distinctions that Machiavelli calls attention to are not grounded 
in essential differences of intellect or understanding, but are entirely 
reducible to historical circumstances of socialization. Hence a shackled 
people will show a more refined judgment than either an unshackled 
people or an unshackled prince. The fundamental nature of all, how-
ever, is equivalent: “the variation in their proceeding  does not stem from 
a diverse nature , because all are in one mode; and if there is advantage of 
good, it is in the people, but from having more or less regard for the 
laws, within which both the one and the other live.” 103 In this passage 
Machiavelli simultaneously reveals the identical nature of the people 
and the great (here represented in the figure of the prince), but also 
provides us with the means to comprehend the meaning of the distinc-
tion between the desire to oppress and the desire not to oppress. As I 
have attempted to show, both the people and the great possess the same 
fundamental ambition, an ambition that is partially expressed in the 
demand for outlets for political self-expression. The two humours thus 
cannot be grounded in a biological differentiation of psychic desire. On 
the contrary, they are two different forms of appearance of the single 
desire for ambitious expression. The difference between the two forms 
lies in the fact that whereas the people seek to satisfy their desire within 
the boundaries of a legal order that has been self-instituted and which 
all are subject to, the great have no such respect, believing themselves 
entitled to an exclusive satisfaction that knows no institutional limita-
tions. In  chapter 6 I will further explore the nature of this type of elite 
insolence within the context of the distinction between the modes 
of republican life detailed by Machiavelli in the  Florentine Histories and 
the  Discourses on Livy. For now, however, we can simply note that 
Machiavelli’s distinction between a wise and an unwise people lay in 
 102  Ibid., bk. 1.47. 
 103  Ibid., bk. 1.58. Emphasis added. 
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this respect for the legitimacy of a democratic order in which all indi-
viduals are provided spaces for the expulsion of their creative energy. A 
wise people, in other words, is one that understands that it cannot 
will what it desires irrespective of consideration of the being of other 
citizens. Genuine freedom is thus constituted in autonomous self-
regulation, for “a people that can do whatever it wants is not wise.” 104 
 It is because forms of institutionalization are capable of filtering pop-
ular desire so as to transform it into an articulate and self-conscious 
deliberative force that Machiavelli claims that the people “have one 
mind in the  piazza , and another in the  palazzo .” 105 It is within the context 
of the need for a city to construct a system of institutions that would 
provide a stable space from which popular ambition can be vented that 
we must understand Machiavelli’s image of “a multitude without a 
head,” which he identifies as politically useless. 106 More often than not 
this appraisal is taken to be a manifestation of Machiavelli’s anti-democratic 
tendencies, his belief that plebeian political intervention is only capable 
of becoming a consciously reflective and articulate force when it is 
directed by an elite leader in possession of a unique skill or intelli-
gence. 107 This, though, does not seem to be the case. In  Discourses 1:44 
the multitude’s lack of a head is identified with the multitude’s lack of 
those institutions necessary for the deliberative expression of political 
will, the installation of a head in this instance being associated with the 
recreation of the military tribunes during the final period of the rule of 
the Ten. 108 This is explicitly confirmed by Machiavelli in 1:57 when the 
Virginia incident and the tribunes are once again invoked. Here Machi-
avelli argues that the transformation of the people into an active politi-
cal force necessitates a process of institutionalization that is able to 
provide safe spaces of action from which each participant is able to self-
articulate their political desire with security: “For there is nothing, on 
the one hand, more formidable than an unshackled multitude without 
a head; and, on the other hand, there is nothing more weak; for even 
 104  Ibid. 
 105  Ibid., bk. 1.47. 
 106  Ibid., bk. 1.44. 
 107  For example, Nikola Regent has recently claimed that the image of the multitude 
without a head is a symbol of the fact that “great individuals are needed to 
organize a republic, and to lead it.” Nikola Regent, “Machiavelli, Empire,  Virtù and 
the Final Downfall,”  History of Political Thought 32, no. 5 (2011): 755. 
 108  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.44. 
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though it has arms in hand, it is easy to diminish it, as long as you have 
a refuge where you can avoid the first surge. For when spirits have 
cooled down a little, and everyone sees that they have to return to their 
home, they begin to doubt themselves, and to thinking about their 
safety through flight or through conciliation. Therefore a multitude so 
excited, wanting to avoid these dangers, has immediately to make from 
itself a head to correct it, to hold it united, and to think of its defence.” 109 
Machiavelli is here suggesting that the head is not an exalted individual 
in possession of a unique rationality or intelligence, but simply the 
institution, providing a concrete example of such a process of subject 
formation when stating that it occurred in Rome after the death of Vir-
ginia, when the plebs self-instituted the twenty tribunes. 
 Indeed, against the seemingly elitist model of single-person political 
transformation suggested by the transitional reading of the relation 
between  The Prince and the  Discourses , Machiavelli here gestures toward 
a dialogical model of self-transformation made possible as a conse-
quence of the receptivity of the people to rational argumentation. Hence 
in 1:58 Machiavelli claims that even an unshackled people can be 
returned to a good mode if it is “spoken to by a good man,” and that “to 
cure the illness of the people words are enough.” 110 In 1:54, where 
Machiavelli begins to overturn his more critical view of the people as 
expressed in earlier chapters of the  Discourses , the multitude’s capacity 
for achieving self-understanding through an openness to argumenta-
tion is again affirmed, Machiavelli tracing the root of reverence to an 
actor’s ability to rationally persuade a critical people of the good of a 
policy. The example given is that Francesco Soderini, who during a fac-
tional dispute between the Frateschi and Arrabbiati inserted himself 
into a group of participants in an attempt to prevent further violence: 
“immediately after he heard the noise and saw the crowd, he put on his 
most honourable clothes, and over them his episcopal rochet, met those 
who were armed, and with presence and with words stopped them; 
this thing was celebrated and noticed throughout the whole city for 
many days.” 111 In short, the people are seen as making prudent deci-
sions when given the requisite access to information via reasoned 
argumentation. 
 109  Ibid., bk. 1.57. 
 110  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.58. 
 111  Ibid., bk. 1.54. 
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 Such a position is only one manifestation of Machiavelli’s affirmation 
of the transformative potential of dialogical activity, an activity that 
could potentially be developed as a ground from which to construct an 
alternative model of political change than the one suggested by the 
transitional reading. Many examples on this point could be provided, 
and not only from the  Discourses . I have already, for example, called 
attention to the example of Philopoeman in  The Prince , his critical scru-
tiny of his contextual situation containing a dialogical component 
grounded in the interrogative demand to give an account. Speaking of 
his relationship with his advisers, Machiavelli writes: “and he proposed 
to them, moving along, all the contingencies that can occur to an army; 
he perceived their opinions, said his own, supported it with reasons; so 
that through these continual cogitations there could never, while he 
guided the army, emerge any accident for which he did not have the 
remedy.” 112 In chapter 23 of  The Prince Machiavelli further highlights 
the necessarily dialogical form of prudent, princely decision making. 
The prince’s advisers should be encouraged to speak freely to the for-
mer, and in turn “he ought to ask them about everything, and hear their 
opinions, and then decide for himself, in his mode.” 113 The prince’s 
right to make a final determination regarding a policy decision cer-
tainly does not degrade the authenticity of the deliberation. Machia-
velli stresses that dialogue between the prince and his advisers must be 
authentic and substantive, the prince neither accommodating mere flat-
terers nor feigning interest in his council. 114 On the contrary, he must 
actively engage with and demonstrate a legitimate will to learn from 
others. Such an active ability to receive counsel is even identified as a 
constitutive part of princely virtue, Machiavelli writing that “a prince 
who is not wise in himself cannot be counselled well, unless indeed by 
chance he defers to one alone, who is a very prudent man, who governs 
entirely.” 115 Dialogue meanwhile is not unidirectional, the prudence of 
the prince acting as a check on the counsel he receives, preventing the 
 112  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 14. 
 113  Ibid., chap. 23. 
 114  It should be noted that in  The Art of War Machiavelli will go so far as to maintain 
that the authority of the ruler in a principality should be highly limited, the prince 
having executive right only in military matters. Machiavelli, “Dell’Arte della 
guerra,” in  Tutte le opere , 19. 
 115  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 23. 
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latter from manifesting the merely private interest of the adviser. If the 
prince lacks a wisdom of his own, “of the advisers, each will think of 
his own interest; he will not know how to correct or understand 
them.” 116 Good counsel does not generate prudence, but counsel can 
become good only where the prince is prudent: “Thus one concludes 
that good counsel, from wherever it comes, should stem from the pru-
dence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince from good coun-
sel.” 117 Dialogue is ultimately a synthetic confrontation between two 
wisdoms, the quality of each allowing for a form of reciprocal exchange 
that deepens the understanding of both parties. 
 Machiavelli’s readers have for many years attempted to highlight the 
extent to which the former’s writings, in both form (e.g., through a dis-
cursive and conversational mode of presentation) and content (e.g., 
through the emphasis on the refinement of the critical-rational capaci-
ties of princes and peoples that results from discourse and delibera-
tion), establish dialogue as a normative value. Such a value is operative 
not only in Machiavelli’s explicitly republican writings but in  The Prince 
as well. 118 Excepting perhaps the sum of his personal correspondence 119 , 
however, the text in which Machiavelli’s formal commitment to dia-
logical processes of learning and knowledge acquisition is most clearly 
articulated is  The Art of War. 120 Unlike the false dialectic that moves 
 116  Ibid., bk. 23. 
 117  Ibid., chap. 23. 
 118  On the dialogical form of  The Prince , for example, see John Parkin, “Dialogue in  The 
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Coyle (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 65–88; Jean-Louis Fournel, 
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for Writing  The Prince ,”  Italian Culture 32, no. 2 (2014): 85–97; Erica Benner, 
 Machiavelli’s Prince: A New Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 119  For example, citing Machiavelli’s most famous letter to Vettori in particular, 
Linda Zerilli highlights the extent to which Machiavelli here articulates an image 
of political theory as dialogical converstation, as “a transhistorical dialogue that 
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Vettori Letters of 1513–1515 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
 120  As is often pointed, it is essential to recognize the extent to which the text’s setting 
in the Rucellai gardens refers us to Machiavelli’s own practical education in 
the transformative power of dialogue in the Orti Oricellari. In the fi rst phase of 
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Platonic dialogues, for example, in which the protagonist is always in 
possession of the terminal knowledge in advance of the conversation, 
in  The Art of War Fabrizio demonstrates a genuine openness to reflec-
tive alteration of his position as a consequence of his exposure to new 
evidences. 121 The emphasis is not on the unidirectional communication 
of a fixed, positive knowledge, but rather on the perpetually open pro-
cess of learning and refinement. In Benedetto Fontana’s words, “the 
conversation is in the process of becoming as it is carried forward by 
the questioning and the answering.” 122 And even in those many 
instances when Fabrizio is seen as possessing the truth of a matter, that 
truth becomes properly established as truth only when his interlocutors 
autonomously affirm it themselves after rational consideration. As 
Erica Benner writes, “Although Fabrizio is much more experienced in 
war and politics, he urges his interlocutors not to accept uncritically 
anything he says. They must question him from many angles, and 
judge for themselves whether Fabrizio would know how to return to 
the ancient modes he praises. It is essential that they trust their own 
judgment more than his or anyone else’s because they, in the end, must 
take responsibility for military and civil orders in their city.” 123 The goal 
meetings in the gardens, hosted by Bernardo Rucellai and his sons, the political 
spirit was strongly aristocratic, the participants being contemptuous of the 
perceived popular persecution of elite citizens. In the second phase, however, 
hosted by Bernardo’s grandson Cosimo, and including the presence of Machiavelli, 
the spirit turns republican, despite the fact that the participants were still young 
aristocrats. Miguel Vatter writes that “no one knows exactly what Machiavelli said 
in his informal lessons, but we do know that some of the aristocrats in his audience, 
perhaps seduced by the mixed messages regarding the virtues of the plebeians 
contained in Machiavelli’s lectures, were later accused of conspiring to eliminate 
the Medici and set up a new republic in Florence.” Vatter,  Machiavelli’s The Prince , 
11. For a short history of the Rucellai meetings see Felix Gilbert, “Bernardo Rucellai 
and the Orti Oricellari: A Study on the Origin of Modern Political Thought,”  Journal 
of the Warburg and Courtland Institutes 12 (1949): 101–13. 
 121  For an account of an example of this openness see Christopher Lynch, “The  Ordine 
Nuovo of Machiavelli’s  Arte della guerra : Reforming Ancient Matter,”  History of 
Political Thought 31, no. 3 (2010): 423–4. 
 122  Fontana,  Hegemony and Power , 113. For a contrary reading, which interprets  The 
Art of War in terms of the discourse of systematic utopia, allegedly looking toward 
the construction of an internally coherent and totalizing form, see Rinaldo Rinaldi, 
“Appunti su utopia (tra Moro e Machiavelli),”  Forum Italicum 21, no. 2 (1987): 
217–25. 
 123  Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 112. 
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of Fabrizio and Machiavelli is thus to stimulate their interlocutors to 
think and act for themselves, not to contribute to the elevation of any 
single or group of individuals to the position of ultimate arbiter of 
authority based on a superior knowledge or capacity. 
 Although it is important to recognize the extent to which Machiavelli 
highlights the popular capacity for political judgment grounded in 
reflection and dialogue on historical conditions of existence, we should 
not be thereby misled into thinking that the criterion of proper political 
determination is for Machiavelli one of rightness, considered in terms 
of a decision’s correspondence with some transcendent standard of 
truth. The specific content of the judgment is not to be assessed by its 
conformity to an exterior measure of rationality. 124 Rather, the legiti-
macy of the judgment is rooted in the extent to which it was formulated 
within a political context that is able to provide spaces for the mediat-
ing of competing positions, and the subsequent acquisition of a certain 
degree of knowledge of the relevant facts of social-historical existence. 
A judgment is correct, in other words, if it was made by the people in as 
full a light as possible of all the relevant evidences. What Machiavelli, 
in emphasizing the institutional conditions of competent popular judg-
ment, is calling attention to is the extent to which the expression of the 
desire of the people must exceed mere voluntarism, the immediate and 
unrefined expulsion of will. It is not the content of the decision that is 
essential, but rather that the decision was made under deliberative con-
ditions allowing for the actualization of the participants’ critical and 
rational human faculties, faculties that they share with all others. The 
standard of correct political determination is no longer one of rational-
ity, but rather one of desire. 125 
 We already know that for Machiavelli it is impossible for a human 
subject to perfectly thematize the objective contours of reality, because 
 124  For a similar line of thought see McCormick,  Machiavellian Democracy , 136. 
 125  Hence Claude Lefort’s judgment that in chapter 25 of  The Prince we see “suggested 
the idea that the power of man does not reside only (nor perhaps principally) in the 
exercise of intelligence, but is due to the initiative of the desiring subject.” Claude 
Lefort, “Machiavel et les jeunes,” in  Les formes de l’histoire: essais d’anthropologie 
politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 154. As noted by Ruth Grant, Machiavelli is 
concerned with demonstrating the impossibility of instituting a rational political 
theory grounded in a dispassionate consideration of interest. Ruth W. Grant, 
 Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 52. 
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of both the limitations of human conceptual appropriation and the 
chaotic and irregular form of the being of the world. Machiavelli never 
suggests that the people can transcend such limitations, only that the 
extent to which these limitations lean on them is no greater than in the 
case of others. He hence writes: “I conclude, therefore, against the 
common opinion which says that the people, when they are princes, 
are varying, mutable, and ungrateful, affirming that they are  not other-
wise in these sins than are particular princes.” 126 The competency of 
popular judgment (or indeed of any judgment) does not lie in the fact 
that the people have access to a privileged knowledge discerned 
through the exercise of a perfect rationality, but rather in the fact that 
they are capable of articulating their desire in light of their reflective 
consideration of worldly possibility, or the effectual truth of the thing. 
They are capable of communicating their political will through speech, 
and of understanding the political will of others, this double capacity 
being in fact the foundation of Machiavelli’s affirmation of freedom 
and equality. 
 The Ciompi Affirmation of Freedom and Equality 
 The ethical foundation for democratic life is grounded in Machiavelli’s 
recognition of human equality, of the fact that the people are in posses-
sion of the same ambitious desire for self-expression as the great, and 
that they possess the same capacity for reflective judgment as the great. 
In the words of Filippo Del Lucchese, “If nature is the same for every-
body, if the prince cannot lay claim to a superior political rationality, 
then the multitude can demand its entrance onto the political scene on 
par with the other players.” 127 And indeed, the fact that the people 
need to be considered as meaningful actors is revealed through Machi-
avelli’s perpetual effort to give a voice to popular political demands, 
an effort most notably expressed in the  Florentine Histories . 128 Perhaps 
in no other place is Machiavelli’s double affirmation of freedom and 
 126  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.58. Emphasis 
added. 
 127  Del Lucchese,  Confl ict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza , 123. 
 128  Erica Benner calls attention to Machiavelli’s effort to give a voice to the entire 
plurality of elements within the city, such an effort speaking to the mutual 
implication of its citizens in a shared life. Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 34. 
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equality articulated with such passion as in his account of the revolt of 
the Ciompi. 129 What is unique in Machiavelli’s retelling of the narra-
tive is that the perspective of the lower class 130 becomes one worthy of 
being taken into account, its conflicts with other groups providing 
impetus to the movement of the republic. Unlike, for example, Plato’s 
giving time to the sophist, Machiavelli does not let the worker speak in 
order to simply dialectically refute his argument and replace it with a 
superior one, but evaluates its legitimacy and respects it on its own 
terms. 131 Although many commentators question the precise degree to 
which, or whether at all, Machiavelli sympathizes with the insurrec-
tionaries, the very fact that he provides an opportunity for the former 
to speak for themselves suggests at the very least a recognition of their 
human ability to articulate their political demand for equality, demon-
strating the fact of the latter in this very movement. 132 The significance 
 129  For Niccolò Rodolico, in narrating the events of the revolt Machiavelli keeps alive 
a sense of the specifi city of the political passions of the era, a sense which in fact 
would soon be lost. Niccolò Rodolico,  I Ciompi: una pagina di storia del proletariato 
operaio (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1945), x. 
 130  It should be noted that in keeping with the articulation of social division in terms 
of a primary distinction between two humours, Machiavelli does not undertake a 
detailed class analysis of the various gradations to be located within the labouring 
groups that lack guild association. As Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff point 
out, members of the  sottoposti were highly diverse with respect to economic and 
social status. For example, although there was a large group of sub-subsistence 
labourers, many of whom were recently peasants, there were also some who were 
economically of the same status as many guild members. In the fi nal instance, 
“sociologically, it is impossible to regard the  sottoposti as a whole, including 
the Ciompi, as a homogeneous class in the modern sense of the term.” Michel 
Mollat and Philippe Wolff,  The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages , trans. 
A.L. Lytton-Sells (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), 158. The fact that 
Machiavelli largely glosses over such internal distinctions reveals the extent to 
which the Ciompi stand in for the people and their desire most generally. 
 131  Martine Leibovici, “From Fight to Debate: Machiavelli and the Revolt of the 
Ciompi,”  Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2002): 648, 655. 
 132  In this sense Machiavelli anticipates the recent democratic contributions of Jacques 
Rancière, who theorizes democratic practice in terms of the demonstration of an 
equality of intelligences, in terms of an excluded group’s struggle to reveal its 
human capacities through speaking and thinking. Especially revealing here is 
Rancière’s rereading of the fi rst plebeian secession in Rome, where in response 
to the patrician denial of their being as humans, the plebs set out to assert 
themselves and their intelligence through their self-activity. Jacques Rancière, 
 Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy , trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University 
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of the fact that Machiavelli’s account of this event, despite any seem-
ing ambivalence within it, goes against the current of all Florentine 
scholarship of the time, cannot be overstated. Michel Mollat and 
Philippe Wolff note that commentators on the revolt “are nearly all 
hostile to the Ciompi.” 133 Indeed, with respect to his own historical 
context Machiavelli’s sympathy with the Ciompi cause is singular. 
Hence Jurdjevic writes that “the Florentine historical tradition leading 
up to Machiavelli spoke with one voice in condemning this revolt. 
Machiavelli’s humanist predecessors in the Florentine chancery, 
including Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni, consistently por-
trayed the Ciompi as an irrational, anarchic, and destructive mob, sus-
ceptible to the worst manifestations of demagoguery in the city’s 
history.” 134 This diagnosis is seen by such commentators as being not 
necessarily specific to the Ciompi case, but rather the tendencies and 
features identified and criticized are interpreted as necessary symp-
toms of any democratic movement. Hence Francesco Guicciardini’s 
claim that in the time of the Ciompi Florence was “in the arbitrary and 
licentious power of the populace.” 135 Licentiousness and arbitrary rule 
are of the essence of democratic politics to the aristocratic mind. 
 It is such thinking that Machiavelli’s account attempts to counter. 
The centrepiece of this account is certainly the revolutionary speech of 
the anonymous Ciompo in book 3:13, the worker seeming to stand in 
for Machiavelli himself to the degree that he articulates various Machi-
avellian lessons and insights. For Yves Winter, Machiavelli’s imagina-
tion of this speech is a key element that indicates his larger democratic 
and egalitarian commitments, and if readers of Machiavelli tend to 
ignore it, this is a consequence of their failure to comprehend the lat-
ter. 136 Indeed, in “rejecting aristocratic doctrines of natural hierarchy 
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 24–5. Signifi cantly, this episode as recalled by Rancière 
is also identifi ed by Emmanuel Roux as belonging to the tradition of democratic 
action that Machiavelli is situated in and advancing. Emmanuel Roux,  Machiavel, 
la vie libre (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 2013), 183–4. On the proximity of Machiavelli and 
Rancière see also Gaille,  Machiavel et la tradition philosophique , 143. 
 133  Mollat and Wolff,  The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages , 142. 
 134  Jurdjevic,  A Great and Wretched City , 110–11. 
 135  Guicciardini,  Dialogue on the Government of Florence , 135. 
 136  Winter, “Plebeian Politics,” 737. Other democratic readers, on the contrary, have 
certainly recognized the speech’s centrality. See, for example, John P. McCormick, 
“Machiavelli and the Gracchi: Prudence, Violence, and Retribution,”  Global Crime 10, 
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and inequality, the Ciompo makes the most radical claim for human 
equality in Machiavelli’s work.” 137 The affirmation of equality in the 
passage, however, is not expressed exclusively through the substantive 
claims regarding the being of the people, but rather has a double regis-
ter. At the same time that the demand for political equality is made 
through a recognition of the conventional form of social hierarchy and 
the universality of human being, the speaker simultaneously, through 
his mode of action, manifests his equality via a clear demonstration of 
the type of human virtue detailed in  The Prince. Regarding the former 
we may quote the best-known part of the speech, in which the Ciompo 
locates the existing forms of economic and political stratification in 
merely contingent facts of existence. Speaking to his fellows he states, 
“And do not be overawed by that antiquity of blood with which they 
reproach us; for all men, having had one same beginning, are equally 
ancient, and  by nature they have been made in one mode . Strip us all naked: 
you will see that we are alike; dress us in their robes, and they in ours; 
without doubt we will appear noble and they ignoble, because only 
poverty and riches make us unequal.” 138 The Ciompo makes the case 
that the superior social status of the nobles is not grounded in any spe-
cial capacity or merit, or indeed in any type of particular qualification 
whatsoever, but rather in a mere accident of birth or circumstance. Even 
if it might appear that one’s privileged position has a legitimate foun-
dation in some sort of demonstration of superior capacity, such as in the 
ideological image of the self-made person, the Ciompo makes it clear 
that such an elevation is achieved only through a willingness to subvert 
established modes of social behaviour: “But if you will notice the mode 
of proceeding of men, you will see that all those with great riches and 
great power have arrived at them either through fraud or through force; 
no. 4 (2009): 301; Dotti,  Niccolò Machiavelli: la fenomenologia del potere , 10; Filippo 
Del Lucchese,  The Political Philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015), 99. Compare such readings with that of Timothy Lukes, 
who speculates that in the Ciompi episode it is the fi gure of Niccolò who stands in 
for Machiavelli himself, possessing as he does, as opposed to the various hasty and 
unrefl ective members of the plebs not yet ready for republican life, a capacity to 
descend to the particulars in deliberative activity. Timothy J. Lukes, “Descending to 
the Particulars: The Palazzo, The Piazza, and Machiavelli’s Republican Modes and 
Orders,”  Journal of Politics 71, no. 2 (2009): 10. 
 137  Winter, “Plebeian Politics,” 746. 
 138  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.13. Emphasis added. 
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and these things, later, that they have usurped with deception or with 
violence, to conceal the ugliness of acquisition are made legitimate 
under the false title of earning.” 139 The Ciompo seems to here, speaking 
in the midst of the entrenchment of relations of merchant capitalism in 
Florence, provide a proto-theory of primitive accumulation, noting the 
extent to which the original acquisition of wealth necessitates acting in 
a “rapacious and fraudulent” manner, or as Marx would say, through 
the methods of “blood and fire.” 140 
 The anonymous Ciompo, however, not only makes in his speech a 
call for equality, but demonstrates it through his very action. He thus 
actualizes that capacity for reflective self-activity which Machiavelli 
had identified in  The Prince as a condition of virtuosity. The speech 
opens with an appeal to the people that the most effective course of 
action is one that adopts the modes of robbery and arson. Such an adop-
tion, however, would certainly be no reactionary or voluntaristic 
response to an external stimulant, but the result of a considered deci-
sion preceded by intensive deliberation on the available options and 
their likely effects. The need for such reflective deliberation, the need to 
represent and mediate between potential trajectories of action, is 
affirmed multiple times. The first sentence of the speech, for example, 
reads: “If we had to  deliberate now whether to take up arms, to burn and 
to rob the homes of citizens, to despoil the churches, I would be one of 
those who would  judge it a choice to  think over .” 141 And a few sentences 
 139  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.13. 
 140  Ibid.; Karl Marx,  Capital: A Critique of Political Economy , vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(London: Penguin, 1976), 875. Also interpreting the Ciompi revolt in the theoretical 
terms of Marx, Simone Weil defi nes it as the fi rst proletarian insurrection. 
Simone Weil, “A Proletarian Uprising in Florence,” in  Selected Essays: 1934–43 , 
trans. Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). More generally, 
Althusser refers to Machiavelli as one of the “true precursors of Marx,” historically 
articulating as he does the form of appearance of class struggle at a particular 
conjuncture. Louis Althusser, “The Facts,” in  The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir , 
ed. Olivier Corpet and Yann Moulier Boutang, trans. Richard Veasey (New York: 
New Press, 1992), 361. Such was also suggested by Lev Kamenev, who labels 
Machiavelli a “dialectician of brilliance,” writing that “in the works of Machiavelli 
emperors, popes, kings, lords, bankers and merchants walk without masks, and by 
their actions confi rm the truth of the historical views of the founders of dialectical 
materialism.” Lev Kamenev, “Preface to Machiavelli,”  New Left Review , no. 1/15 
(1962): 40, 42. 
 141  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.13. Emphases added. 
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later he states: “We must therefore look for two things and have, in our 
 deliberations , two ends: the one is not to be able to be castigated for the 
things done by us in recent days, and the other is to be able to live with 
more freedom and more satisfaction than we have in the past. We 
should, therefore, so  it appears to me , if we want to be forgiven for our 
old errors, to make new ones, redoubling the damages, and multiply-
ing the arson and the robbery … To multiply damages, then, will make 
ourselves find forgiveness more easily, and will give us the way to get-
ting those things that, for our freedom, we desire to have.” 142 Contrary 
to his humanist counterparts who read the violence of the Ciompi as 
arbitrary and irrational, Machiavelli goes to great lengths to demon-
strate that the recourse to violent modes was the productive result of a 
deliberative activity in which the actors evaluated strategies in light of 
their understanding of prior facts of history, and in light of the specific 
goals that they hoped to achieve, specifically their desire “to live with 
more freedom and more satisfaction.” 143 
 Contrary to an actor like Agathocles, for whom violence is deployed 
singularly as a universal political technique, the Ciompo makes it clear 
that the people’s utilization of these methods in this instance is informed 
by their understanding of the concrete facts of the social-historical situ-
ation, not because the deployment of force is seen as exhausting the 
range of political possibility. In other words, force is deployed to the 
extent that it is what necessity requires given the objective situation of 
the Ciompi and of Florence as a whole at that time: “One ought there-
fore to use force when the occasion is given to us. There can be no better 
offered to us by fortune, citizens being still disunited, the Signoria 
uncertain, the magistrates dismayed: so that they can, before they unite 
and harden their spirit, be easily suppressed.” 144 Indeed, in the second 
half of the speech the Ciompo provides a concise summary of the sig-
nificance of the concept of  occasione in Machiavelli’s thought, highlight-
ing the extent to which the seizing of the opportunity necessitates the 
actor’s adoption of those specific modalities of action – again articu-
lated through the contrasting of the ways of force and fraud – required 
given the existing state of the being of the world. 145 And similarly to the 
 142  Ibid. Emphases added. 
 143  Ibid. 
 144  Ibid. 
 145  Ibid. 
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virtuous prince, furthermore, the Ciompo realizes that in an unstable 
world perpetually in flux, should the occasion opened up by  fortuna be 
seized it is necessary to act in a bold and decisive way: “The opportu-
nity that the occasion brings us is fleeting, and it is in vain, when it has 
fled, to try and recapture it.” 146 Such a popular display of boldness is 
certainly no marker of rashness or irrationality, but is a component of 
that critical and reflective human orientation that Machiavelli associ-
ates with  virtù. Hence the Ciompo’s articulation of the bold willingness 
to make a decision in the face of danger in terms of the exercise of a 
faculty of judgment: “I confess this choice to be bold and dangerous; 
but when necessity compels, boldness is judged prudence.” 147 
 In addition to the anonymous Ciompo’s call for and demonstration 
of equality, the second significant detail to be noted in Machiavelli’s 
narrative is the primacy of the political as the field for Ciompi self-
expression. It might be tempting to read the episode in primarily eco-
nomic terms, as being stimulated by a grievance with respect to material 
distribution and looking only toward the satisfaction of this grievance 
in a mere rearrangement of an economic pattern of things. Machiavelli 
thus writes of “a hatred that the lesser people had for the rich citizens 
and princes of the guilds, it not appearing to them that they were being 
satisfied for their labour in accordance with what they believed they 
justly deserved.” 148 It soon becomes clear, however, that the popular 
dissatisfaction is not merely a reactive response to the perception of 
material inequality, and hence potentially reconcilable through differ-
ent forms of economic redistribution, but is actually a specifically polit-
ical dissatisfaction with the lack of outlets for the expression of the 
people’s will. Hence Machiavelli’s stress on the existing composition of 
the guild system, the fact that certain groups, through being excluded 
from self-organization in a guild, lacked a mode through which they 
could direct their activity on their own terms: “in the ordering of the 
bodies of the guilds many of those practices in which the lesser people 
and the lower plebs laboured were without their own bodies of guilds, 
but were subject to various guilds suited to the quality of their prac-
tices. It arose that when they were either not satisfied for their labours, 
or in another way oppressed by their masters, they did not have 
 146  Ibid. 
 147  Ibid. 
 148  Ibid., bk. 3.12. 
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somewhere else to take refuge from the magistrate of that guild that 
governed them; from this it did not appear to them that they were 
granted that justice which they judged appropriate.” 149 
 Machiavelli thus theorizes in this chapter a sophisticated co-
determination of economic and political inequality, 150 grounding the for-
mer partially in the latter, and perceiving protest over the former as a 
potential stimulant to the latter. This second movement is further expli-
cated by Martine Leibovici. Leibovici notes that although the Ciompi’s 
original concerns were economic in nature, this mutated into a specifi-
cally political demand (or better: the social extension of an already 
political demand articulated in an economic context) grounded in a desire 
for freedom: “Even if their motivation was economic in the first place, 
that struggle had begun to change them into politically autonomous 
actors. From now on, they would not content themselves with claiming 
better means of earning their living; they would also raise the question 
of their involvement in sharing political power itself.” 151 As I have 
already noted, the action of the protesters was not indiscriminate or 
indeterminate revolt, but calculated action looking toward a concrete 
political end: “Parallel to the chain of violence, the people are acceding 
to the formulation of their desire for freedom; instead of undifferenti-
ated robbery, we put forward new propositions of organization neces-
sarily specific and definite.” 152 Specifically, the call for the reorganization 
of the guilds – which again, is already partially political in nature – 
morphs into a call for explicit political power at the societal level, as 
initially represented, for example, in the demand for not only the cre-
ation of the new guild bodies, but for them to have their own Signori. 153 
Hence, Mollat and Wolff write: “What was new and original in July and 
August was that the Ciompi adopted an organization of their own ini-
tiative with a view to seizing power.” 154 Although the Signoria 
 149  Ibid. 
 150  On the extent to which the Ciompi revolt reveals the degree to which Machiavelli 
thinks the interrelationship of political and economic inequality and confl ict see 
Filippo Del Lucchese, “Crisis and Power: Economics, Politics and Confl ict in 
Machiavelli’s Political Thought,”  History of Political Thought 30, no. 1 (2009): 75–96. 
 151  Leibovici, “From Fight to Debate: Machiavelli and the Revolt of the Ciompi,” 649. 
 152  Ibid., 656. 
 153  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.15. 
 154  Mollat and Wolff,  The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages , 143. 
180 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
originally attempted to pacify the uprising through reprimanding cer-
tain government elites and rehabilitating some select Ghibellines, given 
the nature of the participatory desire such temporizing was insufficient 
to prevent the revolutionary explosion in July, which culminated in the 
seizing of the Palazzo Vecchio, the reassignment of Gonfalonier of jus-
tice, and the creation of new guilds and a new  balìa . And: “Lastly, on 29 
July, with a view to making permanent the movement of the commune 
toward democracy, the Ciompi burned the ‘purses’ containing the 
names of candidates for the magistature which were to be drawn by lot. 
New and enlarged lists had to be drawn up.” 155 
 Of all these events that speak to the existence of the popular positive 
desire for freedom and participatory self-expression, the most signifi-
cant is the appointment of Michele di Lando to the position of Gonfal-
onier of justice. Machiavelli’s account of di Lando reveals that ambiguity 
in his thought which I have referred to at several times in this study, 
and which is articulated most clearly in the transitional interpretation 
of the relationship between the principality and the republic. Accord-
ing to this view, which Machiavelli clearly promulgates in multiple 
places, the founding institution of good civic modes and orders is 
dependent upon the action of a sole individual who alone is able to cre-
ate the institutional forms necessary for socializing individuals to a free 
way of life. Machiavelli repeats this position in his account of the revolt 
of the Ciompi. Di Lando’s assent to the position of Gonfalonier of jus-
tice was wholly the result of a plebeian exercise of will, the people vol-
untarily, through a political act of delegation, consenting to have him 
function as an institutional representative for them. Speaking of di 
Lando’s selection Machiavelli writes: “turning to the multitude, 
[Michele] said: ‘You see: this palace is yours, and this city is in your 
hands. What do you think that you should do now?” To which all 
responded that they wanted him as Gonfalonier and lord, and to gov-
ern them and the city as it appeared best to him.” 156 The election of di 
Lando is a signal of the people’s recognition that the venting of its 
desire, if it is to be stably reproduced through time, requires a concrete 
outlet, a positive expression in the orders of the city. In this sense it is 
representative of the democratic necessity of sublimating popular 
 155  Ibid., 151. 
 156  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.16. 
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ambition through institutional channels that are able to give it a pro-
ductive and socially beneficial expression. 
 The people soon learn, however, of the instability of all political 
forms – that there is no terminal modality of political being capable of 
indefinitely regulating human affairs – when di Lando violates his 
mandate to express their will and desire in his new office. Specifically, 
Michele in restructuring the orders of the city would give too many 
titles and offices to the people’s patrician enemies, enemies who still 
harboured a humour to oppress and desired the expulsion of the peo-
ple from public life. Thus “it appeared to the plebs that Michele, in 
reforming the state, had been too partisan toward the greater people; it 
neither appeared that they had as much a part in government as was 
necessary to maintain and defend themselves; so, pushed by their usual 
boldness, they again took up arms and tumultuously, under their 
ensigns, came into the piazza.” 157 What will occur next is a clear display 
of plebeian self-institution. Disgusted by di Lando’s subsequent cen-
sure of them in the face of their grievance, “the multitude, incensed 
with the palace, settled at Santa Maria Novella, where they ordered 
among themselves eight heads, with ministers and other orders that 
gave them reputation and reverence; thus the city had two seats and 
was governed by two different princes.” 158 The delegates of the people 
began to make further policy demands and decisions, undertaking a 
bold attempt at redistributing the offices of the city in order to re-establish 
a genuinely popular system of orders: “They took away from Messer 
Salvestro de’ Medici and from Michele di Lando all that in their other 
decisions had been granted them; they assigned to many of themselves 
offices and subsidies, to be able to maintain their position with dig-
nity.” 159 For a second time, then, the people demonstrate a capacity to 
articulate their political desire, and outline a system of orders that they 
deem capable of giving this desire a positive expression in the political 
sphere. 
 Despite his sympathy for the plebeian cause, it seems clear that in 
this dispute between the people and Michele di Lando Machiavelli 
clearly comes down on the side of the latter, even going so far as to 
write of him that “in spirit, in prudence, and in goodness he surpassed 
 157  Ibid., bk. 3.17. 
 158  Ibid. 
 159  Ibid. 
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any citizen of that time, and he deserves to be counted among the few 
who have benefited their homeland,” and that “his goodness never let 
come into his mind a thought that would be contrary to the universal 
good.” 160 Nevertheless, in providing his account Machaivelli demon-
strates the existence of that popular capacity that renders the idea of 
singular institutionalization unnecessary as a mode of political founda-
tion. The people themselves demonstrate during the revolt of the 
Ciompi their ability to autonomously institute political modes and 
orders that would be capable of actualizing their desire for freedom. 
And significantly, the development of such a will to participatory free-
dom is nurtured and expressed in a poorly ordered social context, thus 
demonstrating the extent to which the people are capable of transcend-
ing their one-sided private being in an autonomous way. What the 
revolt of the Ciompi seems to prove, in other words, is that political 
elites are not required in order to lead the people out of their corrupted 
state, but that the intrinsic popular desire for participatory self-expression, 
manifested in the concrete affirmation of the values of freedom and 
equality, is capable of being self-actualized. 161 
 • 
 In this chapter I have argued that Machiavelli thinks about the being 
of the people and the being of the  grandi in an identical way: although 
there exists no positive human nature that permanently outlines the 
structure of human life, it is nevertheless true that all individuals pos-
sess the same negative drive toward creative self-expression, this drive 
being that which accounts for the people’s desire for participation in 
legislative political modes. At the same time, furthermore, Machiavelli 
also recognizes that all individuals are in possession of a certain politi-
cal competency, an ability to articulate their will and formulate prudent 
 160  Ibid. 
 161  I thus disagree with readers such as Kiran Banerjee and Mauricio Suchowlansky, 
who argue that the Ciompi episode reveals Machiavelli’s “pessimism concerning 
the plebs as agents of political innovation.” Kiran Banerjee and Mauricio 
Suchowlansky, “Citizens, Subjects or Tyrants? Relocating the People in Pocock’s 
 The Machiavellian Moment ,”  History of European Ideas 43, no. 2 (2017): 196. This is one 
manifestation of the now common reading which interprets the  Florentine Histories 
as constituting a theoretical break in the Machiavellian oeuvre, initiating a more 
conservative and sceptical orientation toward the people most generally. 
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policy decisions in light of their internal deliberation on the opportuni-
ties for realizing this will. It is this double affirmation that is the ground 
for Machiavelli’s ethical affirmation of democracy as the preferred po-
litical form of being. 
 The fact that Machiavelli has such a political preference, and that this 
preference is rooted in his belief in a fundamental human equality, is a 
fact that was certainly not lost on various of his contemporaries. Guic-
ciardini, for example, clearly recognizes the democratic implications of 
Machiavelli’s defence of popular rationality. Indeed, he criticizes 
Machiavelli for overestimating the political intelligence of the people 
and providing them with the most significant role to play in the repro-
duction of the life of the city. For Guicciardini the good of “a govern-
ment of aristocrats” lay in the fact that it is ruled by “the most qualified 
men in the city,” who “govern it with greater intelligence and wisdom 
than the masses.” 162 There is simply a natural intellectual difference 
between the wise and the many that closes off in advance the possibil-
ity of effective popular government. However, unlike many other anti-
democratic republicans who combine the rejection of popular political 
competency with an affirmation of the fundamentally passive and sin-
gular form of human desire, Guicciardini simultaneously recognizes 
the active and creative being of the people, as well as the people’s fun-
damental plurality. Both of these latter facts, given the assumption of 
the inferiority of popular judgment, produce particularly pernicious 
civic effects. Regarding the first, Guicciardini writes that the people 
have a perpetual “desire for innovation.” 163 This unstable desire seek-
ing outward expression often leads to social persecution, a particular 
problem when directed against elites with the potential to improve the 
life of the city. Regarding the second, the “disharmony of minds,” 
which concretely manifests itself in the production of “differing judg-
ments, differing ideas, and differing ends,” closes off the potential for 
the actualization of deliberative consensus produced via a mutually 
intelligible process of deliberation. 164 
 162  Guicciardini, “Considerations on the Discourses of  Niccolò Machiavelli,” 389. 
 163  Ibid., 423. 
 164  Ibid., 422. Hence “to speak of the people is really to speak of a mad animal gorged 
with a thousand and one errors and confusions, devoid of taste, of pleasure, of 
stability.” Francesco Guicciardini,  Maxims and Refl ections of a Renaissance Statesman , 
trans. Mario Domandi (New York: Harper, 1965), sec. C 140. 
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 Like Guicciardini, Machiavelli also believes that the being of the peo-
ple is multiple and fickle. This is a result of the fundamental form of 
human ambition, of the human desire to innovate, change, and over-
come the existent. Unlike Guicciardini, however, this popular being is 
not differentiated from elite being in any originary way. There is no 
superior group of individuals in possession of a unique intelligence 
that would allow them to transcend their temporality. The type of per-
fectly rational deliberation that Guiccardini takes as a political ideal is 
for Machiavelli simply an ideological veil masking a form of contingent 
domination without any natural foundation. As I showed in this chap-
ter, for Machiavelli princes are just as inconstant and variable as peo-
ples. At the same time, peoples are potentially just as prudent and wise 
as princes. It is this double equality that Machiavelli’s political thought 
is aimed at negotiating. The political question that Machiavelli’s repub-
lican writings seek to answer is: what form of political regime is capable 
of harnessing the universal capacity for reflective judgment for the sake 
of the affirmation of the universal desire for creative self-overcoming? 
 Chapter Five 
 Social Equality and the Contingent 
Being of the Great 
 In the previous chapter I noted how Machiavelli’s account of the revolt 
of the Ciompi suggested a co-determination of political and economic 
equality, the actualization of the former being seen as inconsistent with 
the preservation of the latter. In this chapter I will further explore this 
idea through situating Machiavelli’s contention that the healthy repub-
lic must aim to equalize the distribution of economic resources – classically 
expressed in the formulation that maintains the necessity of keeping 
the public rich and the citizens poor – within the context of what 
remains a largely underdeveloped potentiality in his thought: that of 
the elimination of the  grandi as an organized social class embodying 
a particular shared humour. Contrary to those readers, democratic 
and otherwise, who seemingly eternalize the existence of the  grandi , 
defining popular participatory activity negatively in terms of its oppo-
sition to the activity of the great, I argue that Machiavelli unhinges the 
being of the great from any natural psychological considerations. If it is 
true that the people and the great share the same nature then there can 
be no essential ground distinguishing them, their opposition on the 
contrary being merely conventional. Machiavelli ultimately theorizes 
the  grandi not in terms of a particular psychic orientation unique to 
them, but in terms of a contingent class composition. The great are 
those individuals who are able to consolidate themselves into a social 
group united in their end, which consists in leveraging their economic 
wealth to advance their own particular position within the city through 
excluding others from political modes and orders. The noble humour – 
the will to dominate expressed through conscious social action – only 
emerges with this consolidation. As I will stress below, the  grandi ’s 
desire to oppress considered as a humour only emerges in a class 
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context, the concept of  umore not referring to the direction of individual 
will. 1 The elimination of economic inequality thus presupposes the 
elimination of the  grandi as a social class. After outlining the democratic 
deficits of those readings that eternalize the noble humour, and outlin-
ing some of the manifestations of Machiavelli’s defence of economic 
equality, I will conclude this chapter by gesturing toward the potential 
for the abolition of the  grandi , and hence the conflict between it and the 
people. As I will again stress, however, such is not to suggest that all 
conflict itself may be eradicated. The persistence of conflictual relations 
between particulars is ultimately a necessity given the fact of human 
difference and the plurality of modes of human doing and being. 
Indeed, as we shall see in  chapter 6 , Machiavelli’s democratic politics 
derives its energy precisely from such conflictual relations. 
 The Originary Division of the Social 
in Democratic Readings of Machiavelli 
 For several decades the dominant democratic interpretation of Machia-
velli was that initiated by Claude Lefort, which achieved its most com-
prehensive form of expression in his  Le travail de l’oeuvre Machiavel . 2 
Lefort’s reading of Machiavelli must be understood in light of his cri-
tique of the impulse to totalitarian domination, the latter being an 
attempt to in a sense recolonize the space of sovereignty, although in a 
now limitless form, after the emergence of modern democracy and the 
disentaglement of the principles of power, law, and knowledge. 3 With 
the breaking apart of the medieval order the concept of sovereignty, 
which had previously been incarnated in the body of the monarch, was 
disincorporated of right and emptied of its positive content. Power 
 1  Such is implicitly suggested by Étienne Balibar when he writes that the term  umori is 
“notoriously diffi cult to translate in modern languages since it refers at the same time 
to classes, interests, and regimes of passions.” Étienne Balibar, “ Essere Principe, Essere 
Populare : The Principle of Antagonism in Machiavelli’s Epistemology,” in  The Radical 
Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, 
and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 354. 
 2  Throughout this study I have been citing the slightly abridged English translation. 
Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making . 
 3  For a brief attempt to situate Lefort’s reading of Machiavelli within his overall politi-
cal and philosophical trajectory see Knox Peden, “Anti-Revolutionary Republicanism: 
Claude Lefort’s Machiavelli,”  Radical Philosophy , no. 182 (2013): 29–39. 
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took on the appearance of an empty place, a symbol of the non-identity 
of the social order. In Lefort’s words, “Democracy inaugurates the 
experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the peo-
ple will be said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will con-
stantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent.” 4 
Totalitarianism is the attempt to refill this space, to embody sovereignty 
through the imposition of a new identity on the social order via the 
construction of an image of the People-as-One, a people escaping inter-
nal division or differentiation. 5 The significance of Machiavelli for 
Lefort lies in the former’s effort to give an account of the perpetually 
divided being of the political community. On Lefort’s reading, though, 
this division is articulated through the opposition of society’s two pri-
mary classes – defined in terms of the orientation of their humour: 
toward oppression and toward the avoidance of oppression – which 
co-constitute each other through the mutual implication of their desire. 
 Lefort claims that the division between those whom Machiavelli 
labels the people and the  grandi is an originary one present in every 
social order, and thus has “universal application.” 6 The key question 
resulting from the perception of this universality is that regarding the 
negotiation of the conflictual bifurcation: “Either it engenders a power 
that rises above society and subordinates it entirely to its authority – as 
in the princedom – or it is regulated in such way that no one is subject 
to anyone – legally at least – as in liberty – or it is powerless to resolve 
itself into a stable order – as in license.” 7 What the political observer is 
incapable of hoping to achieve, however, is a termination of the conflict 
between the humours through the reduction of the social order to a 
homogeneous unity grounded in a universality of desire. Society can 
never be reduced to such a unity precisely because each class’s desire – 
the one to oppress and the other to not be oppressed – is insatiable 
and ineradicable. Indeed, it is the dynamic relation between these two 
 4  Claude Lefort, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,” in  The Political Forms of 
Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism , ed. John B. Thompson (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1986), 303–4. 
 5  Claude Lefort, “The Logic of Totalitarianism,” in  The Political Forms of Modern Society: 
Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism , ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 287. 
 6  Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making . 
 7  Ibid., 139. 
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desires that structures the existence of each class. The grandees are the 
“ natural adversary” of the people, “the Other who constitutes them as 
the immediate object of its desire.” 8 If originary division is a universal-
ity inscribed into every political society, we nevertheless can analyse 
the precise form of its articulation in specific social-historical contexts: 
hence Machiavelli’s typology of regimes in chapter 9 of the  The Prince . 
If in the principality it is subordinated to the authority of the prince and 
in a state of licence it is desublimated independently of political order, 
in the  Discourses originary division is the condition for the actualization 
of a concrete freedom, through the institution of a political life in which 
each person or faction is incapable of appropriating power for itself, 
and in which human desire is able to be expressed through law. 
 It is the conflictual interaction of desire between the co-constitutive 
classes that prevents the closure of society via one party’s occupation of 
a site of power. Instituted in this movement, law is not that which 
restricts the expulsion of desire, but rather that which gives it an expres-
sion through the creation of a space that allows for the actualization of 
the will to freedom. In Lefort’s words, “Law cannot be thought beneath 
the emblem of measure, nor traced to the action of a reasonable author-
ity, which would come to put a limit to the appetites of man, nor con-
ceived as the result of a natural regulation of those appetites imposed 
by the necessity of group survival. It is born of the excessiveness of 
the desire for freedom, which is doubtless linked to the appetite of the 
oppressed – who seek an outlet for their ambition – but does not reduce 
to it, since strictly speaking it has no object, is pure negativity, 
the refusal of oppression.” 9 Precisely because the people’s desire is to not 
be oppressed, there is no potential for the objective satisfaction of it: “it 
detaches the subject from any particular position and binds him to an 
infinite requirement.” 10 The universality of originary division is located 
in this articulation: the conflict between the classes is incapable of being 
definitively reconciled to the extent that it is not a contestation over an 
exterior object whose possession is capable of terminating desire. To the 
  8  Ibid., 141. 
  9  Ibid., 229. On the negativity of desire see also Miguel Abensour, “‘Savage Democ-
racy’ and the ‘Principle of Anarchy,’” in  Democracy against the State: Marx and the 
Machiavellian Moment , trans. Max Blechman and Martin Breaugh (London: Polity 
Press, 2011), 122. 
 10  Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , 455. 
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degree that the conflict of desire cannot be eradicated, political struggle 
is a permanent condition of human reality. In the  Discourses on Livy this 
conflict serves as the foundation for a specifically democratic practice: 
the existence of modes and orders that allow the plebs to respond to the 
actions of the grandees permits for the perpetuation of a power open to 
contestation, the dynamic relation of desire serving as the ground for 
the production of the new through its continual negotiation and rene-
gotiation in law. Democratic activity, rooted in the non-identity of the 
social order, in an irreconcilable economy of desire, is presented as a 
form of perpetual interrogation, a refusal to yield to a static order of 
things that would freeze the political field, terminating that explicit 
conflict of humours which is the source of the liberty of the people. The 
city must thus be structured so as to give an expression to this double 
movement or division of desire. The ethical question is not whether 
desire is abolished, an impossibility, but whether desire is given a pro-
ductive expression through ordinary modes: “What makes the virtue of 
the institution is not, then, that it eliminates error and injustice at the 
same time that it disarms instinct; it replaces private with public 
violence.” 11 
 What later radical democratic readers of Machiavelli influenced by 
Lefort would more clearly articulate than the latter is one of the conse-
quences of such a theorization of originary division. The polarization of 
the multiplicity of desire that characterizes life in a shared world into 
what might appear as a quasi-metaphysical opposition between two 
transhistorical terms present in every society seemingly universalizes 
an oppressive humour, reactively defining the will to freedom in its 
opposition to this former tendency. The democratic non-occupation of 
the site of power does not exclude, in fact cannot exclude, the perpetu-
ation of oppression, and hence Lefort’s claim that the people can never 
become free of domination. 12 Because of the always-present opposition 
of the two primary desires, freedom and domination are inseparably 
linked, freedom in fact emerging in opposition to the desire for domi-
nation. In the words of Miguel Abensour, “In short, for Machiavelli 
politics and domination are at once different and closely interrelated; 
the one, in its negativity, born from the fact that it resists and opposes 
 11  Ibid., 236. 
 12  Lefort, “Machiavelli and the  Verità Effetuale ,”” 135. 
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the other and, in its affirmation, asserts that a human world is possible, 
provided that the many cease being oppressed by a minority of the 
great.” 13 To the extent that the plebeian will is oriented toward resisting 
the encroachments of the grandees – that is, to breaking up the attempt 
at unifying the conflict of humours through fixing the form of society 
under one law – its orientation is essentially negative. It is realized not 
through institution, but rather through the struggle against all institu-
tionalizing tendencies, which attempt to schematize the social field via 
the distribution of places and functions in the name of an artificial har-
mony that legitimates the domination of many by some. 
 The contemporary interpreter who has done the most to advance the 
non-institutional reading of Machiavelli’s democratic theory is Miguel 
Vatter, who like Lefort grounds his analysis in a recognition of an origi-
nary social division between the desires of the great and the people. He 
thus speaks of the “two totally heterogeneous desires with totally 
opposite relations to the principle of rule.” 14 The significance of the 
relation between the trajectory of desire and rule is here essential. The 
republic cannot be thought of in terms of the institutionalization of the 
rule of the people because the people do not desire rule, but only no-
rule. Machiavelli’s account of social discord, then, does not refer us to a 
positive institutionalization of a state form now able to provide a space 
for regulating competition: “the republic, as a political form, does not 
exist and will never exist because the  res publica is not a political form 
( res ) at all but denotes an iterable event in which forms of legitimate 
domination are changed in a revolutionary fashion.” 15 The people’s 
very real and active desire for freedom is the desire to replace rule by 
no-rule, and is thus a negative one eschewing a positive instauration in 
an order of things: “the desire for freedom as no-rule transcends every 
given social and political form that imposes a distinction between who 
commands and who obeys. In a literal sense, the people’s desire not to 
be commanded or oppressed is an extra-constitutional desire that can 
never be integrally realized in any form of government or stabilized in 
any legal order of domination.” 16 
 13  Miguel Abensour, “Machiavel: le grand penseur du désordre,”  Le Monde , 11 April 
2006, 8. 
 14  Vatter,  Between Form and Event , 101. 
 15  Ibid., 6. 
 16  Ibid., 95. 
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 Even though the multiplicity of negative desire cannot be positively 
organized into a political form capable of realizing it, it nevertheless 
can lead to the demand to reorder the political form, exposing the being 
of the latter as merely contingent and subject to history. What must not 
be forgotten is simply that there is no end to any chain of reorder, no 
ultimate discovery of a political form capable of actualizing political 
freedom as a permanent condition of existence: “every realization of 
freedom as no-rule is also its reification, that is, any given form is 
bound, in the course of time, to stop counting as an acceptable response 
to the question posed by the desire for freedom as no-rule.” 17 Vatter 
thus concludes that Machiavelli’s republic cannot be interpreted as a 
form of state, even if its constitution allows for the expression of popu-
lar desire through specific counter-institutions: “The people enter polit-
ical life through special institutions, like that of the Tribunate, that 
contrast the proper activity of the state, i.e., the administration of rule. 
These institutions of political contrast, or counter-institutions, carve up 
the state so as to clear a space in which to voice and act out the demands 
of no-rule.” 18 The particularity of such counter-institutions can be seen, 
for example, through examining the function of the Tribunate. The Tri-
bunate is the society’s guard of freedom because its function is to sus-
pend the relation of rule. 19 For Vatter all counter-institutions operate in 
this way: all are opposed to the positive force of the established law of 
the state, the corruption of the free society occurring precisely where 
the people are used as a ground for the construction of a government: 
“To make the people serve as the foundation of the state is equivalent 
to the process of giving substance or reality to the desire for freedom as 
no-rule, thereby denying what is most proper to this desire: its capacity 
to transcend factual political and legal order and suspend its validity.” 20 
Again, the desire of the people is incapable of being embodied in a posi-
tive order of law, for its free expulsion is articulated in its confrontation 
with and interruption of the noble desire to rule. Hence, “the political 
body is alive only when it is discordant with itself, when it makes space 
for the people and their desire for freedom in opposition to the desire 
for domination expressed by the noble elements of the body.” 21 Vatter 
 17  Ibid., 96. 
 18  Ibid., 99. 
 19  Ibid., 104. 
 20  Ibid., 122. 
 21  Ibid. 
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ultimately reads the corruption of the body politic in terms of the reifi-
cation of plebeian desire, as expressed for example in the modern state’s 
attempt to pacify desire through instituting it in a system of negative 
liberty looking toward the achievement of a universal security. Indeed, 
according to Vatter all modern political theory turns on this operation: 
“The state can be founded only on the basis of the security of the peo-
ple, that is, only on condition that the negativity of freedom as no-rule 
is neutralized and co-opted by realizing it as a system of negative liber-
ties or rights that is both secured by, and securing for, the political and 
legal order of domination.” 22 
 The recent democratic reading of Machiavelli produced by John 
McCormick can be largely framed in terms of an alternative to such 
radical democratic interpretations that emphasize the merely negative 
and disruptive form of plebeian activity. McCormick writes: “Through 
the tribunes and in their assemblies, Machiavelli demonstrates unequiv-
ocally that the plebeians participate in rule,” but McCormick insists 
that such participation is not of a radical democratic quality. 23 On his 
reading Machiavelli advocates ruling and being ruled in turn, but not 
“no-rule”; that is, he advocates “a dispersal of rule but  not a dissolution 
of rule as such.” 24 Contrary to readers like Vatter, who see democracy 
and positive institutionalization as incompatible with each other, 
McCormick understands political institutions to be a necessary element 
of democratic life and expression, not the “inherent antithesis of demo-
cratic vitality.” 25 Indeed, through their hostility to the concepts of rule 
and institutionalization, “the scholars who today champion democracy 
most boldly may, in fact, undermine it most seriously.” 26 Curiously 
enough, however, McCormick nevertheless himself reduces plebeian 
political activity to that same reactive principle seemingly affirmed in 
the radical democratic positing of originary division, an originary divi-
sion that structures the very rejection of the institution that McCormick 
criticizes. McCormick also eternalizes a will to domination when he 
writes that “Machiavellian Democracy then capitalizes on  ever-present 
moments of aristocratic oppression by seeking and putting in place 
 22  Ibid., 129. 
 23  McCormick,  Machiavellian Democracy , 204n11. 
 24  Ibid. 
 25  Ibid. 
 26  McCormick, “Defending the People from the Professors.” 
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institutional arrangements through which the people vigorously and 
effectively respond to the grandi’s repressive schemes and actions.” 27 
Indeed, on McCormick’s reading the self-activity of the people is not 
grounded in an intrinsic participatory desire, but rather emerges in a 
reactive manner in the face of elite encroachments and transgressions. 28 
To the extent that there is always an oligarchic element within the 
republic, Machiavelli always looks to elite compromise rather than the 
abolition of the oppressive desire. Hence the fact that he does not pro-
pose to replicate Swiss republicanism, which does not provide noble 
incentives: “The Swiss model provides the popolo with liberty and 
equality without in any way compensating the grandi for this fact.” 29 
The noble desire to oppress is curbed but not eliminated, the  grandi 
continuing to have access to the most prominent civic offices. 
 My own democratic reading of Machiavelli is distinct from both those 
of Lefort and the radical democrats as well as McCormick, and is 
intended to overcome the aporias of each. 30 Although agreeing with 
Lefort that the popular desire for freedom is perpetually surplus, an 
insatiable orientation toward a mode of existence or being, I disagree 
that this desire is actualized in a merely negative confrontation with an 
external power that attempts to constrain it through incorporating it 
within a necessarily repressive institutional order of things. On the con-
trary, I agree with McCormick that the institution can be thought of as 
being capable of giving an expression to the popular desire for freedom. 
This desire, though, cannot be reduced simply to a wish to avoid domi-
nation at the hands of the great. It is rather immanent to human being 
itself, a manifestation of the orientation of the ambitious will for creative 
self-expression. This will for self-expression must be seen as present 
regardless of its relation or non-relation to a dominating force exterior to 
 27  McCormick,  Machiavellian Democracy , 31. Emphasis added. 
 28  For similar criticisms of McCormick see Arlene W. Saxonhouse, “Do We Need the 
Vote? Refl ections on John McCormick’s Machiavellian Democracy,”  The Good Society 
20, no. 2 (2011): 179; Lawrence Hamilton,  Freedom Is Power: Liberty through Political 
Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 62. 
 29  McCormick,  Machiavellian Democracy , 59. 
 30  For a recent attempt to demonstrate that neither the institutional nor the no-rule 
approach to democratically reading Machiavelli is adequate on its own see Boris 
Litvin, “Mapping Rule and Subversion: Perspective and the Democratic Turn in 
Machiavelli Scholarship,”  European Journal of Political Theory , advanced online publi-
cation (2015): 1–23, doi:10.177/1474885115599894. 
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it. This is thus to suggest that readers are incorrect in naturalizing the 
division of humours that Machiavelli presents, eternalizing the will to 
domination through grounding it in a fundamental opposition of desire 
universal to all cities. Although Machiavelli himself never provided a 
definitive answer to this question, in this chapter I will attempt to briefly 
suggest that he gives us enough conceptual resources to at least think 
about the possibility of instituting a social situation in which the  grandi 
are eliminated, thus dissolving the originary division of the social and 
making it easier to grasp the essential form of the human desire for 
ambitious expression, as well as the extent to which this ambitious 
expression can be realized not in terms of its opposition to a now non-
existent social class, but through the very institutional life of the free city. 
 Social Equality as the Precondition for Political Self-Creation 
 Machiavelli primarily speaks about the great in terms of the orientation 
of their humour, which looks toward the oppression of the people. 
Such, however, is not sufficient to establish a definition of the  grandi . 
After all, Machiavelli provides – particularly in the  Florentine Histories – 
several examples of individual members of the people, as well as pop-
ular groups who emerge from the  popolo , who act according to a seeming 
will to domination, looking to exclude others from public life and 
monopolize political authority for themselves alone. There is thus a 
second definitional feature of the category of great: not only are the 
 grandi individuals whose will looks toward political command and 
exclusion, but they are also those who are able to, through combining 
into a class conscious of their desire and united in their end, leverage 
their privileged social position so as to actualize this shared desire 
through a definite mode of activity. Specifically, the great are those who 
are able to deploy their disproportionate economic wealth in order to 
advance their political position relative to those who lack such wealth, 
a position which is then in turn exploited so as to further augment 
the relations of material inequality which they benefit from. 31 A 
 31  Hence McCormick notes that in  Discourses 1:5 Machiavelli uses the term “the great” 
in order identify the oligarchic element in every republic. McCormick,  Machiavellian 
Democracy , 45. Indeed, McCormick reads Machiavelli’s account of the confl ict over 
the Agrarian Laws, for example, as indicating the latter’s understanding of the sig-
nifi cance of economic inequality and the confl ict that it gives rise to as being central 
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consideration of the place of the  grandi in the city is thus impossible 
independently of a consideration of the place of the distribution of 
wealth and resources. 
 In the previous chapter I demonstrated the relationship between 
political and economic inequality as revealed through the events of the 
revolt of the Ciompi. In the  Discourses on Livy the political need to 
overcome the latter inequality can be approached initially through a 
consideration of Machiavelli’s famous contention that “well-ordered 
republics have to keep the public rich, and their citizens poor.” 32 Such 
a statement is not to suggest that the healthy republic has need of 
maintaining its people at a certain determinable level of material sub-
sistence, the concept of poverty being deployed by Machiavelli to indi-
cate not one pole of a social relationship marked by an inequality of 
wealth, but rather 1) the very levelling of such relationships, along 
with 2) a reorientation of citizens’ attitudes toward wealth accumula-
tion. Maurizio Viroli implicitly calls attention to the former through 
linking the concept of poverty less to a certain degree of economic or 
substantive well-being, and more to a principle of social equality: 
“When [Machiavelli] said he was born in poverty, he meant he had not 
been born to a prominent, well-to-do family and therefore could not 
have hoped to be elected to public office or to make a fortune in busi-
ness.” 33 To generalize poverty is not to generalize Machiavelli’s own 
to domestic political struggle. What the episode reveals is that the  grandi , contrary 
to the common Straussian reading, are not motivated only by their love of glory 
and honour, but rather by their desire for wealth. McCormick, “Machiavelli and 
the Gracchi,” 302. The plebs seem to recognize that a condition for the actualization 
of their demand for an increased share in honours and institutions in the city is a 
reduction of material inequality and a limitation of the noble pursuit of wealth. John 
P. McCormick, “‘Keep the Public Rich, but the Citizens Poor’: Economic and Politi-
cal Inequality in Constitutions, Ancient and Modern,”  Cardozo Law Review 34, no. 3 
(2013): 890. For a further reading of economic inequality and the Gracchi case see 
Benedetto Fontana, “Machiavelli and the Gracchi: Republican Liberty and Confl ict,” 
in  Machiavelli on Liberty and Confl ict , ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila 
Vergara (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 235–56. On confl ict between 
the great and the people as being primarily grounded in economic inequality see 
also Tejas Parasher, “Inequality and  Tumulti in Machiavelli’s Aristocratic Republics,” 
 Polity 49, no. 1 (2017): 54–5. 
 32  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 1.37. 
 33  Maurizio Viroli,  Niccolò’s Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli , trans. Antony Shugaar 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 6. 
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experience of political exclusion, but is rather to eliminate such a 
potential through the equalization of wealth, through the abolition of 
the economic conditions that sustain elevated social positions that 
allow some to extract surplus private benefits that are denied others. 
Julie L. Rose, meanwhile, highlights the latter through her attempt to 
demonstrate that the republican need to keep its citizens poor refers 
not only to the maintenance of a fixed level of poverty (and hence 
equality), but more importantly to the maintenance of a particular psy-
chic orientation toward poverty. Specifically, it is “a prescription for 
particular  attitudes citizens must hold toward poverty and wealth.” 34 
According to Rose there are three main elements to Machiavelli’s pre-
ferred attitude to poverty and wealth: citizens must not ground their 
judgment of other citizens on the basis of wealth; citizens must not 
value private wealth more than the public good; and citizens must not 
allow private objects to distract them from public matters. 35 
 Both elements of Machiavelli’s affirmation of poverty are revealed 
through his account, already mentioned in  chapter 2 , of the material life 
of the German free cities. In addition to the passages already cited from 
the  Discourses , in his “Report[s] on the Affairs of Germany” Machiavelli 
explicitly associates living freely with living an austere mode of life, a 
mode of life in which citizens do not aggrandize themselves through 
ostentatious displays of wealth meant to mark their social superiority. 
Indeed, their mutual equality in poverty generates the richness of the 
society in an economic dialectic that seemingly dissolves the conven-
tional opposition and co-relation of the categories of rich and poor. He 
writes: “And if I say that the people of Germany are rich, so it is the 
truth. And they are made rich in large part because they live as poor, for 
they do not build, nor dress, nor furnish their houses expensively, and 
it is enough that they abound with bread and meat, and have a stove 
wherein to take refuge from the cold. Those who do not have other 
things do without them, and do not seek for them … none take account 
of what they lack, but only of that of which they have need; and their 
needs are much less than ours. And because of these customs it results 
that money does not leave their country, they being content with that 
which their country produces, and in this they enjoy their rough and 
 34  Julie L. Rose, “‘Keep the Citizens Poor’: Machiavelli’s Prescription for Republican 
Poverty,”  Political Studies 64, no. 3 (2016): 737. 
 35  Ibid., 10. 
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free life.” 36 Machiavelli here gives an expression to his non-belief that 
civic life is capable of being enriched through a generalized drive 
toward the private accumulation of wealth on the part of individuals. 37 
Machiavelli produces a critique of the debilitating effects of the asym-
metrical distribution of wealth and its production of the ideal of luxury, 
which is stimulated by and stimulates the emergence and entrench-
ment of a psyche obsessed with the self-differentiation of one from oth-
ers. In the  Florentine Histories , for instance, Machiavelli grounds social 
corruption in a certain type of decadent and conspicuous consumption 
that accompanies the institution of pronounced economic inequality: 
“Of which emerged in the city those evils that are most of the time gen-
erated in peace; for the young, more unshackled than usual, were 
spending to excess on dress, on banquets, and on other similar wanton-
ness, and being idle, they consumed time and substance in games and 
in women; they studied to appear splendid in dress and to be witty and 
clever in speech, and the one who was most deft at biting the others 
was more wise and more esteemed.” 38 In response to such displays “the 
good citizens thought that it would be necessary to put a stop to it, and 
with a new law they set a limit on clothing, burials, and banquets.” 39 
 What Machiavelli admires in these German people’s acceptance of 
austere living is the rejection of material acquisition as a mode for the 
actualization of social distinction. We have already seen that in the  Dis-
courses such is one of the two causes of the generation of civic goodness 
among the citizens. The second, meanwhile, is identified as a general 
 36  Machiavelli, “Rapporto delle cose della Magna fatto questo di 17 giugna 1508,” in 
 Tutte le opere , 65. 
 37  See Hans Baron,  In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism: Essays on the Transition from 
Medieval to Modern Thought , vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
255–6; Bonadeo,  Corruption, Confl ict, and Power , 46; Eric Nelson,  The Greek Tradition 
in Republican Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 77; Amanda 
Maher, “What Skinner Misses about Machiavelli’s Freedom: Inequality, Corrup-
tion, and the Institutional Origins of Civic Virtue,”  Journal of Politics 78, no. 4 (2016): 
1003–15. 
 38  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 7.28. For further insight into 
Machiavelli’s perception of the nature of the idle classes see Machiavelli, “Capitoli 
per una compagnia di piacere,” in  Tutte le opere , 930–2. 
 39  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 7.28. Machiavelli repeats the critique of such 
forms of conspicuous consumption in various places. See, for example, his account 
of the meeting of Castruccio Castracani and Taddeo Bernardi in Machiavelli, “La vita 
di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca,” in  Tutte le opere , 627. 
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hostility on the part of the people toward those whom Machiavelli 
labels gentlemen: “The other cause is that those republics where a polit-
ical and uncorrupt life is maintained do not allow that any of their citi-
zens be or live in the way of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among 
themselves a level equality, and to those lords and gentlemen in that 
province they are extremely hostile. And if by chance they receive some 
in their hands, they put them to death as the beginnings of corruption 
and the cause of every scandal.” 40 In this chapter Machiavelli seems to 
define the category of gentleman in a straightforward way, identifying 
members of this group as seeming relics of a feudal order who, although 
they may or may not be able to command political allegiance from a 
vassal population as a result of their holdings, are nevertheless able to 
extract economic advantage from their landed property independently 
of any self-activity. He writes, “I say that those are called gentlemen 
who live idly from the rents of their abundant possessions, without 
having any care either for cultivation or for other labour necessary to 
live. Such as these are pernicious in every republic and in every prov-
ince, but more pernicious are those that, in addition to the aforemen-
tioned fortunes, command from a castle and have subjects who obey 
them.” 41 In regions with gentlemen “there has never emerged any 
republic or political life, for such types of men are entirely hostile to 
every civilization.” 42 Hence “one who wants to make a republic where 
there are many gentlemen, cannot do it unless he first eliminates all of 
them.” 43 
 Machiavelli’s account of gentlemen in 1:55 has aroused much schol-
arly attention, and indeed, such attention has mostly tended to empha-
size the implicit critique of feudal or rentier modes of obligation and 
accumulation. 44 Many commentators will go even further, suggesting 
that Machiavelli’s critique can also be understood as an implicit defence 
of advanced free market relations or a specifically capitalist mode of 
 40  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.55. 
 41  Ibid. 
 42  Ibid. 
 43  Ibid. 
 44  For a reading of  Discourses 1:55 as Machiavelli’s critique of rentier capitalism see 
Jérémie Barthas, “Machiavelli, Public Debt, and the Origins of Political Economy,” 
in  The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, 
Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 288–9. 
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production and exchange. 45 The conceptual delimitation of the category 
would then seem to preclude its extension so as to be able to serve an 
explanatory function with respect to other relations of inequality, most 
specifically that between the nobles and the people. I would argue, 
however, that such an operation misses what is the essential core of 
Machiavelli’s critique. What needs to be interrogated in the first instance 
is whether, as most commentators assume, there exists a clear analytical 
distinction between the very categories of noble and gentleman. 46 There 
are indeed several instances in which Machiavelli deploys the latter 
term in an ambiguous way, or at least one that is apparently distinct 
from its specific usage in  Discourses 1:55. 
 During a discussion of the foundation of the Venetian state in  Dis-
courses 1:6, for example, he notes that in Venice the term gentlemen 
referred to “all those who can hold administration,” that is to say, to a 
specific class of social elites who are marked off against the people and 
who, unlike the majority of the population, participate in government. 47 
In the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs” Machiavelli repeats his belief 
that if one wants to order a republic in a city with inequality “it would 
be necessary to eliminate all the nobility, and reduce it to an equality 
with the others; for between them they act so extraordinarily that the 
laws are not enough to restrain them, but you need a living voice and a 
royal power to restrain them.” 48 Conversely, if one wants to institute a 
princedom where there is a general equality, “it would be necessary to 
first order inequality, and make for yourself many nobles of castles and 
villas, who, together with the prince, would keep the city and the whole 
province in subjugation with their arms and adherents.” 49 What is 
 45  See, for example, Kocis,  Machiavelli Redeemed ; Lionel A. McKenzie, “Rousseau’s 
Debate with Machiavelli in the  Social Contract ,”  Journal of the History of Ideas 43, no. 
2 (1982): 209–28; Jo Ann Cavallo, “On Political Power and Personal Liberty in  The 
Prince and  The Discourses ,”  Social Research 81, no. 1 (2014): 107–32. On Machiavelli’s 
anticipation of the “market liberal tradition” see also Brandon Turner, “Private Vices, 
Public Benefi ts:  Mandragola in Machiavelli’s Political Theory,”  Polity 48, no. 1 (2016): 
109–32. 
 46  Erica Benner, for example, gives voice to a common ground for such distinction, 
identifying the nobles as those who possess privilege through birth, and the gentle-
men as those who possess privilege through wealth. Benner,  Machiavelli’s Ethics , 273. 
 47  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.6. 
 48  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” in  Tutte le opere , 27. 
 49  Ibid. 
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interesting in this passage from the “Discourse” is not only that Machi-
avelli repeats the need to eliminate gentlemen as a pre-condition for the 
establishment of a genuine republic, but also that he uses the terms 
noble and gentleman interchangeably, the term gentlemen being asso-
ciated with the nobility most generally, who support the prince as a 
means to advance their own self-interest. This arrangement is “seen in 
all the states of a prince, and especially in the kingdom of France, where 
the gentlemen lord over the people, the princes the gentlemen, and the 
king the princes.” 50 
 In an important contribution, Alfredo Bonadeo suggests that the con-
ceptual distinction between noble and gentlemen is largely illusory. 
Bonadeo notes that Machiavelli was writing in a historical context in 
which the term grandee was used synonymously with terms such as 
 nobile ,  potente , and  gentiluomo , and that “this reveals a connection 
between the concepts of power, nobility, and ‘grandigia.’” 51 Indeed, by 
the end of the thirteenth century the term noble was not exclusively 
deployed in reference to an individual’s hereditary status, but was 
applied also to those wealthy commoners who had become rich through 
commerce, acquiring power and status that was previously reserved 
for the feudal nobility. They thus also achieved the rank of grandee, 
alongside that older class of gentlemen that readers of Machiavelli 
associate with the explicitly idle group of expropriating lords. What 
Bonadeo points out is that the terms noble, great, and gentleman all 
refer to the same individuals, individuals not necessarily defined in 
terms of membership in an economic or political class precisely speci-
fied, but rather simply in terms of their articulation in a relationship of 
general inequality in which they extract surplus political benefit: “‘gen-
tiluomini,’ ‘nobili,’ ‘signori,’ ‘ottimati,’ ‘potenti,’ ‘ricchi,’ ‘principali,’ 
‘grandi,’ and similar terms appear with the same meaning. All desig-
nate people who may be noble, either by extraction or by acquisition, or 
may not be noble; but they are wealthy and either have political power 
or are seeking it as socially prominent citizens.” 52 As noted in the previ-
ous chapter, it is important to remember that Machiavelli does not see 
himself as articulating a precise class analysis, whether in the ancient 
Roman or the Florentine case, the category of the people subsuming 
 50  Ibid. 
 51  Bonadeo, “The Role of the ‘Grandi’ in the Political World of Machiavelli,” 10. 
 52  Ibid., 11–12. 
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several other distinctions, just as the category of the great or noble 
does. 53 
 What Machiavelli is calling attention to is social inequality as such, 
and the extent to which it militates against the establishment of a free 
way of life considered in terms of the generalization of public participa-
tion. The asymmetrical distribution of wealth and resources provides 
the few with the concrete conditions necessary for the actualization of 
their desire for domination. Hence his critique, not of any particular 
mode of social production and exchange, but disproportionate material 
accumulation in itself, and his subsequent contention that republican 
life is capable of being instituted only in a social context marked by 
distributive equality. Hence also his affirmation of equality as a condi-
tional element or principle of justice: “[Justice] defends the poor and 
the powerless, restrains the rich and the powerful, humbles the arro-
gant and the impudent, curbs the rapacious and the avaricious, casti-
gates the insolent, and scatters the violent; it generates in the state that 
equality which, in order to maintain them, is desirable in every state.” 54 
As Filippo Del Lucchese suggests, the “wonderful equality” that 
 53  This is noted by John Najemy, who suggests that Machiavelli is not concerned with 
providing his readers with a precise sociological account of the nature of class divi-
sion in ancient Rome, but is rather locating in the categories of the great and the 
plebs a means to analyse the key contemporary social division of the Florence of his 
time, that between the  popolo and the  grandi . John M. Najemy,  A History of Florence: 
1200–1575 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Indeed, the term  popolo had multiple meanings 
itself in Florence, at its most expansive referring to all Florentines, although it most 
often was intended to simply designate non-elites: “When Florentines spoke of the 
popolo in specifi cally political contexts, they usually understood it as synonymous 
with the large majority of guildsman who did not belong to elite families.” Ibid., 
35. Discussing the distinction between the concepts of the people in pre- and post-
eighteenth-century political contexts, McCormick notes that whereas in modern 
republics the idea of the people refers to the homogenized sum of all individuals in 
society, possessing as they do identical abstract formal rights, prior to this the people 
referred to not simply the citizen body as a whole, but to the poor and non-elite 
elements of the city. John P. McCormick, “People and Elites in Republican Consti-
tutions, Traditional and Modern,” in  The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent 
Power and Constitutional Form , ed. Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 107. 
 54  Machiavelli, “Allocuzione fatta ad magistrato,” in  Tutte le opere , 36. For a situation of 
Machiavelli’s “Allocution Made to a Magistrate” within what is seen as his broader 
understanding of the conventional form of political justice, see A.J. Parel, “Machia-
velli’s Notions of Justice: Text and Analysis,”  Political Theory 18, no. 4 (1990): 528–44. 
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Machiavelli famously references in the  Florentine Histories refers to “an 
economic situation more favorable to a popular government and to 
freedom, a position Machiavelli consistently holds throughout his intel-
lectual production.” 55 This economic equality would be achieved 
through “the destruction of the rich and the reappropriation of the rich-
ness by the many.” 56 
 Referring in particular to the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs,” Bon-
adeo argues that it is evident that the establishment of a republic 
depends upon the realization of a certain type of equality, this realiza-
tion including both the elimination of social and political class distinc-
tions, as well as the generation of a space for plebeian participation in 
government through, not just the exclusion of the grandees from cer-
tain institutions, but the very elimination of the  grandi itself. In his 
words, “to establish a republic it is necessary to wipe out all the nobility 
and bring it to a level with the other citizens.” 57 Such a possibility is 
suggested, even though it was never realized in the Roman case, in  the 
Discourses on Livy . It can be counterposed to what is often pointed out 
to be one of Machiavelli’s preferred solutions to the problem of the 
internally destructive orientation of noble desire: its external redirec-
tion. In such redirection an outlet is given for the satisfaction of the 
 grandi ’s will to dominate via the city’s imperial expansion. 58 This was 
indeed the preferred mode in the Roman case, although in  Discourses 
3:16 it is acknowledged that there is another option that republics may 
take. Machiavelli begins the chapter by noting that “it has been always, 
 55  Filippo Del Lucchese, “Freedom, Equality and Confl ict: Rousseau on Machiavelli,” 
 History of Political Thought 35, no. 1 (2014): 42. 
 56  Ibid., 46. For a recent account of Machiavelli’s critique of economic inequality in the 
 Florentine Histories and its implication in the fact of political corruption see Amanda 
Maher, “The Power of ‘Wealth, Nobility and Men’: Inequality and Corruption in 
Machiavelli’s  Florentine Histories ,”  European Journal of Political Theory , advanced 
online publication (2017): 1–20, doi:10.1177/147885117730673. 
 57  Bonadeo,  Corruption, Confl ict, and Power , 104. 
 58  Nikola Regent sums up the position of several readers on the question of republican 
expansion, writing that for Machiavelli “ the highest possible aim ” of political life is 
the establishment of a “long-lasting empire which expands.” Regent, “Machiavelli, 
Empire,  Virtù and the Final Downfall,” 753. Original emphasis. For perhaps the most 
systematic and thorough attempt to demonstrate that one cannot separate Machia-
velli’s commitment to internal Florentine liberty from his commitment to Florence’s 
external imperial expansion see Mikael Hörnquist,  Machiavelli and Empire (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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and always will be, that great and rare men in a republic are neglected 
in peaceful times; for through the envy that has accompanied the repu-
tation that their virtue has given them, one finds in such times many 
citizens who wish, not only to be their equals, but to be their superi-
ors.” 59 That such is not the immediate object of Machiavelli’s concern 
should be readily apparent in light of his understanding, which I artic-
ulated in the previous chapter, of the non-superiority of the great in 
relation to the people. In short, there is no natural foundation for the 
esteemed position of the grandees within society, their social elevation 
being entirely conventional. 
 The social division between the great and the people in a newly insti-
tuted principality grounded in the great, for example, is the result of the 
will of the prince, not a non-identity of the being of citizens. Hence 
Machiavelli writes that “the prince always lives with the same people; 
but he can do well without the same grandees, being able to make and 
unmake them every day, and take away and give, of his accord, their 
reputation.” 60 And within the context of his discussion of gentlemen in 
the  Discourses he states that “where there is much equality, one who 
wishes to make a kingdom or a principality will never be able to do it if 
one does not draw from that equality many of ambitious and restless 
spirit and make them gentlemen in fact, and not in name, gifting them 
castles and possessions, and giving them favour through possessions 
and men.” 61 Once again it is worth pointing out: the great do not have 
a fundamental nature distinct from the people. Rather, their differing 
humour is to be located in their attempt to actualize ambition through 
denying such actualization to others, such being a concrete possibility 
only to the extent that they occupy a contingent social or political place 
within the city. Being not concerned with the disjunction between the 
self-perceived superiority of a few and the extent of their social recogni-
tion in a community of ostensible equality, in the second paragraph of 
3:16 Machiavelli reveals the true disorder at the heart of the chapter. It 
is that the grandees have an intuition of being not properly esteemed, 
this intuition intensifying their insolence: “That thing makes them 
indignant in two modes: the one, to see themselves lacking their rank; 
the other, to see made comrades and superiors unworthy men not as 
 59  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.16. 
 60  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. 9. 
 61  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.55. 
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sufficient as themselves.” 62 Such insolence can be neutralized through 
one of the two modes already suggested, going to war so as to allow the 
great to vent their ambition, or deepening equality within the city, elim-
inating the great and the desire to oppress which gives rise to the very 
disorder. 
 Several chapters later in 3:25, Machiavelli elaborates on the relation 
between the establishment of equality and the extension of virtue. Here 
Machiavelli again affirms that “the most useful thing to order in a free 
city is to maintain the citizens poor.” 63 The specified advantage of this 
order, of the institution of a general social and economic equality, is that 
there is thereby no artificial barrier erected preventing the actualization 
of  virtù on the part of individuals, here represented in terms of the 
assumption of office and the achievement of distinction: “through 
experience one sees that four hundred years after Rome had been built 
there was a very great poverty; nor can one believe that any other 
greater order produced this effect than seeing that the way to any rank 
and any honour was not blocked to you because of poverty, and that 
one went to find virtue in any house that it occupied. That mode of liv-
ing made riches undesirable.” 64 Not only does the establishment of 
equality militate against the leveraging of wealth toward political ends 
by a few, allowing all to strive after virtue, but it also neutralizes the 
very desire for economic accumulation through allowing people an 
outlet for self-expression via political participation, through giving 
them a concrete stake in public life. For Machiavelli this lesson is 
expressed particularly well in the case of Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus. 
Fearing the loss of the consul Minucius and his army while battling the 
Aequi, Rome created Cincinnatus as dictator, who at this point was liv-
ing a particularly modest life: “Cincinnatus was plowing his small villa, 
which did not exceed four  jugera , when from Rome came the legates of 
the Senate to reveal to him his election to the dictatorship, to show in 
what danger the Roman republic found itself.” 65 Not only was Cincin-
natus able to actualize  virtù through defeating his enemy and liberating 
Minucius, but after the termination of the crisis he demonstrated no 
desire to increase his estate through the appropriation of the spoils of 
 62  Ibid., bk. 3.16. 
 63  Ibid., bk. 3.25. 
 64  Ibid. 
 65  Ibid. 
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war. Hence, “One notes, as was said, the honour that was done in Rome 
to poverty, and how to a good and valiant man, which Cincinnatus 
was, four  jugera of land was enough to nourish him.” 66 
 Contrary to figures like Cincinnatus, Machiavelli is ultimately highly 
sceptical that the majority of the great, given the orientation of their 
humour, will ever rest satisfied with their share of government or their 
institutional allotment within the city. To illustrate this point, in the  Flo-
rentine Histories he calls attention to an episode in which the people and 
the nobles, after a period of negotiation, agreed on a specific distribu-
tion of positions that was intended to satisfy each group, the great ulti-
mately being granted one-third of the Signoria and one half of the 
remaining offices. Needless to say, however, the nobles immediately 
worked to undermine the organization of the city through increasing 
their political share: “with this order, this government, the city would 
have settled, if the great had been content to live with that modesty that 
is required for civil life; but they operated in the contrary way, for as 
private individuals they did not want companions, and in the magistra-
cies they wanted to be lords; and every day there emerged some exam-
ple of their insolence and arrogance.” 67 This recognition of the  grandi ’s 
perpetual tendency to resist the sharing of political authority should 
immediately lead us to question the earnestness of the ideal of the 
mixed regime, in which each social part is apportioned a political place 
and function, contributing toward the healthy reproduction of the city 
through the voluntary acceptance of its particular role. 
 On Machiavelli’s account there is no grounds for thinking the great 
will ever be satisfied with their social position, and hence for thinking 
it possible for the people to establish a lasting conciliation with them. 
Especially relevant here is a discussion in book two of the  Histories . 
After the self-exile of the Ghibellines Florence was reordered in an 
effort to create an institutional milieu that would be able to resist the 
type of civil purging that had been carried out by this faction. Specifi-
cally, “they elected twelve heads, who were to sit in the magistracy for 
two months, and they called these not Ancients, but Good Men; along-
side these was a council of eighty citizens, which they called the  Cre-
denza ; after this was one hundred and eighty from the people, thirty for 
each of the six [wards], which with the  Credenza and twelve Good Men 
 66  Ibid. 
 67  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 2.39. 
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were called the General Council. They ordered yet another council of 
one hundred and twenty citizens, people and nobles, through which 
was rendered complete all the things determined in the other councils; 
and with that they distributed the offices of the republic.” 68 The prob-
lem, however, was that as a consequence of reflection on the Ghibelline 
tyranny it was decided to invest the Guelfs specifically with more 
offices, authorities, and magistracies, with predictable results given 
what we know of noble desire: “Florence was then in a very bad condi-
tion, because the Guelf nobility had become insolent and did not fear 
the magistrates.” 69 
 What the Florentines forgot was that, Guelf or Ghibelline, “the few 
always act in the mode of the few.” 70 In light of the former’s insolence 
the people thought it prudent to invite back into the city the latter as a 
counter-force, producing a reordering in which the final result was an 
overall decline of noble influence, both Guelfs and Ghibellines agreeing 
to a form of mutual political exclusion out of fear that the other would 
gain power at the one’s expense. The suppression of factional conflict, 
however, allowed for a clearer emergence of the primary division 
between the humours of the people and the great, the latter no longer 
being contaminated or blurred by internal factional difference. In the 
end the laws and orders were powerless to contain the elite persecution 
of the people, as was the institution of a Gonfalonier of justice. 71 Subse-
quently yet another reordering was carried out in light of this situation, 
this time stimulated by Giano della Bella – “of very noble lineage, but 
lover of the freedom of the city” – who lobbied to create laws to deny 
the  grandi certain offices and privileges. 72 After accidents conspired to 
compel Giano to voluntarily leave the city the nobles took the opportu-
nity to reassert themselves, which they were able to do through further 
neutralizing their internal divisions. Just before the  grandi and the 
 68  Ibid., bk. 2.10. 
 69  Ibid., bk. 2.11. 
 70  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.7. Indeed, this 
phrase is situated in a passage in which Machiavelli highlights the noble tendency 
to disrespect ordinary modes, such disrespect being a concrete manifestation of their 
sense of exceptionality. Their willingness to subvert legal orders for their own good 
is a sign of their belief that the people should not possess a designated means for the 
satisfaction of their desire. 
 71  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 2.12. 
 72  Ibid., bk. 2.13. 
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people were to come to arms, certain prudent individuals intervened in 
order to try and prevent the emergence of bloodshed, reminding the 
great that the laws made to deny them authority were only instituted in 
light of their insolence. At the same time, however, they made an appeal 
to the opposite side: “The people, on the other hand, were reminded of 
how it was prudent to want always the final victory, and how it was 
never a wise choice to make men despair, because one who does not 
hope for the good does not fear the evil. They should think that the 
nobility was that which had in war honoured the city, and thus it was 
neither a good nor a just thing to persecute them with so much hatred; 
and as the nobles easily suffered not enjoying the supreme magistracy, 
they could not suffer that it should be in the power of everyone, through 
the orders made, to expel them from their homeland. Therefore it was 
good to mitigate them, and by this benefit lay down their arms; nor 
should they want to test the fortune of battle relying on their number, 
for many times it has been seen that the many have been overcome by 
the few.” 73 
 It may seem as if Machiavelli is here calling attention to the necessity 
of a conciliatory form of compromise in which each side of the conflict 
is willing to make concessions for the sake of a peaceable way of life. In 
fact, however, Machiavelli is simply advocating the replacement of 
extraordinary with ordinary modes to control and accuse elites. His 
ultimate conclusion is that the city should use laws in order to check the 
insolence of nobles, this being the most prudent position in social situ-
ations marked by, first, an already firmly established noble class, and 
second, an impossibility of denying this class political authority alto-
gether. After the positive institutionalization of modes of accusation 
and the restriction of noble participation in government, the city lived 
in relative peace, Machiavelli concluding that “never was our city in a 
greater and more happy state than in these times, being filled with men, 
riches and reputation.” 74 As demonstrated throughout the rest of the 
book, however, no established order is sufficient to quell the insatiable 
humour of the great for long. Hence the words that Machiavelli has 
Piero de’ Medici speak in a lamenting speech chastising the mode of 
expression of the ambition of the few, Piero bemoaning his inability to 
 73  Ibid., bk. 2.14. 
 74  Ibid., bk. 2.15. 
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check the latter: “I know now how much I have deceived myself, as one 
that knew little of the natural ambition of all men, and less of yours: for 
it is not enough for you to be princes in such a city and for you few to 
have those honours, dignities, and benefits of which formerly many 
citizens were wont to be honoured; it is not enough for you to have 
divided between yourselves the goods of your enemies; it is not enough 
for you to be able to afflict all with public burdens, while you, free from 
those, have all the public advantage. You afflict everyone with every 
type of injury. You despoil your neighbour of his goods, you sell justice, 
you avoid civil judgments, you oppress peaceful men, and you exalt 
the insolent.” 75 
 Machiavelli’s Unrealized Ideal: 
The Elimination of the Noble Humour 
 Machiavelli’s normative ideal is the establishment of a city in which all 
citizens are capable of expressing their political will, democratic partici-
pation in public affairs being the primary mode by which individuals 
externalize their ambitious desire. Such a situation, however, would 
seem to necessitate the elimination of the  grandi , to the extent that the 
latter always attempt, through the private deployment of their wealth 
and resources, to dominate others, an element of such domination 
being the exclusion of these others from participatory modes. Again, 
the few always act in the mode of the few. There certainly seem to be 
cases where Machiavelli suggests that it is possible to purge from the 
city the desire to oppress, at least inasmuch as this desire is concretely 
articulated in the formation of a political humour identified with a 
determinate group of individuals united in their end. Putting aside the 
question of whether the following examples reveal to us the specificity 
of Machiavellian  virtù as I attempted to define it in  chapter 3 , they nev-
ertheless no doubt reveal the practical possibility of eliminating the 
 grandi within a city. Clearchus of Heraclea, for example, was raised to 
the position of tyrant by the city’s aristocrats in their effort to strengthen 
their own position relative to the people. Finding himself stuck between 
a people who had been deprived of its freedom and an insolent aristoc-
racy, however, Clearchus correctly realized that his own security 
depended on grounding his authority in the popular element, which 
 75  Ibid., bk. 7.23. 
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would be most effectively achieved through completely purging the 
city of the desire for domination. Hence, recognizing “a convenient 
occasion for this, he cut to pieces all the aristocrats, to the extreme sat-
isfaction of the people.” 76 Agathocles the Sicilian, meanwhile, followed 
the same pattern: “he gathered together one morning the people and 
the Senate of Syracuse, as if he had to decide things pertaining to the 
republic; and, with a signal he arranged, he made his soldiers kill all the 
senators and the richest of the people; they being dead, he occupied 
and held the principality of that city without any civil controversy.” 77 
 Machiavelli is highly sceptical, however, of the efficacy of relying on 
singular individuals or princes in order to eliminate the  grandi . There 
remains the potential for such individuals to become tyrants, thus gen-
erating a new internal social hierarchy that equally militates against 
the popular venting of desire. 78 Hence the identification of the error of 
the Roman plebs’ support of Appius when it appeared to them that he 
would improve their standing relative to the nobility: “when a people is 
led to make this error – to give reputation to one – because he beats 
down those that it hates, and if that one is wise, he always will become 
tyrant of that city. For he will wait, together with the favour of the peo-
ple, to eliminate the nobility; and he will never turn to the oppression 
of the people until he has eliminated [the nobles]; at that time, when the 
people recognize itself as servile, it has nowhere to take refuge. This 
mode has held for all those who have founded tyrannies in republics.” 79 
This establishment of a singular concentration of authority was doubly 
injurious in that it took place in a republican context in which the peo-
ple were already in possession of certain popular modes and orders for 
 76  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.16. 
 77  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 8. For the suggestion that Machiavelli is a cham-
pion of Greek tyrants like Clearchus and Agathocles to the extent that they reform 
corrupted states and defend the people from those who would oppress them, see 
John P. McCormick, “Of Tribunes and Tyrants: Machiavelli’s Legal and Extra-Legal 
Modes for Controlling Elites,”  Ratio Juris 28, no. 2 (2015): 252–66; John P. McCormick, 
“Machiavelli’s Greek Tyrant as Republican Reformer,” in  The Radical Machiavelli: 
Politics, Philosophy, and Language , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vit-
torio Morfi no (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 337–48. 
 78  For an account of Machiavelli as a radical critic of tyranny in all its forms see 
Giovanni Giorgini, “The Place of the Tyrant in Machiavelli’s Political Thought and 
the Literary Genre of the  Prince ,”  History of Political Thought 29, no. 2 (2008): 230–56. 
 79  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.40. 
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regulating the trajectory of noble decision making: “where they ought 
to place a guard over [the magistrates] to keep them good, the Romans 
removed it, making [the Decemvirate] the only magistracy in Rome, 
annulling all the others due to the excessive wish (as said above) that 
the Senate had to eliminate the consuls. This blinded them in such a 
mode that they agreed to such a disorder.” 80 Speaking more generally 
of the singular reordering of the social field via extraordinary means, 
Machiavelli posits the internally contradictory form of such a model of 
political transformation, seemingly invalidating thereby the logic of 
singular foundation: “the reordering of a city to a political life presup-
poses a good man, and becoming prince of a republic through violence 
presupposes an evil man; from this it will be found that it very rarely 
happens that a good person will want to become prince through evil 
ways, even if his end would be good, and that a wicked person who 
became prince wants to work well, as it will never cross his mind to use 
that authority well which he has acquired evilly.” 81 
 More notable than the examples of Clearchus and Agathocles, then, to 
the extent that the relevant purging of the great is carried out by the peo-
ple themselves – with external assistance – as opposed to a prince acting 
in their name, is the account of the civil war in Corcyra during the Pelo-
ponnesian War. The internal division in Corcyra mirrored that between 
Athens and Sparta, there emerging groups supportive of each of these 
powers, with the nobles looking to appropriate authority for their faction 
exclusively. However, “having occurred in that city that the nobles pre-
vailed, and took away the freedom of the people, the popular [group] 
regained its power by means of the Athenians, and laying their hands on 
the whole nobility, locked them in a prison capable of holding them all, 
from which they drew out eight or ten at a time, under pretence of send-
ing them into exile in different places, and had them put to death with 
many examples of cruelty.” 82 The fact, furthermore, that the people are 
commonly such oriented toward the attempt to establish freedom via the 
elimination of the nobles and their desire to oppress is revealed in Machi-
avelli’s observation that “it is no wonder, then, that peoples take extraor-
dinary revenges against those who have taken their freedom.” 83 
 80  Ibid. 
 81  Ibid., bk. 1.18. 
 82  Ibid., bk. 2.2. 
 83  Ibid. 
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 If the possibility of eliminating the nobility is a real one, what should 
we make of Machiavelli’s critique of the people’s desire for such an 
elimination, or at least a noble exclusion from institutions of rule, in the 
Florentine context? The universal participatory form of popular desire 
is once again affirmed in the  Histories , Machiavelli noting, however, the 
different form it took in Florence as opposed to in Rome. Whereas “the 
people of Rome desired to enjoy the supreme honours together with 
the nobility,” in Florence the people “fought to be alone in the govern-
ment, without the nobles participating.” 84 It was this effort to exclude 
the nobility altogether from rule, which Machiavelli calls “unfair and 
unjust,” that intensified the noble desire to oppress, instigating the lat-
ter’s violent reaction in Florence. 85 As always, however, we must be 
sensitive to the historical specificity of the narration. Machiavelli is 
affirming that the people have not yet transcended their status as 
unshackled, that they have not yet been fully socialized to exclusive 
rule, as evidenced in their wish to immediately express their political 
will without having undertaken a transformative learning process via 
participation in shared deliberative activities. This is made explicit 
when Machiavelli claims that in Rome it was by governing with the 
nobles, that is to say, those who had prior experience in political life, 
that the people actualized their deliberative potential: “in the victories 
of the people the city of Rome became more virtuous; for as the people 
could administer the magistracies, the armies, and the high offices 
along with the nobles, they were filled with the same virtue as the latter 
were, and that city, growing in virtue, grew in power.” 86 Contrary to the 
Roman experience, in Florence the exact opposite movement occurred, 
for there, when “the people overcame [the nobles], the nobles remained 
deprived of magistracies; and if they wanted to reacquire them it was 
necessary – in conduct, in spirit, and in mode of living – not only to be 
but to appear similar to the people.” 87 This non-concern with popular 
political education, and the nobles’ abandonment of their virtue as 
expressed in the orientation toward the transmission of political knowl-
edge, made it impossible to institute good orders looking toward 
 84  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.1. 
 85  Ibid. 
 86  Ibid. 
 87  Ibid. 
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political socialization: “So the virtue of arms and generosity of spirit 
that was eliminated in the nobility – and in the people, where it never 
was – could not be rekindled; thus Florence became more and more 
meek and abject.” 88 There is thus a concrete trajectory of democratic 
socialization that can be read in terms of Machiavelli’s recognition of 
the transformative potential of dialogical learning, such as was detailed 
in the previous chapter. Despite the fact that the political education of 
the people takes place in an institutional world that it occupies with the 
nobles, it is still a self-education, one that takes place through shared 
rule. 89 
 My suggestion has been that we can read the ultimate end of such 
self-education in terms of the abolition of the  grandi . As we have already 
seen, in the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs” Machiavelli contends 
that each of the main social groups within the city must have access to 
political institutions that allow these groups’ members to vent their 
ambition. As we have also seen, however, Machiavelli here suggests as 
well both the possibility of constructing a city in which the nobility 
have been eliminated, and that his proposed reconstitution of Florence 
would be characterized by an increasing empowerment of the people, 
who are invested with more and more authority as they increasingly 
educate themselves regarding political things. The acquisition of politi-
cal knowledge tends toward increasing democratization and wealth 
equalization that would ideally lead to the elimination of the great as 
an organized class. Machiavelli, though, is not so utopian as to imagine 
that such an elimination might result in the harmonization of the inter-
ests of the city and the concomitant eradication of all impulses to domi-
nation. It is not possible to structure a regime that will produce citizens 
whose desire is incapable of taking the form of a will to oppress. For 
example, in  Discourses 3:17 he maintains, despite an earlier claim that 
healthy republics will not allow for the emergence of corrupt citizens, 
 88  Ibid. 
 89  Hence Dante Germino writes that “Machiavelli’s critical study of politics, then, far 
from shoring up the position of the political elite and providing them with eso-
teric ‘secrets of rule,’ has the effect, if seriously pursued, of democratizing politics 
through the spread of political knowledge to elites and non-elites alike.” Dante Ger-
mino, “Machiavelli’s Thoughts on the Psyche and Society,” in  The Political Calculus: 
Essays on Machiavelli’s Political Philosophy , ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972), 76. 
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that it is always possible for insolent individuals to arise. 90 Given this 
concession, we must once more remind ourselves of how we specified 
the definition of the  grandi in Machiavelli’s work. 
 Machiavelli seems to define the great in term of the orientation of 
their humour: the fact that they have a desire to oppress. This simple 
definition is complicated by the fact that in many places Machiavelli 
identifies members of the people as also possessing such a desire. The 
matter becomes clearer when we identify a second component of the 
noble humour, that is, its class characteristic. Machiavelli’s use of the term 
 umore refers not to the orientation of individual wills, but of social 
groupings, the range of which far exceed the typical bifurcation of 
humours into the categories of the people and the great. In the  Floren-
tine Histories Machiavell expands upon the possibility of a city contain-
ing a plurality of humours, thus engendering a diversity of enmities. 
For example, after the failures of Niccolao da Prato to eliminate the 
tumults in Florence, “full of disdain he went back to the Pontiff, and left 
Florence full of confusion and interdicted. And not was that city dis-
rupted by one humour,  but by many ; it contained hostilities between the 
people and the great, the Ghibellines and the Guelfs, the Whites and the 
Blacks.” 91 Thus only insolent individuals constitute grandees, represen-
tatives of one specific humour, when enough of them simultaneously 
emerge and are able to succeed in organizing themselves into a class 
self-conscious of its generally unified end, acquiring sufficient eco-
nomic resources to work toward the actualization of this end. 
 Although the political community is powerless to prevent the appear-
ance of wills to domination, it is not inevitable that these wills will be 
 90  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.17. On the former 
claim, for example, see  Discourses 3:12, where Machiavelli writes that the potential 
for conspiracy is neutralized in the healthy republic, for the thought of privately sub-
verting established institutional norms would not occur to citizens socialized in such 
a context. Only the corrupt republic thus need worry about conspiratorial threats. 
Ibid., bk. 3.12. 
 91  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 2.21. Emphasis added. There are other places 
in which Machiavelli notes that the variety of humours in a city may exceed those 
of the people and the great. Most obviously, for example, see his discussion of the 
humour of the soldiers in Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 19. For a recent example 
of an argument grounded in the presumption of the existence of this third humour 
see Paul A. Rahe, “Machiavelli and the Modern Tyrant,” in  Machiavelli on Liberty and 
Confl ict , ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila Vergara (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2017), 207–31. 
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consolidated into a humour that is perpetually opposed to that to live 
freely. On the contrary, the community must be vigilant in repressing 
such urges to oppress when they manifest themselves precisely so that 
they do not organize themselves into a shared humour, that is, into the 
 grandi , through for example, excluding such individuals from accessing 
major office. 92 As we have seen, the people do not possess any intrinsic 
nature that is specific to them and that would provide a natural ground 
for psychologically distinguishing them from the great. It is thus not 
surprising that Machiavelli should provide many examples of insolent 
individuals emerging from within the body of the people. Such is 
impossible to overcome. However, it is not impossible to institutionally 
structure the political regime such that these individual wills are not 
immediately capable of concentrating themselves into an organized 
class that can actualize the particular form of appearance of their desire. 
Hence in the  Florentine Histories Machaivelli notes that “evil humours” 
do not necessarily appear naturally with a city, but only when there do 
not exist social conditions that act as checks preventing their appear-
ance. 93 A city can overcome the formation of organized class humours, 
which is what Machiavelli’s democratic theory would ultimately seem 
to demand. As I have suggested in this chapter, one of the most essen-
tial mechanisms in this respect is the equalization of economic condi-
tions, as the leveraging and deployment of wealth is the key instrument 
by which the humour to oppress expresses itself. Not only can an  umore 
be neutralized, then, as in those cases of institutional pacification of the 
 grandi that are detailed in the  Discourses , but the city can be so struc-
tured so as to militate against its very appearance. Although the  Floren-
tine Histories provide us with some examples of the people eliminating 
the nobility, as we will see later, new enmities perpetually emerged in 
Florence not because the antagonistic opposition of humours is inher-
ent to social being, but because Florence failed to create institutional 
modes and orders that would be able to productively stabilize conflict 
so as prevent the re-emergence of separate class interests. 
 • 
 Machiavelli’s concession of the impossibility of eradicating insolence 
within a city also allows us to grasp a further political consequence 
 92  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.17. 
 93  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 4.28. 
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of the potential elimination of the  grandi . Specifically, it demonstrates 
that this movement is not characterized by a homogenization of the 
social field that would render individual desires identical, thereby 
instaurating a regime of consensus that effaces social conflict. As I 
specified in  chapter 2 , human difference greatly exceeds that differ-
ence that characterizes the opposition of the noble and the popular 
humours. Although Machiavelli often suggests that the enmities be-
tween the people and the great are the “cause of all the evils that 
emerge in cities,” 94 he does not maintain that this precise form of so-
cial division exhausts all possible forms, nor even that it is naturally 
instrinsic to cities. Human multiplicity is an ineradicable feature of 
human life, and thus conflict a perpetual dimension of human co-
relation. 95 The key political issue is not whether conflict can be elimi-
nated, but rather the form that conflict takes and the modes by which 
it is negotiated. What must be distinguished is the contingent conflict 
between the desire to oppress and the desire not to oppress, and the 
more generalized and universal conflict grounded in the very fact of 
human multiplicity. It is no doubt the case that Machiavelli concerns 
himself most with detailing the manifestation of the former expres-
sion of conflict. Such results not as a consequence of a belief in its 
naturalness or inevitability, but of Machiavelli’s own precise social-
historical situation. It is not the case that the overcoming of inequal-
ity, represented in the overcoming of the division of humours, leads 
to an elimination of conflict, for conflict is irreducible to this division, 
grounded as it is in natural human difference. Equality, however, can 
be affirmed in difference through the equal participation of all in 
institutionalized agonistic conflict over the direction of the political 
community. The conflictual confrontation between always non-identical 
wills in the public sphere, proceeding non-antagonistically and being 
inclusive of all citizens, is the ground upon which democratic deter-
minations are formulated and the principles of freedom and equality 
 94  Ibid., bk. 3.1. 
 95  Although Alfredo Bonadeo, for example, recognizes that the realization of the 
Machiavellian political ideal involves the elimination of the nobility, he is incorrect 
in presuming that this would entail a correlative elimination of social confl ict with 
the city. Alfredo Bonadeo, “Machiavelli on Civic Equality and Republican Govern-
ment,”  Romance Notes 11, no. 1 (1969): 163. 
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concretely expressed and affirmed. In short, the key issue is not 
whether conflict exists, but the quality of the conflict and the mode 
by which the energies structuring it are expressed. I will outline some 
of the productive and democratic of such modes in what remains of 
the present study. 
 Chapter Six 
 Institutionalizing Ambitious Expression: 
The Republic as the Self-Overcoming 
Regime 
 1  John P. McCormick, “On the Myth of the Conservative Turn in Machiavelli’s  Florentine 
Histories ,” in  Machiavelli on Liberty and Confl ict , ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, 
and Camila Vergara (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 204. 
 2  In his own contribution to this tendency, Mauricio Suchowlansky sums up the posi-
tion concisely: “It has been argued that the Machiavelli of the tracts from the 1520s 
no longer endows the people with an instrumental role as guardians of liberty; that 
Machiavelli is critical of the tumultuous form of popular republicanism as quintes-
sentially represented by ancient Rome; and fi nally that the Machiavelli of the 1520s 
no longer sees in the fi gure of the princely individual a solution to a republic’s dif-
fi culties.” Mauricio Suchowlansky, “Machiavelli’s Summary of the Affairs of the City of 
Lucca: Venice as  buon governo ,”  Intellectual History Review 26, no. 4 (2016): 429. For a 
critique of this interpretation of the Florentine writings see McCormick, “On the Myth 
of the Conservative Turn in Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories.” 
 In the previous two chapters I highlighted select passages from Machi-
avelli’s  Florentine Histories and “Discourse on Florentine Affairs” that 
suggest 1) the existence of a popular desire for political participation, 2) 
the existence of a popular capacity for autonomous self-organization, 
and 3) a critique of economic inequality that ultimately points toward 
the elimination of the  grandi as a determinate social class. In emphasiz-
ing this content I position myself in opposition to that “now nearly 
hegemonic interpretation” that identifies a fundamental transition or 
break in Machiavelli’s work. 1 For these latter readers Machiavelli’s later 
Florentine writings are marked by a general conservative turn that 
repudiates the earlier defence of the people’s productive role in civil 
life. 2 I argue, on the contrary, that there remains in this later work a 
clear democratic content, and indeed, a somewhat unique democratic 
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content relative to the earlier republican writings, in that the issue of 
the potential for the equalization of material conditions of life is consid-
ered to be more of a realistic historical possibility. To the extent that the 
mode of political being detailed in the  Discourses on Livy continues to 
assume the existence of the  grandi , it cannot be identified as embodying 
Machiavelli’s democratic ideal, for there still exists an organized 
humour to oppress as a concrete form of appearance of the desire for 
ambitious self-expression. 
 Such is not at all to suggest, however, that the  Discourses is thereby 
irrelevant to Machiavelli’s normative defence of popular political self-
activity, or even that it is more distant from the Machiavellian ideal 
than the image presented in the  Florentine Histories . 3 On the contrary, 
the complete revelation of a Machiavellian form of democratic life as a 
normative political goal is achieved only through a combination of var-
ious of the lessons contained within these texts. Although the texts do 
emphasize differing elements of democratic life, these emphases are 
not mutually incompatible, thereby necessitating our thinking the form 
of relation between them in terms of break or transition. On the one 
hand, in the Florentine writings Machiavelli highlights the fact that the 
equalization of economic conditions is a possibility that may be con-
cretely actualized. This possibility was closed off in the republican 
Rome of the  Discourses as a result of the continued existence of the great 
as a separate social class. On the other hand, in the  Discourses Machia-
velli highlights the fact that the non-antagonistic expression of human 
ambition is possible only if there exist political forms that can produc-
tively channel it. This possibility was closed off in the Florence of the 
 Florentine Histories as a result of the lack of stable institutional orders 
respected by all citizens. What unites both the republican writings of 
the  Discourses and the later Florentine writings is the affirmation of an 
ambitious popular desire for self-expression. In the former text 
 3  Distinguishing between the form of confl ict in Rome as opposed to Florence, Filippo 
Del Lucchese, for example, maintains that democratic life is ultimately not possible in 
the former given its reproduction of inequality. Filippo Del Lucchese, “La città divisa: 
esperieza del confl itto e novità politica in Machiavelli,” in  Machiavelli: immaginazione 
e contingenza , ed. Filippo Del Lucchese, Luca Sartorello, and Stefano Visentin (Pisa: 
Edizioni Ets, 2006), 23–4. If the  Florentine Histories is Machiavelli’s most democratic 
text, however, its radically democratic potential can nevertheless be gleaned in certain 
other scattered places through the Machiavellian oeuvre. Ibid., 24. 
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Machiavelli theorizes the institutional conditions for the socially pro-
ductive sublimation of this popular desire, while in the latter texts 
Machiavelli theorizes the possibility of the establishment of a general 
economic equality via the abolition of the  grandi and the self-education 
of the people. The synthesis of these two accounts, never undertaken 
systematically by Machiavelli, generates a more complete and coherent 
democratic constellation. 
 Even though Rome failed to institute conditions of social and eco-
nomic equality, the presentation of republican life in the  Discourses 
nevertheless allows us to grasp the main contours of Machiavelli’s 
democratic thought. Specifically, the existence of the  grandi in Rome 
does not obscure the recognition of the need for all citizens to have an 
assured political outlet for the venting of their desire. Reconstructing 
the constellation that aims to articulate the image of a regime in 
which the capacity for political self-expression is universalized 
allows us to go well beyond those readings that locate in Machiavelli 
only “the germs of a theory of democracy.” 4 At the same time, 
 4  David Held,  Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 54. Needless to 
say, the vast majority of readers of Machiavelli do not even identify this germinal 
potential. An exhaustive list of the readings that posit Machiavelli as an anti-democratic 
thinker would be impossible to construct, although some representative ones – 
primarily from republican and Straussian perspectives – may be noted. Those who 
attempt to assimilate Machiavelli to a classical republican tradition argue that the 
actualization of the common good cannot be grounded in the equal participation of 
all citizens, the aristocratic structure of the republic being a consequence of the fact 
that it is the virtuous few alone who are competent to enact policies that can ensure 
such an actualization. See, for example, Colish, “The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” 
347; de Grazia,  Machiavelli in Hell , 180; Werner Maihoffer, “The Ethos of the Republic 
and the Reality of Politics,” in  Machiavelli and Republicanism , ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin 
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recognizing the explicitly institutional form of the democratic repub-
lic – specifically, that it is through institutional life that the people 
express their creative energies – allows us to go beyond those radical 
democratic readings that posit an unbridgeable chasm between the 
instituted form of the political regime and the instituting power of 
popular self-activity. I argue that through theorizing the possibility 
of creating institutions open to their own perpetual self-interrogation, 
Machiavelli provides the means to think the simultaneous affirma-
tion of the instituted and the instituting in one democratic form. 5 
Machiavelli’s discovery lies in his conception of a political regime that 
is able to affirm, through its institutional structure, the negative 
desire of the citizens of the polity, the democratic form of the positive 
structure being ethically grounded in the universality of the nega-
tive desire. After detailing the key elements of Machiavelli’s theori-
zation of democratic institutionalization and how it functions so as to 
give an expression to the form of ambitious desire that was detailed 
in  chapter 3 , in the final section of the chapter I will re-examine the 
centrality of the question of the institution negatively through a brief 
account of the democratic deficiencies of the historical episodes 
detailed by Machiavelli in the  Florentine Histories , reiterating why it is 
a mistake to identify this text as Machiavelli’s main democratic 
contribution. 
Human Liberty, and Politics Reformed (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1996), 178; Harvey C. Mansfi eld,  Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 307; Harvey C. Mansfi eld, “Bruni and Machiavelli on Civic Human-
ism,” in  Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Refl ections , ed. James Hankins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 239; J. Patrick Coby,  Machiavelli’s 
Romans: Liberty and Greatness in the Discourses (Lanham: Lexington, 1999), 256; Daniel 
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cal Thought 37, no. 4 (2016): 619–20. It should be noted that it is perhaps the case that 
whereas contemporary Straussian readers tend to cover up Machiavelli’s democratic 
commitments and read him as an aristocratic critic of the people, Strauss himself 
seems to recognize these commitments, they in fact being the source of his distaste for 
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 The Republican Multiplication of Virtuous 
Self-Expression 
 Machiavelli’s participatory demand is given an expression as early as 
 Discourses 1:2. This chapter is often read as evidence that Machiavelli 
appropriated the theory of cyclical historical movement posited by 
Polybius. For Polybius there is “a regular cycle of constitutional revolu-
tions, and the natural order in which constitutions change, are trans-
formed, and return again to their original stage.” 6 Such changes are the 
result of “an undeviating law of nature.” 7 Every unmixed form of gov-
ernment is unstable to the extent that it contains within itself its nega-
tive malignity, which will eventually pervert it into its opposite. It is 
often assumed on the part of readers that Machiavelli’s defence of the 
mixed regime is the means by which he attempts to overcome the insta-
bility of the political realm and stabilize the being of the polity. As 
Lefort points out, however, it is highly doubtful that Machiavelli 
intends to read Polybius literally, as there is no reference to the cyclical 
theory of regimes after the very beginning of the  Discourses , and the 
ideal of the mixed regime is quickly abandoned. 8 Already in the chapter 
dealing with the cyclical theory is Machiavelli undermining the tradi-
tional image of the harmonious mixed regime by emphasizing Rome’s 
affirmation of the disunion between the plebs and the nobles, thus con-
tradicting the classical position that the virtue of the mixed regime lay 
in the establishment of a proportioned unity in which each part through 
performing its social role contributes to the overall concord of the soci-
ety. By the end of the book it has become clear that the very goal of 
social stability has been rejected as a normative end, Machiavelli instead 
theorizing the republic in terms of a political regime that is open to the 
necessity of being continually restructured so as to adapt to the contin-
gent indeterminacy of history. 
 6  Polybius,  The Histories of Polybius , vol. 1, ed. and trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), bk. 6.9. 
 7  Ibid., bk. 6.10. 
 8  Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , 224. Needless to say, however, Lefort is not the only 
commentator to question the literalness of Machiavelli’s engagement with Polybius. 
See also, for example, Salvatore di Maria, “Machiavelli’s Ironic View of History: The 
 Istorie Fiorentine ,”  Renaissance Quarterly 45, no. 2 (1992): 251–2. 
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 The purpose of  Discourses 1:2 is not to articulate a philosophy of his-
tory grounded in a determinate principle of movement, but rather to 
call attention to the necessity of generalizing public participation within 
the republican polity. Machiavelli begins by noting that he will concern 
himself specifically with states that have been free with respect to their 
institution, he not being interested in servile principalities or republics. 
Importantly, the contingency of such institution, the independence of 
political foundation from a fixed logic of creation, is immediately 
affirmed through the recognition of the multiplicity of free states, which 
“have had, like diverse beginnings, diverse laws and orders.” 9 Machia-
velli will recapitulate the traditional taxonomy of regimes, distinguish-
ing between the principality, the aristocracy, and the popular form, 
along with their corrupted opposites. Already Machiavelli will depart 
from Polybius in suggesting that the cycle’s monarchical origin is not a 
natural phenomenon, but rather emerges by chance. In any case, what 
is clear is that the corruption of each political form stimulating the 
movement to the next is identified with a principle of exclusive author-
ity: degeneracy is in each moment grounded in the failure of the regime 
to incorporate all of its citizens into the participatory life of the city. This 
is the case even in the so-called democratic regime, where the people 
themselves take responsibility for the ordering of the polity, but so as to 
deny any authority to those who had previously excluded them: “the 
memory of the prince and of the injuries received from him still being 
fresh, and having unmade the state of the few and not wanting to 
remake that of the prince, [the people] turned to the popular state; and 
they ordered it in a way that neither the powerful few nor a prince 
would have any authority.” 10 In other words, the people cannot order a 
popular republic in a city in which there is an established class of  grandi 
in such a way as they could if there were not. The potential democratic 
form leans upon the realities of the historical matter, placing limits on 
the institutional possibility germinating within the social field. Again, 
the essential point is that all citizens have a place in government so as 
to vent their ambition, including the great in republican contexts in 
which they are an organized social class. This then is the virtue of the 
mixed regime identified with Rome. It is not that the distribution of 
political roles generates a social stability through giving an expression 
to an organically or naturally differentiated set of class elements, but 
 9  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 1.2. 
 10  Ibid. 
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rather that it provides the concrete conditions, in a contingent historical 
environment, for the generalization of political participation. It was 
only after the creation of the tribunes of the plebs that each element in 
the city had a legal place, and even as it oscillated between kingly gov-
ernment and noble government and popular government, “neverthe-
less it never took away, to give authority to the aristocrats, all the 
authority of a kingly quality; nor did it diminish wholly the authority 
of the aristocrats, in order to give it to the people; but remaining mixed, 
it made a perfect republic: and that perfection came through the dis-
union of the plebs and the Senate.” 11 
 I have already suggested that Machiavelli posits an ethical impera-
tive to expand as widely as possible the fields that allow for the 
expression of individual  virtù , an imperative that is grounded in his 
perception of both the universality of human ambition, and the uni-
versality of the capacity of individuals to autonomously externalize 
or vent this ambition through creative self-activity. 12 Such an impera-
tive was affirmed in a partial form already in  The Prince , specifically in 
chapter 21, where Machiavelli maintains that the prince should make 
it a policy to encourage the development of citizens’ creative and criti-
cal capacities in all spheres of human activity: “A prince furthermore 
ought to show himself a lover of virtue, giving recognition to virtuous 
men, and honour the excellent in an art. Alongside this, he ought to 
encourage his citizens to exercise their powers peacefully, in trade 
and in commerce and in every other activity of men.” 13 Even if virtu-
ous self-expression is politically denied in the new principality, there 
nevertheless remain outlets for the expulsion of creative desire, and 
the prince should work to honour those citizens who distinguish 
themselves in their endeavours in these fields: “he ought to prepare 
rewards for whoever wants to do these things.” 14 Indeed, in his very 
 11  Ibid. 
 12  Given that the majority of Machiavelli’s readers insist on conceptually differentiat-
ing between civic and princely  virtù, it is perhaps not surprising that this process of 
generalization is not often recognized. One commentator who does come close to 
using this language, however, is Eugene Garver, who suggestively writes that in the 
 Discourses Machiavelli is attempting to think the possibility of instituting a politi-
cal community in which all citizens have acquired  virtù in a sort of “movement of 
universalization.” Garver,  Machiavelli and the History of Prudence , 124. 
 13  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in  Tutte le opere , chap. 21. 
 14  Ibid. 
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celebration of the capacity for virtuous innovation the prince renders 
himself “an example of humanity.” 15 Nevertheless, despite the 
princely imperative to encourage and reward virtue, it remains true 
that the generalization of the capacity is incapable of being actualized 
in the context of monarchical life. In  The Art of War Machiavelli notes 
that where individuals are under the command of one or a few princes, 
not many citizens of virtue will emerge. It remains true, though, that 
“the world has been more virtuous where there have been more states 
that have favoured virtue, either by necessity or by another human 
passion.” 16 To the extent that the achievement of political virtue is 
closed off to citizens in a principality as a consequence of the lack of 
participatory organs, Machiavelli notes that ultimately the republic is 
the necessary political form for the widespread actualization of  virtù : 
“for from republics come more excellent men than in kingdoms, 
because while in the former virtue is honoured most of the time, in 
kingdoms it is feared; so it arises that in the one virtuous men are 
nourished, in the other they are eliminated.” 17 
 The republic is thus conceptualized by Machiavelli as that form of 
political regime that is capable of multiplying the spaces for virtuous 
self-expression, most notably through the institution of participatory 
modes and orders that open up the potential for the actualization of a 
specifically political form of such self-expression. And indeed, in  Dis-
courses 1:30 Machiavelli maintains that a republic must attempt to gen-
eralize virtue to the greatest degree possible, such as happened in 
Rome: “Because the whole city, both the nobles and the ignobles, was 
participating through war, there emerged in Rome in every age so 
many virtuous men, adorned from manifold victories, that the people 
had no reason to doubt any of them, as they were many, and one 
guarded the other.” 18 Not only was this increasingly large group of 
individuals satisfied with its positive role in the city, to the extent that it 
allowed for an externalization of the desire for virtue, but each particu-
lar one acted as a check against those whose ambition might lead to an 
attempt to privately appropriate authority. Such orders were so well-
instituted “that, coming to the dictatorship, one brought back from it 
 15  Ibid. 
 16  Machiavelli, “Dell’Arte della guerra,” in  Tutte le opere , 332. 
 17  Ibid. 
 18  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.30. 
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greater glory the sooner one laid it down. And so, not being able to 
generate suspicion, such modes did not generate ingratitude.” 19 
 What is more, the association of virtuous self-expression with the 
type of creative innovation that is articulated in  The Prince is detailed in 
the next chapter, where Machiavelli speaks of the need for the city to 
cultivate and nurture a spirit of experimentation. This need is mani-
fested in a particularly notable way in the fact that the Romans were 
more hesitant than most when it came to punishing captains who erred. 
If the error was made not through malice, but honestly through igno-
rance, the captain would not only not be punished, but in fact be 
rewarded. For Machiavelli “this mode of proceeding was well consid-
ered by them: for they judged that it should be so important to those 
who governed their armies that they have a free and expeditious spirit, 
without other extrinsic considerations in taking resolutions, that they 
did not want to add to a thing – in itself difficult and dangerous – new 
difficulties and dangers, thinking that if they added them, nobody 
would ever be able to work virtuously.” 20 The elimination of the fear of 
punishment allows actors to more consistently affirm risk through the 
development of innovative and hence necessarily unproven strategies, 
unsullied by considerations that would limit in advance the range of 
their action. 
 We must not think, however, that the only medium for the expression 
of virtue is that of civic participation in activities associated with war. 
In 3:34, for example, Machiavelli maintains that one of the greatest 
sources of social recognition is to be found in the active doing of virtu-
ous public works. Such a mode of acquiring reputation is contrasted 
with those that depend upon pedigree or association. Although the lat-
ter two speak to the significance of positive socialization, of the fact that 
one may be educated to good modes through exposure to the examples 
of others, such socialization is sufficient only for the production of the 
conditions of good action, but not that action itself. The actual doing of 
the deed is thus a superior criterion when making judgment on virtue, 
and all citizens in the republic should strive to not only demonstrate 
their virtue through such self-activity, but perpetually expand the scope 
of this action. As Machiavelli says, judgment grounded in action, “hav-
ing been begun and founded on the deed and on your work, gives you 
 19  Ibid. 
 20  Ibid., bk. 1.31. 
226 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
so much name at the beginning that afterwards you need to do many 
things contrary to this if you want to annul it. Men born in a republic 
ought, therefore, to take this route, and strive, with some extraordinary 
action, to begin to become notable.” 21 Machiavelli gives as examples of 
such notable things “promulgating a law that was for the common ben-
efit,” “accusing some powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws,” or 
any “similar notable and new things, of which one would have to 
speak.” 22 The expression of virtue is thus explicitly identified with par-
ticipatory political activity that is oriented to the creation of the new, to 
the alteration of the structure of the political form in such a way as to 
benefit public life. Machiavelli is adamant in this chapter, though, that 
it is not sufficient to simply act virtuously in an instant. Rather, the 
political actor must strive to continue to extend the process through 
perpetually renewing creative virtue in expansive action: “Not only are 
such things necessary to give oneself reputation but are likewise neces-
sary to maintain and increase it. And if one wants to do this, one needs 
to renew them.” 23 
 The imperative is further elaborated within the context of a discus-
sion of Spurius Maelius in 3:28, where Machiavelli raises the topic of 
the distribution of reputation, locating the republican degeneration 
into tyranny in the improper deployment of high honours. The ques-
tion is how to order a city so that reputation can be used only for the 
sake of the good of the city, as opposed to the good of the individual 
who has the reputation alone. Machiavelli argues that to achieve such a 
condition – the mutual actualization of individual and collective good 
in the distribution – reputation should be founded on specifically pub-
lic service: “one ought to examine the modes with which they get repu-
tation. There are in effect two: either public or private. The public modes 
are when one individual, counselling well and acting better, for the 
common benefit, acquires reputation.” 24 Private modes of achieving 
reputation, in opposition, are those that look toward the exclusive ben-
efit of the private person. Such benefit can be achieved “by lending 
[others] money, marrying off their daughters, defending them against 
the magistrates, and doing for them similar private favours, which 
 21  Ibid., bk. 3.34. 
 22  Ibid. 
 23  Ibid. 
 24  Ibid., bk. 3.28. 
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make men partisans, and give spirit to whoever is so favoured to be 
able to corrupt the public and break the laws.” 25 If public modes are to 
be privileged over private ones then the city must provide the condi-
tions for a generalization of the capacity to benefit the public, providing 
outlets for citizens to achieve civic distinction. Such a project of exten-
sion constitutes an essential moment in the goal of generalizing virtue, 
the city opening the path to reputation to as many citizens as possible. 
Hence Machiavelli’s celebration of the Roman mode: “for as reward to 
whoever worked well for the public, it ordered triumphs, and all the 
other honours that it gave to its citizens; and as punishment to whoever 
searched under various colours to make themselves great through pri-
vate ways, it ordered accusations.” 26 
 What Machiavelli details is a dialectic between individual and collec-
tive virtue, demonstrating how the generalization of the former pro-
vides the condition for the actualization of the latter. This movement is 
most explicitly articulated in  Discourses 3:31. Here Machiavelli reasserts 
the nature of the virtue of the individual, locating it not in the ability to 
replicate precise patterns of behaviour, nor in the actualization of a con-
crete end, but rather in a certain type of spiritual resolve that proves 
itself in the encounter with the world: “one sees how great men are 
always the same in every fortune; and if it varies, now by exalting them, 
now by oppressing them, they do not vary, but always keep their spirit 
firm, and united with their mode of living, so that one easily knows for 
each that fortune does not have power over them.” 27 Weak individuals, 
on the contrary, are those who mistake their good fortune for their own 
virtue, not recognizing the dialectic – mediated through the occasion – 
that exists between the two terms. 28 After recapitulating this dialectic of 
 fortuna and  virtù , more systematically developed in  The Prince , and the 
differing characters resulting from its recognition or non-recognition, 
 25  Ibid. 
 26  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.28. 
 27  Ibid., bk. 3.31. 
 28  In the  Discourses the dialectical form of the relation between  virtù and  fortuna , medi-
ated through the appearance of the  occassione , is represented in chapter 2:29, where 
Machiavelli again interprets  virtù in terms of the capacity to recognize the spaces of 
action opened up by  fortuna. Indeed, here the relationship between the two terms 
is taken to be so obvious as to not even warrant specifi c examples. Ibid., bk. 2.29. 
Machiavelli does, of course, provide many examples of the dialectic of virtue and 
fortune as manifested in the Roman case. See, for example, ibid., bk. 2.1. 
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Machiavelli goes on to argue that these latter orientations are always 
observable among republics. In Rome, for example, no bad fortune ever 
rendered them abject, nor did any good fortune generate in them inso-
lence, whereas the Venetians, because they interpreted their worldly 
condition to be an exclusive product of their non-existent virtue, did 
become insolent, and as their condition changed over time they were of 
necessity ruined. 29 Stressing the extent to which virtue as opposed to 
insolence is grounded in a concrete knowledge of the historical specific-
ity of existence, and the extent to which this knowledge is acquired 
through being subject to a productive form of socialization, Machiavelli 
writes: “For this becoming insolent in good fortune and abject in bad 
emerges from your mode of proceeding, and from the education in 
which you are nurtured: this, when it is weak and vain, renders you 
similar to itself; when it has been otherwise, it renders you also of 
another fate; and, making you a better knower of the world, it makes 
you rejoice less in the good, and be saddened less in the bad.” 30 
 The virtuous city is thus defined in terms of its production of virtu-
ous citizens, who themselves collectively constitute the essential sub-
stance of the virtuous city. The manifestation of the collective virtue of 
the republic is realized through the generalization of the individual vir-
tue of the citizens that compose it. Although the structure of the action 
of the prince represents the Machiavellian ideal, a city “founded on 
good laws and good orders has no necessity of the virtue of one man, as 
have the others, to maintain it.” 31 This is because in the democratic 
republican city all citizens take responsibility for the maintenance of 
the polity through a collective exercise of their virtue. The specifically 
creative nature of such virtuous self-expression is revealed through 
Machiavelli’s continual emphasis on the necessity of perpetual innova-
tion and reinstitutionalization for the reproduction of the polity through 
time. Under such conditions, not a single individual, but all, are princes. 
This formulation is given its best-known expression in  Discourses 2.2, 
where the generalization of virtue is seen as one element of a more 
expansive generalization of social goods characteristic of republican 
life. Machiavelli here thinks the co-determination of economic, social, 
and political freedom: “all the towns and the provinces that live freely 
 29  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.31. 
 30  Ibid. 
 31  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” in  Tutte le opere , bk. 4.1. 
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in every part, as said above, make very great gains. For there one sees 
more people, because marriages are freer and more desirable to men, 
since each one willingly procreates those children that he believes he 
can nurture, and he does not worry that his patrimony will be taken; 
and he knows not only that they are born free and not slaves, but that 
they can, by means of their virtue, become princes. One sees riches mul-
tiply in greater number, both those that come from cultivation, and 
those that come from the arts.” 32 This possibility, of citizens becoming 
princes through the exercise of their capacity for virtuous self-expression – 
or better, the association of the image of the prince with this capacity – 
is further suggested elsewhere, such as in the  Florentine Histories, where 
Machiavelli speaks of “the whole multitude” of Milan becoming 
“almost as princes of the city.” 33 
 In the chapter that follows  Discourses 2:2 Machiavelli expands on 
what is there suggested: that the enrichment of life in the various 
human spheres is intensified through the demographic multiplication 
of free citizens, which necessarily implies a further deepening of human 
multiplicity. 34 The generalization of virtue must not be read in terms 
of a process of homogenization that reduces individuals to the same 
generic content as simple members of an organic community. On the con-
trary, human plurality is preserved and affirmed through the expres-
sion of the collective virtue of the republic, which is rooted in the 
conflictual expression of the individual virtues of the always multiple 
citizens that constitute this republic. Machiavelli claims that the com-
mon good is capable of being actualized only in republican contexts, 
writing: “And without doubt, this common good is not observed except 
in republics, for all that looks toward its goal is executed; and although 
it may damage this or that private individual, there are so many bene-
fited by that spoken of that they can go forward against the disposition 
of the few suppressed by it.” 35 Machiavelli is here explicit that the actu-
alization of the common good is not a universal actualization of every 
individual good, such a coalescence of individual and general interest 
being possible only in a social environment in which the human will 
has been sufficiently homogenized. Although he will differentiate 
 32  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.2. 
 33  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 6.24. 
 34  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.3. 
 35  Ibid., bk. 2.2. 
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between different forms of articulation of social division – particularly 
those that are accompanied by sects and partisans and those that are 
not – Machiavelli will be adamant that there is no possibility of institut-
ing a republic that is internally unified: “those who hope that a republic 
can be united are very deceived in this hope.” 36 What characterizes 
republican life cannot thus be the imposition of a singular social iden-
tity on all individuals such that their desire tends toward the same end. 
Human multiplicity remains an essential fact of life, this multiplicity 
foreclosing the possibility of a universality of satisfaction. The general-
ization of the capacity for virtuous self-expression does not refer to a 
social situation in which all individuals are capable of equally realizing 
their desire, but one in which all are equally capable of expressing their 
will, that is, articulating the form of their desire. It is facilitated through 
the appearance of social conflicts rooted in the ineradicable fact of 
human multiplicity. 37 This conflict is in fact the ground for the determi-
nation of political trajectories of action, the latter’s democratic formula-
tion being articulated through the perpetual confrontation of particulars 
via dialogue, debate, discussion, and so on, the significance of which 
for Machiavelli I detailed in  chapter 4 . 
 To further illustrate this conjunction of internal conflict and creative 
instituting power we can again return briefly to Machiavelli’s account 
of accusation as a political mode. Machiavelli’s most systematic treat-
ment of the function of accusation to republican life is undertaken in 
 Discourses 1:7. The centrality of this mode is asserted through his con-
tention that “to those who in a city are responsible for guarding its free-
dom, one cannot give a more useful and necessary authority than that 
to be able to accuse citizens to the people, or to some magistrate or 
council, when they sin in anything against the free state.” 38 This central-
ity, however, should not be reduced to the reactive principle that inter-
prets the accusatory activity of the people as simply functioning to 
 36  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 7.1. 
 37  This emphasis on the confl ictual basis of political generation is obscured, for exam-
ple, in the reading of Negri, who despite seeing the democratic city as collectively 
expressing the constituent power of  The Prince , interprets this power in terms of a 
singular will. Negri,  Insurgencies , 74. For a critique of this position see Filippo Del 
Lucchese, “Machiavelli and Constituent Power: The Revolutionary Foundation of 
Modern Political Thought,”  European Journal of Political Theory 16, no. 1 (2017): 3–23. 
On Machiavelli and constituent power see also Vatter,  Between Form and Event , 223. 
 38  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.7. 
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restrict or repel the encroachments of the great. On the contrary, Machi-
avelli identifies two beneficial results of the practice. Interpreters tend 
to focus primarily on the former, the fact that as a result of the potential 
for accusation citizens are dissuaded from attempting to privately 
appropriate power, and even if they do make such an attempt, they are 
capable of being thwarted in their effort. The more significant from the 
standpoint of my reading, however, is the second benefit, the fact that 
in constructing an institutional space for accusation a political field for 
the expulsion of the creative energy of the people is generated. That is, 
there “is given an outlet to vent those humours that grow in cities, in 
some mode, against some citizen; and when these humours do not 
have an outlet for being vented ordinarily, they have recourse to 
extraordinary modes that bring to ruin an entire republic. And there-
fore there is nothing that makes a republic so stable and firm as to order 
it in a mode so that those changing humours that agitate it can be 
vented in a way ordered by the laws.” 39 
 The co-determination of the two benefits is revealed through the 
example of Coriolanus, whose transgressions against the people are 
stimulated by his belief that only the nobles should have the opportu-
nity to politically express their will. In an effort to pacify the plebs Cori-
olanus suggested withholding from the city badly needed grain, 
believing that through this action the nobility “could punish the plebs, 
and take away that authority that had been the prejudice of the nobil-
ity.” 40 The subsequent tribunal movement against Coriolanus had the 
effect not only of resisting his indiscretion, but also of expressing in an 
institutional form that popular desire for participation that motivated 
the indiscretion in the first place. The extent of accusation as a mode for 
the expression of popular energy, furthermore, exceeds the persecution 
of insolent nobles who voice that will to domination that characterizes 
their social class. In 1:50 Machiavelli maintains that the object of accu-
satorial activity may be individuals belonging to either the  grandi or the 
people: “one has to note, first, the benefit of the tribunate, which was 
not only useful to restrain the ambition that the powerful used against 
the plebs, but also that which they used among themselves.” 41 What 
this suggests is that the institution is capable of being productively 
 39  Ibid. 
 40  Ibid. 
 41  Ibid., bk. 1.50. 
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deployed in democratic contexts marked by social equality as a general 
mechanism for the agonistic expulsion of ambitious energy. It is one of 
the orders that can be established to productively manage social con-
flict between individual elements within the city, providing institu-
tional space for the venting of human ambition. There is of course 
nothing necessary or permanent about the structure of such orders. As 
will be further elaborated on below, the impossibility of instituting a 
fixed constitutional configuration capable of indefinitely regulating 
social life is a consequence of the perpetual fact of human difference, 
the multiplicity of ideal forms of being, doing, and thinking ultimately 
foreclosing the establishment of a firm consensus over the normative 
ends to be affirmed by the political community. Although the republic 
can institutionalize conflict through, for example, modes of accusation 
that allow desires to express themselves relative to one other, the dyna-
mism of desire precludes the possibility of a permanently stable nego-
tiation or mediation between particulars. 42 
 The Mechanics of Popular Rule 
 The orientation of accusatory activity toward the venting of energy 
reveals the extent to which it transcends the merely instrumental and 
reactive persecution of those that might attempt to deny the people 
their security or negative liberty. On the contrary, accusation is one of 
the means facilitating the expulsion of an always surplus plebeian 
desire. Given that human ambition is primarily directed toward value 
creation, it should not be surprising that Machiavelli considers as the 
most politically appropriate media for such expression explicitly legis-
lative modes and orders. 43 Machiavelli affirms the creative legislative 
 42  In this sense, in the words of Neal Wood, “politics is a kind of dialectical process 
characterized by a clash of opposites, their temporary reconciliation in a rather 
tenuous social balance, and then the need to readjust the equilibrium because of new 
causes of confl ict.” Neal Wood, “The Value of Asocial Sociability: Contributions of 
Machiavelli, Sidney, and Montesquieu,”  Bucknell Review 16, no. 3 (1966): 8. 
 43  It is not the case, as suggested by Hélène Landemore for example, that Machiavelli’s 
defence of popular judgment is purely negative, limited to the ability to mediate 
between pre-formulated policy options: “This ability to make good judgments is, in 
Machiavelli’s account, passive and reactive. The people do not initiate a view; they 
simply respond to those voiced in the public forum.” Hélène Landemore,  Democratic 
Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 66. 
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capacity of the people, for example, in 1:18. He notes that, so long as a 
city is healthy – such health being largely associated with the continu-
ing inculcation of civic-mindedness among the citizen body – the peo-
ple’s active participation in the formulation of and deliberation over 
the law is a good to be affirmed: “A tribune or any other citizen could 
propose a law to the people, on which every citizen could speak, either 
in favour or against, before it was decided. This order was good when 
the citizens were good, because it was always good that everyone who 
intends a benefit for the public can propose it; and it is good that every-
one can speak their opinion on it, so that the people, having heard 
everyone, could then choose the best.” 44 
 Machiavelli’s language of the selection of “the best” here should not 
however lead us to question his commitment to political equality. 
Although clearly recognizing the impossibility of the institution of a 
political system that is capable of guaranteeing a literal universality of 
participation at all moments, in 3:19 Machiavelli provides a gesture 
toward the problem of the democratic distribution of functions in large 
and complex societies. The topic is approached through the question 
of whether one should tend toward cruelty or humaneness when com-
manding or ruling. Ultimately the tendency to be affirmed, which is 
not at all to say the universal technique, is dependent upon the histori-
cal situation, specifically on the establishment or non-establishment of 
equality as a social condition of human life. Punishment and severity 
as educative modes are potentially appropriate apparently only when 
one is engaging with those with whom one does not share an equal 
status, such as pre-political or corrupt populations. Such, however, did 
not define republican Rome, Machiavelli here positing a strong partici-
patory equality between the people and the nobles: “I say, you have to 
rule men that are ordinarily partners with you, or men that are always 
subjects. When they are partners, one cannot fully use punishment, 
nor that severity on which Cornelius reasons; and because the Roman 
plebs had in Rome  equal rule with the nobility, one who became a 
prince  for a time , could not manage with cruelty and coarseness.” 45 
Implicit in this quotation is a recognition of democratic life as embody-
ing a principle of ruling and being ruled in turn, individuals temporar-
ily occupying particular offices for determinate periods, and in this 
 44  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.18. 
 45  Ibid., bk. 3.19. Emphases added. 
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capacity achieving the status of prince, that is to say, of a virtuous and 
creative actor. 46 
 The defence of an ideal of ruling and being ruled in turn as a mecha-
nism for the generalization of legislative power is perhaps most clearly 
discernible in Machiavelli’s advocacy of lottery as a political mode for 
filling office. 47 Such an advocacy represents “the closest possible insti-
tutional realization of the demos’s desire to rule themselves; more spe-
cifically, its desire to be ruled intermittently by random citizens who 
wished to serve politically but were not sufficiently rich or renowned to 
gain office through elections.” 48 In the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs,” 
as we have seen, Machiavelli proposes a lottery-selected office of mag-
istrates that productively integrates common citizens into the constitu-
tional order, which is otherwise grounded in election and appointment. 
This office has the double function of not only checking the insolence 
and ambition of the great, but also of generalizing participation through 
providing a space within which the people can express their desire and 
further their political education. In the  Florentine Histories , meanwhile, 
 46  For Mary Dietz the principle of ruling and being ruled in turn is not only actualized 
in the context of free republican life. It can also be seen to operate in a different form 
in princely contexts, Machiavelli in fact refusing the categorical distinction between 
ruling and ruled, seeing the identifi cation with one or the other term as a merely 
temporary product of political struggle between active participants. Mary G. Dietz, 
 Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2002), 150–1. 
 47  For a brief account of Machiavelli’s proposal for remodelling the government of 
Florence in the context of the wider potential for the institution of lottery as a mode 
for fi lling political offi ces, see Oliver Dowlen,  The Political Potential of Sortition: A 
Study on the Random Selection of Citizens for Public Offi ce (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2008), 117–20. 
 48  McCormick, “Defending the People from the Professors.” Despite his emphasis 
on the capacity of the people to articulate their political demands independent of 
representative expression, McCormick sometimes seems to nevertheless neutralize 
the concept of self-rule through reading the popular desire not to be ruled partly 
in terms of a desire to be ruled well: “Machiavelli clearly distinguishes between 
oppression, on the one hand, which the people rightfully resist, and government or 
command, on the other, which they tolerate and even welcome, when performed 
well.” John P. McCormick, “Subdue the Senate: Machiavelli’s ‘Way of Freedom’ or 
Path to Tyranny,”  Political Theory 40, no. 6 (2012): 722. This being ruled well seems 
to be a moment independent of ruling themselves, and is perhaps an expression of 
McCormick’s belief that any democratic regime will need to accommodate elites in 
some signifi cant way (as opposed to eliminating any distinction between the com-
mon and the elite via an equalization of social and political conditions). Ibid. 
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Machiavelli identifies the concrete actualization of participatory free-
dom with the institution of lottery as a mode for creating magistrates. 
He notes in particular how the people themselves perceive that such a 
mode is most appropriate for a free city in which all are able to poten-
tially share in government through joint deliberation and decision 
making: “The city thus having returned to creating magistrates by lot, 
it appeared to the generality of citizens that they had recovered their 
liberty, and that the magistrates were judging, not according to the will 
of the powerful, but according to their own judgment.” 49 This and other 
similar reforms, in particular the reinstitution of the  catasto , “where the 
taxes were assessed not by men, but by the laws,” horrified the great, 
who recognized they had “become equal to those whom they were long 
accustomed to see as inferior.” 50 
 Although Machiavelli shows a preference for distributing political 
offices through the democratic mode of sortition, he also clearly advo-
cates election in those instances in which the demands of the position 
require a particular knowledge or ability that it would not be reason-
able to expect all citizens to possess immediately. 51 Nevertheless, if the 
differentiation of political tasks necessitates that decisions be made by 
select persons or groups who hold office, there need to be institutional 
guards in place in order to ensure that such decisions map onto public 
will. 52 In the context of a discussion of the consuls Quintius Cincinnatus 
and Gnaeus Julius Mentus, who as a consequence of internal disagree-
ments ground the republic to a halt through their inaction, Machiavelli 
writes: “For example, if you give an authority to a council to make a 
distribution of honours and uses, or to a magistrate to administer a 
matter, one must either impose a necessity so that he has to do it in any 
mode, or, if he does not want to, order that another can and ought to do 
it; otherwise, this order would be defective and dangerous, as would 
 49  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 7.2. 
 50  Ibid. 
 51  On the fact that certain positions or offi ces do require a specialized technical skill or 
knowledge, and that this justifi es the autonomy of the offi ce holders from those who 
are lacking in this capacity, see, for example, Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima 
Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.33. 
 52  Again, however, such will cannot be interpreted as unifi ed and homogeneous. 
Indeed, Arlene Saxonhouse notes how the strong emphasis on voting as a key ele-
ment of democratic practice tends to mask or cover up the confl ictual core of politics. 
Saxonhouse, “Do We Need the Vote?,” 176. 
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have been seen in Rome, if to the obstinacy of those councils could not 
be opposed the authority of the tribunes.” 53 Indeed, in  Discourses 1:35 
Machiavelli makes a sustained effort to highlight the fact that the distri-
bution of authority through the deployment of “free and public votes” 
may generate harmful consequences within the republic if not used 
carefully, and that its use is thus appropriate only if certain limiting 
conditions attach. 
 The extent to which the form of election – to the degree that through 
its internal principle of distinction it operates to construct a necessary 
political inequality – may be harnessed for non-democratic ends is 
revealed through the example of the Roman Decemvirate. The Decem-
virate acquired authority via “free and public votes,” but was ulti-
mately able to transgress the limits of this authority through leveraging 
its newly exalted political position toward the further acquisition and 
consolidation of power. To guard against such potential the utilization 
of election should be subject to certain limits. Specifically, “one ought to 
consider the modes of giving authority and the time for which it is 
given.” 54 With respect to the latter, “if free authority is given for a long 
time, calling a long time one year or more, it will always be dangerous, 
and will make the effects either good or bad, in accordance with 
whether those to whom it was given are bad or good.” 55 Indeed, in 3:24 
the prolongation of commands is identified as one of the two primary 
causes of the dissolution of the Roman republic, Machiavelli noting 
that wise citizens recognized the corrupting nature of such prolonga-
tion. For example, after the plebs prolonged the command of the tri-
bunes, thinking they were especially well suited to checking the 
ambition of the  grandi , the Senate offered to prolong Lucius Quintius’s 
consulate in response. However, he “altogether refused this decision, 
saying that he wanted to try and eliminate bad examples, not to increase 
them with another worse example; and he wanted new consuls made.” 56 
As commands in Rome were increasingly prolonged, the starting point 
given being Publius Philo’s ascension to the rank of the first proconsul, 
there resulted both a degeneralization of participation – fewer and 
fewer individuals having the opportunity to actively participate in the 
 53  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.50. 
 54  Ibid., bk. 1.35. 
 55  Ibid. 
 56  Ibid., bk. 3.24. 
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life of the city – as well as an increase in private authority. As Machia-
velli writes: “This thing produced two inconveniences: one, that a lesser 
number of men exercised rule, and through this they came to restrict 
reputation to a few; the other, that when a citizen remained for a long 
time commander of an army, he would win it to himself and make it 
partisan to him, for that army in time forgot the Senate and recognized 
him as head.” 57 
 With respect to the former limit, there must be concrete restrictions 
regarding the parameters and quality of the authority acquired through 
election. In 1:35 this principle is expressed through Machiavelli’s obser-
vance of the inability of the dictator to encroach upon the prerogative of 
the tribunes, consuls, and Senate. In this way “the Senate, the consuls, 
the tribunes, remaining with their authority, came to be like his guard, 
making him not exit from the right way.” 58 Precisely the opposite 
occurred after the election of the Ten, however, the latter acting to abol-
ish the consuls and tribunes, political corruption necessarily resulting 
as a consequence: “So, finding themselves alone, without consuls, with-
out tribunes, without appeal to the people, and because of this not com-
ing to have anyone observe them, they could, in the second year, 
motivated by the ambition of Appius, become insolent.” 59 Machiavelli 
concludes by noting that to say that positions given by free votes is 
never hurtful to a republic is to assume such votes are given under the 
proper conditions, that is, that the offices subject to election are limited 
in duration and have a definitive scope of authority. Authority must be 
given “in the proper circumstances and for the proper times.” 60 What 
authority must never be is absolute, “for an absolute authority very 
quickly corrupts the matter, and makes itself friends and partisans.” 61 
As Machiavelli notes in 1:49, “And although many times, through pub-
lic and free votes, for the power to reform it, extensive authority will be 
given to a few citizens, they have not thereafter ever ordered it for the 
common benefit, but always to the goal of their party; this has made, 
not order, but greater disorder in that city.” 62 
 57  Ibid. 
 58  Ibid., bk. 1.35. 
 59  Ibid. 
 60  Ibid. 
 61  Ibid. 
 62  Ibid., bk. 1.49. 
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 It is significant that the chapter immediately following his critical 
investigation into the nature of election as a mode for filling certain 
offices in 1:35 is one in which Machiavelli defends rotation, a much 
more essentially democratic mode, as a scheme of political distribution. 
There is again something of a principle of ruling and being ruled in turn 
implicit in Machiavelli’s observation that “although the Romans were 
great lovers of glory, nevertheless they did not esteem it a dishonour-
able thing to obey now someone whom they had commanded another 
time, and to find themselves serving in the army of which they had 
been princes. This custom is contrary to the opinion, orders, and modes 
of citizens of our times.” 63 Citizens should not be ashamed to follow a 
high rank with occupation of a lower one, and indeed, Machiavelli will 
partially locate the health of the city precisely in citizens’ willingness to 
voluntary accept such a movement: “For a republic ought to have more 
hope in, and rely more on, a citizen that descends from a high office to 
govern a lesser one, than one who rises from a lesser one to govern a 
higher one. For one cannot reasonably believe in the latter, unless one 
sees around him men of so much reverence or so much virtue that the 
novelty of him can be, through their counsel and authority, moder-
ated.” 64 And notably, with respect to the latter part of the quoted pas-
sage, it is not any lack of intrinsic ability that should generate scepticism 
with respect to the movement from lower to higher rank, but simply 
unfamiliarity with the political role, an unfamiliarity that is easily cor-
rected through political collaboration. In any case, rotation – like lottery – 
concretely affirms equality through the presumption of an equivalent 
ability of many or more than a few to carry out political tasks, the will-
ingness of citizens to oscillate between positions of higher and lower 
rank functioning as a sign of the popular recognition and affirmation of 
this equality. 
 In sum, as a general principle Machiavelli maintains that those deter-
minations having to do with the maintenance of the republic should lay 
in the hands of all whenever possible. Machiavelli affirms a principle of 
isonomy, political equality being irreducible to an equal status before 
the law, but including as well an equal ability to participate in the active 
formulation of the law through concrete participation in legislative 
 63  Ibid., bk. 1.36. 
 64  Ibid. 
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activities. 65 Machiavelli’s preference for the distributive modes of sorti-
tion and rotation over election – the former being two means for the 
realization of the goal of generalizing participation – is one of the most 
prominent manifestations of his rejection of aristocracy in the name of 
democracy and isonomy. 66 Election, as is often noted, is an aristocratic 
mode to the degree that it is grounded in the recognition of a “principle 
of distinction,” the fact that the elected are in some sense dissimilar and 
unique from the body of electors. 67 What Machiavelli recognizes is that 
elected office holders constitute, in short, a few, and are thus predis-
posed to act in the interests of those other few of perceived distinction. 
 The Form of Political Decision 
 In the  Discourses Machiavelli attempts to think the possibility of a gen-
eralization of individual  virtù , such a generalization producing a new 
collective  virtù whose subject is the city as a whole, and whose 
 65  Readers who fail to recognize the isonomic form of Machiavelli’s democratic 
thought, focusing only on a principle of negative liberty or equal status before the 
law, tend to reduce him to a proto-liberal thinker who merely anticipates modern 
representative forms of government. For different manifestations of this tendency 
see, for example, Julia Conaway Bondanella, “ The Discourses on Livy : Preserving a 
Free Way of Life,” in  Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli , 
ed. Patricia Vilches and Gerald Seaman (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 82; Kocis,  Machiavelli 
Redeemed , 17; Clifford Orwin, “Machiavelli’s Unchristian Charity,”  American Politi-
cal Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978): 1227; Philippe Van Parijs,  Just Democracy: The 
Rawls-Machiavelli Programme (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011); Dragica Vujadinovic, 
“Machiavelli’s Republican Political Theory,”  Philosophy and Social Criticism 40, no. 1 
(2014): 60. Garver, “After  Virtù : Rhetoric, Prudence, and Moral Pluralism in Machia-
velli,” 195–6; Edward Burns, “The Liberalism of Machiavelli,”  Antioch Review 8, no. 3 
(1948): 321–30. 
 66  The isonomic character of Machiavellian equality has been noted by Miguel Vatter: 
“Republican freedom means that the citizens can become princes, that freedom is 
not only negative liberty (i.e. the knowledge that one is born free and not a slave) 
but also isonomy, understood as the equal freedom to make and unmake laws, and 
not simply as the equality of everyone before these laws.” Vatter,  Between Form and 
Event , 293. 
 67  The term “principle of distinction” is drawn from the work of Bernard Manin, who 
notes that “representative government was instituted in full awareness that elected 
representatives would and should be distinguished citizens, socially different from 
those who elected them. We shall call this the ‘principle of distinction.’” Bernard 
Manin,  The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1997), 94. 
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trajectory of decision making is stimulated by the conflictual interac-
tion of the multiplicity of social fragments within the republic. As we 
recall from  chapter 3 , Machiavellian creation is highly specified, and is 
thus significant that the features of princely self-activity that are pre-
sented in  The Prince reappear in a new context in the  Discourses , the 
dynamics of creative determination re-emerging in a specifically repub-
lican context. This, for example, can be seen in the extent to which polit-
ical creation is mediated by worldly indeterminacy, the latter in fact 
providing the objective conditions for the expulsion of ambitious desire. 
Such a mediation is most clearly revealed in Machiavelli’s account of 
the function of the dictator. 
 Machiavelli’s defence of the institution of the dictator is meant to 
reveal the human potential to negotiate and manage – if not master – 
worldly contingency, it being one of the Roman remedies to the imme-
diate and indeterminate dangers that often accompany those accidents 
produced as a consequence of the non-identity of objects. The institu-
tion involves “giving power to one man, who could decide without any 
consultation, and could execute his decisions without any appeal.” 68 
Machiavelli argues that it is not true, as claimed by some, that the estab-
lishment of tyranny in Rome can be traced to the creation of the order 
of the dictator, but rather the name of the order was conceptually 
appropriated by those who attempted to usurp public authority. 69 
Machiavelli calls attention to the distance between concept and object, 
and the consequent potential for the continual reconstruction of the 
form of the idea, when he writes that “if in Rome the dictatorial name 
 68  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.33. Despite Machia-
velli’s language here, Marco Geuna suggests that the dictator in fact need not be 
one person, but that the institution could be a council composed of several or more 
people, the important issue being simply the possession of a prerogative to act and 
decide swiftly in the face of the extraordinary situation. Marco Geuna, “Machiavelli 
and the Problem of Dictatorship,”  Ratio Juris 28, no. 2 (2015): 234–5; Marco Geuna, 
“Extraordinary Accidents in the Life of Republics,” in  Machiavelli on Liberty and 
Confl ict , ed. David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila Vergara (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2017), 293. 
 69  Hence Carl Schmitt writes that for Machiavelli “the dictator was not a tyrant and 
dictatorship was not a form of absolute government but rather an instrument to 
guarantee freedom, which was in the spirit of the Republican constitution.” Carl 
Schmitt,  Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Pro-
letarian Class Struggle , trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity, 
2014), 4. 
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had been lacking, they would have taken another; for it is forces that 
easily acquire names, not names forces.” 70 In reality, however, never did 
the dictator do harm to the city so long as it remained subject to public 
control: “it is seen that the dictator, while he was instituted according to 
public orders, and not by his own authority, always did good to the city. 
For the magistrates that are made and the authorities that are given 
through public ways, not those that come through ordinary ways, harm 
republics: such one sees follow in Rome, where through a long period 
of time no dictator did anything if not good to the republic.” 71 
 There were several reasons why this was the case. First, if a citizen 
desired to seize power extraordinarily and for his own benefit he must 
be in possession of “qualities that in a republic that is not corrupt he can 
never have.” 72 Specifically, he will not have the required wealth nor the 
willing partisans that such wealth can buy, the conditions for the acqui-
sition of such being lacking in a well-ordered state. What is implied 
here is the power of socialization to shape human desire, a socialization 
that, when combined with the establishment of a general economic 
equality – itself implied through the claim regarding the non-sufficiency 
of financial resources – seems to point again toward the elimination of 
the apparently originary division between the great and the people. 
That is, the existence of a desire to oppress as an organized social 
humour is not a feature of a well-ordered republic that has achieved a 
general equality. Second, the appointment to the office was temporary 
in nature, not intended to extend beyond the actuality of the emergency. 
And third, there were determinable limits on the legitimate range of 
dictatorial activity, Machiavelli arguing that the legislative capacity to 
reinstitute the social was constitutionally precluded. Specifically, “his 
authority extended to the power to decide for himself about the reme-
dies for that urgent danger, and to do everything without consultation, 
and punish everyone without appeal; but he could not do things that 
might diminish the state, as would have been done through taking 
away the authority of the Senate or of the people, unmaking the old 
orders of the city, and making new ones.” 73 When all of these facts are 
 70  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.34. 
 71  Ibid. 
 72  Ibid. 
 73  Ibid. As Filippo Del Lucchese points out, however, this should not lead us to obscure 
the constitutive dimension of dictatorial power. Situating Machiavelli’s theorization 
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combined, “it was impossible that he transcend its limits, and harm the 
city; and through experience ones sees that he always worked to benefit 
it.” 74 In the final instance Machiavelli concludes that the dictator was 
one of the most useful of Roman orders, allowing the city to respond to 
the emergence of accidents which it might otherwise have been too 
slow to, for as is reaffirmed again in this chapter, time drives all things 
forward. When such orders are lacking, where there is no publicly sanc-
tioned mode for engaging with the emergency situation, cities must 
resort to extraordinary modes, which are of their essence always 
dangerous. 75 
 Most readers of Machiavelli recognize that the dictator represents a 
statement regarding the necessity of exceptional action, a concrete 
attempt to institutionalize such action through legal means, or rather, 
the attempt to legalize extra-legality. Hence Nomi Claire Lazar, for 
example, writes that “the constitution itself allows for its own suspen-
sion, for the suspension of quotidian norms in exceptional cases.” 76 For 
Lazar as for others, though, the dictator is also a representation of 
Machiavelli’s bifurcated ethics: it or the political founder can act in a 
way that the people cannot. The exercise of the exception must be by 
one who is necessarily exceptional: “The state must be continually 
maintained by one who is beyond the reach of everyday norms. The 
exceptional figure, but only the exceptional figure, acts according to 
existential ethics because his aim is the moral aim of establishing or 
preserving the worthy state.” 77 But is this true? Can we instead use the 
of the dictator within a discussion of the antinomies of constituent power, Del Luc-
chese writes that “dictatorship is precisely the tool – legal and constitutional – with 
which the republic recognizes its own incapacity to face the extraordinary with 
ordinary means.” Del Lucchese, “Machiavelli and Constituent Power,” 7. What is 
signifi cant for Del Lucchese, and what is not recognized by commentators such as 
Carl Schmitt, is that Machiavelli’s dictator reveals to us the fact that constituent 
power, here represented in the dictator’s ability to creatively respond to the extraor-
dinary situation irresolvable via existing norms, cannot be thought of as completely 
external to the already instituted social order: “Instead, constituent power lives in 
the institutional politics of the republic. Far from acrtically justifying the institutional 
moment, though, constituent power continuously transforms the actual institutional 
confi guration.” Ibid., 8. 
 74  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.34. 
 75  Ibid. 
 76  Lazar, “Must Exceptionalism Prove the Rule?,” 256. 
 77  Ibid., 253. 
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dictator as an example of a self-interrogating political order, one that 
exists alongside others which might be potentially generalizable? Can 
the people themselves be seen as possessing the legal means to alter 
constitutional arrangements, reform legal orders, reinstitute the politi-
cal sphere, and so on? Although the dictator is a useful example that 
reveals to us the fact of worldly indetermination and the necessity of 
virtuous adaptation to it, it certainly does not exhaust the modes of 
such adaptation. 78 The variability of the world is necessarily countered 
by a variable politics that affirms multiple forms of acting and 
reacting. 
 Before exploring the mechanics of popular reinstitutionalization, 
however, two further features of political determination as outlined in 
the  Discourses – features that refer us back to Machiavelli’s ontology of 
creation as developed in  The Prince – should be mentioned. First, if the 
dictator represents an institutional example of the political imperative 
for action or decision in the face of worldly contingency, in the  Dis-
courses Machiavelli also stresses the extent to which the actualization of 
such a capacity for resolution must exceed mere voluntarism. That the 
efficacy of the decision requires transcending the immediacy of action 
is revealed in Machiavelli’s long chapter on conspiracy, where poten-
tially successful reordering is explicitly said to depend on the actor hav-
ing the time for reflection and deliberation. The conspirator as actor 
generally lacks this time, and hence Machiavelli maintains that as a 
general rule he or she should not attempt to vary the stratagem: “I say, 
therefore, that there is not anything that makes so much disturbance or 
hindrance to all the actions of men, than in an instant, without having 
time, having to vary an order and distort it from that which had been 
ordered before.” 79 Machiavelli is not rejecting here innovation itself, 
however, stringently affirming the necessity of obedience to the pre-
formulated and fixed rule, for “this happens when one does not have 
the time to reorder; because, when one has the time, man can govern in 
his own mode.” 80 The danger lay in the formulation of hasty 
 78  Such a possibility seems to be gestured toward by John McCormick, the dicta-
tor being seen as potentially just one order among others that is deployed so as to 
engage the political exception. John P. McCormick, “Addressing the Political Excep-
tion: Machiavelli’s ‘Accidents’ and the Mixed Regime,”  American Political Science 
Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 888–900. 
 79  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.6. 
 80  Ibid. 
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determinations independently of deliberation, a danger reasserted in 
3:44: “when one prince desires to obtain a thing from another, he ought, 
if the occasion allows, not give him space to deliberate, and make it so 
that he sees the necessity of a quick decision; this is when he who is 
asked sees that from refusing or from deferring emerges a sudden and 
dangerous indignation.” 81 Indeed, the superiority of reflective to imme-
diate decision is revealed in Machiavelli’s own political engagements. 
Hence, for example, his frustration at his masters in Florence demand-
ing that he produce knowledge of the intentions of Cesare Borgia, with-
out having first had the opportunity to deliberate on the various 
particularities of the case, and their interrelation and meaning: “one 
who does not want to write fancies and dreams has to verify things, 
and in verifying them time passes.” 82 
 The key chapter on this topic of embedded determination, however, 
on the necessity of grounding decision in rational consideration of the 
particularity of the historical situation, is  Discourses 2:15. The fact that 
one’s action needs to be delimited by the realities of the concrete case is 
articulated at the very beginning of the chapter, Machiavelli noting that 
“in every consultation it is good to come to the particular of that which 
has to be deliberated on, and not remain always in ambiguity or uncer-
tainty of the thing.” 83 This understanding, though, is politically useless 
if it remains merely contemplative, the objects of rational consideration 
expressed through speech not being externalized via outward action in 
the world. As Piero de’ Medici says to one of his conspirators in the 
 Florentine Histories , who attempt to cover up the malignancy of their 
action through using a language of freedom dissociated from any sub-
stantive reality: “one ought to esteem deeds more than words.” 84 The 
very rectification of the concept is made difficult if it is not formulated 
in light of the necessity of the situation. This dialectic, the construction 
of a relational order between concept and act, is given an expression in 
the statement of the Latin praetor Annius in a council with the Romans: 
 81  Ibid., bk. 3.44. 
 82  Machiavelli, “Legazione alla duca Valentino in Romagna,” in  Tutte le opere , sec. 
42. On the extent to which Machiavelli’s diplomatic activity both informs and is 
informed by his political philosophy see Greg Russell, “Machiavelli’s Science of 
Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder,”  Diplomacy and Statecraft 16, no. 2 
(2005): 227–50. 
 83  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.15. 
 84  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 7.18. 
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“‘I judge it to belong to the highest of our affairs for you to consider 
more what one ought to do than what is to be said. Once the counsels 
are made clear, it will be easy to accommodate words to things.’ These 
words are, without doubt, very true, and ought to be savoured by every 
prince and by every republic.” 85 
 Although it is very easy to formulate the word when one has an 
understanding of the concrete political project one wants to undertake, 
the consistency of the word is degraded where the latter condition is 
lacking. One’s understanding is structured by one’s recognition of the 
specificity of the historical context, knowledge of the goals to which 
words are to be put: “for, in ambiguity and incertitude about what to 
do, they cannot accommodate words; but, once their spirit is firm, and 
what to be executed is decided, it is an easy thing to find the words.” 86 
What is essential, then, is the political moment, the actualization of the 
word through the making of a decision. The failure to act not only neu-
tralizes political potential but degrades understanding through the 
production of ambiguity. Hence Machiavelli’s example drawn from an 
event after the death of the tyrant Hieronymus, the Syracusans having 
to decide between supporting the Romans or Carthaginians in their 
war against one another: “And such was the ardour of the parties that 
the thing remained ambiguous, nor was any resolution taken until 
Apollonides, one of the highest in Syracuse, with an oration full of pru-
dence, showed how those were not to blame who held the opinion that 
they should adhere to the Romans, nor those who wanted to follow the 
Carthaginian party; but it was good to detest that ambiguity and indo-
lence in making a resolution, for he saw the whole ruin of the republic 
in such ambiguity; but if the resolution was taken, whatever it might 
be, one could hope for some good.” 87 Again, Machiavelli is not celebrat-
ing decision for the sake of decision. On the contrary, there was a long 
process of discussion between the deliberative participants over the 
preferred mode. Such deliberation, though, is impossible of being pro-
ductive of universal consensus. To the extent that the deliberative pro-
cess is incapable of producing such an outcome – that is, to the extent 
that there will always be ineradicable differences grounded in human 
 85  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.15. Latin translation 
taken from Machiavelli,  Discourses on Livy , bk. 2.15.1. 
 86  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 2.15. 
 87  Ibid. 
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multiplicity – there always exists the need to will a decision. What is 
crucial is that the deliberation leading up to this decision be grounded 
in relevant factual content, both word and act being mutually impli-
cated in the procedural mode. 
 In 2:23, where Machiavelli returns to the question of the decision, he 
maintains that there is a primary ethical substance that should guide 
the deliberation that precedes it. Once again the actor is cautioned to 
avoid the middle way. The initial context is Camillus’s speech to the 
Senate regarding the fate of Latium, it being ultimately maintained that 
“subjects ought to be either benefited or eliminated.” 88 The prudent 
actor must not temporize, but exercise virtue through the affirmation of 
the will to make a decision. The goal in this instance, the object to which 
the decision looks, is identified as security, which is here seen as being 
potentially actualized only through one of the two modes mentioned. 
Machiavelli immediately goes on, however, to proclaim that these 
modes are not equivalent in the sense of being of the same neutral 
moral value. On the contrary, as we have suggested, there is an essen-
tial ethical imperative to generalize human equality and virtue, and 
when this imperative is applied to the deliberation, Machiavelli clearly 
comes down on the side of assimilation rather than elimination. The 
ethical and instrumental elements of decision making are unified 
toward the end of the chapter, the former not being subordinate to, but 
rather structuring, the latter. This is revealed through Machiavelli’s 
account of the Roman Senate’s consideration of the action to take 
against the Privernates, who were recently defeated and subordinated 
to Roman authority. Several citizens of Privernum appealed before the 
Senate, during which one senator asked a representative of the city to 
articulate the punishment that he thought they deserved. Machiavelli 
writes: “To this the Privernate responded, ‘That which they deserve 
who consider themselves worthy of freedom.’ To this the consul replied, 
‘If we remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have 
with you?’ To which he responded, ‘If you give a good one, both faith-
ful and perpetual; if a bad one, not long-lasting.’” 89 Recognizing and 
respecting the desire and will for freedom, the Privernates were granted 
citizenship, the Senate stating, “The voice of a free man had been heard, 
nor could it be believed that any people or indeed any man should 
 88  Ibid., bk. 2.23. 
 89  Machiavelli,  Discourses on Livy , bk. 2.23.4. 
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remain in a condition that was painful longer than necessary. Peace is 
faithful where men are willingly pacified, nor could faith be hoped for 
in that place where they wished for freedom … Only those who think 
of nothing but freedom are worthy to become Romans.” 90 Eventually in 
the chapter, then, the strategic advice to avoid the middle way gives 
way to ethical advice guided by a universal human imperative: to 
respect the will to freedom through initiating processes of incorpora-
tive institutionalization. 
 The political lesson – that the virtuous actor must possess the will to 
make an informed decision in light of the particularities of  fortuna – 
morphs into a democratic affirmation of the capacity for a people to live 
in freedom. This same logic can be seen to be at play with respect to our 
second consideration of the form of virtuous action. In  Discourses 3:9 
Machiavelli returns to a theme that he acknowledges he has “consid-
ered many times,” that it is to say, “how the cause of the bad and good 
fortune of men is the matching of [the actor’s] mode of proceeding with 
the times; for one sees in their works that some men proceed with 
impetuosity, some with care and with caution. And because in either of 
these modes they exceed appropriate limits, they cannot observe the 
true way, erring in both the one and the other. But one comes to err less, 
and to have prosperous fortune, if one matches, as I said, one’s mode 
with the times, always proceeding as nature forces you.” 91 We have 
already noted that Machiavelli associates  virtù with the human capac-
ity to deliberate on the shifting conditions of the being of the world, 
launching action in accord with one’s knowledge of the form of the 
occasion. Hence Machiavelli’s emphasis on the virtuous actor’s oscilla-
tion between different personas or modes of proceeding. In this chap-
ter, however, Machiavelli moves from the particular to the general, 
examining the issue of the correspondence of mode and world not from 
the standpoint of the singular actor, or even the political body where 
legislative authority is concentrated in the singular actor, but from the 
standpoint of the free collectivity, where action is grounded in the inter-
play of the diversity of desires within the city. 
 Once again it is affirmed that the existence of “diverse citizens and 
diverse humours” is an essential feature of republican life. 92 To the 
 90  Ibid. 
 91  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.9. 
 92  Ibid. 
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extent that the object of the analysis is the republican collectivity as 
political actor, interrogated in light of its capacity to adjust its mode to 
the times, the determination of political action must be grounded in this 
diversity. Determinations are not representative of an exteriorization of 
a homogeneous popular will that is simultaneously expressed in the 
particular will of each citizen. Rather, determinations are the result of 
conflictual political interaction between necessarily distinct and poten-
tially opposed wills. It is precisely the diversity of republican will that 
renders the republic more adequate to respond to worldly contingency, 
and hence which makes the republic, as I will note again in the next 
section, a more properly historical regime than the principality. It is a 
regime more open, that is, to historical becoming: “Hence it arises that 
a republic has greater life, and has more sustained good fortune, than a 
principality; for it can better accommodate itself to temporal diversity – 
through the diversity of the citizens that are in it – than can one prince. 
For a man who is accustomed to proceed in one mode never changes, 
as was said; and it must be of necessity that, when the times change in 
disconformity with his mode, he is ruined.” 93 Although Machiavelli 
will go on to give the examples of Piero Soderni and Julius II as being 
representative of the incapacity of the singular actor to reflectively alter 
his or her own mode, the fact that virtue itself is elsewhere identified 
with this ability must lead us to conclude only that Machiavelli is scep-
tical about the possibility of an actor being able to perform such an 
operation in every instant, not that individual nature is so fixed so as to 
preclude such alteration in particular cases. After all, even Cesare Bor-
gia, the paradigm of the actor capable of oscillating between performa-
tive modes for the sake of political creation, himself erred in supporting 
the elevation of Giuliano della Rovere to the papacy, not adequately 
perceiving the nature of the latter’s hostility. 94 Such a threat of misman-
agement, however, is neutralized in the republic, not because individu-
als are any more virtuous or less likely to err than a figure like Borgia, 
but because authority is diffused through such a diverse body of 
citizens. 
 What is significant about Machiavelli’s discussion in 3:9, which leads 
into my discussion in the following section, is that the necessity of 
republican openness to alteration in the face of worldly contingency is 
 93  Ibid. 
 94  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 7. 
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seen as referring not just to shifts in the content of decisions, but the 
very institutional form of the decision-making organs. If republics are 
to survive they must perpetually interrogate and modify their orders, 
as “The ruin of cities also stems from not varying the orders of republics 
with the times.” 95 This necessity is revealed two chapters later in 3:11, 
where Machiavelli once again emphasizes the significance of the tri-
bunes as an institutional means for restraining the expression of noble 
ambition. Here Machiavelli will be explicit, though, that the institu-
tional form of the tribunes is incapable of becoming fixed in a determi-
nate order that is capable of perpetually regulating the relations 
between the people and the Senate. On the contrary, like any other 
object or order, the tribunes are subject to the vicissitudes of time, and 
must therefore be open to the possibility of their own institutional alter-
ation – which includes an alteration of their relation with other institu-
tions, through for example the creation of new orders to counterpose 
them – in light of changing external circumstances. As Machiavelli 
writes, “because everything, as has been said other times, conceals 
some evil in itself that makes new accidents emerge, it is necessary to 
provide for this with new orders.” 96 Political orders must thus be struc-
tured so as to be able to accommodate a self-interrogation of the legiti-
macy of their existing form. This renovation may be achieved through 
either the internal restructuring of the order or the creation of new 
orders that enter into a relation with the existing order in such a way as 
to fundamentally redefine the latter’s mode of being. 
 In short, it is necessary to reflectively alter institutional forms in light 
of the indeterminacy of the social field. Indeed, Machiavelli goes on in 
this chapter to give one of his most significant statements on this indeter-
minacy and its root in the multiplicity of human being. In the Roman 
case, for example, Machiavelli notes how potential tribunal insolence 
came to be checked by the generation of a new mode demonstrated by 
Appius Claudius: “this was that they found always amongst themselves 
someone who was fearful, or corruptible, or a lover of the common good, 
so that they disposed him to oppose the will of those others who wanted 
to move forward some decision against the will of the Senate. This rem-
edy was a great temporizer of so much authority, and many times worked 
 95  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 3.9. 
 96  Ibid., bk. 3.11. 
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to benefit Rome.” 97 Machiavelli goes on to locate the potential for such a 
mode to succeed in the impossibility of social groups being perpetually 
homogenized, reduced to a coherent unity expressive of the same will or 
orientation. The advice is that one should always consider the single 
power of the greatest, even if in the immediate situation the many united 
powers are more dominant, and this precisely because there is nothing 
essential about this social unity. There is no means by which it is possible 
to permanently hold the many together, to perpetually impose unity on 
diversity: “any time there are many powers united against another 
power, even though all together are much more powerful than that one, 
nevertheless one ought always to expect more from that one alone, who 
is less strong, than from the many others, though very strong. For, leav-
ing aside all those things in which one alone can prevail more than many 
(which are countless), this will always occur: that [the one] will be able to, 
using a bit of industry, disunite the many, and make weak that body 
which was strong.” 98 The Senate was able to counter the power of the 
tribunes through fracturing popular identity, an identity that is always 
precarious to the extent that it is a manifestation of an always contingent 
unity of diverse and plural human beings. To the extent that the people 
are always multiple, there is no guaranteed method for keeping them 
united. 99 The democratic project, on the contrary, consists in attempting 
to think an institutional means for affirming difference in unity, which 
necessarily includes potential institutional reformation in response to the 
shifting contingency of human co-relation. 
 Machiavelli’s Innovative Republic: 
On the Self-Overcoming Form of Republican Institutions 
 Several readers of Machiavelli have pointed out the unique character of 
his preferred republican institutions such as they are detailed in the 
 Discourses : the fact that they are open to self-innovation or refinement. 100 
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My argument is that this specific form of institutional being is a reflec-
tion of Machiavelli’s perception of the universality of the desire for vir-
tuous self-expression. In the previous three sections I have attempted to 
demonstrate how the logic of  virtù developed in  The Prince re-emerges 
in the republican context. In particular, Machiavelli demonsrates how 
the republic multiplies the spaces for the expression of  virtù , how  virtù 
is associated with self-legislation, how such self-legislation is predi-
cated on the contingent openness of the being of the world, how it must 
be rational and historically embedded, and how it necessitates a perfor-
mative embodiment of a plurality of political modalities. In this section 
I will show how the realization of  virtù in the republican context, to the 
extent that virtuous action is defined in terms of creative transgression 
and value formation and that in this context the people themselves are 
the subject of such action, is achieved through the ability of democratic 
institutions to perpetually call into question their own efficacy through 
a process of self-interrogation. 
 We must recall that Machiavelli’s critique of positively defined mod-
els of the human essence – models grounded in the affirmation of deter-
minate human drives or orientations that unduly circumscribe the 
possible range of human doing and being – is inseparable from his 
affirmation of a negative essence, a specifically indeterminate human 
capacity to create the new. The creation of the human world is coexten-
sive with the creation of the human being to the extent that it is human 
beings themselves who are responsible for instituting those socializing 
objects and forces that lean on and structure their existence. For Machi-
avelli, to be human is to be both a being born of a particular social and 
cultural heritage, yet also one capable of contributing to the making, 
refinement, or transmission of this history. Machiavelli’s project is to 
think the conditions for the possibility of actualizing this latter capacity, 
an actualization that depends upon the existence of a political world 
that is understood to be neither absolutely fixed nor completely inde-
terminate or accidental. 101 Humans, in other words, are both the sub-
jects and objects of historical creation. The philosophical anthropology 
that Machiavelli develops structures his normative political theory. It is 
the Ways of Politics,” 341; Lefort,  Machiavelli in the Making , 344; John Kennedy, 
“Machiavelli and Mandeville: Prophets of Radical Contingency,”  Political Theology 
5, no. 1 (2004): 108. 
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not the case that the question of human nature is irrelevant to politics, 
or simply that human nature’s fickleness or instability refers us to noth-
ing more than the impossibility of instituting a form of regime that is 
foundationally stable and secure. 102 On the contrary, reflection on 
Machiavelli’s radical destabilization of positive essences, and his inter-
pretation of ambitious desire in terms of transgressive value formation, 
provides a means to deepen our understanding of his theorization of 
the ideal republic as a system of orders that is perpetually open to the 
possibility of its own institutional renovation or even transcendence. 
This openness is a necessity if the polity is to persist in its freedom and 
stave off ruin. 103 It is precisely because the human desire for creative 
expression is insatiable – that is, that the human is constantly redefining 
the nature of itself and its world through its self-activity – that the form 
of the political regime is never capable of becoming permanently fixed. 
Machiavelli’s republic is singular in that it is oriented toward its own 
perpetual interrogation and possible overcoming. 104 The project is to 
think a system of institutions that is capable, through harnessing the 
creative energy of the people who constitute the society, of continually 
calling itself into question, and through reinstituting itself provide a 
means for the actualization of what is taken to be a fundamental cre-
ative human desire. The republic is thus a historical regime in a way 
that the new principality – even in relation to the hereditary and eccle-
siastical principality – is not, the latter ultimately looking to stabilize 
political life through the homogenization of the social field, through 
singularly imposing an artificial unity on the fragmented elements of 
the city. 
 Whereas in  The Prince Machiavelli is making the effort to highlight 
the political actor’s perpetual need to be active in response to the shift-
ing of  fortuna , thus articulating the mode of being of a person open to 
time, in the  Discourses he turns to the question of the form of political 
society that is capable of actualizing such an active mode of being in all 
individuals. Such a form would necessitate a temporality that rejects an 
 102  For one example of the latter position see Rebhorn, “Machiavelli’s  Prince in the Epic 
Tradition,” 88. 
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ideal of political fixity, to the extent that the creation of political institu-
tions is the primary mode of expression of virtuous self-activity. That 
the historical prince, the head of an actually existing principality, is not 
particularly well suited to embodying this ideal subjectivity is sug-
gested in Machiavelli’s poem “Of Ingratitude.” Here Machiavelli not 
only highlights this particular quality of princes, but also links it to 
their hostility to temporal alteration, to their orientation toward social 
preservation as opposed to innovation:  
 Search through all the world’s shores; you will fi nd few princes to be 
grateful, if you read that which is written of them;  
 and you will see how changers of states and givers of kingdoms are 
always repaid with exile or death.  
 For when you cause a state to change, the prince you have made doubts 
that you will not take away that which you have given;  
 and he does not observe faith nor compact with you, for more powerful 
is the fear he has of you, than the obligation agreed to.  
 And this dread lasts so long, that it sees your lineage extinguished, and 
the burial of you and yours. 
 Hence you struggle often in serving, and then for your good service are 
repaid with miserable life and violent death. 105  
 Princes, then, appear as doubly unsuited to initiate a project of reinsti-
tutionalization for the sake of public benefi t, the principality not being 
a regime open to the movement of time. 
 The particular temporality of the Machiavellian republic is initially 
approached through contrasting Rome with Sparta and Venice. Machi-
avelli notes that if the former were to remain as internally peaceful and 
unified as the latter, it would have needed to arrest historical time 
through reifying the being of the polity. This reification could have been 
achieved, for example, in different ways, such as: “either not deploy the 
plebs in war, like the Venetians; or not open the way to foreigners, like 
the Spartans.” 106 The Romans, however, rejected both of these modes in 
favour of a principle of innovation, represented in this chapter in a 
 105  Machiavelli, “Dell’Ingratitudine,” in Tutte le opere, 983. On the blindness of princes 
to historical time see also Niccolò Machiavelli, “Decennale secondo,” in  Tutte le 
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 106  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” bk. 1.6. 
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dynamic expansion that, beyond merely functioning to externally redi-
rect noble desire, was characterized in terms of the ability to harness the 
productive energies of the plebs. In 2:6, furthermore, Machiavelli will 
more explicitly locate the source of Roman virtue in the willingness to 
divert from established patterns of action, to be generally oriented 
toward reflective innovation in all endeavours: “in all their actions it 
will be seen with how much prudence they deviated from the universal 
modes of others, to facilitate the way to come to a supreme great-
ness.” 107 Rome for Machiavelli is especially well suited to articulating 
the historical being of society to the extent that it is a city that does not 
attempt to cover up historical mutation through the affirmation of 
immutable constitutional laws, but rather is always open to its own 
self-transformation, grounding creative institutionalization in the play 
of forces that perpetually express themselves through the non-identity 
of desire. 
 In 1:18 Machiavelli provides perhaps his clearest statement on the 
necessity of institutional and legal reform in the face of the fluctuation 
of time. He writes that “the orders and the laws made in a republic at 
its origin, when men were good, are not afterwards to the purpose, 
when they have become bad.” 108 Temporal variability is here grounded 
in the variability of the psyche, the indeterminacy of the human mind 
allowing for the possibility of the emergence of a disjuncture between 
the structure of the polity and the circumstances of human being. The 
distinction in this chapter between laws and orders is fundamental, 
Machiavelli writing that “if the laws vary according to the accidents in 
a city, its orders never vary, or rarely: this makes new laws insufficient, 
because the orders, which are durable, corrupt them.” 109 The potential 
for renovating orders, however, is certainly not closed off. Indeed, such 
potential is significant enough that Machiavelli identifies as one of the 
seemingly few deficiencies of Roman republicanism its one-sided will-
ingness to alter law, but not the more fundamental institutional sub-
stratum represented by the concept of order. He notes that “The order 
of the state was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the tri-
bunes, of the consuls, the mode of selecting and creating the magis-
trates, and the mode of making the laws.” 110 Although as the nature of 
 107  Ibid., bk. 2.6. 
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individuals changed specific laws were varied in an effort to accommo-
date such movement, this alteration could only have so much effect: 
“by holding firm the orders of the state, which in corruption were no 
longer good, those laws that were renewed were not enough to keep 
men good; but they would have assisted much if with the innovation of 
the laws, the orders had been retransformed.” 111 Innovation must thus 
take as its object those elements that constitute the very core of the 
social order. Indeed, such institutional innovation would seem to be 
necessary if, as suggested by the key passages cited from the  Florentine 
Histories and the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs,” Machiavelli’s end is 
the increasing entrenchment of democratic life, made possible through 
the actualization of a requisite civic orientation achieved through pop-
ular political education. 
 In any case, in the context of Rome Machiavelli provides two exam-
ples of this general movement: the selection of magistrates and the cre-
ation of laws. Initially in the republic high offices were distributed 
according to a principle of self-selection, this being an appropriate 
order when virtue was sufficiently generalized such that only those 
individuals who considered themselves most adequate for the position 
put themselves forward. However, in a corrupt city lacking such a gen-
eralization, where there is no fear of public exposure and derision in the 
case of a non-suitability to the office, only the already powerful would 
seek authority, other more apt candidates not nominating themselves 
out of fear. Machiavelli identifies such corruption in this instance as the 
end result of a gradual subduing of external threats, one that produced 
a passive sense of security among the population: “This security and 
this weakness of their enemies made the Roman people, in giving the 
consulate, no more regard virtue, but favour, putting in that office those 
who best knew how to entertain men, rather than those who best knew 
how to overcome enemies. Afterwards from those who had more 
favour, they descended to giving it to those who had more power; so 
the good, through the defect in that order, remained entirely 
excluded.” 112 With respect to the creation of the laws, meanwhile, as we 
have already seen, initially the order was such that any citizen was 
empowered to propose a law to the people, and such that any citizen 
could interrogate and scrutinize this proposal publicly. Machiavelli 
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256 Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation
writes that “this order was good when the citizens were good; because it 
was always good that everyone who intends a benefit for the public can 
propose it; and it is good that everyone can speak their opinion on it, so 
that the people, having heard everyone, could then choose the best.” 113 
When citizens are corrupt, however, only the powerful propose laws, and 
only for the sake of their own private advantage. No citizen, meanwhile, 
would dare speak against such a process of privatization out of fear of 
retribution at the hands of the powerful. As a consequence of this dynamic 
“the people came to be deceived or forced to decide its ruin.” 114 
 The continuing reproduction of the freedom of Rome would have 
necessitated the latter’s perpetual self-alteration of its orders: “It was 
necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to in its corruption maintain itself 
free, that, just as in the course of its life it made new laws, it should have 
made new orders.” 115 The fundamental principle is that unique social-
historical circumstances demand unique modes and orders: “for one 
ought to order different orders and modes of life in a bad subject than 
in a good; nor can there be a similar form for an entirely different mat-
ter.” 116 What this principle closes off in advance is the thought of the 
potential for the creation of any fixed system of institutions or terminal 
political form that is capable of stabilizing the social being of the city 
and indefinitely regulating human affairs. Such an impossibility is 
noted by Machiavelli in several places and in various contexts through-
out the  Discourses . In 3:17, for example, the impossibility is rooted spe-
cifically in the invariability of human desire, as revealed through the 
example of Claudius Nero. Claudius took foolish and rash action in a 
confrontation with the Carthaginians, believing that if he succeeded his 
honour would be restored, and if he failed the Roman people would be 
appropriately punished for the injustice that Claudius thought was 
perpetrated against him. On Machiavelli’s account Claudius’s passion 
interrupted his capacity for prudent decision making, overwhelming 
the rational understanding of the necessity to moderate desire for the 
sake of life in common. It is the possibility for the indeterminate expres-
sion and redirection of human desire that necessitates the perpetual 
renegotiation of those institutions necessary to channel it. Machiavelli 
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thus writes, “when these passions of such offences can do so much in a 
Roman citizen, and in those times when Rome was still uncorrupt, one 
ought to think of how much they can do in a citizen of another city that 
was not made as was [Rome] then. And because in similar disorders 
that arise in republics one cannot give a sure remedy, it follows that it is 
 impossible to order a perpetual republic , because its ruin is caused through 
a thousand unexpected ways.” 117 
 Such an image of the perpetual republic is counterposed with that of 
the historical republic, the republic that affirms becoming through its 
openness to institutional innovation. In 1:49 Machiavelli claims that cit-
ies with free beginnings are capable of preserving themselves only 
through such openness, it being impossible to order a city such that all 
of the laws providing for freedom are given in advance. Continual 
refinement of the institutional form of the republic is needed as acci-
dents arise. In the case of Rome, “always in managing that city new 
necessities were being discovered, and it was necessary to create new 
orders: such happened when they created the censors, which were one 
of those provisions that helped keep Rome free, that time that it lived in 
freedom.” 118 What is perhaps suggested here by the juxtaposition of the 
notions of freedom and self-alteration, if not made explicit, is the extent 
to which the latter is not simply the means for the preservation of the 
latter, but the very mode through which the latter is actualized. 
 If human freedom lies in the expression of  virtù , which as we have 
seen refers us to a creative activity of giving form, the republic’s open-
ness to its own alteration via popular reinstitution represents a general-
ization of this expression at the collective level. Recognizing this fact 
allows us to reconsider the place of  The Prince in relation to the  Dis-
courses , according to the model of relation that I have proposed in this 
study. We may note again the specificity of the Machiavellian republic, 
the latter being distinguished from the principality in 1:58. Here Machi-
avelli notes that innovation in a popular republic is much more dynamic 
than in a principality, and thus more comprehensively affirms creation: 
“one sees, beyond this, that cities where the people are princes make 
extreme gains in a very brief time, and much greater than those that 
have always been under a prince.” 119 There is not necessarily a 
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contradiction in this chapter between the recognition of the intensity of 
popular innovation in a republic and the claim that whereas princes 
excel at creating initial laws and orders, people excel at maintaining 
them. Regarding the latter Machiavelli writes, “if princes are superior 
to peoples in ordering laws, forming civil existences, ordering new stat-
utes and orders, peoples are so much superior in maintaining ordered 
things that they attain, without doubt, the glory of those who order.” 120 
This is because maintenance in the republic is a form of creation, it 
demanding the perpetual renovation of existing laws and orders in 
response to temporal variability. It is because of the republican open-
ness to popular innovation, to the generalized expression of  virtù , rep-
resented in the continual interrogation of existing institutional forms, 
“that those governments of peoples are better than those of princes.” 121 
 The freedom of the republic is thus manifested in the multiplication 
of creation, which is realized through the popular reinstitutionalization 
of the city. The  Discourses demonstrates the extent to which the form of 
creative subjectivity articulated in  The Prince is capable of being given a 
popular actualization through democratic activity. Hence the signifi-
cance of a statement made by Machiavelli in  Discourses 1:60, where he 
notes approvingly that Roman magistrates distributed according to the 
will of the plebs did not give “regard to age or to blood,” but rather 
endeavoured always “to find virtue, whether it was in the young or in 
the old.” 122 This is again one manifestation of the republic’s superiority 
with respect to innovation, it being better equipped than the principal-
ity to harness the active vitality of youth: “when a young person is of so 
much virtue that he makes himself known in some notable thing, it 
would be a very injurious thing if the city could not then affirm it, and 
if it had to wait until that vigour of spirit and that readiness, which it 
could have affirmed at that time, had aged with him.” 123 The republic is 
thus the regime of the young, which is to say, the regime of the bold and 
the innovative. In other words, it is the regime that is most appropriate 
to harness the particular political subjectivity detailed in  The Prince , 
where Machiavelli famously identifies the capacity to productively 
engage with fortune with the spirit of youth, fortune being “the friend 
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of the young, because they are less cautious, more aggressive, and com-
mand it with more audacity.” 124 
 The Return to Beginnings and 
the Potential for Democratic Innovation 
 We can conclude our discussion of the self-overcoming form of repub-
lican institutions through reading within its context one of the most 
commented upon concepts in Machiavelli’s oeuvre: that of the republi-
can return to beginnings, which is most systematically developed in 
 Discourses 3:1. For a long time the traditional way of interpreting Machi-
avelli’s theorization of the return to beginnings as a mode for the reju-
venation of the spirit of the republic was to assimilate it to a cyclical or 
self-identical philosophy of history that emphasized the historical 
recurrence that results from the invariability of human doing and being. 
Such a reading, though, is certainly inconsistent with the repeated 
emphasis placed on the new and on the diversity of forms and modes 
of human existence. On the contrary, what we ultimately see is that the 
account of the return to beginnings is in no way indicative of a conser-
vative belief in the necessity of a literal reproduction of the existent, but 
rather one element of Machiavelli’s stress on creativity and innovation. 
This is because what returns in this movement is nothing but creative 
virtue itself. The return to beginnings is thus an essential expression of 
Machiavelli’s revolutionary emphasis on the human potential to upset 
the order of things and reinstitute the political community. 125 
 Machiavelli begins 3:1 by once again calling attention to the fleeting-
ness of the objects of the temporal world, writing that “It is a very true 
 124  Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” chap. 25. 
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thing, that all the things of the world have a limit to their life.” 126 The 
fact of historical flux necessitates human intervention in the order of 
things, objects having to be purposefully altered if their being is to be 
preserved through time. The condition of the object’s being, in other 
words, must be adapted to the perpetually changing condition of the 
being of the world. In this chapter Machiavelli is concerned with outlin-
ing the form of activity which is capable of altering the republican polit-
ical object, which is just as susceptible to the vicissitudes of history as 
any other. In the case of republics, preservation through alteration 
depends upon a return to beginnings: “And because I am speaking of 
mixed bodies, such as republics and sects, I say that those alterations 
are healthy that take them back to their beginnings. And therefore those 
are better ordered, and have a longer life, that by means of their orders 
can frequently renew themselves, or that, by some accident external to 
that order come to said renewal. And it is a thing clearer than light that, 
if not renewing themselves, these bodies do not last.” 127 This explicitly 
self-renewal through a return to beginnings is seen as necessarily 
embodying a certain intrinsic virtue: “For all beginnings of sects, and of 
republics and of kingdoms, must have some internal goodness, by 
means of which they recapture their first reputation and their first 
growth.” 128 The question then becomes, what is this internal goodness in 
beginnings? Clearly it cannot simply be associated with the reproduction 
of a stable or fixed pattern or order, for we know that the invariability of 
historical movement forecloses the possibility of the institution across 
time of identical forms. The answer can only lie in the very capacity that 
makes possible the initiation of the process of beginning itself: to return 
to the beginning is to return to, to reactivate, the specifically human 
capacity for creation. To affirm the return to beginnings is to affirm, not a 
specific organization of things, but the uniquely human ability to begin. 129 
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 Now, as suggested by the quotation above, this return can be stimu-
lated through either “extrinsic accident or intrinsic prudence.” 130 
Extrinsic accidents, as in for example the loss of Rome to the French, 
produce a political crisis significant enough to starkly reveal the cor-
ruption at the heart of the body politic, the neglect of those previously 
virtuous institutions that provided the foundation for a civil and free 
way of life. The external crisis is thus a manifestation of internal degen-
eracy so profound as to stimulate a will to reform: “This extrinsic beat-
ing thus came, so that all the orders of that city might be revived, and it 
might be shown to the people that it was not only necessary to maintain 
religion and justice, but also to esteem its good citizens, and to take 
more account of their virtue than of those conveniences that it appeared 
to them that they were missing through their works.” 131 Intrinsically 
stimulated renewal, however, does not refer us to a fundamental crisis 
of the political order, but rather the civic recognition of the perpetual 
need to refine institutional life in the face of contingent temporality. 
This renewal, furthermore, can take one of two forms: it “must stem 
either from a law, which often examines the account of the men who are 
in that body; or indeed by a good man who is born among them, who 
with his examples and with his virtuous works produces the same 
effect as the order.” 132 
 Machiavelli is here suggesting that there are two modes for institu-
tional alteration aimed at the preservation of the social order. One is a 
princely type of reordering in which a single great individual who, in 
possession of a unique skill or intelligence and acting seemingly inde-
pendently of institutional authority, assumes responsibility for altering 
orders so as to bring them into line with the times. The second, how-
ever, is a form of alteration that is mediated precisely through institu-
tional authority, through existing orders that are somehow or other 
structured such that they are capable of providing a ground for their 
own self-interrogation. According to this second model, the creative 
source for the renewal of the polity is to be located in the motion of 
existing laws and institutions themselves, as they, as Alfredo Bonadeo 
observes, are “so constituted that a constant and self-generating reno-
vation occurs.” 133 Contrary to most examples in Book One, in which 
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renewal is stimulated through the shock of an event that reveals the 
necessity of constitutional reform, in Book Three reform measures are 
primarily preventive in nature, demonstrating the degree to which the 
polity is capable of self-correcting without going through a process of 
total corruption. 134 Hence Machiavelli will call attention to several 
instances in which a tendency to institutional self-innovation can be 
perceived in the Roman case, one such being the tribunes of the plebs, 
but also the censors and “all the other laws that were against the ambi-
tion and the insolence of men.” 135 
 Even here, however, we see a manifestation of that tension within 
Machiavelli’s thought, between the potential for democratic self-
actualization and the necessity of single-person elite foundation and 
renovation, this latter moment appearing in the form of a guiding hand 
that takes leading responsibility for the renewal. Machiavelli writes that 
“such orders have need of being made to live through the virtue of one 
citizen, who spiritedly conduces to execute them against the power of 
those who transgress them.” 136 Democratic self-alteration is thus appar-
ently subsumed by a princely type of reordering, here manifested 
through purging from the city those insolent elements that would 
threaten to violate civic norms. Such executions should be carried out no 
less than every ten years, “for, after this time, men begin to vary in their 
customs and to transgress the laws.” 137 The return to beginnings thus 
becomes a return to the origin of foundation, a reinstallation in the poten-
tially insolent of the original fear that accompanied the institution of 
republican life. It is the  grandi , in other words, who must be made to fear 
the authority of the collectivity. Following Florentine practice, Machia-
velli calls “recapturing the state, putting that terror and that fear in men 
that had been put there in taking it, since they had at that time beaten 
down those who had, according to that mode of living, worked for evil. 
But as the memory of that beating is extinguished, men have the audacity 
to test new ways of asserting evil; and so it is necessary to provide for 
this, returning [the state] back toward its beginnings.” 138 
 The overall movement of the chapter at this point can be summed up 
through the isolation of the following moments: 1) political orders 
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become no longer appropriate for the times; 2) political corruption sets 
in as a consequence; 3) exploiting this corruption, certain insolent indi-
viduals attempt to privately appropriate power to advance their par-
ticular interest; 4) a purging of this insolence occurs through a reform of 
institutions of public accusation; 5) such reform reproduces the repub-
lic’s initial generation of fear and terror among the  grandi . Although the 
return to beginnings is here associated with a return to the popular 
power of the people and the execution of those who attempt to pri-
vately appropriate authority for themselves or their faction, there are 
two ambiguities in the narrative from a democratic perspective. The 
first is that which we have encountered numerous times throughout 
the study: the fact that republican institutionalization is realized not 
through the self-activity of the people, but through the action of a single 
princely individual who reforms in the name of the common good. The 
second is the persistence of inequality, as represented in the persever-
ance of a will to domination. The  grandi continues to exist as an orga-
nized class, as that which is eliminated through the return to beginnings 
is not the organized humour to oppress, but rather just particular indi-
viduals who are seen as representative of this will, and whose execu-
tion is intended to serve as a symbolic communication to the  grandi 
regarding the necessity of civil obedience. 
 These two ambiguities are not unrelated to each other. That the vio-
lence potentially accompanying the return to beginnings is specifically 
a violence against social elites – grandees who would attempt to pri-
vately appropriate surplus political authority for themselves at the 
expense of the people – is confirmed in 3:22. If it is possible, as I sug-
gested it is, that Machiavelli is willing to think the non-existence of the 
 grandi as a whole, then the necessity of elite initiated violence as a 
response to social corruption is eliminated, and noble insolence is thus 
no longer able to short-circuit the process of renovation. Institutional 
alteration in the face of worldly temporality can then proceed accord-
ing to the internal logic of the political orders, the people democrati-
cally recreating these orders on the basis of their own rational 
understanding of the historical situation. If Machiavelli’s original dis-
tinction between a prudent return to beginnings mediated by individu-
als versus one by institutions is collapsed through his affirmation of the 
necessity of singular reordering, this is as a consequence of his percep-
tion of the reality of the continuing existence of a  grandi with a humour 
to oppress. A genuinely democratic regime  requires not only the type 
of major institutional overhaul every ten years or so as suggested above, 
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but a perpetual openness to self-alteration, a self-alteration that is real-
ized through the everday collective activity of a participatory people. 
 Machiavelli closes chapter 3:1 by in fact returning to the distinction 
between two conceptually distinct forms of renewal, that generated by 
individuals who are external to political orders, and that internally 
mediated by political orders themselves: “one concludes, therefore, 
that there is not a thing more necessary in a common life, whether it is 
a sect or a kingdom or a republic, than to restore it to that reputation 
that it had at its beginning, and to strive that it be either good orders or 
good men that make this effect, and not to have it be made by an extrin-
sic force.” 139 And Machiavelli throughout the  Discourses , in fact, pro-
vides several examples of this institutional self-renewal, a self-renewal 
that can be thought of as a return to beginnings – to the extent that it is 
a concrete expression of the creativity of political foundation – despite 
it not being accompanied by the seeming terror and violence that 
Machiavelli associates with extraordinary or extra-institutional reform 
by individuals. 140 The possibility of such non-violent renewal is notably 
expressed, for example, in 3:7, where he writes: “One will perhaps 
doubt from whence it arises that of many changes that are made from 
free life to tyrannical, and to the contrary, some are made with blood, 
some without; for, as one understands through the histories, in similar 
variations sometimes countless men have died, sometimes no one is 
injured.” 141 In fact, when violence is used as a technique for instituting 
the new regime, it will always generate additional violence later in time 
when crises arise and those who were injured previously attempt to 
avenge themselves. Machiavelli goes on to suggest that the more demo-
cratic the foundation, the greater the possibility for avoiding this cycle 
of violent retribution. This is because there is a lack of aggrieved indi-
viduals in instances in which regimes are founded through “common 
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consent,” that is, through a universal act of popular constitution. 142 In 
the final instance the return to beginnings, then, can be read as one key 
manifestation of Machiavelli’s recognition of the necessity of perpetual 
institutional innovation, this innovation being demanded by the fact of 
worldly contingency and temporal flux, and being representative of the 
essential human desire for creative expression. This necessity is 
summed up most notably and with special clarity in the title of the con-
cluding chapter to the text, which reads in part, “A republic, if one 
wishes to maintain it free, has each day need of new acts of foresight.” 
Machiavelli here affirms that accidents arise in cities “every day,” and 
that the maintenance of polities requires that these be corrected through 
specific modes and reorderings. 143 
 Factional Activity and the Depoliticization of Republican Life 
 What I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous two sections, 
and which I believe is obscured by most radical democratic readers of 
Machiavelli, is the role of the institution as essential to democratic self-
expression. It is the institution, albeit the institution as conceived in a 
very specific way, that productively expels human ambition, sublimat-
ing desire in non-antagonistic (which is not to say non-agonistic) and 
public ways. 144 This essentiality seems to be explicitly confirmed in 
various passages within the  Discourses and the  Florentine Histories in 
which Machiavelli contrasts the form of institutional life in republican 
Rome with that in contemporary Florence. It must be stressed, how-
ever, that Machiavelli’s critique of Florence is certainly not one-sided, 
but grounded in a specific philosophical anthropology and theory of 
political change that recognizes the potential for the transformation 
and improvement of the city. 145 Such a redemptive critique is explicitly 
contrasted by Machiavelli with that of Dante, “who in every part 
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showed himself to be, through his genius, through his teaching, and 
through his judgment, an excellent man, except where he had to rea-
son about his homeland, which, outside of all humanity and philo-
sophical foundation, he persecuted with every type of injury. And he 
was not able to do other than defame it, accuse it of every vice, damn 
its people, speak badly of its customs and of its laws; and this he did 
not only in a part of his Cantica, but all of it, and differently and in 
diverse modes.” 146 
 What Florence was seen by Machiavelli to lack was a regime of 
institutionalization capable of mediating the diversity of desire that 
characterizes life in an internally divided city. The necessity of 
expressing human energy, and in particular plebeian energy, through 
institutional forms is articulated early in the  Discourses , and is nota-
bly expressed in Machiavelli’s account of the opposition of the peo-
ple to Coriolanus. Although, upon learning of Coriolanus’s attempt 
to persuade the Senate to withhold provisions as a stratagem for 
reversing plebeian political gains in the city, the people initially in 
their indignation confronted him upon his exit from the Senate with 
the threat of extra-legal violence, he was ultimately legally appre-
hended in order to be put before the tribunes. Tribunal prosecution 
would have the effect not only of releasing the energy of the people, 
but also of doing so in a controlled and mediated form, through its 
directed channelling via a publicly recognized order. Indiscriminate 
and potentially unlimited modes of private retribution, on the other 
hand, would have the effect of multiplying offence and generalizing 
illegality. Machiavelli thus concludes that in considering this epi-
sode “one notes that which was said above, how it is useful and 
necessary that republics, with their laws, give outlets to vent the 
anger that the generality conceives against one citizen: for when 
these ordinary modes are not there, one resorts to extraordinary 
ones; and without doubt, the latter produce much worse effects than 
the former.” 147 Little disorder results in the city when insolent citi-
zens are constrained via ordinary modes, for there is no necessity for 
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the intervention of private or foreign forces, “which are those that 
ruin the free way of life.” 148 
 Unlike private forces, for example, public ones have determinable 
limits that are generally known and acknowledged as legitimate, if not 
seen as beyond question and scrutiny, ensuring that sanctions and pun-
ishments do not multiply in a cycle of retribution. Indeed, in this chap-
ter Machiavelli notes that much harm has been done in modern Florence 
precisely as a result of the lack of those institutions that are capable of 
mediating popular desire and allowing the people to vent in ordinary 
as opposed to extraordinary ways. Given as an example of such harm 
is the case of Francesco Valori, who after consolidating authority in the 
city increasingly offended against the people through violating civic 
modes. Such violation was undertaken reflectively and as a conse-
quence of his perception of the lack of ordinary modes for accusation. 
Those who would attempt to resist him had no choice but to develop 
extraordinary strategies, which Valori guarded against through the 
recruitment of partisans. Conflict was reduced to the confrontation of 
private forces, and as a consequence there resulted a generalization of 
violence, harm ultimately coming to many. 149 Contrary to this and 
many other examples in Florence, then, “these modes were in Rome so 
well ordered that, in many dissensions of the plebs and the Senate, 
never did either the Senate or the plebs or any particular citizen design 
to make use of external forces; for, having the remedy at home, to go 
outside for it was not necessitated.” 150 
 In the subsequent chapter the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary modes of expulsion is more clearly mapped onto a dis-
tinction between public and private. Although both public and private 
action refer to the same economy of desire, they differ in their relation 
to the law, in the fact or non-fact of institutionalization. Specifically, 
public institutions function to give a legitimate expression to the inevi-
table discord that arises as a necessary consequence of social division, 
of a society’s internal differentiation of desire. The distinction between 
the concepts of accusation and calumny is one of the most significant 
manifestations of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
modes of action. In short, whereas accusations are public, calumnies 
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are private: “Men are accused to magistrates, to peoples, to councils; 
they are calumniated in the piazzas and in the loggias.” 151 The problem 
with calumnies is their extra-legal form, no witnesses or corroboration 
being a prerequisite for the determination of guilt, such that every indi-
vidual is capable of being calumniated by anyone else without discre-
tion. On the contrary, “not [everyone] can be accused, accusations 
having the need of real evidence and circumstances that show the truth 
of the accusation.” 152 Again, on this subject Rome is contrasted with 
Florence, the lack of orders allowing for legal forms of accusations lead-
ing to a multitude of calumnies in the latter. In Florence citizens would 
slander others indiscriminately and for the sake of private ambition, 
this further generating and intensifying existing hatreds, divisions, and 
sects. Indeed, “if there had been in Florence orders for accusing citi-
zens, and punishing calumniators, the endless scandals that followed 
would not have followed; for those citizens, whether they were con-
victed or absolved, would not have been able to harm the city, and 
much fewer would have been accused than were calumniated.” 153 
Machiavelli concludes that the most effective method for avoiding cal-
umnies is in fact to increase the number of accusational outlets, and that 
“an orderer of a republic ought to order that one can in it accuse every 
citizen, without any fear or without any respect; and this being done, 
and well observed, he ought to harshly punish calumniators.” 154 
 It is in the  Florentine Histories , of course, that Machiavelli most sys-
tematically distinguishes between modes of ordinary and extraordi-
nary political expression on the basis of this expression’s relation or 
non-relation to the fact of institutionalization. This distinction accounts 
for the difference between the portrayals of conflictual civic practice in 
the  Histories and the  Discourses . 155 In the preface to the  Histories 
 151  Ibid., bk. 1.8. 
 152  Ibid. 
 153  Ibid. 
 154  Ibid. 
 155  Such is noted by many readers. On the differing forms of confl ictual practice in 
these texts see, for example, Gisela Bock, “Civil Discord in Machiavelli’s  Istorie 
Fiorentine ,” in  Machiavelli and Republicanism , ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and 
Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 181–201; Kent M. 
Brudney, “Machiavelli on Social Class and Class Confl ict,”  Political Theory 12, no. 
4 (1984): 507–19; Anna Maria Cabrini, “Machiavelli’s  Florentine Histories ,” in  The 
Cambrige Companion to Machiavelli , ed. John M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 128–43; Nicolai Rubenstein, “Machiavelli and the World of 
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Machiavelli is adamant that the form of social division – the particular 
mode of appearance of human difference – that was most predominant 
in Florence must be qualitatively differentiated from that which was 
most predominant in Rome. As opposed to the productive division 
between noble and pleb, a division incorporating into the positive 
orders of the city both groups, in Florence one observes an unproduc-
tive multiplicity of divisions internal to these social groups, the victori-
ous parties splintering among themselves after the establishment of 
their superiority relative to the others: “In Florence first the nobles were 
divided among themselves, then the nobles and the people, and finally 
the people and the plebs; and many times it occurred that one of these 
parts, remaining superior, divided into two.” 156 This perpetual multi-
plication of division through the internal fragmentation of the social 
groups results from the fact that each of the latter posits itself in a rela-
tion of antagonism with the other groups, seeking to monopolize politi-
cal right for itself. In this way any movement toward the universalization 
of political participation is blocked. Factional division can never be 
eliminated in a city with partisans, to the extent that the latter act only 
for an individual good that is relationally articulated: when one oppo-
nent is defeated the victorious party will necessarily itself be divided as 
its members attempt to further their private advantage relative to their 
peers. 157 In the final instance it is impossible for civic-minded citizens to 
flourish in a city that is divided into factions, where social difference 
becomes ossified into antagonistic poles that preclude mutual under-
standing and co-operation: “If it is a republic that governs it, there is no 
finer mode to make your citizens evil and to make your city divided, 
than to have a divided city to govern; for each part searches to obtain 
favours, and each makes friends through various corruptions. So then 
arise two very great inconveniences; the one, that you never make them 
your friends through being able to govern them well, the government 
varying often, now with one, now with the other humour; the other, 
that such concern with parties of necessity divides your republic.” 158 
Florentine Politics,” in  Studies on Machiavelli , ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Firenze: G.C. 
Sansoni, 1979), 3–28; Marco Geuna, “Machiavelli ed il ruolo dei confl itti nella vita 
politica,” in  Confl itti , ed. Alessandro Arienzo and Dario Caruso (Napoli: Libreria 
Dante & Descartes, 2005), 19–57. 
 156  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. proem. 
 157  Ibid., bk. 7.1. 
 158  Machiavelli, “Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,” 3.27. 
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 The degeneracy of the Florentine regime lay in the fact that the actu-
alization of ambitious desire on the part of some was seen to be exclu-
sive of the actualization of it with respect to others. Particular good, in 
other words, was not perceived to be a constitutive element of a public 
good of which other particular goods were essential parts. To the extent 
that there did not exist a means for a generalized venting of desire, 
human ambition, precisely because grounded in a psychic desire to be 
which cannot be eradicated, was necessarily desublimated. 159 Hence 
the various private and direct modes of satisfaction that Machiavelli 
exhaustively details throughout the text. Such activity is differentiated 
from that detailed in the  Discourses with respect to its object and its 
mode. First, the object of the activity is an invidious private good whose 
satisfaction is dependent upon closing off the potential for others’ satis-
faction. This fact is articulated by an anonymous citizen in the  Histories , 
who identifies participation in factional parties with the quest for the 
actualization of a private ambition that is always realized at the expense 
of someone else, not to the degree that the other parties are incapable of 
achieving a mutual and identical satisfaction (impossible given the 
always divided nature of the city), but to the degree that the other par-
ties are not even recognized as having a legitimate right to pursue their 
satisfaction through participation in civic modes: “For the prize they 
desire from victory is, not the glory of having liberated the city, but the 
satisfaction of having overcome the other, and of having usurped the 
principality. Where carried out, there is nothing so unjust, so cruel or 
avaricious, that they do not dare to do it. Hence they make orders and 
laws, not for the public, but for their own benefit; hence wars, peaces, 
friendships are decided not for the common glory, but for the satisfac-
tion of the few.” 160 
 Second, the identification of personal utility with factionalism refers 
us to the form of the activity, which is associated with partisanship, 
private modes being the appropriate method for the acquisition of pri-
vate objects: “citizens in cities acquire reputation in two modes: through 
 159  On such a form of expression as a necessary consequence of the inability of energy 
to be legitimately vented see, for example, Wood, “The Value of Asocial  Sociability,” 
7; Honig,  Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics , 71. On the concept of 
desublimation more generally see Herbert Marcuse,  One-Dimensional Man: Studies 
in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 74–9. 
 160  Machiavelli, “Istorie fi orentine,” bk. 3.5. 
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public ways or through private modes. Publicly they acquire by win-
ning a battle, acquiring a town, carrying out a legation with solicitude 
and with prudence, advising the republic wisely and happily; through 
private modes they acquire by benefiting this or that citizen, defending 
them from the magistrates, helping them with money, getting them 
unmerited honours, and gratifying the plebs with games and public 
gifts.” 161 Although it is impossible to eliminate social difference and 
even “very great hatreds” given the divided nature of the city, which is 
ontologically rooted in the diversity and multiplicity of human psyche, 
such difference is not destructive of the civil order when human ambi-
tion is prevented from receiving a direct expression via partisan activ-
ity: rather, “they work to benefit it, because it is necessary to overcome 
their obstacles for them to attempt to exalt [the republic] and observe 
each other particularly, so that civil limits are not transgressed.” 162 
 The key political question is not how to eliminate conflict, but rather 
how it is to be expressed, specifically, whether it will be legitimately 
expressed ordinarily through public modes, or illegitimately expressed 
extraordinarily through private ones. The failure to appreciate the dis-
tinction between these two general modes of ambitious expression is 
what produces that confusion marked by the conceptual collapsing of 
the categories of freedom and licence. Machiavelli locates the gap 
between these notions in the willingness or unwillingness on the part 
of social actors to undertake a project of self-limitation on the basis of 
their consideration of the good and desire of others. Genuine freedom 
depends upon obedience to institutional orders that have been collec-
tively generated, Machiavelli affirming autonomy in the etymological 
sense as the self-generation of and obedience to one’s own law. 163 
Hence, for example, in  Discourses 2:27 he stresses the extent to which 
individuals must understand the necessity and the means to autono-
mously place limits on their desires and on actions looking toward 
actualizing these desires: “men make this error, who do not know how 
to put limits on their hopes; and by relying on these, without otherwise 
measuring themselves, they are ruined.” 164 The range of human action 
 161  Ibid., bk. 7.1. 
 162  Ibid. 
 163  This has been noted by Erica Benner, who in her reading of Machiavelli’s ethics of 
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is clearly not limited only by the range of human desire. In 3:47 the 
need for such autonomous self-limitation is again affirmed, Machia-
velli maintaining that civically minded citizens must not allow certain 
of their particular passions to interfere with publics modes, being will-
ing instead to subordinate consideration of their private injuries for the 
sake of the good of the city. 165 Such a conception is entirely opposite to 
the so-called and false freedom that one sees in licentious republics, 
which are marked by the complete absence of internal limitation. 166 
Hence, “Cities, and chiefly those not well ordered that are administered 
under the name of republic, often change their governments and states, 
not between freedom and servitude, as many believe, but between ser-
vitude and licence.” 167 In the latter instance the language of freedom is 
exploited by those who possess the means to extract most private ben-
efit from licentious behaviour, the  grandi playing on that popular desire 
for liberty that Machiavelli, again in the  Histories , maintains can never 
be effaced, even when individuals lack any past experience of the con-
ditions of freedom. Wanting “to be subject to neither the laws nor to 
men,” 168 social elites perpetuate the myth that freedom is licence, thus 
seeking to legitimate a condition in which their ambition can be directly 
expressed through the utilization of techniques of violence. 
 As noted by several readers, the emergence of factional activity and 
the generalization of extraordinary modes of action constitute a process 
of privatization of the political, the expulsion of ambition being 
detached from public projects and offices, expressed instead in the ego-
istic quest for personal gain and profit. 169 The political is defined in 
terms of the popular sublimation of human ambition through public 
 165  Ibid., bk. 3.47. 
 166  We are thus justifi ed in being sceptical that Florence, to the extent that it does not 
look to the generalization of participation, may even be classifi ed as a republic. See, 
for example, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “On Machiavelli, as an Author, and Passages 
from His Writings,” trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner,  Philosophy 
Today 60, no. 3 (2016): 767; Nicolai Rubenstein, “Machiavelli and Florentine 
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Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3; 
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 169  On political corruption and privatization see Shumer, “Machiavelli: Republican 
Politics and Its Corruption,” 9; Pitkin,  Fortune Is a Woman , 321; Najemy, “Society, 
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modes and orders, or the institutional mediation of desire. The linking 
of factional activity is then associated with depoliticization, as is 
revealed with special clarity in the “Discourse on Florentine Affairs.” 
Here the lack of institutional spaces allowing the people to share in 
government is identified as a fundamental perversion of republican 
life, one that leads to “countless disorders.” 170 Such could be seen in the 
failed attempt of Maso degli Albizzi to order a republic governed by 
aristocrats. On the one hand, such a government had no institutional 
means to restrain and check the domineering ambition of the nobles, 
which was consolidated through the creation of factional parties: “there 
was not established a dread in the grandees so that they could not make 
sects, which are the ruin of a state.” 171 On the other hand, faction was 
additionally encouraged to the extent that “private men” were often 
granted prominent roles in public deliberations, there emerging as a 
result a widespread drive toward the gain of private status as a means 
to acquiring authority. Such “maintained the reputation of private men, 
and removed it from public ones, and it took away authority and repu-
tation from the magistrates: something that is contrary to every civil 
order.” 172 Far from constituting an obstacle to the expression of human 
desire through fixing the being of the city and individual places and 
functions within it, the institution is that medium through which the 
universal ambitious desire that all individuals possess is channelled. As 
the case of Florence illustrates, no political or civil way of life is thus 
possible when cities fail to provide such media. 
•  
 If the institution is to perform its role in expressing human desire, which 
we recall is a negative desire for creative value formation, than it must 
be an institution of a very particular kind. Far from reifying the insti-
tutional form of the polity and neutralizing individual self-expression, 
Machiavelli’s orders affirm the creative potential through being perpet-
ually open to their own interrogation and self-alteration, functioning as 
modes for the expulsion or venting of human ambition. Although Ma-
chiavelli often uses the language of necessity in describing institutional 
 170  Machiavelli, “Discursus fl orentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medi-
ces,” in  Tutte le opere , 24. 
 171  Ibid. 
 172  Ibid. 
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innovation, we must not be misled into interpreting the latter in terms 
of a merely strategic technique for countering worldly contingency. 
The impossibility of the republic ever coming to rest in a fixed terminal 
form is grounded in the non-determination of being, a fact that is often 
pointed out. My argument, however, is that there is a further norma-
tive dimension to Machiavelli’s positing of the openness of republican 
institutional orders. Not only does such openness allow for swift ac-
commodation to objective changes caused by temporal flux, but it also 
provides an outlet for the expulsion of that essential human desire for 
creative expression that is revealed through the concept of ambition. 
The potentially self-overcoming republic can thus be read as that form 
of political regime that is capable of providing media for the actualiza-
tion of the negative human essence as creative becoming. One’s social 
context certainly leans on, yet does not determine, one’s being. What 
the existence of ambition speaks to is the specifically human capacity 
to self-generate the conditions of its existence. The necessity of vary-
ing the laws and orders of the polity in order to stay in accord with 
the times transcends the realm of mere instrumental consideration and 
assumes a new ethical content in light of what Machiavelli takes to be 
the essentiality of human ambition and the desire for innovation and 
novelty. Machiavelli defends democratic participatory modes not only 
because they most effectively engage with the diversity of situations, 
but more importantly, because they allow for the actualization of an in-
trinsic human potential shared by all. Democracy is ethically grounded 
in the recognition of the essentiality of creative desire, and the recogni-
tion of the equal capacity of all to virtuously express this desire through 
political activity. 
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